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with reference to that alliance, we were necessarily in son degree strong in her strengtli, and safe in her security; v should therefore be precluded from taking those steps whi< might restore tranquillity, and be for the general interest 1 Europe; which might preserve the value of that defense system we had formed, by preventing an important injury 1 our ally; and which might be ablolutely necessary for 01 eventual protection. We should have been forming treati; upon curious principles indeed, if the effect and operation c them were to place us in a snuch worse situation than vv should have been, if no such treaties bad existed : if we hai renounced the means of guarding and averting evils si on ourselves, and abandoned all right of adopting such measures as would have flowed from clear and rational policy alone, without any continental connections whatever. What was the principle of our interference in the internal disputes of Holland? Were we under any fœderal necessity of becoming parties to altercations respecting its municipal Government? Under what treaty had we guarantied a specific mode of civil establishment in that countrv? Upon what point of honour did we feel ourselves called upon to decide between two parties in the State, upon a question of civil right and authority? or to what imputation of mala fides should we have been subject, if we had remained totally neuter and inactiye? In fact, we were under no such fœderal necessity; we were not guarantees to such effect; we were not bound in honour to interfere; we were liable to no such reproach: but we consulted our own interest as a nation; we looked to the salvation of our own political importance in the scale os Europe, and successfully resisted that ascendancy which France was labouring toestablisti, and must have produced its destruction. Mr. Pybus said, he had not the absurd vanity to affect having received from his right honourable friend any communication upon this subject; for none could be made, without a Criminal violation of bis duty to his Sovereign, and a manifest tendency, either at the present crisis, or by example, to hurt the interest of bis country. But Mr. Pybus thought that the posture of affairs in the North, and the formidable 1 success of the Russian arms, afforded in themselves quite information enough to justify the belief, that this country was actuated by the fame spirit, and had interfered upon the same grounds of policy, as were the basis of her conduct in Holland, without feeling herself under any obligation to do so, from an article of any existing treaty. It was the avowed opinion of the most distinguished Statesmen on both sides of the House, that Great Britain was deeply interested in the situation of political affairs on the Continent, and that her exertions were never better and more judiciously employed

than

tina in preserving the balance of power in Europe. An honoraMe gentleman had said, that considering the Turkish <kes.ons as being of any weight in the Icale, was an idea ^erher new and unprecedented Without enquiring miacftijinto the correctness of such an assertion, though he feed the honourable gentleman would ri.id, upon examic:ion into the politics of France, and the history of the Tcrkifli empire, that the idea was not altogether of so mo(fern a date as he had represented it, Mr.- Pybus begged kiwto state the mode in which he thought this matter ought fcrlj to be considered. Setting aside, therefore, all ideas ihatever of the intrinsic importance of the Turkish Governroent, the question would be, not whether the Otioman Empire had been usually considered by the cabinets of Europe as a proper object of jealousy to the other States; but whether a defalcation from it in favour of Russia, who had Ken universally so considered, might not throw into her 'nds such additional advantages, as would greatly increase "?r consequence as a maritime Power, and make her dangers to the strength and liberties of the neighbouring nafons. Russia, from the nature of its produce, and from 'ia circumstances, had been styled a sitter and more raUmj object of alliance to this country, than the Porte could He was, however, strongly convinced, that if we suf'•••ed her to realize her obvious, schemes of conquest and doSuiion, (he might hereafter, and, as States were more fre?»titty guided by the law of power than that of morality or justice, probably would (at least it became us, for our own lecurity, to act as if we thought so) do us infinitely' more - rra, than her friendstiip could possibly do us good. She Tiscertainly enabled to he extremely useful to us in supply'joswith articles for our navy. But it should be rememwed, that she was not exclusively so, and that other sources f! supply were open to us. The loss, therefore, of such a -irket for her stores, would press more severely upon her than it would upon our convenience. This country, •~*wer, stiould take care to prevent her having the best and ^substantial reason for withholding them from us, by their doming more necessary for her own consumption. Rely':,5«wedid, and he hoped always should do, upon our nastrength, as the solid basis of our power, we should reP'i every attempt to rival us in that, and to dispute our •Priority at sea, with the most serious jealousy. Russia, in present extent, could hardly ever be formidable to us in !'3t respect - but naval importance was a favourite object of '-Empress's ambition; and he was sure the House mt ft be. :,Jre of the maritime advantages she would derive from her fiction of the Turkish dominions in Europe. Viewing

the the question in this light, he considered Great Britain as ing deeply interested, for her own fake, and for the fak< Europe in general, in checking the progress of the Ku'.i arms. But, fays the honourable gentleman, if our intei rence were ever necessary, why was our late naval arn mentreduced, as the Minister was, long before its rt-tlucii' as completely acquainted with the only fact of consecj utn namely, the capture of Oczakow, as he is at the preltrtit n ment r If Oczakow were ascertained to be the only difficu in the way of an immediate accommodation, the fubit would be open to argument upon that ground. Hut witlio meaning to undervalue those sources of foreign intelligenc which any Member might be in possession of, he was pe suaded that the points, upon which the negociation was pr ceeding, could be known to those only whom His Majc/rj Ministers might have given specific information to upon tl subject; and he was too well satisfied of their honour a/ fense of duty, to believe that they had done so to any one < those with whom they were intimately connected. To co: tend, therefore, that Oczakow, or any other special circurr stance, was the only impediment to an immediate peace, w; to beg the question completely. V et, if • 'exakow had-bee the only place of consequence, the capture of which had bee considered by this country as so important an acquisition ti Ruslia, it would not by any means follow, that we ought ti have armed, or to have interfered at all, the moment we be came acquainted with that event. The fortune of wjr while any thing like equality of force subsists between belli gerent Powers, is continually changing the possession of for tresses ; and we could have had no reason for being convinced. , at that period, that whatever advantages Russia had gainec by-one liege, she might not lose by another. The aspect ol affairs had since experienced a considerable alteration. '1 hf success of the Russian arms had not been confined to the barren district between the Bog and the Neister: the distant hanks of the Danube had been the scene of their victories} Ifmael had fallen before them; and tlie capture of that place had been attended with such acts of carnage and barbarity^ as could not be thought of without horror, and were a div grace to humanity. Could we wonder, then, that new terrors had been added to the Russian name f Could we doubt that this series of conquest had weakened, and must operate to dismay, the enemy? Constantinople itself was endangered; and if this country had not interfered to prevent the utter and impending annihilation of the Turkish power in Europe* the time might not be very remote, when the fleets of Ruf' iia would triumph in the Mediterranean, an object to the whole world, of her activity, adroitness, and power, ami of / our

ourfcp.'æness, impotence, and disgrace. He admitted that Kvcu to be deplored under any circumstances, an:l partioifeJjsoiii the present state of this country. However asxbefly we might regard the operations of the two armies, Awever ardently we might wifli that those projects of amisika might be defeated, yet, as long as the Turks appeared A'tto fight their own battles, it would have befcii highly criminal to have involved us in fresh expence. A strict attention, however, to present economy, if carried all lengths, aajk lead to unavoidable expence hereafter, in a m istenorIeobsdegree. He was confident that no Minister had ever ^wnmore anxious to revive the drooping credit of the nation, than his right honourable friend had clear'y (hewn hmself to be. The reduction of that oppressive load of kk under which we had long groaned, was an object nearest heart. Was it, then, reasonable to believe, that he woaU wantonly sacrifice his own happiness and fame; that, unl;ls he strongly felt himself impelled by considerations of At most urgent duty, he would retard the progress of that Jrrangement, upon which he had always depended for his and most valuable character as a Minister? The supposition would be groflly absurd; it could proceed only from fee preposterous doctrine, that human nature was not true to its own propensities, and delighted in being faithless to

Ail honourable gentleman had said, that the measures •itely taken by the King's Ministers, wpre extremely unpopular. If he meant to use the term- in its largest fense, it 'Man epithet at which no honest Minister would He terrifsi; hot if he meant to confine it to those, whose information and habits enabled them to form the most correct opinions upon subjects of a political nature, it was one that, Hr. Pybus was convinced, had neither been meri'ed, nor Wold befound to have been generally applied. He admitted Satthe present armament was not likely to meet with that 5»ntisal approbation which attended the last, after a manik'i and palpable insult had been offered to the national ho■Wt. The most illiterate mind could understand w hen this (-Wryhad been insulted, and the spirit of an Englishman •lid be always eager to insist upon reparation. But in the r'tfent cafe, something more than mere uninformed intel■Sws necessary; and it would be setting a low value, inH upon experience, talents, and knowledge, the fruit of 1 fhole life's application and labour, if no measure"ftf State, ^ttver expedient, no negociation, however complicate, '•>& no war, however politically just, were'entitled to apf'fflse, unless they fell within the comprehension of the ftantst and most unenlightened individual Upon this last

hi. XXIX. R defcrip

description of persons, he was afraid that the inconven.enc of war were usually the most pressing; and it was not wo derful, that among those many should be found unwil ing engage in it, for the purpose of preventing a calamity, whi might be distant, and might pass ov.r their heads to afFe posterity. But the Minister who Ihould he capable of tui reasoiijng, would be very unfit to retain his situation; and his practice accorded to such maxims of indolence aod lei conliderition, he should be stripped of his authority wii disgrace, and receive the punishment due to his offence. Bi he was happy to find that the present servants of the Crow had been actuated by no such unworthy motives; they ha nor scrupled to disturb the calm, which they perhaps migr. Jong have continued to enjoy ; and they had done so to aver the storm, which was gathering in the North, unliIce/y as i Was to burst over this country, till long after they shouli have ceased to have the care of its interests. They had therefore, desired His Majesty to negociate a peace betweer Russia and the Forte, and to increase his naval establishment in order to add weight to his mediation. The negociatior was then depending; and being so, though no man could be more interested than himself, in maintaining the power and dignity of the House of Commons, he deprecated its interference; not up«n the ground of personal confidence in his right honourable friend, but upon'that which had been marked out by the constitution itself. That House, as the fountain of supply to the Crown, had a power, the extent of which could hardly be limited; and God forbid that it should have less. It was contemplated by the whole world with an ad-1 miration little inferior to our own. And why? Was it 011 account of its adventitious power? That was a poor and pitiful theme of applause. It was because it had used that power with wisdom, temper, and moderation. It had followed those sacred laws which reason and the spirit of the constitution had framed; nor had ever separated responsibility * from its proper attendant, the exercise of discretion. LA. North Lord North observed, that if he could have agreed with the noble Lord (Ilrlgrave) in reposing unlimited confidence in Ministers, he should have done it; but no confidence 111 any Minister would justify that House in entailing destruction on their fellow subjects. The noble Lord had observed, that his knowledge on this subject was very partial. He was in the fame situation, but he perfectly comprehended the resolutions of his honourable friend, and therefore he held himself bound to vote for those resolutions. He wilhed to know who was to pay the price of all this expence? He concluded, that by the treaty with the King of Prussia, (neat Britain was not bound to give assistance to her ally,

unless

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