interrupt our repofe. What was the effet the right honourable gentleman boafted? what was the fecurity we had bought? Our fleet is fearce difmantled, our feamen are fcarcely turned adrift, before, with arrogance and infolence, we offer our mediation to two contending Powers. That mediation was rejected with contempt, as it well deferved, and we are obliged to arm again and for what had we interfered? To prevent, as we are to conjecture, Ruffia from becoming fo Atrong, as to endanger the balance of power in Furope! It was a fpeculation not unworthy any politician, to confider whether, in effect, Ruffia, by her conques to the South, was increafing in ftrength and power: for his part, he confidered every acceffion of territory to her in that quarter, as an acceffion of weaknefs; that her empire, by extenfion, became more unwieldy, and lefs to be dreaded, and if that were really the cafe, the true policy to be pursued, the true method to prevent her becoming formidable to the tranquillity of Europe, would be to fuffer hier to pursue her schemes to the South; to fuffer her to fight, and weaken herself. In his opinion, Ruffia could only be formidable, when her attention was entirely applied to her northern poffeffions, and when the momentum of her vaft empire was given to Peterburg; and upon this fubje&t he defired to remark the contrariety of opinion adopted by the Minifter. It had been faid by a right honourable friend of his on a former occafion, and had not at any time been denied by Administration, wherefore he should take it for granted to be true, that Great Britain, in concert with the King of Pruffia, had stirred up the Porte to make war upon the Emprefs: the apprehenfions then entertained were, that her attention was too much alive in the North, and this fcheme was to divert it towards the South: now, circumstances were entirely reversed, and all our fears were of her aggrandifement in the South. But let the idea be carried to its fartheft extent, and fuppofe that the Empress could realize all her imputed views of ambition, and get poffeffion of Conftantinople, and expel the Turks from all their European provinces ! would any unprejudiced, impartial man contend, that by fuch an event mankind would not be largely benefited? Would any man contend, that by the expulfion of a race of beings, whofe wretched, abominable tyranny profcribed the arts and literature, and every thing that was good and great and amiable, would not conduce to the happiness and profperity of the world? He was convinced it would: thofe countries endowed by nature with every advantage, and fuffering by oppreffion the most abject mifery, would revive, and be productive of fources of commerce beneficial to every nation. This was an event, with which the paltry confideration of the nice adjustment of the VOL. XXIX. balance

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balance of Europe was not to be put in competition, although he was a friend to the prefervation of that balance, upon broad and liberal principles. Suppofing, he faid, that this event had actually taken place, could any body imagine that fo vaft an empire, extending from Petersburgh to Kamschatka and Conftantinople, could fubfift under one Government? Did not experience tell us that empires, when they become too vaft, always broke in twain? If they did fubfift under one Government, would not the internal regulations of fuch an extent of territory fufficiently engage the attention of its Sovereign, to prevent her molefting or interfering with foreign Powers? If they divided, would not a new creation, as it were, arife, fruitful in bleffings to itfelf and all the world? He abhorred the wretched and narrow policy which could entertain a wifh that the most luxuriant part of the earth fhould remain defolate and miferable, that its system might be maintained.

But was Oczakow, and the defert around it, ferioufly confidered as the point on which the balance of Europe hinged? Was it contended, in earneft, that by poffeffion of that fortrefs, the Emprefs was more likely to poffefs herfelf of Conftantinople than without it? His honourable friend had obferved, that in the late war, the Ruffian army had got as far as Mount Hamus, the pafs of which the Grand Vizier had only 10,000 men to defend. Her fleet was also as far as Varna, more than half way from Oczakow to Conftantinople, and yet peace was made, wi hout the acquifition of that capital by Ruffia.

But if he might venture to hazard a conjecture, it would be, that Oczakow was held out to the world as the pretence for this armament, when in fact its object was the aggrandifement of the King of Pruffia. He had heard it fuggefted, and he believed it to come from pretty good authority, that the object of that Monarch was the acquifition of Thorn and Dantzick; that we favoured his views, notwithstanding we were guarantees for the fecurity of thofe towns; and that because the Emprefs refifted this idea, fhe was to be thwarted and punished, by an endeavour to wreft from her the only place the wifhed to retain (and that for her fecurity alone) of all her extenfive conquefts. In short, we were to facrifice the Emprefs and ourselves to the ambition of the King of Pruffia. What were we to gain by this transfer of our friendship? Would the alliance of Pruffia compensate for the lofs of that of Ruffia? The former could only supply us in cafe of neceffity with land forces, and thofe only in parts of the world where we were leaft likely to want them; for it was ftipulated that they should not be employed out of Europe. Ruffia, on the other hand, might affiff us in time of

war,

war, in a very effential manner, by adding to our naval ftrength; but in cafe of a rupture with Ruffia, our trade in the Baltic would be liable to the greatest annoyance from that Power; the difadvantages which would arife to this country, if the war was profecuted, were numerous and manifeft; the advantages which the warmeft advocates of the Minifter would contend for, must be allowed to be diftant and precarious.

With regard to the inftance of Sir J. Norris being fent into the Baltic, alluded to by a right honourable gentleman (Mr. Ryder) he would just take notice of the iffue of that armed negociation. Sir J. Norris was fent to the Baltic with a fleet for the exprefs purpose of accommodating a peace between Sweden and Ruffia. The Czar (Peter the Great) rejected the mediation with fcorn. During the time the English fleet remained in thofe feas, an engagement took place between the Swedes and Ruffians, which our Admiral was not able to prevent, nor to affift our allies the Swedes, and they were worfted; and after all the expence and trouble of the armament, our fhips returned to their ports reinfecta. The anfwer alfo which was fent by the Czar's Refident at Copenhagen to the British Admiral, was worthy, at this particular juncture, to be mentioned.

Sir J. Norris informed him, that he was come to negociate a peace between Sweden and the Czar his inafter; to which the Refident replied, "that if he was really come for the ❝purposes of negociation, he thought he might have taken "a mare compendious method, but that he had no inftruc❝tions to treat with him."

In difpatching your fleet to the Baltic, could you say, as upon former occafions, to your failors, Ite alacres et fpe pleni? Could you tell them, they were going to avenge the injured honour of their country, to punish a haughty and irreconcileable enemy? Or could you hold out to them, as a reward for their valour, the rich captures they may make? You muft be filent on all these topics of encouragement; and although he revered as much as any man the enthusiastic va lour of the British fleet, which had atchieved, from year to year, and from age to age, the wonders which had raised this country to the highest pitch of glory; and although he was confident they would be victorious over all dangers, however great, and difgufts, however poignant, yet your filence would too plainly tell them they were going, without prospect of reward for their toils, against their ancient and natural friends, and to deftroy the very fources from which they used to draw their fubfiftence.

From all these confiderations, he contended that the refo

Sir Wm.

lutions were highly proper, and that it was the duty of the Houfe to adopt them.

Mr. Whit read was followed by

Sir William Young, who faid, that one principal reason of Young. his rifing was, to reprobate a doctrine of moft unconftitutional tendency, as well as moft pernicious, in refpect to the immediate queftion before the Houfe. An honourable gentleman (Mr. Powys) had stated that we were free in this moment of debate to retrace our former procedure, regain the very premifes we fet out fron, and act in our parliamentary capacity, as if we had made no engagements, had returned no answer to the meffage from the Crown, and had no ways fanctioned its contents. Such declaration was no farther objectionable, than as it fought to involve the Houfe in actual inconfiftency of conduct, under the plea of freedom of debate, and parliamentary practice in the confidering the fame matter under various fhapes, and in various stages of bufinefs. But when this claim to return back, and put the House in a fituation of free agency, was introduced, for the fole and exprefs purpofe of declaring what should be the precife line of conduct adopted by the executive Government in its negociations with Ruffia, he could not fufficiently exprefs his aftonishment at fuch a propofition coming from a gentleman who had even refifted the spirit of innovation, and given a faithful fupport to the conftitution of his country, under every circumftance of wild inroad on its fubftance or forms, which had been fo repeatedly attempted, under pretences of reform or amendment. Could a more unconftitutional or mifchievous propofal be advanced, than that a Houfe of Commons fhould thus refolve itfelf into a kind of diplomatic Committee, trench on the most acknowledged prerogative of the Crown? Could a propofal be suggested more pernicious in regard to the prefent meafure? Such interference and dictum of the Houfe muft preclude all means by which the country might avail itself of mutual conceffion, of "a medius terminus," the refult, to which contracting parties generally looked. It would be declaring, that Ruffia fhould have fuch terms as the rate might exprefs, without contra ftipulation, unless, indeed, the House meant fairly to correfpond, treat, argue, and become an agent for foreign affairs. But then it is faid, that we truft the country to a fituation of danger, and eventually of war, blindly, and in mere confidence of Ministers. In adverting to that word confidence, fo much talked of, and fo little examined, he muft beg to difcard all farther difpute about the word, under its plain analyfis. By confidence, as applied to men, is underftood an opinion that he who hath done well, is most likely to do well again, and under this opinion he is trufted; this definition

I

definition applies to confidence between man and man, and to Ministers as other men. In cafes like the prefent, another plea operated of a yet ftronger nature. The executive Government had a claim not merely for a confidence, which any Member of this Houfe, or this House itself, had to beflow, but for a confidence which the conftitution of the country had already beftowed and given, when it vefted in the Crown, and in its Minifters, under fafeguard of their responsibility, the powers to make peace or war, and a fertiori to negociate terms tending to thofe conclufions. Sir Wil liam faid, that he, however, had opinions on the prefent queftion which would direct his vote to the fupport of Minifters in the prefent armed negociation, independent of any credit and truft he repofed in them on general accounts.They, whilft engaged in treaty, could not with prudence debate the actual fituation of affairs in Europe. But he was not fo precluded; he had no connection or habits of perfonal intimacy, and much lefs of official intelligence. He committed no man, or fet of men; he had merely maps, and books, and that common knowledge to found his argument on, which every man in the Houfe poffeffed equally with himself. He would freely, therefore, frate his reafons, why Great Britain fhould regard with a jealous eye the aggrandifement of Ruffia: he would ftate, too, other obvious reafons for our prefent interference. Gentlemen had talked of a balance of power: a balance of power, with regard to the maritime potentates, is more especially the concern of Great Britain; and what, in this refpect, is the fituation of Ruffia? Ruffia is tending, step by step, under the name of alliances, to make mere provinces of all the kingdoms of the North. Confederacy of the weaker with the ftronger is fubjection, if none else interfere. Thi obfervation applies to Sweden already, perhaps to Denmark, and to Poland too, if we do not prevent it. So much for the Baltic. Look where Ruffia extends her arm on the other frontier of Europe. It has been the fashion for gentlemen to talk of Oczakow, as a mere fortrefs of defence to Ruffia, or as a place of no effential danger to the Turks whilft in her hands. Those have heard little, and read lefs, who ufe fuch language. Oczakow is the key of Conftantinople; the Dnieper, which, under the walls of that fortrefs, difemboguing into the Black Sea, is connected by canals, or other water carriage, with the very capital; the arfenals of Petersburgh can be emptied into Óczakow, and ftores of a naval or warlike kind float to the very water of the Leman, under its walls. The natural barriers and fortreffes of Hæmus and Rhadope covering Adrianople to the land, Oczakow alone can provide, and protect what is provided, to fend a force against Conftantinople by fea. If