A. 1792. Ruffia gets Conftantinople, fhe gets the Mediterranean; her empire being the emporium of timber, hemp, and iron, none will then be enabled to contend with her in that quarter either in commerce or in arms. The iron of the North will command the gold of the South. Are we prepared for an aggrandifement in the Baltic, and among the Northern Powers, which fhall command the whole market of naval stores? If not, Ruffa must not be permitted, under the name of an ally, to have Poland for a dependency. Are we prepared for an aggrandifement of Ruffia, which, from the Black Sea, may command the Dardanelles, and through the Dardanelles the Mediterranean? If not, Ruffia must not have Oczakow. If, in addition to Oczakow, Ruffia is farther permitted to poffefs the fortrefs of Akerman, fhe commands the mouths. of the Danube, and the eastern frontiers of Germany are wantonly expofed to her. If Ruffia connects with Auftria, as fhe has heretofore done, fo circumftanced, Pruffia is as much endangered on the fide of Silefia, as on other and prefent accounts, on its Polish frontier. Sir William faid he would take the question on another ground, and which gentlemen had much infifted on, on the other fide of the Houfe. He would fuppofe it to be not a queftion of British policy, but a queftion of good faith to Pruffia, and in a Pruffian quarrel. Every one knew the occafion and immediate effect of our Pruffian alliance in 1787; through fuch means we wrenched Holland from the intrigues and power of France; we gained an ally, who could most hurt us as a maritime power, from our own channel to the Eaft Indies, and who could moft befriend us in every fituation. Holland, giving us the benefit of its maritime frontiers, that is, of its arfenals and navy, required protection on its back or inland frontier; and Pruffia could fupply that protection. Pruffia had actually given that protection. He did not fay that it was within the cafus fœderis, but it surely was within the fpirit and bona fides of the treaty, to requite Pruffia, endangered by acceffions to Ruffia on the Polish frontier, or elsewhere, by timely interference of kind offices; to grant her affiftance in refifting fuch encroachments, on juft reafons of apprehenfion to her, was a mere retribution for fervice, a national justice. union with Holland; and a debt that cannot be refufed withIt was a mere price of our out national infamy. Sir William faid, that he could not fit down without once again adverting to the question, on grounds of British policy, and calling on a House of Englifhmen to watch more efpecially the interefts of commerce and marine power; for it was on those premises that refted their public wealth and independence; and an aggrandifement of one who controlled the very fources of naval force, and mer mercantile equipments, was, of all others, to be checked and prevented by every means which timely fpirit and policy might fuggeft. On this, and many other grounds, he should vote for the previous queftion, and not permit the measures taken by the Crown of Great Britain, in counteracting the ambition of Ruffia, to be interrupted. Sir William alofed his fpeech, with some farther attempts to define what was the nature of confidence, as repofed in the Crown by the British conftitution, in regard to negociation with foreign powers. Mr. Mr. Sheridan remarked that, although he had feveral times prefented himself in vain to the Speaker's eye, he never felt Sheridan. it more unneceffary to trefpafs on the time of the House than at that time, fince, if ever there was a debate, in which the motions had been fupported by the ableft arguments that ever were urged on one fide, and only flimfy delufion opposed to them on the other, the caufe difcuffed that day had been that caufe. Not even any argument had been offered by the honourable Baronet who spoke laft, and who had traverfed over all Europe, traced the hiftory of the navigation and commerce of Ruffia, from the earliest times; defcribed her back frontiers, and all parts of her dominions, and expatiated with as much familiarity concerning the Dnieper and the Danube, as if he had been talking of the Worcestershire canal, and pictured the Emprefs as a female Coluffus, ftanding with one foot on the banks of the Black Sea, and the other on the coaft of the Baltic, and yet, in fpite of this fund of knowledge and ingenuity, all which the honourable Baronet faid, did not amount to an argument against the motion, which, in his mind, was entitled to the finalleft weight. From the right honourable gentleman oppofite to him, (Mr. Dundas) who was fomething like a Minifter, though not actually one, he expected to have heard important reafoning; but he prefumed he had continued dumb, becaufe if he had rifen to fpeak, it might have been fufpected that he knew fomething, and thus have broken in upon that impenetrable myftery, and that magnificent filence which was to characterize the day, as far as regarded the conduct of those who alone could have afforded the House the information which they had a right to expect. Those who had rifen to speak, like the honourable Baronet who had juft fat down, had profeffed that they knew nothing of the cause of the armament, or had indulged in ftating what they gueffed to be that caufe; thus the fum and fubftance of all the arguments against the motion had been profeffed ignorance on the one hand, or avowed conjecture on the other. If, then, they were to guefs only from conjecture, and to argue from maxims drawn from maps and books, as the laft honourable gentleman on the other file had done, were they poffibly to come at any fatisfactory know knowledge on the fubject? Are maxims drawn from maps and books the caufe for which an English House of Commons are to plunge their country into a war, and waste the blood and treasure of their conftituents! The reafons stated 0 by different gentlemen, among their gueffes of the causes of the war, were not more different than extraordinary. One right honourable gentleman had affigned fomething that looked like an argument, which might account for the right honourable Chancellor of the Exchequer's filence. He had ftated, that if his right honourable friend faid any thing relative to the negociation, it might put it out of the power of the negociating parties to recede or retract what they had advanced, and thus render a war unavoidable. Did the right honourable gentleman then think it necessary to recede and retract any of the bluftering menaces which he had made to Ruffia? If he did, it ought to be avowed, that an opportunity might be given for fuch retractation. But that right honourable gentleman, who had talked of the Minister's receding, had alfo alluded to one matter as the cause of the war, from the bare mention of which he shrunk with horror; he had hinted at the armed neutrality, and at the poffibility of this being a fit opportunity for retaliating and revenging that measure. Were we then to go to war for fo base a purpofe, as to give vent to the lodged hate and burning refentment which had been avowed to have ranked in our bofoms for fo many years? He hoped not. The fame right honourable gentleman had talked of the partition of Poland. Were they to refent that event at this crifis? If fo, it ought to be avowed. But he would not believe that any of thefe could be the caufe of the war. He would rather turn to the noble Lord, who had, in his opinion, acted in a more open and manly way, and refted the argument on its true ground.— The noble Lord had exprefly avowed that he gave his confent on the ground of implicit confidence in the Minifter, and had even gone fo far as to declare, that he fhould confider it as criminal in the Minifter, if he gave the Houfe any information whatever on the fubject. The ground of confidence had fhifted materially fince its first introduction three years ago. They had then heard of rational confidence; fince, a greater degree of confidence had been talked of, and now the noble Lord had avowed that he gave the Minifter implicit confidence. Had they not better at once appoint the right honourable gentleman Dictator, and give him the power of making war and peace juft as he thought proper? The noble Lord, who had, on a former occafion, fhewn himself very much attached to the ancient Greeks, had appeared not to be fo much attached to the modern Greeks, and had faid, " See "See what a faithlefs fet of people thefe modern Greeks "are" In what, Mr. Sheridan afked, did their treachery confift? He knew of no fuch treachery, and he owned that he fhould rather have expected that the noble Lord, with a claffical indignation, would have lamented that the defcendants of Demofthenes fhould not be orators, ftatesmen, and foldiers, but an unfortunate race of men, kept only to pamper the falfe tafte and degraded appetites of the Ottoman Court. So much out of humour had the noble Lord proved himself to be with the modern Greeks, that he had been betrayed into a perfidy of quotation, and had quoted a Latin line, to his furprise, Mr. Sheridan faid, when he had expected a line of Homer from him at least. With regard to what had been obferved of that Houfe invading the prerogative of the Crown, if they interfered with negociations, he was, for one, always ready to confefs, that the juft prerogatives of the Crown fhould be kept facred; but those were no friends to the prerogative, who fhould advife the exercise of it in the extreme, and endanger its proving obnoxious to that House. The best Government under the practice of our conftitution confifted in a wife blending and co-operation of the executive and legislative branches of it. The King certainly might, if he pleased, make what treaties he thought proper, and keep them from the knowledge of Parliament, if he was fo advised by his Minifters; he might alfo make war and peace, and in doing that, confidence was repofed in those on whofe fhoulders, as a counterpoife, refponfibility lay. But the moment they came to that House for support and affistance, confidence was at an end, and the hour of inquiry and control was arrived. Yet, what he wished to contend for was, that ancient, conftitutional, and moft ufeful function of a British Houfe of Commons, their capacity of advifing the Crown, and of being enabled, by a due application and exercife of their preventive wifdom, to fave the country from that expence and calamity into which they might otherwise be plunged, either by the error of Minifters, their imprudence, their neglect, or their corruption. If the House of Commons were to be deprived of that important function, and were never fuffered to exercise their preventive wisdom, their chief use, as a deliberative Affeinbly, would be loft to the Public, and the whole powers of that House would be reduced to two dry points: the power of the purfe, and the power of impeachment. Thus, inftead of confulting them as advisers of the Crown, they would be reduced to the miferable condition of acting upon public measures in the last fatal inftance, that of loading their conftituents with the expence of them, when it might afterwards turn out that they were measures not fit to have been purfued; and in that cafe, VOL. XXIX. U all all left for them to do, would be to profecute Ministers to punishment. If the purpose of a meffage from the Crown fhould be at any time to tell them that the enemy were at their doors, and therefore fupplies must be granted, he certainly fhould first ask, on whofe account they were called upon, and how it happened that they had not before been apprized of the public danger? but he fhould grant the fupplies on account of the neceffity and exigency of the cafe. The honourable gentleman oppofite to him had wondered that they fhould fpeak of the proceedings in that manner as a novelty, and remarked, that they were totally ignorant of parliamentary conftitution, if they did not know that it had been the practice of Minifters, in fimilar cafes, to ask for fupport, and give no explanation at the time. Ignorant, indeed, he confeffed they muft be, if the cafe were fo; yet he could not but imagine that the honourable gentlemen who were fo ready to give their confidence blindly and implicitly, were themselves fo confident, that they ventured to quote precedents, without ever having given themfelves the trouble to look and fee whether they would fupport their argument. It fo happened, that all the precedents from the year 1700 downwards, were against them, and in favour of what he had juft contended for. In the cafe of the war of 1700, there had been a defire of preferving the balance of power in Europe, and King William had applied to the Houfe on the occafion. Mr. Sheridan read from the journals the meffage of King William, and the addrefs of the Houfe in anfwer. In the one, the King states the purpose of his application, and calls for the advice of his Commons, and in the other, the Houfe tells His Majefty that they will give him their advice, as foon as they are fully informed on the fubject, and defire that all the treaties entered into by His Majefty may be laid before them, that they may be able to offer him their mature advice. It appeared from hence, that King William, in the inftance which he had read, did not think it beneath him to afk the advice of the Houfe of Commons, and they had heard what the language of the Houfe had been in return. As the honourable gentlemen on the other fide might not like a precedent fo near the Revolution, he would turn to another of a more recent period, that of 1734. So far from the Minifters of that day calling for the confidence of Parliament, the King placed a confidence in his Parliament, and put the whole bufinefs into their hands. Mr. Sheridan declared that he could not but wonder that the Houfe bore with patience the cant of refponfibility, which was preached to them by all who contended for confidence. They were eternally faying, give Minifters implicit confidence; have not they the refponfibility? as if they confidered refponfibility as a perquifite of office, |