Mr. the progrefs of the Turks, and that he was then much "Robbing the Bank, in thee, was only great, Speciously had it been contended, that we fhould gain a suf- Mr. Cocks congratulated the Houfe on the oppofition which a large minority had given to a meafure brought forward entirely without ground, and without reafon. He was convinced, that while the lots and expence were certain, the advantages were merely fpeculative, nay, wholly chimerical. They depended on a train of probabilities, and were the one to fail, they must all be deftrcyed. The progrefs of the Emprefs of Ruffia, and the probability of her obtaining poffeffion of Conftantinople, were mentioned as objects of alarm and danger. It was, perhaps, difficult to perceive what we could have to dread on this quarter. Poffeffed already of an extent of territory thinly peopled, little was to be apprehended from a mere extenfion of territorial dominion. If the object of her conquests was the improvement of commerce, the advantage from the diflinguifhed rank which it holds in every fpecies of art and induftry, muft ultimately accrue to this country. To Minifters he would not addrefs himfelf; they had already formed their opinions, and to fpeak to them he knew would be in vain. But he would addrefs himself to the country gentlemen; he would intreat them not to involve the country, at the prefent period, when it t is fo diftreffed in its refources, in a war, of which they knew nothing. The refources, of which the country might still be capable, he knew were indeed great; but he intreated them not to lavish thofe refources unworthily, or leave their pofterity to feel the confequences of their prefent mifconduct. He might be wrong, but difinterefled, and free from any influence; he had formed his opinion from the most attentive and deliberate confideration, and if on fuch a fubje&t it was ill founded, he muft difclaim all pretenfions to common fenfe. He confidered the conftitution, nay, the very exilience of the country, as interested in the iffue of this question. It was to decide what were the privileges of the Houfe, and what the confidence due to Minifters. If there was any good principle, which had been adopted in a late revolution, or which was deferving to become an univerfal regulation, it was, that war fhould not be made from any motive, except for felf-defence. He hoped that it was not hazarding too much, to affert that this was not an age when Minifters, or Kings' favourites, or Kings' miftreffes, or the mistresses of Minifters, (nobody would fuppofe that he intended any imputation on the right honourable gentleman on the other fide) could make a war merely for their own will and plea fure. That age was now paft, and he trusted that this country would never engage in a war, from blind confidence in a Minifter, without either an inquiry into its object, or a difcuffion of its confequences. Mr. Pole Carew having premifed that he meant to move Mr. R. P. the previous queftion, as the motions now made flated the Carew. fame propofal, as thofe which had been brought forward in the laft debate, only expreffed in a different form, added, that it was mentioned in His Majetty's fpeech, that negociations were going on to provide for the complete eftablishment of tranquillity in Europe. But, in confequence of the afpect of affairs, a part of the armament had been retained, fo that thus the preparations of the prefent crifis were in fome degree anticipated. In a defenfive alliance, the intereft of the parties was, in his opinion, clofely connected even in those refpe&s which were not exprefly flipulated by treaty. Mr. Mr. Elliot contended, that at a crifis like the prefent, inquiry was to be poftponed, till it could be gratified with Elliot. more propriety. Some fupplies had already previously been granted for an armament. The total ignorance in which gentlemen on the other fide profeffed themselves to be with regard to the prefent bufinefs, ought to have convinced them that the period of difcuffion was not come; and that more information was neceffary, before they could be qualified to make it the subject of debate. On this account, he would fecond the motion for the previous queftion. It appeared to be the object of the motions, to put an end to the war. To this point, thofe who had moved and feconded them feemed to have directed their arguments. But if there was any branch of authority peculiarly vefted in the prerogative, it was that of mak ng war and peace. Before they had come forward with their inquiries, they fould have been convinced, that thofe inquities were abfolutely neceffary. By not moving for the documents of the negociation, they had indicated a fenfe, that this was not yet the time to be fatisfied with regard to the very circunftances which formed the objects of their inquiry. The only document to which they could have recourfe, was the Rufian Memorial, which, as from evident motives, it would not fail to reprefent the bufinefs in the most favourable point of view for one fide, could not be produced as an evidence, nor depended upon as an authority. Mr. An- Mr. Anfiruther remarked, that the object of this motion ftruther. did not at all affect the prerogative. It was a strange reason which had been affigned why they fhould grant fupplies, becaufe to make war is the prerogative of the Crown. The ve ry converfe of the propofition prevailed; it was, because it is the prerogative of the Crown to make war, that we are not to grant fupplies. It was to operate as a check on that prerogative, that the power of granting fupplies was placed in our hands. He would grant, indeed, with the honourable gentleman, that they were perfectly ignorant of every circumtance which had influenced the conduct of Minifters on the prefent cccafion. But he was far from deeming this ignorance an argument for a partial confidence, till Minifters fhould chufe to afford the means of information. For his part, he had no conception of degrees of confidence; he either gave his confidence implicitly, or not at all. But, before any Minifter fhould obtain his confidence, he must first ftate upon what grounds it is required, and how it can be given conftitutionally. And he must be a perfon to whom that confidence can be committed with fecurity. A degree of confidence was now required, which had never been claimed on any former occafion. A motion of cenfure is proposed. The Minifier does not come forward to give a vote in favour of his own meafures; he frinks from that approbation, which is only to be purchafed by previous inquiry; he is aflamed of himfelf, and afraid of the confequences of his conduct; he dares not even fanction himself with his own voice. He declines to meet the motion, which he thould have challenged, and in order to get rid of a difcuffion which he found himfelf unable to fupport, moved the previous queftion. The fecrefy, which was neceffary to be observed dur ing a pending negotiation, had been repeatedly urged by the advocates of confidence. The fecrets of a pending negociation were were not now asked to be discovered. It was only wished to be ascertained what they were ngociating about; what was the object of the negociation, not what were the means by which that object was purfued. With regard to means, it was always neceffary to employ confidence. All that was now required to be known was whether it was an object which was really entitled to a facrifice of blood and treasure. A vague idea had been thrown out of danger from the North. But why was it not stated what the danger was, from what quarter, or in what mode it was to be apprehended? Thus we should be enabled to ascertain how far it was formidable, what were the best means of guarding against it, and with what refources Minifters fhould be furnished in order to avent it The demands of Ruffia in the negociation ! ad not been stared, fo that we did not know how far these might be moderate and pacific. The Minifter had in his difpute with Spain purised a different line of conduct. He had first stated the injury, and then the claims which had been formed. Why then were not the claims of Ruffia ftared upon the present occafion? Whatever was the refult, whether peace or war, we thould find it difficult to extricate ourselves with credit and tafery from the fyftem, in which we were at prefent engaged. The principle on which we feemed to have proceeded was to preferve every thing in Europe on its prefent footing. The offence which we had given and the difgufts which we had created, by the adoption of this principle, and by our coofequent conduct, had injured our interefts much inore at all the courts of Europe than they could poffibly be benefited by any advantage which we could reap from the progrefs of our arms, or the influence of our negociations. It had been alJedged, that confidence was due to the Minifter, on acer unt of having been fo fuccefsful. His Majefty, in a former Speech, had informed the House, that it was his wifh to prevent the extenfion of hoftilities abroad, but at the fame time he affured them, that this country had nothing to dread from that quarter. He afterwards informed them, that he had fucceeded in his object of preventing the extenfion of hoftilities. Strange it was, that at a time when Turkey was attacked by Germany, furrounded by Ruffia, at a time when Belgrade and Bender were taken, there fhould, then, have been heard no word of affifting the Turks against thefe powerful combined foes, of fupporting them under fuch circumstances of exigency and diftrefs. During thefe two years, in which we have been receiving affurances from His Majefty of the pacific atpect of our affairs abroad, Oczakow has been in the bands of the Ruffians. But the most remarkable circumftance is, that His Majefty in his fpeech upon the diffolution of laft Parliament, did not mention a word about the ftate of affairs in Europe. Mr. Europe. He recollected an infiance of a fimilar line of conduct to that which the Minifter had adopted in this country having been purfued in Spain. The Spanish Minifter in 1734 had chofen to find a pretext for a quarrel with the Emperor of Germany, on account of his preponderance in Poland; a circumfiance, which is always at hand to justify any dif pute. Other Powers had, for two years, been publifhing manifeftos, during which the King of Spain remained filent. His Minifler, in order to account for this filence, faid, that it fpoke his indignation as pointedly as the most violent manifeltos. Upon the fame principle the Minifter would justify the filence of His Majefty, and, doublefs, he must be allowed to have been indignant, fo far as filence is the teft of indignation. The manifefto of the Spanish Minifter, notwithftanding the ingenuity of the reafoning, was treated with contempt by this Houfe, as the meffage of our Mirifter would be by all the other courts of Europe. The demand of confidence might appear rather ftrange, when the neceffity of that confidence had arifen from the practice of a fyftem of deception upon the belligerent Powers, who, if he had fooner declared his intentions, might have avoided part of the vast effufion of blood which had been expended for the two laft years. If any condu&t merited at once the appellation of weak and wicked, it was the conduct of the Minifter. It was equally deceitful and fraudulent to this country, and to the belligerent Powers. Although we were not actually at war, yet the nation was burdened with the expence of an arined negociation. A diftinction was made between the power of the fword and the purfe; yet that diftinction was but of little value, if the ftrings of the purfe were put into the hands of thofe who held the fword. The honourable gentleman who moved the prefent question had advanced, that in a defensive treaty, there fubfified between the parties a connection of intereft beyond what was exprefsly ftipulated in the treaty. Nothing could be more pernicious than fuch a doctrine; it was carrying that fort of treaty beyond whatever had been understood or explained; it was leading into engagements, the extent of which could never be known or afcertained: it was rendering the refource of this country fubfervient to the neceffities of Pruflia: it was, in fact, leaving the difpofal of our blood and treafure to the Court of Berlin, and rendering Pruffia a part of England. Mr. Martin obferved that, in fpite of the arguments which Martin. had been advanced for the purpofe of proving how very much preparing for war, and coming to actual hoftilities, differed from each other, he fhould ftill continue to retain his opinion, that an armament which feemed to lead to a war, was a fubject of fuch importance to the country, that fome reafon and |