planation, must give up the principle on which they had voted an additional number of feamen; and the principle on which a right honourable gentleman, Mr. Fox, had faid when an addition of troops for the defence of the Weft Indies was propofed, that if the addition was meant to be permanent, he would oppose it; but that if any of his Majefty's Ministers would fay, that there were circumftances which made it neceffary for a year, he would agree to it. No gentleman on his fide of the House had denied the right of refufing the fupplies; but argued only, that to grant them without explanation, was in the difcretion of the House. If gentlemen meant to contend that there ought never to be an armed negociation without all the reafons of it being first fubmitted to the House, they ought to say so at once; the negociation would then reft wholly with the Houfe; and they ought to call for all the papers, and other information, relating to it, instead of putting queftions to men in office. Of this gentlemen feemed to be aware, and therefore they difavowed the prin ciple while they adopted the practice, and by calling on the House to affert their privileges, wished to weaken those very privileges, and injure the country by a line of conduct which was neither conftitutional, nor, if conftitutional, confiftent. Were those the friends of the rights of the House who defired them to retract what they had done indirectly, without avowing their error, and to fay that the country fhould give up all the poffible benefits of negociation, without examining the papers on which alone a judgment could be formed of its nature and refult. Admitting, for the fake of argument, that the demands of Ruffia were to retain Oczakow and the barren country between the Bog and the Neifter, which whether they were or not, Minifters could not state, what fecurity could any of thofe give who ftated them to be fo, that if we were to difarm, Ruffia would not rife in her demands?"Let Ruffia take all her conquefts, let her push "them to the extremity, and drive the Turks out of Europe, 66 we have no intereft in it." To those who could maintain fuch a propofition, he would not argue. By our defenfive fyftem, we were bound, not by any ftipulation of treaty, but obvious intereft, to take care that Pruffia, our ally, fhould not be rendered infufficient, by the aggrandizement of any other power, to afford us that aid which we expected; in like manner was Pruffia bound to us, and accordingly, had affifted us in 1787, in wrefting Holland from France. Our joint right to interfere in the prefent, or any other inftance, to prevent either of the parties from being rendered lefs fecure, was the fame which juftified the interference of a fingle ftate, and which warranted our interference in Holland. The principle was therefore juft, whatever might be the poVOL. XXIX.

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licy. Concerning the policy, it was impoffible to enter into a detail, on account of the negociation. But if Ruffia were to be rendered more powerful, and the Turks more weak, so that the former would be in lefs danger of attack than heretofore, then would Pruffia become lefs fecure against an attack from Ruffia, and confequently lefs able to contribute to the fecurity of the allies. When gentlemen talked of the balance of power, they did not attempt to fay that it ought not to be attended to, but that it ought to be in abeyance till, by fome fortunate conjuncture, it was put under the direction of their own great talents. In the debate on the commercial treaty, he recollected that the righ honourable gentleman (Mr. Fox), who was reprefented by his friends as the only hand capable of poifing it, had stated warmly, as an objection to that treaty, that by allaying the jealoufy and animefity which had fubfifted for fo many years between our merchant's and thofe of France, we fhould be daily lefs and lefs on our guard against the defigns of that intriguing nation, and the balance of power would be loft; and now attempts were made to weaken the principle which then was thought of fo much importance. It was true, that if pushed too far, it might be dangerous. It was alfo true, that two or more powers in defenfive alliance, might either of them be expofed to war, when they would not have been fo exposed, had no fuch alliance exifted; but it was equally true, and that was the principle for which he contended, that they would each be more fecure, and each lefs expofed to wars on the whole, and confequently incur lefs expence of blood and treasure in defence. -It was argued that repeated affurances had been given to Parliament from the throne, after the places in difpute were taken by Ruffia, that there was no danger of this country being involved in the war. The only inference from this was that Minifters did not then fee that the events of war would ultimately make the interpofition of this country neceffary; nor could it be contended, that becaufe a place was taken, it neceffarily followed that no fteps fhould be purfued during the course of a war, to compel the restoration of that place, as the price of peace.

Mr. Fox remarked, that fo long as he retained a regard for the conftitution, a zealous attachment to the welfare of the people, and a true fenfe of his duty to the House, he should rife for the purpose of refifting fuch ftrangely unwarrantable doctrines as thofe which had been advanced on a question of the highest political and conftitutional importance, involving no less than, whether this was a mixed Government, or whether the whole power of it was vefted in the King. If it was fuch as the friends of the Minifter had contended, the Houfe had given up all its deliberative, and reserved only its inqui

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inquifitorial power; and the Members, inftead of meeting day after day, had much better appoint one day in the year for a general inqueft, and give the Minifter implicit confidence for the reft. They had been asked, if they would take the whole negociation into their own hands. They had never pretended that they would. There was a clear diftinction between the object of a negociation, and the means employed to obtain it. Of the former, they claimed an indifputable right to judge, and the latter they confided to the executive power. He was not fond of ftating general propofitions, without any exception; but he could hardly conceive a cafe in which the King might arm at the expence of the people, without informing them of the object. In the cafe of Spain, which was an armament to give weight to negociation, the object was clearly and distinctly. ftated, Here, in fpight of its general notoriety, is was ftudioufly endeavoured to be concealed. It was the prerogative of the Crown to make war, but a prerogative not to be trusted for a moment, without the corrective-the right of the Commons to refufe the fupplies. Minifters now came to the Houfe, and demanded money without any explanation, fo that what was admitted to be the undoubted right of the Houfe, was to be exercifed without knowledge, and confequently without judgement; but with regard to the exercife of the King's prerogative, the declaring of war, they were to have every poflible information. Of the perfonal or minifterial confidence, of which gentlemen had talked fo much, the right honourable gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had no title to either. He had given proofs of incapacity, and he had deceived the House. The constitution knew no fuch thing as confidence. The King's right to declare war, and the right of the House to withhold fupplies, were both abfolute. He would give confidence for an armament for a fhort time, and that for the purpose of defence only; and when he agreed to keeping in commiffion an additional number of fhips, on being told that the state of Europe required it, he fhould have spurned at the idea, had he been apprised that they were kept up for the purpose of offence, In the prefent cafe, too much was difclofed for confidence, and too little for conviction. If the armament was formed on the moft abfurd grounds, as he and all the country believed it was, he fhould be glad to hear from those who talked of refponfibility as the guardian of confidence, how an article of impeachment could be drawn against the Minifter for bringing down a meffage from the King, and moving an addrefs. On the declaration of war, he would take the opinion of the Houfe; and as he was not impeachable in the one cafe, he would be fcreened by the concurrence of the Houfe in the other. He would fay, how

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is that criminal in me which you agreed to fupport? The House, not a fortnight fince, had rafhly promised to support an armament, in other words, an armament whenever His Majefty's Minifter fhould think proper, and they were told that any propofition to undo what they had done, was too late, unless the Minifter came again to demand the supplies. The refolution, the friends of the Minifter objected, was meant to put an end to the war. Undoubtedly it was, though it was rather fingular that they fhould own this, when they knew that it was only an inquiry into the expediency of it. It was, indeed, a bad fign, when the advocates of a measure were compelled to allow, that to enquire into the expediency, and to put an end to it, were one and the fame thing. They faid the House must enquire into the whole of the negociation, or into no part of it; but to what purpose examine the means, when even the object was withholden? This could not be disclosed to the Public, pending the negociation, and in the mean time the public money was fpent, in purfuit of an object of which the Public had no knowledge. To admit a cafe, for the fake of argument, when all the world knew that the cafe admitted was the real cafe, was a folemn farce; a miferable attempt to deceive. On what principle were five hundred and fifty-eight gentlemen, because they happened to be affembled in a House of Parliament, to pretend ignorance of what all the foreign gazettes, and all the memorials, could inform them of, of what was known beyond difpute two months ago, that the Emprefs demanded, of all her conquefts, to retain only the fortrefs of Oczakow, and the country from the Bog to the Neifter? That the moderation of this demand arofe from our arinament, was completely and morally impoffible, for it had been made before the armament was heard of. With regard to what he might demand, were we to disarm, there was only one argument to which he could not reply, and Minifters fhould not tell him that they had ufed her fo ill, that he would liften to no terms whatfoever. If we fent a fleet into the Baltic, alarmed and infulted her coafts, which was all, he believed, we could do; if we fhewed our teeth, and our inclination to do mifchief, then, indeed, fhe might probably be provoked to depart from the moderation of her firft demand. If the Houfe defired to know the object before they gave away money, he thought they would act neither unconftitutionally, nor with any improper degree of fufpicion; if they rejected this doctrine, they betrayed the intereft of their conftituents, and declared themselves incapable of judging of the propriety of voting away their money. The right honourable gentleman, under the plea of State fecrefy, had brought forward the worft poffible excufe for hold

ing his tongue, to fave him from expofing the moft unjuftifiable conduct. His defenfive fyftem was wicked and abfurd

that every country, which appeared, from whatever caufe, to be growing great, fhould be attacked; that all the powers of Europe fhould be confined to the fame precise fituation in which this defensive system found them. If this was a defenfive, he fhould be glad to hear what was an offenfive system. The family compact, fo juftly reprobated, because the contracting parties engaged to affift one another, at all events, whether the quarrel was juft or unjuft, never carried its prefumption fo far as this defenfive fyftem. According to this fyftem, were any nation to acquire territories in Afia, from which revenue could be derived, that would be a fufficient caufe for war; if any country, in any fhape, became more ftrong at home, and confequently more fecure abroad, the allies, under this defenfive fyftem, muft inftantly make war against it, and reftore it to its former ftate of mifery at home, and imbecility abroad; a principle fo diabolical as this he ne ver expected to hear ftated in a civilized Affembly. He had faid, that what was a ground for armament, was not a ground for war. What! were we degraded into a mere bully as a nation, to enforce infolent propofitions by arms, and if they were firmly refifted, to recede from them? Nothing could juftify an armament, which could not justify a war; for, the nation that was once difcovered to have armed in bravado, would find little regard paid to her armaments again. He had been a ftrenuous advocate for the balance of power, while France was that intriguing, restless nation which she had formerly proved. Now, that the fituation of France was altered, that he had erected a Government, from which neither infult nor injuftice was to be dreaded by her neighbours, he was extremely indifferent concerning the balance of power, and should continue fo till he faw fome other nations combine the fame power with the fame principles of government. His idea of this balance was, that every State was not to be kept in its precife old fituation, but to prevent any one from obtaining fuch an afendancy as to be dangerous to the reft. No man could fay that Ruffia was the fucceffor of France in this refpect. Her extent of territory, scanty revenue, and thin population, made her power by no means formidable to us; a power whom we could neither attack, nor be attacked by; and this was the power against whom we were going to war. Ouerturning the Ottoman empire, he conceived to be an argument of no weight. The event was not probable, and if it fhould happen, it was more likely to be of advantage than injurious to us. If we wifhed to retain the good wishes of our Dutch allies, we should be careful of engaging them in ruinous wars; for, the aversion to,

and