of Commons which entertained the propofition betrayed its duty, and infulted its conftituents. The right honourable gentleman who moved the addrefs, had enveloped himself in mystery and importance, but explained nothing. His speech refembled the fpecimen of the paragraph writer in the play about Ruffia, Pruffia, Turkey, and what not, of which the person to whom it was fhewn pronounced that it was well done, for it was finely confufed, and very alarming. The right honourable gentleman's fpeech was, indeed, finely confufed, but alarming only in point of expence. When gentlemen talked of the balance of power as a reasoning for arming, they ought to fhew how it was endangered; when they called for fupplies to prevent the aggrandifement of Ruffia, new as it was to a British Houfe of Commons to hear the greatness of Ruffia reprefented as an object of dread, they ought to ftate whom he meant to attack. Was it Pruffia against whom her arms were to be directed? She had made no attempt as yet, and if it was known that an attack was meditated, it ought to be fairly laid before the Houfe. Were the King of Pruffia to be attacked, he fhould feel himself as much bound to fupport him, as if he had himself concluded the defenfive treaty; but not one fyllable had been uttered concerning the probability of any fuch attack, and therefore he muft prefume that none was apprehended He would ftate what the former policy of this country, with refpect to Ruffia, had been, with a view of comparing it with the prefeat. Twenty years ago, when war commenced between Ruffia and the Porte, we aided her in fending a fleet into the Mediterranean, and this fupport of ours gave her the first opportunity of appearing as a naval power in that part of the globe, and of obtaining an eftablishment on the Black Sea. It was evident that we felt no jealoufy of her aggrandifement at that period. Towards the conclufion of 1782, the Em-. prefs having previously complained that her poffeffions in the Cubar and the Crimea were not fufficiently fecure, took them, by a fort of Royal fyllogifin, entirely into her own hands. His Majesty's Minifters, on that occafion, of whom he had the honour to be one, did not think it neceffary to support Turkey against this affumption. France and Spain were both alarmed, and propofed to this country to join in oppofing it. The fame Minifters told them explicitly that they would not accede to any measure of fuch a nature. They gave up the point, and the Crimea was formally ceded to Ruffia by treaty. Such had been our former condu&t towards Ruffia. What had it been lately? He spoke from a very general opinion, although not from direct authority, in faying, that when we renewed our continental connections in 1787, Ruffia was attacked by the Porte, at the inftigation of Great Britain and Pruffia. Now it was faid we were bound to fee peace reftored, without the aggrandifement of Rufia, when, if this ftory was true, we had been the inftigators of the war. If we were not the infigators, why did we not prevent it if we thought that we had any concern in its iffue? Would Sir Robert Ainflie, then our Ambaffador at Conftantinople, fay, that he had been inftructed, either with or without the co-operation of the Pruffian Minifter, to divert the Porte from attacking Ruffia? After the war hegan, we employed our mediation, and in all His Majefty's fpeeches to Parliament, he regretted the continuance of the war, on principles of humanity; but always added to his expreffions of regret, a political affurance that no danger was to be apprehended from it to us. Were he, therefore, to form his opinion, that we had nothing to apprehend from the war, on the annual communication, of His Majesty to Parliament, he fhould not be accufed of laying a flattering unction to his foul. What had fince happened to involve us? Was the fuccefs of the Emprefs's arms fo formidable in our eyes, that we must infiit on her renouncing her conquests? The difpute between her and us, he believed to be this: She offered to cede all her conquests between the Neifter and the Danube, and propofed to retain only those between the Neifter and the Don; while we infifted that the fhould furrender all her conquefts without exception. Such was the prepofition which we held to Ruffia; while, in India, we infifted, in our own cafe, that Tippoo Sultan fhould not only make reparation for having commenced, as we faid, a war against us, but if our arms were fuccefsful, furrender as much as we could conquer of his territories, as a fort of fine for having made an unjust attack. Was it to be conceived that any fovereign who had spirit to feel and power to refift, would not fpurn with indignation at the infulting infolence of a propofition fo diametrically oppofite to what we claimed for ourselves. We might, indeed, domineer in the infolence of a momentary power, as Lewis XIV, had done, but whether it was in the nature of circumstances, or the propenfity of mankind to unite againft infolence, it had never profpered long in the civilized world, and never would profper. Our whole ground of quarrel with Ruffia was, therefore, the tract of country he had mentioned, unprofitable and worthless to any power, except for a fingle place contained in it, and this place was Oczakow. Now, had Oczakow been taken in the prefent year, as far as its value went, it might have been faid to have produced a change of circumstances; but it was taken in 1788, and in 1789 His Majefty again affured Parliament, after mentioning the war as ufual, that the fituation of affairs was fuch as promised 1 us a continuance of peace. This was an explicit declaration, of the highest poffible authority, that Oczakow was not thought of fuch importance then as to be deemed the object of an armament, and a ftrong prefumption that it was not the real object of the prefent armament. It might be faid, that the former conduct of Minifters towards Ruffia was wrong, and that the prefent Minifters acted on another fyftem. But was Ruffia obliged to know this? Was it her bufinefs to enquire what were the opinions of this Lord of the Treasury and that Secretary of State, or to look to the general policy and conduct of the country? With what furprise must the now hear that England, who had aided her in obtaining an establishment on the Black Sea, who had enabled her first to enter the Mediterranean, and who had refufed to oppote her in feizing on the Crimea, was jealous of her power? If, fhe might reasonably obferve, you were afraid of my conquefts, you ought to have prevented my being attacked. Conqueft is the neceffary confequence of war with my enemy, against whom defenfive war would be ruin. Let not the Houfe attempt to diffociate effects from caufes, or fuppofe that a power attacked was not to repel attack by conqueft, if the fortune of war turned in its favour. In all interferences with foreign nations, juftice was the best foundation of policy, and moderation the fureft pledge of peace. If there was nothing of a vindictive spirit in our conduct, the honourable gentleman who mentioned it might as well have paffed it unnoticed. If there was, it applied equally to Sweden and to Denmark, for both had acceded to the armed neutrality. It applied ftill more to the Court of Berlin; for the late King of Prufa, it was well known, had ftirred up that combination. But were the late King of Pruffia now alive, would he, on that account, introduce a fpirit of revenge in his policy towards him? Undoubtedly not it was a principle on which he would never act, and as much despised in public as in private life. Whatever confidence might be claimed by Minifters, none could be due where they had betrayed incapacity; and this the present Minifters had done in the continental connections; for they had not followed up their defenfive fyftem with confiftency. In the negociations at Reichenbach, when they found the Emperor difpofed to peace, they had neglected the opportunity of engaging the Empress by the fame arguments which induced him to confent, and which were then in their power. They had ftimulated Sweden to attack Ruffia; prevented Denmark from affifting her; then neglected Sweden, and tamely, or ignorantly, fuffered an active enemy to be converted into an useful ally. Where was the policy of thus meddling and retracting? Of the armament against Spain, it it had been faid, that we ought not to look only to the southweft of America, but to the north-eaft of Europe. If that armament was equipped with any view to Ruffia, deceit and fallehood were practifed on the Houfe; but when it was equipped, it might have been supposed that men's eyes would not have been fo riveted to the fouth-west of America, that they could fee nothing else, or that the Minifter would not have been put into fuch a flutter by his difpute with Spain, as to be able to attend to nothing else, while that continued. After it was over, to what purpofe did we difarm, if we knew that we had ftill an occafion for an armament? It was common to hear Minifters glorying in the fituation of the country, while with an arrogant affectation of modefty, they admitted that many circumstances, in particular the state of France, had contributed to that fituation in which their conduct had no fhare. The advantages to be derived from the ftate of France had been always confidered, by every rational man, as those of reducing our expences, reftoring our finances, and fecuring, for a long fucceffion of years, the probable continuance of peace. How miferably had we been disappointed by our own abufe? By the abfurd pride of interfering in the affairs of every foreign State, we had involved ourfelves in expence, and obtained only the hazard of war. Neither had we been fuccefsful in any one inftance, except that of Holland. We had not lowered Ruffia; we had not raised Sweden; and between the Emperor and his Belgic fubjects, our interference had been absolutely ridiculous. The allied Powers had made certain ftipulations with the Emperor in behalf of the provinces; and when Marshal Bender was about to enter the Netherlands with an armed force, their Ministers at the Hague wrote to him, that he ought to stop till certain preliminaries were adjufted. His answer was a peremptory refufal. They then faid, "You must take the confequences, " and we wash our hands of the bufinefs." He difregarded the menace, and took poffeffion of the provinces, where, as was faid, the Emperor had fhewn a greater difpofition to pardon than to punish; then those very Minifters came forward, and figned the treaty; the news was thought of fufficient importance to be dispatched by Lord Henry Fitzgerald, and we plumed ourselves on our fuccefs in that which had in fact been done without our concurrence. If our allies were attacked, or threatened, then, indeed, the honour of the nation would be concerned to interfere. We had no alliance with Turkey, and were only called on to gratify the pride of our own Minifters, and to fecond the ill-judged policy of Pruffia. How far Minifters were pledged to fupport that policy, he knew not; but he knew that the country was not pledged to fupport it; and let the House abide by what Mi nifters Mr. Pitt. nifters had declared, and Parliament fanctioned, but pay no Mr. Chancellor Pitt contended, that our attention to the |