sary to have made the late attack upon | 'Copenhagen, which had been so much the subject of complaint.-There was another point to which their lordships' attention was particularly called; namely, the probable effect which our Orders in Council would have on the government of America, the degree of irritation which they would be likely to occasion in the minds of that people, or, in short, how far they would be likely to affect the relations, political or commercial, of the two countries reciprocally. At present, he would not tell all that came within his knowledge on that subject, neither would their lordships think it becoming in him, if, pending a negociation, he were, in his place in that house, publicly to announce the whole amount of whatever information he might obtain elsewhere, by means of his official situation. But, this much he could assure their lordships, that, notwithstanding the apprehension which some noble lords might have upon that point, and notwithstanding the alarm which appeared to be entertained elsewhere, he could assure their lordships, that no such disagreable sensation was occasioned in America by the promulgation of these Orders in Council. A noble lord, however, had stated, that it was proved at the bar that such was their effect; but this he begged leave to contradict, and in so doing he believed the house would eventually see that he was warranted by the facts as they would be hereafter disclosed. They had not a statement to that effect, but a speculative opinion of an interested merchant at their lordships' bar. With respect to the treaty that had been referred to, he had to inform their lordships, that the reason it had not been so speedily ratified as might have been expected, was, that an alteration had been made in it; not a trivial alteration or addition, but a most substantive and complete deviation from the principles upon which that treaty was originally agreed to to the final execution of a document so altered, some resistance was naturally given; but there was good reason to believe, as indeed he wished, and no doubt every noble lord who heard him wished, that America must shortly have a proper sense of its own interest; and noble lords must see, that this was not to be obtained by a tame acquiescence in every fear or alarm with which weak or interested individuals might endeavour to impress their lordships.

Lord Holland replied to the arguments and assertions of noble lords on the other

side.

He particularly insisted, that it would appear, from the evidence which either now was, or would soon be, in the possession of each individual of that house, that the substance of our Orders in Council was known in America, before the laying on of the embargo in that country; a fact which was also apparent from this circumstance, that a description of the enactments of these Orders in Council was given in an American paper some considerable time previous to the laying on of the embargo.

The question was then put on the first Resolution, when the house divided: Contents, 25: Non-contents, 53. Majority, 28.-The other Resolutions were put, and negatived without any division.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, March 29.

[DANISH FLEET.] Lord Folkestone rose, pursuant to notice, to submit to the house a motion on the subject of the Danish Fleet. He professed himself to be one of those who had approved of the expedition against Copenhagen; but, the frivolous manner in which that expedition had been since defended by his majesty's ministers, had contributed considerably to shake his original opinion upon the question. When the expedition was undertaken, he thought it warranted as a measure of self-defence on our part, considering the situation of the continental powers at that time, and the probability there was of the Danish Fleet being added to the other acquisitions of France. He confessed, that so strong an act as this was, could only be justified by a most pressing emergency; and, therefore, it seemed to him that we were called upon by every principle of equity as well as of policy, not to appropriate the Fleet to ourselves in perpetuity; but to restore it, as soon as that could be done consistently with the maintenance of our own security. He was aware, that a proposition had been made to Denmark to restore it, provided the Danish government would consent voluntarily to surrender it into our custody; but this proposition was so degrading in its nature, that it could not be expected that the Danish government would accept of it, and he was of opinion, that that people ought not to be placed in a worse situation, than if such a proposition had never been either made by us or rejected by them. If we were to retain the pos

we should retain possession of it in perpetuity. Were the temper and views of Buonaparté to change, were his ambition to subside into a policy more consonant with the peace and happiness of mankind, and were a treaty of peace to be concluded similar to that of Westphalia, he thought, that it would be incumbent on this country to shew to Europe and the world, that its councils were not influenced by a selfish policy; but that having provided for its own security when that security was in danger, it was equally ready to respect the rights of other nations, and to make every reparation for a strong measure which was forced upon it by an imperious and overruling necessity. On these grounds, he should vote for the Address which had been moved by his noble friend.

Mr. S. Thornton expressed an opinion that the seizure of the Danish fleet could only be justified by an urgent necessity, and that, had no other measures of hostility taken place between this country and Denmark, that act on our part ought to have been limited by the necessity that gave rise to it. It ought to be remembered, however, that it was in the power of Denmark, at one time, to have secured the restitution of the fleet, but that she did not chuse to accept the proposition that had been made to her with this view. As matters now stood, the fleet had come into our possession by conquest, and it appeared to him, that publishing a declaration avowing our intention of giving it up, without any knowledge whatever of the future state of Europe, would be a step dictated neither by policy nor justice. The address was also, to say the least of it, the more unnecessary, as it was not known what intentions his majesty's ministers might have without the interference of the house of commons.

Sir T. Turton said, that if the weakness of Denmark had been the only reason why we should have had recourse to the seizure of the Danish fleet, in order to · prevent its falling into the hands of France, a declaration of this kind would be very proper. But that was by no means the case, for there was proof of a hostile disposition on the part of Denmark ever since the French revolution. He denied that any new principles of morality had been maintained on that side. It had only been said, that circumstances might alter the mode of acting upon the old and real principles. Government might, per

haps, be disposed, in the event of a change taking place, which would fully restore the neutrality of Denmark, to give up these ships; but they ought not to be bound by a resolution of the house; such a resolution would only be giving an advantage to Buonaparte in any negotiation that might take place.

Mr. Davies Giddy supported the Address, not that he looked upon the restoration of the ships to Denmark as a matter of right; but that he thought it an act of generosity becoming the character of the British nation.

Mr. Wilberforce professed himself one of those who thought that ministers had conscientiously and ably discharged their duty towards the country, in taking possession of the Danish fleet. He was satisfied they were aware of all the objections in point of morality; but that a paramount duty had compelled them to over-rule those objections. He would not allow that any consideration of time or circumstances warranted a deviation from the great principles of morality. In the expedition to Copenhagen, there was no such deviation. A superior duty had outweighed a lesser; and that was itself one of the first principles of moral duty and moral reasoning. The transactions with respect to Portugal involved the same principles, and the result made no difference. It might have been said that Portugal should be controuled by force, and that Denmark might have accepted the proffered alternative of amity and protection. Denmark was unwilling to take any measure whatever of defence against France; and if she had been willing, all she could have done would have been inadequate. It was, therefore, perfectly allowable in us, to secure the arms, which, if directed against us, might be dangerous. But, he was unwilling to carry violence beyond what the necessity of the case required. He would not have the high character of the nation sunk, by shewing a disposition to retain a valuable possession, when the exigency that caused us to seize that possession should have passed away. He wished, therefore, to take no step, with respect to the application of the ships,which might make it matter of difficulty for his majesty to restore them, when circumstances should render that proceeding perfectly consistent with the public safety. The naval and military officers might be compensated as they usually were, by a compensation from the public purse. He

wished to prove to Denmark, and to the world, that we were actuated by no feeling of interest in taking the Danish fleet; and that the fleet would be given back, if the independence of Denmark should be again established.

Mr. Hawkins Browne entered fully into the generous feelings of his hon. friend, and agreed that all he had said would have been applicable, if the Danes had no hostile feelings to this country, and if their weakness alone had been the ground of danger to this country. But Denmark had acted like an enemy, and was treated as such, and her fleet was as lawful prize as any of the enemy's ships captured at sea. The motion was, besides, imprudent, even if there had been a ground for it; for who was to judge when Denmark might be completely neutral or not?

Mr. Hanbury Tracey concurred in the motion. But, as to the ministers restoring the ships at the end of the war, he hoped that would not be exactly applicable; for he expected that before that time they would be out of power.

Mr. Babington, though he thought the expedition justified, concurred in the address, on the same grounds as his hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce).

Mr. Simcon argued that there was no ground for such an address, either in point of justice, policy, or generosity. We were justified in seizing the fleet, on the ground of necessity, whether -Denmark should be considered as weak or as hostile; and therefore could not be bound in justice to restore the ships after the course which Denmark had taken at the time, and subsequent to the event. The policy also would be absurd, flagrante bello; for it would prove an obstacle to future negotiation, and to our obtaining peace on such good terms as we might otherwise do. It would be regarded, in fact, as a censure on the expedition, and, therefore, he could see no ground for the motion, but a romantic generosity, which was of no use.

Mr. Bathurst could not agree with an hon. gent. on the other side, that the ships in question, whether our lawful prize or not (for into that question he should not now go), were to be considered as the same sort of capture as if they had been taken on the high seas, durante bello. He denied, that any conviction was entertained of any previous hostility on the part of Denmark towards this country. Gentlemen, in saying so, said more than was

even insinuated by ministers themselves, for they had never contended that there had been any previous hostility; for, if there had been such, why were there any amicable proffers made to them on the part of this country? He thought, upon the whole, that complying with the present motion would be worthy of the characteristic magnanimity of England.

Mr. Stephens thought the present motion went to bind the future discretion of the country, by promises and stipulations which might ultimately prove more injurious and restrictive than it could now be possible to foresee.. If the ships were to be restored, merely on the plea of generosity, he did think that the object of the present motion would be to rob that generosity of its grace.

Sir James Hall had never spoken with any gentleman upon the subject of the Baltic expedition, who did not, however strongly its advocate, seem to think that some degree of shame attached to it. That was a feeling rather foreign to the success that crowned the British arms in general; and, as he thought that the conditional restoration of the ships in question might serve, in some measure, to do away that imputation, he should feel it his duty to vote for the motion of the noble lord. The house then divided: Ayes 44, Noes | 105; Majority against the motion 61.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, March 31.

[NABOB OF OUDE.] Lord Archibald Ha- milton made his promised motion, for compensation to be made to the Nabob of Oude for the losses he had sustained by the seizure of one-half of his territories, and the very embarrassed state of his finances, occasioned by the measures of marquis Wellesley's government in India. The noble lord spoke at considerable length, but in so low a voice that it could not be heard distinctly from the gallery; but, as far as we could collect, it was to the following effect: He observed, that the Papers laid before the house, and the recent debates upon the Oude question, relieved him from the necessity of trespassing again upon their patience by farther details; the house had, indeed, come to a resolution upon this subjectfinal, he would admit, as far as concerned the conduct of the marquis Wellesley. To this resolution, as it was the sense of a majority of that house, he was bound to