in the late negotiation. As to Austria, she had never assigned any cause for her hostility to this country, and this fact would appear from the documents to be produced. With respect to the motion of which the right hon. gent. had given notice, for papers relative to the expedition to Copenhagen, it was very possible he might move for some information which might safely be produced. But if he should, for the purpose of removing, as he represented it, the foulest stain that ever attached to the annals of any nation, move for the secret information upon which that expedition was undertaken, as far as his judgment went, he believed he would never have ocular conviction. The right hon. gent. was at a loss to imagine why this secret intelligence was not published. But he would assure that right hon. gent. that as the fact now stood, and as it would be made out in argument, ministers would trust to it for their justification, and never expose the source of their secret intelligence. If this subject was again to be brought into discussion, he begged to state, that he would prove the measure not to have been unprecedented, and though the conduct, of his majesty's ministers might be held up in a few speeches in that house to the execration of the country, they would run than risk and incur that penalty, rather than suffer the secret to be torn from their bosoms. But, was this the moment when such documents were to be called for? Was it possible, at a time when there was no capital on the continent where the power of Bonaparte could not drag the offender against him to execution; when there was no British accredited agent in any country of Europe, was it possible, that such a time should be fixed on for divulging the sources of secret intelligence? Was this country to say to the agents, who served it from fidelity, or from less worthy motives, you shall serve us but once, and your life shall be the forfeit ? He should contend, as his hon. friends had done, that the arrangements at Tilsit, and the measures which ensued, without any document, fully justified the measures of government. He should be glad to know what motives could be ascribed to his majesty's ministers for acting as they had done, if not from the conviction of the necessity of the case. He could easily conceive a factious motive for imputing to them an intentional delusion of the public, but he was confident he could make out a full justification, thoug he thought it right to state before hand that no force should extort from then the secret source of their intelligence. I any doubts could be entertained of th designs of Bonaparte, thus far he could tel the hon. gentlemen, that the communica tions from the Portuguese government re lated as well to the Danish as to the Por tuguese navy. What had happened i Portugal was sufficient to convince every fair thinking man of the truth of the infor mation respecting Denmark, and the wis dom of the steps taken upon that infor mation. In taking those steps, the presen ministers had the example of their prede cessors before them. It was only necessary to apply to Denmark the principle the had applied to Portugal, to threaten an coerce secret enemies, or at least suspi cious neutrals, instead of old and faithfu allies. The same cause that prevented parliament from possessing similar infor mation respecting most of the other project of the late ministers, prevented it from possessing the documents respecting the expedition of earl St. Vincent to Lisbon namely the failure of the plan. The trace however were to be found in the Foreig Office. The instructions were the same but the issue was different.-With respec to the late proceedings at Lisbon, it wa necessary for the country to know, that th court of Lisbon always made an unreserve communication to his majesty's represen tatives, of the full extent of the demand of France, as well as of the extent t which it was disposed to comply with thos demands, rather than proceed to the las extremity; and of the point beyond which it would refuse compliance, let the refusa be accompanied with what risk it might These communications were accompanie with an assurance, that in no case shoul the persons of British subjects, or thei property, be injured or violated. Unde those circumstances his majesty's govern ment thought it right to allow some lati tude for obtaining by negociation, and par ticularly by shewing the vigorous deter mination of Great Britain, the forbearanc of France. Even though some doub might have been entertained of the sta bility of the good faith of Portugal, i seemed better to run all risks; and th issue had justified the determination. Wit respect to sending an army to defend Por tugal, we had the assurance of a most abl officer, that no army 'Great Britain coul send would be adequate to that object, an surprize that the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Ponsonby) should have required time to marshal his arguments, with a view to convince any small portion of persons who might be persuaded to agree with him in his opinion upon the matter of the address. The intention of that right hon. gent. to postpone delivering his sentiments upon that subject, was undoubtedly, in some degree, embarrassing to those who differed from him. But in the state in which the fact then was, when the debate, however protracted, could lead to no decision, and in the confidence of his impression, that a great majority of that house thought as he did on this occasion, he should indeed be culpable if he went into a great length of discussion in the present instance. But, as the gentlemen opposite had thought proper to state to the house the course they meant to pursue, he felt it a respect due to the house, to state the manner in which, in all probability, their arguments would be met, when the discussion should come on. He did not mean to undervalue the talents of the right hon gent. opposite (Mr. Ponsonby), but it would be rather surprising, if he alone of all those who had filled the place which it seemed he was now to occupy, should require a day's preparation to deliver his sentiments upon topics on which the mind of the public had been long made up. The right hon. gent. had stated also, as a ground of delay, that the communications respecting the intercourse between his majesty's ministers, and the courts of Austria, and Russia, were necessary for their discussion; but the right hon. gent. seemed to understand these communications in a larger sense than the words of the speech would warrant. By what had fallen from the right hon. gent. he seemed to expect voluminous documents respecting treaties with those courts; but on a reference to the words of the speech, he would find that they referred only to official Notes, which passed between his majesty's minister and the Russian and Austrian ministers. If the right hon. gent. should think that his majesty's ministers were justified in not accepting the mediation offered, until they could ascertai whether the power offering it was in a situation to mediate impartially, and the Notes to be produced should prove that fact, he hoped for his approbation of their conduct, in not consenting to treat till they should know upon what basis-a question that had occupied three months compatible with the honour and interests of s country might be obtained. He knew wat whether the disposition of the people 4this country was for peace or for war, the would assert, that the late Orders Council would be found to produce great inconvenience to the great mass of e people. If any felt this inconvenience, 2 was their birth-right to express their sense, and the constitutional course was y petition. He not only would not repress it, but, if the disposition of his maesty's ministers should not incline them peace, would think them justifiable in petitioning for the removal of such ministers, in order to make way for others more disposed to peace. Peace, in his opinion, was necessary to the salvation of the country; but he would rather that the country should perish, than submit to a dishonourable peace. As to Ireland, he regretted, with his right hon. friend, that no allusion had been made to that country. Ministers, notwithstanding all their vigour, must have been sufficiently urged upon that subject by men acquainted with the country, during the recess. If something was not done for Ireland, the security of the empire would be put to hazard. At the same tane he agreed with his right hon. friend, that they should have patience, and not press the subject precipitately forward, in the hope that ministers would in time take it into consideration. On the subject of America he should not say much, as his majesty's ministers seemed to hold out a hope, that our differences with that country would be amicably accommodated. When gentlemen talked of the prosperity of the country, and of the productiveness of the income tax, and the flourishing state of our resources, he would ask, whether an indefinite war would not be ruin? We should not go on in a blind security, that death would never come. We had fought 15 years against France, and reduced all the powers of Europe, except Sweeden, to a state of subserviency to France, to a power, the greatest the world ever saw, and governed by an individual, as able to wield that power as any person the world ever produced. He begged to deprecate of acrimonious language towards a power with which we must sooner or later negociate. He should not trespass longer on the attention of the house, as he should have opportunities of delivering his sentiments at length, when the separate points should come under discussion. the use Mr. Secretary Canning expressed some in the late negotiation. As to Austria, she had never assigned any cause for her hostility to this country, and this fact would appear from the documents to be produced. With respect to the motion of which the right hon. gent. had given notice, for papers relative to the expedition to Copenhagen, it was very possible he might move for some information which might safely be produced. But if he should, for the purpose of removing, as he represented it, the foulest stain that ever attached to the annals of any nation, move for the secret information upon which that expedition was undertaken, as far as his judgment went, he believed he would never have ocular conviction. The right hon. gent. was at a loss to imagine why this secret intelligence was not published. But he would assure that right hon. gent. that as the fact now stood, and as it would be made out in argument, ministers would trust to it for their justification, and never expose the source of their secret intelligence. If this subject was again to be brought into discussion, he begged to state, that he would prove the measure not to have been unprecedented, and though the conduct of his majesty's ministers might be held up in a few speeches in that house to the execration of the country, they would run than risk and incur that penalty, rather than suffer the secret to be torn from their bosoms. But, was this the moment when such documents were to be called for? Was it possible, at a time when there was no capital on the continent where the power of Bonaparte could not drag the offender against him to execution; when there was no British accredited agent in any country of Europe, was it possible, that such a time should be fixed on for divulging the sources of secret intelligence? Was this country to say to the agents, who served it from fidelity, or from less worthy motives, you shall serve us but once, and your life shall be the forfeit? He should contend, as his hon. friends had done, that the arrangements at Tilsit, and the measures which ensued, without any document, fully justified the measures of government. He should be glad to know what motives could be ascribed to his majesty's ministers for acting as they had done, if not from the conviction of the necessity of the case. He could easily conceive a factious motive for imputing to them an intentional delusion of the public, but he was confident he could make out a full justification, though he thought it right to state before hand that no force should extort from them the secret source of their intelligence. If any doubts could be entertained of the designs of Bonaparte, thus far he could tell the hon. gentlemen, that the communications from the Portuguese government related as well to the Danish as to the Portuguese navy. What had happened in Portugal was sufficient to convince every fair thinking man of the truth of the information respecting Denmark, and the wisdom of the steps taken upon that information. In taking those steps, the present ministers had the example of their predecessors before them. It was only necessary to apply to Denmark the principle they had applied to Portugal, to threaten and coerce secret enemies, or at least suspicious neutrals, instead of old and faithful allies. The same cause that prevented parliament from possessing similar information respecting most of the other projects of the late ministers, prevented it from possessing the documents respecting the expedition of earl St. Vincent to Lisbon, namely the failure of the plan. The traces however were to be found in the Foreign Office. The instructions were the same, but the issue was different.-With respect to the late proceedings at Lisbon, it was necessary for the country to know, that the court of Lisbon always made an unreserved communication to his majesty's representatives, of the full extent of the demands of France, as well as of the extent to which it was disposed to comply with those demands, rather than proceed to the last extremity; and of the point beyond which it would refuse compliance, let the refusal be accompanied with what risk it might. These communications were accompanied with an assurance, that in no case should the persons of British subjects, or their property, be injured or violated. Under those circumstances his majesty's government thought it right to allow some latitude for obtaining by negociation, and particularly by shewing the vigorous determination of Great Britain, the forbearance of France. Even though some doubt might have been entertained of the stability of the good faith of Portugal, it seemed better to run all risks; and the issue had justified the determination. With respect to sending an army to defend Portugal, we had the assurance of a most able officer, that no army Great Britain could send would be adequate to that object, and the fleet was of course to be looked for, and then the confidence in Denmark would have been commented on as weak and imbecile as the confidence in Portugal was said to be at present. It was strange that this proceeding with respect to Copenhagen was objected to by the very men who advised the occupation of Madeira without the consent of the Portuguese government in the year 1801. That measure was viewed with as much indignation by the the presence of such an army was deprecated by the prince Regent, as tending to precipitate his ruin. A secret treaty, signed in Oct. last, bound the Portuguese government not to admit a French garrison into the Portuguese forts, and to protect the persons and properties of English subjects. This treaty was faithfully executed on the part of Portugal. It was a fact, that a French force had entered Portugal, and had advanced some way before the fact was made known to the head of the Portu-Portuguese government then, as the seizguese government; and this was at the moment when the known presence of such a force on the frontiers, and a promise that it would forbear to enter, had induced the prince Regent to shut the ports against the English, and to seize the small remains of British property that were to be found. This proceeding called forth some degree of hostile retaliation on our part, which was abandoned as soon as the discovery of the actual invasion of Portugal by the French led the Portuguese government to see that its only chance of safety was in the alliance and under the protection of Great Britain. The advantage of this conduct was felt in the emigration of the Portuguese government, in perfect friendship and alliance with Great Britain, to the Brazils, and yesterday, more immediately, on the arrival of the dispatches announcing the surrender of Madeira to this country. There was, certainly, reason to believe that there was treachery in some part of the Portuguese government, and to that part must be attributed the occasional prevalence of French interest, and the concealment of the advance of part of the French army, at a time when assurances were given that it would not pass the frontiers.--It was remarkable, that while the application of force at Copenhagen was condemned by the gentlemen opposite, the non-application of it at Lisbon was censured no less severely; but so it would have been if the force had been applied at Lisbon, and negotiation at Copenhagen. Censure would have still followed the force and the negotiation. Copenhagen, then, would have been lost by foolish confidence, and Portugal outraged by unprincipled and impolitic violence. A French army could not have reached Lisbon in less than five or six weeks; but a French army was on the very frontier of Holstein, ready to overrun that province, and to enter Zealand immediately after. The Danish army was not in a condition to resist; the compromise of shutting the ports and surrendering VOL. X. ure of the Danish fleet was now by the court of Denmark. Certainly, the repugnance was as much justified on principle; but the Portuguese government itself had since recognized the justice and propriety of the proceeding; for Portugal herself could not have preserved the Island from falling into the hands of France --With respect to the points of mediation and peace, he had no objection to discuss those also at the present moment. Though there was reason after the Treaty of Tilsit, for this country to entertain a more hostile policy towards Russia, every thing that friendship and conciliation could dictate was done to the last moment, when the hostile Declaration came with as much surprize upon Petersburgh as it did upon London. So it was also with respect to Austria. No complaint, no remonstrance, no discussion had preceded the recal of the ambassador of that power; not even so much as a notice: so it was also with respect to the recal of the Prussian Ambassador; and here he felt himself called upon to contradict an insinuation in the Moniteur, which charged baron Jacobi with giving to the court of London the secret information respecting the proceedings of the French government in Prussia, when the fact was, that this information came from a British minister. With respect to the late supposed negotiation for peace, no tangible overture had been made by the French, or the Austrian government. Prince Stahremberg, with that generosity of character for which he was so distinguished, had made an offer of his personal services to institute and establish a pacific intercourse. But that was not the mode of negociation which could be satisfactory to a country like this. The gentlemen at the other side sneered, as if they knew more than he did on this subject. There had been a period within his memory, when the minister of a party had braved the king's minister in a foreign court [alluding to Mr. Adair's F powers of the continent to oppress us, the conduct at St. Petersburgh, during Mr. Lord Henry Petty said, that whatever merit as to style, the speech ascribed to his majesty might possess, it wanted the more vulgar but more important merit of a full statement of facts. It was a singular instance to be in a state of war with a power against which there were no documents to prove an hostile act. The only reason stated for refusing information was, that those who had communicated the intelligence might be thereby injured. But, all the mischief that could be occasioned by this had been done already, for ministers had in a public Declaration stated, that they had intelligence as to the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit. It was extraordinary in those who had, about a year and a half ago, exposed the ministers of different courts to animadversion, by their communications, to be so scrupulous on this point. With regard to the expedition to Lisbon sent out by the late ministers, it was curious enough to hear it said, that it had failed, merely because its object had been attained without the violence employed against Denmark. If lord St. Vincent had proceeded as ministers had done, where would now have been their golden dream as to the Brazils? He wished for no better parallel than the instructions which had been given to lord St. Vincent, compared with those given to lord Cathcart, and he wished the right hon. secretary would move for them. He contended that the principles of right and wrong were to be considered in politics as well as in philosophy, and on these they must reason generally till a particular case was made out. It became those, who checked petitions for peace, to take care that no opportunity of negotiation should be let slip, merely on points of form. We ought to examine with jealousy into the subsidiary connection with Sweden. He agreed in the propriety of keeping the affair of the Chesapeake distinct from other points, and in the necessity of maintaining our essential rights; but we ought, at the same time, to guard against unnecessary irritation, and to beware of being led away by the name of vigour, so as to inflict a severe blow on our own commerce. The noble 1 |