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lity towards the French emperor. I mean not, and cannot be supposed to mean, any such thing. But in negociation with'foreign powers, as well as in the conduct and business of private life, if we cannot talk with confidence, we had better not talk at all; a communication upon any business would be very injudiciously carried on by a party, who in the outset should tell the person with whom he is communicating, that he has the worst opinion of him in the world. Such, however, is really the way in which this government has always conducted itself towards the present ruler of France; and setting out with a determination not to believe any thing that is told us, we are surprised that our communications have not come to a happy issue. Sir, I cannot help observing upon the sort of personal hatred and antipathy towards the French emperor, which appears to prevail in the minds of a large part of the community, as if each man had a personal quarrel with him. The origin of this feeling is to be traced to the various endeavours which have been made to excite the public hatred from the moment he attained the consular power. It argues a great degeneracy of national character, and it has given rise to many very disgraceful publications. A national antipathy, founded upon the crimes perpetrated by the chief of a government, whether crimes of state, or of a more private nature, can be no ground for a continuation of war between two countries. The murder of Don Carlos by Philip the second, was never urged as a cause of war against Spain. The execution of the Czarowitz Alexis by Peter the Great, was never considered as a just cause of hostility against Russia. The punishment of the crimes of princes, is in the hand of the Ruler of princes; and it is not for us, to make them the cause of punishment to their guiltless people and our own. Providence, in its inscrutable wisdom, works by means, and often deigns to produce the greatest good by the most ignoble and vicious instruments. I do not suppose that any person will question the advantage derived to this country from the introduction of the reformation. Yet by the brutal lusts of Henry the VIIIth, was that reformation introduced among us. The advantage accruing to the cause of true religion, morality, and virtue, is the same, whether he who effected it were the most virtuous or the most vicious of mankind. Sir, it has been much the practice in this house, to substitute recrimination VOL. X.

for defence. Could the present ruler of France obtain a verdict of acquittal from any charge preferred against him, provided he could shew that his accusers had been guilty of a parallel crime, he would have no great difficulty in standing clear with the world. If, for instance, he were charged with violent and unjust aggression by Austria, Prussia and Russia, he might answer in one word-Poland. At all times the answer he could have given to England might have been-India; and now, unhappily, he might add the decisive name of Denmark. I fear there is nothing arising out of the particular purity of this country, which can justify us in saying, that we will have nothing to do with the government of France. If France be loaded with political crime, so are the nations she has conquered, and so are we. Let us view the trespasses of France, with the same indulgence we think due to those of other countries, or to our own. Or at the least let us not set up an hypocritical reason for refusing to negociate with her. Again, if we are in the high situation, at times described in colours so glowing, by orators on the other side of the house, let us follow the example of Buonaparte, and seize the propitious moment of national elevation. In the zenith of our strength, let us make one frank and generous overture for pacification.-Sir, it will be objected that such is the inordinate ambition of Buonaparte, there can be no hope that he will be seriously inclined to peace. That his ambition is great, nobody can doubt; but it is an ambition much under the guidance of prudence: he never fails to take every precaution for his security. He never proceeds without knowing, in case of reverse, how he is to retire; and his ambition has never yet, as far as I have been able to observe, tempted him to go much beyond the true line of his interest. In talking of inordinate or insatiable ambition, we mean that passion when carried to such an extent as to predominate over prudence and discretion. Such was the ambition of Charles the XII. which was truly insatiable, and disdaining even the slightest controul, hurried him to his ruin: but the ambition of Buonaparte has always been subservient to his policy. Previous to the treaty of Campio Formio, the Austrian capital was in his power: he stopped because it was his interest to do so. After the battle of Austerlitz, when in possession of the capital of the Austrian empire, did he make a peace with Austria 3 I

different from that which the coolest politician would have prescribed? Did he display the features of a savage ferocity, or did he gratify by acts of barbarity that disposition to vengeance, which is attributed to him? Did he not rather conduct himself towards the Austrian monarchy, its sovereign and his people, in a manner, which, if it had been adopted by any other than Buonaparte, might have been extolled as of exemplary moderation? the same may be remarked of his conduct subsequent to the victories of Jena and of Friedland. If then, upon a review of the whole of his conduct, I perceive that his policy has controuled his ambition, and has allayed if not extinguished his thirst for revenge: and I at the same time perceive that it would be conducive to his interest, even now to make peace with England; my hope of accomplishing such a peace is not without foundation, and my desire that ministers would attempt to open a negociation, is not ill-timed or improper. Sir, I am no apologist of any crimes which he may have committed; but I am aware that I may be represented, by my opponents, as the apologist of the French emperor; I know that I am not so. I am endeavouring to do some degree of justice to the character of that extraordinary man, in order that ministers may do justice to the country.-Sir, I will again shortly recur to the period of Louis the XIVth. The power of France was then almost physically as great as it is now. When a prince of the blood of France, was placed upon the throne of Spain, and the Pyrenean mountains were no more, Wm. the IIId. no longer filled the throne of England: the French armies were still commanded by generals of the highest reputation. There was every prospect that the whole of Europe would be overwhelmed by France! there was no obstacle in the mind of the French monarch, arising out of humanity, good faith, the ties of honour, or the calls of justice. He had exemplified his contempt of treaties, by suffering Philip to seize the Spanish crown: by his ravage of the Palatinate, he had shewn how callous he was to the miseries of mankind. There remained nothing but strength to oppose to strength; and there did providentially arise at that period that greatest and noblest bulwark of nations, men of transcendent talents, who eventually reversed the fortune of war. The potentates confederated against France, under the auspices of the duke of Marlborough

and prince Eugene, reduced the power of her arms, and brought her to the lowest state of humiliation. Let us not, however, forget that the cruel bigotry of Louis the XIVth. materially embarrassed his military exertions, and blending domestic contentions with foreign war, heightened his own distress, and powerfully contributed, among other causes, to effect the salvation of Europe.--But is it the power of France that we now contemplate? Sir, I maintain that it is not the power of France, but the power of the French emperor. The mighty mass of dominion which you in your attempts to destroy him, have placed within his grasp, he alone can wield: none but Ulysses can bend the bow of Ulysses. But as in the course of nature, his life must at length terminate, God forbid it should be cut short by any improper means! the power of France would then no longer be what it is now. Nay, even suspend for a time the operations of war, and the power of the French emperor would be no longer what it is now. By your resistance you created, and by continuing to resist, you consolidate that power. It is the contest of the wind and the sun; by urging the tempest of war against him, you bind faster all those ties, which have placed the different powers of the earth under his controul; the genial influence of peace would tend gradually to disunite and to dissolve them. Look at the map of Europe and see whether the arrangements that he has made, and those which he is about to make, are not such as must create in themselves a division of interests, amongst the persons who obtain those possessions, from whatever family sprung, or however united by blood or otherwise. In process of time new combinations must arise: and, there are upon the continent the elements of great powers, which may at a proper time be called into action. There will be the means of resisting the power of France hereafter, provided France should shew herself incapable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity. Give them but time to breathe, and they may be beneficially and effectually used. The existence of one great man, at any period of the world, changes the whole face of human affairs. Great men have indeed existed in our day, but their warnings have been disregarded. If the advice of the gallant and patriotic Archduke Charles had been taken, the last coalition would never have been formed, and Austria would have remained that great power,

which she was subsequent to the peace of Luneville. If the admonitions of Mr. Fox had been attended to, the bloody tragedy of the French revolution would never have been acted; Buonaparte would never have been emperor of the French," he would not have had kingdoms prostrate at his feet, and the population of nations under his banners." Having mentioned the name of Mr. Fox, I willingly acknowledge myself his true and genuine disciple. I am only feebly urging the sentiments which he would have forcibly uttered, had he not been unhappily taken from us. I trust that I am treading in his footsteps; would to God that his countenance were now upon me! would to God, this humble effort over, I could feel myself as I have often done, secure under the impenetrable egis of his eloquence! How bitter is the reflection! Had this country but hearkened to his prophetic voice, all the horrors which have passed during the last fifteen years, would have been averted; prophetic I may truly call it, for there is not one of his predictions which has not been exactly verified. The period of delusion is now at an end. We can no longer entertain any expectation of intestine convulsion in France; we can no longer flatter ourselves with the hope, that the moment Buonaparte quits Paris, some terrible commotion will take place. We have seen the capital, nay all France emptied of soldiers, and the whole country tranquil. We can no longer hope for a general revolt produced by the supposed misery of the people, groaning under the oppression of his tyranny. Sir, I believe that an impartial observer, in travelling through France, (at least from all the information I have received, it is so), would find that the situation of the inhabitants of the country, is improved rather than deteriorated, since it fell under his dominion. We can no longer hope, that the soldiery, discontented with the distant expeditions to which he has led them, will be excited to a spirit of mutiny against him. We can no longer hope that the countries which he has conquered will rise in one general mass, and vindicate their own cause by the massacre of his troops. The experiment in all these cases, has been made, and the predictions of those absurd and foolish prophets who foretold these and similar events have been, completely falsified. The union of the great powers of the continent to defeat him is no longer practicable. I repeat that I am not the apologist of France,

I am the advocate of England. I want to shew to England, that it is expedient on every account to make peace, and possible to maintain it; and, that those who would still induce them to believe, that there is any prospect of obtaining better terms than we can now have, at any future period, grounded upon any of the common-place topics, which have been dwelt upon during so many years, have no foundation for their assertions. We are told that if peace were made with France, she would immediately turn the whole or chief of her attention to the restoration of her navy. Undoubtedly she would do so, and France has always done so, during any peace that has taken place between the two nations: and she has always so far succeeded, as very much to improve the number and condition of her ships. The consequence has only been upon the renewal of war, to give fresh triumphs to G. Britain, and such I am confident would again be the case. But there is this difference: the French emperor is at this moment, and has been for a considerable time, as fully employed in the construction of ships, as he could be in time of the profoundest peace; but what he wants, and what France will always want, is sailors. From the relative situation of the two countries, it is utterly impossible that as long as the commercial greatness of this country exists, the French navy can ever become, by many degrees of comparison, equal to that of G. Britain. By the continuation of the war, you risque the eventual loss, or at least the serious diminution of your commerce, the foundation of your naval greatness. By peace your commerce will be restored, enlarged; and your naval greatness will be proportionably augmented. It is therefore in my opinion a most chimerical apprehension, that during any interval of peace, such a navy could be created by France, as would be at all formidable to the marine of G. Britain.Lastly, it has been said, that the French emperor has sworn the destruction of this country, and will therefore never allow you to be at peace. I would ask when, where, and how, was this tremendous oath taken? not when he was created chief consul of France, for at the moment of his elevation he eagerly applied for peace. Not when he was created emperor, for then he repeated in earnest and dignified language, his request for peace. Not in the course of the last summer, when victorious over Russia, when he again attempt

ed to open a negociation for peace. Not even in the beginning of the present year; when he perhaps for the last time, made advances for the same salutary purpose. The recognition of the consular power, was at the time of his first pacific overture of the utmost importance to him; the recognition of the imperial dignity, he would also I think, have purchased at a great price; but you have forced him to appear personally in every part of Europe, and that title which he vainly attempted to obtain from your friendship, or at least from your discretion, he has asserted and established at the point of his sword. Still, however, it would be highly conducive to his interest, to have that power acknowledged by this country. In point of military reputation, he has nothing to wish for, he stands pre-eminent in the history of past or present times; the primary object of his ambition must now be the firm and durable establishment of his authority over France, and the other nations which are under his dominion. That he cannot accomplish except he be at peace with England. If peace then be his interest, and it be likewise ours, why should any foolish punctilio, why should any petulance of temper, stand in the way of so desirable an object? I think I have shewn that to offer peace, would be neither humiliating nor discreditable. I have shewn it, from reasoning upon the nature of the offer itself, and from the examples which I have produced, both at home, and abroad. I have shewn by reviewing the situation of our own country, the difficulties and dangers attending a continuation of the war; and they are such as it would be the most unpardonable presumption to encounter without an adequate necessity. If I should be successful in persuading the house to adopt the three resolutions, which I shall have the honour to propose, and that an offer to negociate should be made by this country, I would then remind those who make it of the rule laid down by Mr. Fox, which I have before quoted in this house, namely, that in conducting a negociation, far from displaying an eager and inordinate ambition we should be moderate in the extreme; that we should fairly and impartially place ourselves in the situation of France, whenever engaged in any great political transaction with her: that is, that we should abide by a maxim, which as a disciple of the old morality, I am not ashamed to avow to be the corner stone of all moral,

and political wisdom; that divine maxim, which however the disciples of the school of the new morality may, by their actions contradict, and by their insinuations deride it, they will not in terms venture to disown, that in all cases nations as well as men should do unto others, as they would that others should do unto them. Sir, I propose,

1. "That it is the opinion of this house, that the conditions stipulated by his majesty's ministers for the acceptance of the Mediation offered by the emperor of Russia, were inexpedient and impolitic." 2. That it is the opinion of this house, that the conduct of his majesty's ministers on the subject of the Mediation offered by the emperor of Austria, was unwise and impolitic, and not calculated to ascertain how far the restoration of the blessings of peace, might or might not have been attainable through the means of such Mediation.-3. That there is nothing in the present state of the war, which ought to preclude his majesty from embracing any fair opportunity of acceding to, or commencing a negociation with the, enemy on a footing of equality for the termination of hostilities on terms of equity and honour."

Mr. Herbert rose and seconded the first Resolution.

Mr. Ponsonby, expressed his sense of the disadvantage under which he rose, after the admirable speech of his hon. friend. As to the two first Resolutions, he perfectly concurred with him; and in the third likewise he agreed as to the letter, but differed as to the spirit and effect, and as to the propriety of passing such a resolution at the present moment. With regard to the two first, no man who considered the conduct that had been displayed by ministers, as to the Russian and Austrian mediation, could doubt that they manifested a tone, a temper, and a language which were wholly adverse to peace. The right hon. secretary had demanded an impartiality from Russia, which it was impossible to attain or to expect; but it was needless for him to enter upon that point, after what had been said by his hon. friend. It was the most silly and absurd idea that could possibly be entertained, that because a power whose disposition was known to be friendly had suffered a niomentary depression, its mediation ought not to have been accepted. Russia was our friend; Austria was also our sincere friend. Because events had reduced them to a low condition, could we believė that they loved Buonaparte more than

us, or would prefer his friendship to ours? | He ought to understand whether peace It was amazing, with the events of the war before them, that they could have indulged in such ungenerous suspicions, and in such irritating language. Holland had been, ever since the year 1794, under the dominion of France; and yet, as the disposition of the maritime part of that country was hostile to the French, they had never been able to produce more than one effort against this country. The engagement of De Winter with lord Duncan was the only one of any consequence, and in that battle they had only seven ships. In the East Indies their fleet surrendered-In the Helder, too, their whole fleet surrendered; and the indisposition of the Dutch to fight the battles of France, rendered her powerless at sea. Why, then, should it be supposed that we had lost the affections of our allies? He did not say that we ought to have proceeded to a treaty; all that he said was, we had lost an opportunity of trying whether France was disposed for peace, and had irritated those nations who were willing to befriend us. No step had been taken by ministers to get the country out of the difficulties with which their own conduct had contributed to involve us. How did they mean to continue the war? Did they mean to allow Ireland to remain as it was, without taking a single step to secure, the attachment of that country? The inhabitants of this country could not be led away by any machinations of France, and here we were secure. But though he was willing to hope the best of Ireland, yet he could not conscientiously say that we were equally secure there as here. If we conciliated the people of that country, we should be enabled to look France more boldly in the face: but, unless we did this, Ireland would be a source of weakness to us, and a source of confidence to our enemy. Could we make any impression on France, under the commercial reguations of ministers, by which they had efected the object which France had in view? If this was the way to contend with France, why was it not tried before? Why was it not resorted to before our allies on the continent had fallen? But they would not produce the smallest impression on the enemy. He agreed with his hon. friend that a negociation ought to be entered upon if possible: if this could not be done, the country ought to know it, and then they would bear their privations with comparative patience. The poorest man in the country ought to know its situation.

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could be attained or not. If it could not, then the same effect would be produced as had been produced in Holland in the time of king William. Entertaining these sentiments, it became him to state the reasons why he differed from his hon. friend on this occasion. The third resolution, if adopted, would bind ministers to take immediate steps towards a negociation. Now, although he agreed, that this was the true policy of the country, he was not prepared to say that it was so at the present moment. The motion must produce one of these two results:-having tried the inclination of our enemy, ministers would come back to the house, and say, 'We have tried him, and find him cold and averse to negociation, or in such a state of irritation, that it is in vain to expect him to treat on any thing like honourable terms.' This, of course they would assert, was the effect of the passing of this resolution. Or, again, if they did go into terms, and a dishonourable peace was concluded, this would be giving ministers an opportunity of saying, We could not get a proper peace, on account of this Resolution;' and if it should be a very bad one, which he was afraid it would be, they would say, The reproach does not lie on us; blame yourselves. You were too impatient. It is to you,therefore, not to us that the stigma must attach. You are the authors of the calamity.' He was averse, therefore, to any thing which could force ministers into negociation. His hon. friend, however, had said, that the petitions for peace had put an end to the American war. He did not think that case applicable to the present. Every person knew, that it was foolish to continue a contest which was no longer attainable. The object was to induce France and Spain to abandon the contest against us, conscious that America, urged on as she was by the spirit of enthusiasm, would never yield, and that no force we had to employ could compel her. We had, therefore, some advantages to expect, and little risk to run, in attempting to get out of that contest.-Another consideration weighed extremely in his mind. He confessed, he had no opinion that ministers were anxious for peace; of which his conviction they had exhibited most satisfactory symptoms in the two offers of mediation, which they had already slighted. Was the country insensible of its state? Did not the house every day receive petitions for peace, not only not encouraged by any political cha

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