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is, (for if he does know it would be very difficult to say that he must not make the demand personally) and proceeds under this clause: is reasonable time after this demand, of which the tenant may remain utterly ignorant, to be computed in the same way, if the tenant remained utterly igno: rant of it, as if the tenant had actually heard of it imme. diately from the occupier to whom it was given, or had seen it in the gazettes, and had set his landlord at defiance? Is the fine in such a case to be paid within the same time after demand, as it ought to be if the tenant were actually on the spot? or is he in such a case to be precluded from the benefit of renewal after a fixed period of time, although the moment he knows what has happened he is ready to pay the fine? On the other hand, though the tenant were in the East Indies, yet if it appeared that he knew of the demand, and yet took no step to get the money, and procure the re. newal, his absence would not excuse him from the consequences of wilful default. There may be many other circumstances affecting what shall be deemed reasonable time. The property may be in litigation, and the notice given to a trustee who cannot act without the direction of the court, and perhaps cannot raise the money but under the authority of the court. In such a case, six months might not be a reasonable time. Therefore all these cases must be considered upon the good or ill conduct of the tenant, in paying or not paying the fine, to convert that which was originally mere neglect into wilful default: and it would be mischievous to both parties to give indulgence beyond what is necessary, or to withhold indulgence where necessary by adopting any fixed period of time. The best thing for tenants having estates of this kind, is, to renew as the lives drop, unless they intend to defraud their landlords : and where these interests are in settlement, I think it particularly important to compel renewal from time to time ; for the tenant for life never will renew, as long as he can avoid it,
because if the compulsion does not happen in his time, he puts all the rents and profits in his own pocket. The same observation will apply to estates in the hands of creditors: it is better both for subsequent creditors and for those in remainder under settlement to compel regular renewals by the persons in possession. .
On the first hearing the decree was " that plaintiff's bill “should stand dismissed with costs, save as to so much “ thereof as relates to the construction of the covenant for " perpetual renewal contained in the original lease of 12th " Nov. 1724, in the pleadings mentioned ; and as to so “ much of plaintiff's bill as relates thereto, let the same “ stand dismissed without costs."
Reg. Lib. xlviii. 447.
On the re-hearing, the former decree was affirmed, but without costs.
WHILE the last of the foregoing sheets was at press, a case
was decided by the court of Exchequer, materially affecta ing the doctrine in Lord Dunsany v. Latouche, (Vide, ante, 137, 160) respecting the effect of the registry act as to judgment creditors: We think it will be acceptable to the profession to be apprised of the decision of the court on that point.
EXCHEQUER, :214 .)
June 23d, 1806. ibistas; . D'ARCY, EXECUTOR OF MARSHALL, D. HEIR
AND TER-TENANTS OF CHAMBERS."
EDWARD CHAMBERS was seized for Tife, "With remainder to his eldest son John in tail; and in Michaelmas term, 1741, Edward and John suffered a recovery. On the 18th December, 1747, a deed was executed, declaring the uses to Edward for life, remainder to fohn for life, with remainder to the first and other sons of John: This deed was not registered until 1786.
Edward, the tenant for life died, and in 1780, John Chambers confessed a judgment to plaintiff's testator: John having died, a scire facias to revive the judgment was sued forth against the heir and ter-tenants, to which the defendants pleaded non-seizen; and upon the trial offered in evidence, the deed of 18th December, 1747; which deed, the learned judge was of opinion, should be considered as fraudulent and void against plaintiff's demand; he being a creditor by judgment entered previous to the registry of said deed.
To this opinion an exception was taken, which came on to be argued in the court of Exchequer.(a)
O'GRADY, chief baron, pronounced the judgment of the court, which as to this point, was in substance as follows:
The question is whether the judgment of 1780 shall, by virtue of the 6th Ann. chap. 2, commonly called the registry act, prevail against the deed of 18th December 1747, which was not registered till 1786; long subsequent to the judgment under which the plaintiff derives.
The argument in this case, in support of the exception, has been very ingenious, but has been in substance taken, as most probably was the exception, from the argument in Lord Dunsany v. Latouche, and the observations of the court in that case. I do not suppose there is a judge on the bench who would feel greater difficulty in dissenting from lord REDESDALE than I should: but even were the case referred to a decision of his lordship upon that point, I should be somewhat relieved by reflecting that the statute was new to him; and that it was his construction of a clause not to be found in any of the registry acts in England. But when I consider that the question there was not such as occurs at present, but merely, whether the defendant had a right to avail himself of the doctrine of tacking; while I subscribe most fully to what Lord REDESDALE decided on the question before him, I cannot subscribe to his observation on this part of the registry act; which I can consider only as a dictum not necessary in the case, and merely an assent to an argument of counsel, and which perhaps was more readily
(a) By statute 28th Geo. 3,c. 31.—Bills of exception may be examined and determined on by the court out of which the record issued.
adopted, because the proposition intended to be established by it, namely, that there could be no tacking, was unquestionably true. In that case there were several deeds, registered, and unregistered; therefore on the point now before us there was no necessity to decide: so far as it was necessary for his lordship in that case to decide upon the registry act, his decision was accurate and just.
According to the argument in that case, a judgment creditor has no protection under the registry act, unless his judgment intervenes between two conflicting deeds: and it is said that he is then protected, not from any favour shewn to himself, but for the sake of the registered deed, and to avoid a confusion and absurdity, which the new system, established by the registry act, might otherwise produce. This construction is adopted by the court in these words :(a) “ The act is not intended to apply to judgments generally, “but to the difficulty which would arise from the preceding “ clause, that clause havingpostponed the subsequently regis"tered deed, and the law not postponing judgments in the “ same way. The legislature has in that particular case given " a preference to judgments, which it would not otherwise: " have done, in order to put them in their proper situation “ with respect to the subsequent deed. The effect of the “ clause so construed is to give such judgment creditors not “ only the priority which they would before have had against “the registered deed, but a priority against the unregistered " deed, which they had not before, and that for the sake of the “ registered deed.” I confess this construction, which it was not necessary for the court in that case critically to examine or decide upon, at first sight seems favoured by the words of the statute, taken in the order in which they stand. But can there be any sound reason, in point of substantial justice,
(a) Ante, 160.