See ADMINISTRATOR pendente lite, 1 2. As to time for shewing cause against BARON and FEME, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
conditional orders, (See Practice 6)
GRAND-FATHER AND GRAND-CHILD
A grand-father having taken the chil- dren of a son who had ruined himself, educated them entirely, and by his will gave the son an annuity, provided he did not interfere with the children, and then gave legacies to the children. Lord BATHURST held that the grand- father had put himself in loco parentis, and decreed interest on the legacies, 5 379 2. So, per Lord Rosslyn, where a testa- tor gave legacies to the natural chil- dren of his son, payable at a future day, and gave no maintenance in the mean time; but gave directions how they should be educated, and attempt- ed to make testamentary guardians,
1. A fine sur concessit begins to operate as a bar only from the execution; Sembl. 2. Fine and non-claim by a trustee to a person having notice of the trust, shall not bar the cestui que trust: It is merely a conveyance. Kennedy v. Daly, 355, 379 3. One taking from a trustee, with no- tice, levies a fine to strengthen his estate; this shall not bar the cestui que trust, 4. A person coming to a title which is bound by an equitable right, cannot, by levying a fine, discharge his estate from the consequences of that right, 380 5. Where a fine is levied upon a posses- sion gained in such a way that the title on which the equity attaches, is not altered or where the possession is gained on a confidence, and it is at- tempted to make title contrary to that 1. confidence, a fine and non-claim will make no bar, 381
tion, an answer is put in, swearing in such a manner that an injunction can- not be maintained on it; if the answer be afterwards falsified, the court will put the plaintiff in the same situation' as if the answer had been originally 308 fair,
See LANDLORD and Tenant, 1, 2. PRACTICE, 1, 8.
1. Purchase money remaining in the pur- chaser's hands to pay off incumbrances, shall bear interest. Hughes v. Kear-
..134 ney, 2. Interest on the arrear of an annuity bequeathed to a married woman for her sole and separate use, not given, though the fund was productive, and though there was a large residuum.An- derson v. Dwyer,.
İNTERROGATORIES, PERSONAL.
1. To be settled by the master,
1. Tenant restrained from cutting turf See PRACTICE, 7. for sale, (his lease giving a right of estovers only) notwithstanding an un- interrupted practice for eighty years. Lord Courtown v. Ward,
2. Where a verdict at law has been ob- tained against a defendant who neglects to apply for a new trial within the time appointed by the rules of the court of law, this court will not entertain a bill for an injunction on the ground that the plaintiff's demand was unconsci- entious, or that it was subject matter for an account: provided it was com- petent to the party to lay those grounds before the jury on the trial, or before the court of law on motion for a new trial. Bateman v. Willoe,
201 3. Where, to a bill filed for an injunc-
See MARRIAGE ARTICLE, 1, 2.
A.taking an assignment of a judgment from an assignee, is bound to look to the assignment to him: if he neglects to do so, and it prove that such assign- ment was in trust for the conusor, the judgment being satisfied, A. cannot set it up against creditors. But if A. took it without knowing of the fraud, he shall be satisfied by the person who 162 assigned to him, See PAPIST, 3.
1. The possession of a tenant even when abusing his right, or exercising it to an extent not authorised by his tenure, is still the landlord's possession; and the allowance for the abuse for any length of time shall not give the tenant a right to continue it, 2. Where there have been various deal- ings between landlord and tenant, so as to produce an account too complicated to be taken at law; and the landlord 2 has brought ejectment for non-payment of rent, the tenant may file a bill, before judgment at law; for an account on the foot of those dealings, and to have the balance applied to the rent claim- ed to be due, and for an injunction. O'Connor v. Spaight, 3. In such case the tenant need not bring in the rent, under statute 4 Geo. 1, c. 5,
"if she does not marry without the "consent of her trustees, the sum of "4007. one moiety to be paid her upon "her marriage with such consent, the "other moiety in one year after: but "if said M. was then married or should
marry without such consent, said
sum to sink into his personal fortune." M. being unmarried, is not entitled immediately either to principal or in- terest: not to principal, because mar- riage is a condition precedent, and the legacy therefore contingent until then: nor to interest, because the legacy is payable in futuro, and there is no suf- ficient ground of implication that in- terest was intended in the mean time. Ellis v. Ellis,
A legacy out of a personal fund, be- queathed generally, without assigning any time for payment, bears interest only from a year after the death of the testator, though the fund out of which it is to be paid consist of stock and other matters yielding immediate pro- fit. Pearson v. Pearson,
In such case, interest is payable from the end of the year, though the fund does not come to be disposable for the payment of the legacies until long after; and if the fund is productive within the year, the intermediate profits belong to the residuary legatee, 4. But if the legacy be charged on lands, interest is payable from the death of the testator, or not at all, - 11 5. Legacy to executor, to be distributed amongst the poor relations of testator. A relation who was poor at the time of testators death, but became rich before distribution, not entitled. Mahon v Savage,
111 6. A specific legacy cannot, in a subse- quent part of the will be charged with See ADMINISTRATOR pendente lite, 1. payment of debts and legacies, GRANDFATHER and GRANDCHILD, 1, 2.
PARENT and CHILD, 1.
1. Purchase money unpaid, is prima facie, alien on the lands sold, and if a secu- rity is taken for that money, it lies on
LIMITATIONS, (STATUTE OF) See GREAT SEAL, 1.
death of testator, it may be set up; for the debts are presumed to be paid, ibid.
3. The true meaning of the statute of limitations, as applied to titles to land, is, that the party shall have twenty years, during which it should be open to him to proceed to assert his title. Bond v. Hopkins,
1. By articles previous to the marriage of W. T. with R. F the father of W. 7. "bound the whole of the farm of, "&c. as a dowry or marriage portion "to his son W. T. along with R. F. "one half of said farm to be the right "title and interest of the issue, wheth- "er son or daughter, if begotten on "the body of R. F. by W. I" The issue take as tenants in common. Tag- gart v. Taggart, Joint-tenancy, as a provision for the children of a marriage, is an incon- venient mode of settlement, Limitation in a marriage article, to A. for life, subject to annuities for the lives of B. and C. and a charge for a jointure for D. if she should survive A. and after the death of said B. and C. A. and D. then to the use of the issue, &c.: The limitation to the issue is not to await the deaths of A. B. C. and D. but they are to take upon the death of A. subject to the charges for B. C. and D. Bushell v. Bushell,
4. Though the statute of limitations does not apply in terms to proceedings in equity, yet such proceedings are affect- ed by analogy to the statute: so that, in general, if a party be guilty, of such laches in pursuing his equitable title 3. as would bar him at law, he shall be barred in equity. But equity will re- move the legal bar proceeding from lapse of time, as it would any other legal advantage, if sought to be used unconscientiously. Ibid. 428, 431 5. Lapse of time shall not prejudice a person who has title, while seeking a discovery of that title from persons who have possessed themselves of the evidences of it. Ibid. 413, 425 See POSSESSION, 1.
1. Where there is a suit pending for for- ty years, and not abated, but remain-
Of changes on the Bench, &c. 136, 239
1. Mortgagee having got possession of mortgagor's title deeds, lodged them with an attorney, who claimed a lien on them for business done for mort- gagee. On the application of mortga- gor, mortgagee was restrained from proceeding at law upon his collateral security. Schoole v. Sall,
"at any time thereafter during his "life be qualified by law so to do." In 1778 he becomes qualified by law to carry - these articles into execution. The lands were not specifically bound by these articles until 1778, and there- fore judgments subsequent to 1764, but before 1778, were prior liens. Kennedy v. Daly,
355 2. To hold that the articles of 1764 bound the lands specifically, would defeat the intent of the parties, by giv- ing a title to a protestant discoverer,
3. Judgment creditors were not bound by the articles of 1764 prior to the statute 17 & 18 Geo. 3. From the passing of that statute they were bound, 373
176 2. But it was referred to the master to take an account of what was due for principal, interest, and costs, and the costs of the proceedings at law, and the money to be paid into the bank and remain until the title deeds should be secured, the mortgagor paying the costs at law and in equity, 177 3. Mortgagee has a right to proceed on his mortgage and bond at the same 4. time, (being an exception to the rule, that a party shall not sue at law and in equity at the same time); but mort- gagor shall not be obliged to pay upon his bond, unless secure of his title deeds being delivered up, ibid. 4. An executor of a mortgagee restrain- ed from enforcing payment, and the money ordered into court, where there was no heir of the mortgagee who could re-convey, 177 See REGISTRY, 5.
1. A papist, by articles on his marriage, in 1764, agrees "to convey to trustees "in strict settlement, in case he should
A papist neglecting to take the oaths prescribed by the statute 17 & 18 Geo. 3, c. 49, within six months, &c. was not protected by that statute from a protestant information, nor enabled to sue: but the consequences of such ne- glect are removed by statute 33 Geo. 3, c. 21, upon his performing the re- quisites therein mentioned, 355, 381.
PARENT AND CHILD.
1. In case of a legacy left by father to child, the child having no other pro- vision, it is a necessary implication that the legacy shall bear interest: but this implication is ousted if he pro- vides any maintenance for the child, however small the maintenance, and however large the legacy. Ellis v. Ellis,
1. Part-performance does not take a case out of the statute of frauds at law, though it does in equity. O'Herlihy v. Hedges, 123, 130 See AGREEMENTS, 4, 5.
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