kind, much in the same way that prevails in the concoction of Pantomimes; rendering just as much as they could understand, and supplying the place of what they could not comprehend by the substitution of slaps on the back, cuttings off of legs and arms, beating out of eyes, and other minutiæ equally pleasant and entertaining.-The present publication preserves this old translation wherever it represents the original and wherever it is not worse; but every picture and every trait of costume, however minute, is restored, and considerably more than half the book is re-translated.' (Preface, P. 44-) The language, as we might expect, is an odd mixture of antient and modern expressions, frequently ungrammatical, and to our apprehension uniformly dull and careless. The following passage is surely not corrected by Robert Southey?'

While the princess Flerida remained in the forest, expecting that which came not, as well to abandon divers choleric humours that overcharged her in patient mind, as also to exile the eager passions which were still approaching her weak nature, she busied herself in gathering dowers, for it was the month of May, accompanied with the fair Artada, and divers ladies and gentlemen; for that this time of recreation was more correspondent to her good liking, than heretofore she could conceive the opinion to like any. Thus she waited for the return of her lord Don Duardos, whose long absence she admitted to some misfortune, or else ungentleness in himself disdained her presence. In which of these to resolve herself she was doubtful, for that in the one she might convict herself of rash belief, though in the other, she might stand upon good occasion. Between these cogitations she spent this whole day, yielding her complaints likewise to the uncomfortable night approaching which indeed seemed to her more obscure, more grievous, and more desperable, than any night passed to her remembrance. So that upon this hard motion, she fell fato a resolute opinion, never to hear good tidings of her lord Don Duardos.'

On the whole, we dismiss Palmerin with every courteous wish for his happiness, and for his success in any future adventures with which he may meet: but we must decline to give him any letters of recommendation to our friends and readers, and cannot help wishing that we may never have another rencontre with him. As for Mr. Southey, we estimate so respectably his character and talents, that we really regret that he should devote himself to the correction of nonsensical Romances, while we can by no means praise him for the manner in which he has executed that office on the present occasion.

ART.

ART. VII. Mémoires, &c.; i. e. Memoirs of the Count Joseph De Pulsaye, Lieutenant-General. &c. &c. being Materials for the History of the Royalist French Party during the late Revolution. Vol. VI. in two Parts. 8vo. 16s. Boards. Budd.

WE E again resume the irksome task of attending to the confused and (seemingly) endless relations of M. de Puisaye but it is not within our province or our power to reduce a chaos of this sort into order, nor to form a narrative from a melange in which so little regard is paid to plan and method. Like the former volumes, the present discloses facts of great importance, and imparts communications which are of high interest: but they are mixed up with very undue proportion of matter which bears a very opposite character. A few of the more curious statements, and which wear most of the semblance of authenticity, we shall submit to our

readers.

If the counter-revolutionary plans of M. de P. have failed, he acquits the British ministry of having in any degree occasioned the course which was taken by events; and he speaks in the highest terms of their ready, chearful, and zealous co-operation.

• Every thing, (says he,) that I deemed necessary or useful for the success of my projects, I had only to demand in order to obtain. Far from experiencing in the offices those difficulties of detail and form by which opportunities are lost, and the best concerted and most matured schemes are defeated, I have found in them all as much alacrity as if in truth it had been the King of England whom we sought to restore to his throne, and not the King of France. Mr. Crewe in the ordnance, Mr. Nepean in the navy, and Mr. Huskis son in the finance departments, are names which I cannot recall without gratitude, and which are intitled to the acknowlegements of the royalists. Even now, at the distance of ten years, the latter gen tleman still feels that interest for them, which he displayed when they were making their greatest exertions; and when the ministry was changed previously to the peace of Amiens, Mr. Huskisson, who had been privy to the engagements of the preceding government in their favour, did them justice not in that doubtful and reluctant manner which annuls the obligation, but with that promptitude and good will which so much enhance the price of the service.'

These, then, were the important personages who were so active and alert in committing their country to those inauspicious measures, which have so deeply affected her fortunes, and which have accumulated on her burthens that are without parallel.

If, however, the cabinet of St. James's assisted M. de P. by their zeal, even according to his own account, he does

not

not seem to have been much indebted to their judgment. This fact is shewn by their imposing on him the Comte d'Hervilly as his second in command; an appointment which, according to the statements before us, occasioned the dismal catastrophe which terminated all the mighty preparations that, had been made, and the vast expence that had been incurred.

During the troubles which were occasioned by the obstinacy of the Archbishop of Sens and M. de Lamoignon, d'Hervilly was sent by the Government to Brittany at the head of a regiment of which he was the second colonel, to compel by force the submission of the country to the orders of these senseless innovators. As the object was nothing less than to annihilate all the remains of the Breton constitution, the resistance was unanimous ;-it was not a revolt but a whole people claimed the observance of those conditions on which they had consented to be united to. France; and who did not consider themselves as bound by their promises, any longer than the conditions accepted by the sovereign when they entered into them were observed. The government, too unwise to yield to justice, had recourse to coercion but when the griefs of a people (observes M. de P.) are founded in reason, the application of violence is a certain symptom of debility.'-On this occasion, M. d'Hervilly is said to have acted the soldier, and to have drawn on himself the detestation of all the Bretons, as well Royalists as Republicans. The lapse of a few years had not effaced the impression which this adventure had made. Yet this circumstance, which certainly ought to have formed no recommendation to the ministers of a monarch who owes his throne to the assertion of the right of resistance, and which with wise and calcu lating men must have weighed as an insurmountable objection to d'Hervilly's appointment, was lightly estimated by Mr. Pitt and his colleagues.

D'Her

The event, however, according to this author, proved to be extremely unfortunate; and, if we may trust his judgment, this unnatural preference, by ministers of a free country, caused the failure of the restoration of the Bourbons. villy is here charged with being under the influence of the courtiers of the Princes, and with having entered into their scheme to render the Quiberon expedition abortive. He is said to have set himself against his superior commander, to have insulted him, to have thwarted him in every thing, uniformly to have disobeyed his orders, and to have defeated all his plans by opposition or delay. It is worthy of notice, as shewing in what a ridiculous and preposterous manner this little party act who are in the interest of the French Princes, REY. OCT. 1809.

M

that

that this M. d'Hervilly, who is accused of having conde scended to be their tool, was regarded by them with suspicion and disdain, because he had accepted military preferment in 1791; and, says M. de Puisaye, it was represented by these -courtiers," that it was only from their hands that absolution for the Constitutional sin could be received, and the bastards of the Revolution could be legitimatized."

One of the instruments employed to excite d'Hervilly to this plan of counteracting his superior commander was M. de Contades, who is thus described by the present writer: M. de C. is one of those beings who cannot dissemble their incapacity, but who still have cunning enough to attach themselves to the fortune of others, so as to follow them in their elevation without running the risk of sharing in their fall. A courtier by instinct, greedy of favour, and prodigal of protestations, to which his benign exterior and slender powers lend an air of sincerity, he is always true to the trivial principle so familiar to animals like him, it is a good thing to have two strings to one's bow.'

M. de P. very properly inveighs against the unaccountable folly and perverseness of the emigrants, in confounding the Constitutionalists with the Jacobins. The proclamation issued by the author on the occasion of his ill-fated expedition avoided that error, and was drawn up with great good sense and moderation. In March 1795, we are informed, a letter from the Regent was published, which was little calculated to bring back the Constitutionalists to the interests of that Prince. This party,' observes M. de P., has been the only formidable one in the course of the whole revolution; and on the death of Robespierre, it gradually resumed its ascendancy, which the reign of terror had only suspended.' Though this party might have been conciliated, though it could never have been conquered but the councils of the Princes paid no regard to this consideration; and on the death of the Dauphin they issued a proclamation, the tendency of which was to counteract all the good effects of that of M. de Puisaye. In offering a general pardon, it enumerated the offenders, and made no distinction in favour of the Constituent Assembly: but it described its members as unfaithful trustees, who had betrayed the confidence placed in them, violated their oaths, paved the way to revolt, and caused all the evils that had occurred. required that the re-establishment of the royal authority should precede the reform of abuses.' This was language,' continues the author, which would have been suitable only after numerous victories, and was not such as ought to have been held to men who were in a situation to make their terms.

6

It

The royal counsellors, who had Monk and Charles constantly in their mouths, ought not to have forgotten that, if the declaration of Breda had been as vague as that of Verona, Charles would never have found his way to the throne.' This paper, circulated industriously in la Vendée by the agents of the court of Verona, clearly proves that, while the British ministers were exerting their utmost endeavours to restore the King of France, the depositaries of that prince's confidence were taking every step in their power to defeat the object of England. Innumerable facts, which occur in this volume, shew that the weakness of the princes, and the folly of their partisans, have more advanced the fortunes of Bonaparte than his own unparallelled abilities.

Count de Puisaye admits that his situation, on landing at Quiberon, was highly favourable, while that of the republican forces opposed to him was the reverse.

Hoche,' he states, had few troops, and discontent was general among his officers and soldiers, a natural result of their being in want of every thing, while we had abundance, and received intelligence of their proceedings from various quarters. It is indubitable that, if all the royalist divisions as well in Brittanny as in Maine and Normandy had risen together at this time, as they were disposed to do, and as I had given them orders to do, and if we had marched rapidly forwards, we should have prevented Hoche from collecting his small army, which lay dispersed over a surface of fifty leagues of country; and had this been done it is beyond all doubt that the deliverance of Brittany would have been effected; that the rescue of the whole kingdom would have followed; and that an immense majority of the French, who were as yet strangers to the impolitic declaration which the agents of the King had substituted for that which I had issued, would have shown themselves, and declared in favour of their lawful sovereign. I now speak only of the party of the royalists which I had organized but how much more certain would have been the result which I have mentioned, had the three armies which occupied la Vendée united in one grand movement ! Why was it only the Morbihan, which scarcely forms one fifteenth part of the insurgent countries, that rose in arms on our arrival? Why did not Poitou and Anjou, the remaining five fifths of Brittany and the Maine, follow the example? Of whom shall the widows and orphans demand their fathers and husbands, and the King of France his crown; and to whom are we to charge the blood which then flowed? The chiefs of la Vendée were apprized in time, and charged to be in readiness to co-operate with us on our arrival. They were disposed to do so; and how happened it that they did not? The agents of the royal favourites and confidants found means to communicate with the insurgents, and had impressed them to that degree with the idea of English perfidy, and the treachery of Pitt, that they paid no attention to promises from that quarter, but believed that I had been the dupe of the finesse of the British ministry;