Studies in Philosophical Criticism and Construction

THE explanation of the problem of Philosophy which is theoretically most satisfactory is generally found to be practically least so; the reason seems to be that in order adequately to comprehend the bearings. of the former, we must already in some degree have accustomed ourselves to philosophical reflection. In this Introduction my endeavour is to give a general indication of the ways in which the actual movements of human thought practically lead into Philosophy. We may regard these movements as arranging themselves round two foci,-scientific thought and religious thought; each of these is the focus of an area which has no clearly defined outer limit but fades away.

The problem of the true and reasonable relation between Science and Religion is a problem arising out of the relation between two deep but partially

independent activities of human thought; hence it is continually assuming new forms as the years go on. This is only natural; stagnation is impossible in human thinking, scientific thought and religious thought alike are never at a standstill. All experience shows that ideas are like seeds,-they must either die and vanish, or go on to grow; they cannot abide unchanged. Ideas may indeed seem to survive unchanged in the form of religious and political creeds; but in this case one of two things must in reality have happened. The ideas may die and leave behind them a husk of words,-professions of faith, creeds, and the like, which may be religiously preserved intact and repeated as divine truth for many generations, but which none the less are a mere form of words,-the meaning which once gave them life has gone. On the other hand, if the ideas are really significant and fruitful, if they are capable, through criticism, of giving birth to further thoughts, they must evidently become too wide and deep for the fixed expression they have received, so that they break it up and demand its

restatement.

Not only is it true that the fixed expression may be inadequate to the thought, but the thought itself may be inadequate to the reality which it endeavours to express. For although thought is a real activity or function of the human mind, and has a structure and laws of its own, yet it may fail to apprehend its own nature and aims. Again, the whole mind is not merely a thinking activity but is more; and these other functions of our nature may, and often do, grow and develop faster than the thinking function; then the latter fails to comprehend them, and the intellectual expression and explanation which it gives to

We may say

them may be thoroughly inadequate.1 that this is the case with every religious movement of the deeper and more vital sort, particularly in its earlier stages. Involved in every such movement is that kind of belief which is a principle of life rather than a declaration of the intellect; the belief which is part of a man's nature—a sign of his whole character. In this sense, when a man's belief grows wider and deeper, it is because his whole nature—or some vital function thereof-has grown, has taken a step forward. To take a very simple case, this is the belief which a child has in its mother. Now, since different functions of our nature-themselves equally vital to that nature may be unequally developed, it may happen that those who hold a real belief of this kind most intensely, whose lives may be entirely moulded by it, are the very ones who are least able to express it in an intellectual form-in the form of definite assertions which can be clearly understood. Either they cannot express it in this way at all, or if they do, the intellectual expression of it may be quite insufficient, or entirely or partly wrong. Would it not be absurd to expect the child to set down the particulars of its belief in its father and mother, in the form of a number of propositions beginning with 'I believe '-like a creed? Is the reason simply be

cause the child is a child-is not old enough and wise enough? I scarcely think so; for in regard to all our deepest beliefs, the real roots of our personal character,

1 On the other hand, the intellectual function may be in advance of the other sides of the man's nature; and the result of this will depend entirely on the extent to which the intellect is aware of the significance of its own principles and ideals. If it takes a superficial, inadequate view of these, it will engage in mere destructive criticism, which finally it will endeavour to direct upon itself, ending in Scepticism.

we are in the same position. We cannot dig up the roots of our own being.

It is well to remember that what we have been saying is as true of scientific text-books as it is of religious creeds. The inadequacy of the established creeds and confessions to express the best religious ideas of modern times is widely recognised, and the conflict and uncertainty which prevail are themselves signs of progress; but the case is not different with science. In those very sciences where there is the most constant discussion, with incessant conflict of ideas and incessant criticism, there is also the greatest hope of real progress and of the attainment of real knowledge. In those there are not many fixed results to show-the list of results that are distinct and clear is small; but there is every hope and prospect of its becoming larger. To this class belong the sciences dealing with the nature and history of living beings Physiology and Biology; and the science which endeavours to trace whatever law and order is to be found in the boundless complexity of the operations of mind-Psychology. But in the socalled 'exact' sciences, where fixed formulas are always appealed to, it is very questionable whether there is as much prospect of real knowledge. The exactness of these sciences - Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry-rests in measurement, so that their results. can be expressed in numbers; but numbers and measurements do not explain anything,-they cannot be more than descriptions, though of course very accurate descriptions, of facts of observation. It is in explanations that knowledge consists; mere descriptions are only the veriest beginning of knowledge. In so far as these sciences go beyond descriptions to

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