be the very nature of predication. The affirmative categorical asserts as real a Unity in the midst of a certain stated diversity,—it assigns an individual determination or finite centre to reality, and at the same time further qualifies it. The negative categorical denies that a suggested unity holds in a certain stated diversity, it denies that an individual is determined in a certain suggested way, on the (implicit) ground that it is conceived as determined in a way that excludes the suggestion. The Subject of the Judgment may be understood to symbolise1 the individual in all the completeness of the qualities or determinations (known and unknown) that really belong to it; this is the 'substance'; the known determinations, on the other hand, are the attributes.' The attributes' or 'modes' are simply as much of the 'substance' as is known, and, conceived as dependent, form the intension of the Subject; the function of the predicate is to extend the area of these. In other words, the conception of the Subject must have some degree of truth in reference to the Reality a degree which may be indefinitely far removed from the complete exhaustive truth, but is not therefore false unless it is treated as if it were the whole truth; and the function of the predicate is to bring this conception to a certain extent nearer the complete truth.2 Since, as we have said, the individualities to which such Judgments refer are numerically distinct, we have differences of 'quantity,' socalled, in Judgment, according to the greater or less. extent of the group to which the subject-term refers.

1 This does not imply that the intension of the term includes the unknown determinations; the intension consists of the known determinations conceived as depending upon others yet to be known.

2 To this point we shall have to return.

All the Judgments which thus categorically refer to and qualify an individual or group may be called 'individual' a term which seems preferable to 'singular,' though this designation is employed by Bradley, Bosanquet, and Sigwart. In all of them the Subject is limited by certain conditions of time and space, and only under these conditions is the Judgment true. These limits of the truth are always determined by their relation to the 'here-now' of present perception, -whether this reference is explicitly indicated or not. Of such a kind are those apparently universal but really individual Judgments where the 'all' refers to a group thus limited. From these apparent universals we must distinguish the real or absolute universal, as it may best be called, where the 'all' is not limited by any reference to time or place. The characteristic of the Individual Judgment is to qualify its subject by conditions which are true of some particular sphere in time and space; to transcend this limitation is the characteristic of the Universal Judgment.1

§ 4. This brings us to an important doctrine which has been emphasised by recent logicians, but which, I think, has scarcely yet been stated so as to appear in its true light. For our intelligence, all individual Judgments are categorical and all true universals are hypothetical, or rather conditional. The term 'hypothetical,' employed by Bradley and others, is a very unfortunate one in this connection, for it suggests that doubt or uncertainty attaches to the true Universal by its very nature, which would be a fatal error. Whatever uncertainty is involved may arise, on the one

1 When this fundamental distinction in Judgments is once grasped, all subordinate distinctions become comparatively insignificant.

hand, from the fact that the universal Judgment has been illegitimately arrived at, or on the other, from the fact that we are not sure whether it can be legitimately applied to some particular case. The Universal is a scientific generalisation, stating a law of the universe, and is only applicable in experience that is to say, under the conditions of time and space-if the circumstances which it postulates are realised there.

This distinction of the individual Judgment as 'categorical' from the universal as 'hypothetical' is no doubt fairly true of the procedure of intelligence in ordinary and in scientific thinking. Individual Judgments are normally and fittingly expressed in the categorical form, while the universal or law is not accurately expressed in any other form than the conditional. It is, however, a purely relative distinction,-it cannot for a moment be maintained to be final or absolute. We shall see that there is a deeper reason why every Judgment from its nature must be conditional, not in relation to events in space and time, but to Reality as a whole. Nevertheless, the distinction in question has a real significance which is often overlooked, and which appears when we regard it as an inaccurate statement of the distinct and necessary parts played by the Individual and Universal Judgments in the growth of knowledge. No such real Universal can be used as knowledge-i.e., it cannot be made a means of interpreting experience-apart from the 'categorical' singular Judgments in which its application to experience consists. I do not imply that this has been ignored; it is impossible to ignore the function of the minor' (the individual Judgment) in relation to the 'major' (the Universal, or law of Nature). The fact that has tended to pass out of sight is this: we require to investigate

the question, In what sense is the Universal true of experience of events in space and time? Mr Bradley and Mr Bosanquet have shown that the truth of the real Universal, or pure 'hypothetical,' consists—in one aspect of it-in its reference to an actual objective system within which it is affirmed; in this system general laws of connection obtain, so that it becomes possible to affirm a universal and necessary relation in the form, 'given A, then B must follow.' This is the world of what we have called Harmony: it is the world of science-the same objective system to which, as we saw, every Judgment refers, but now in process of organisation by science. The truth, then, of the real Universal lies in its affirmation1 of the connection of the then with the if—that is, the affirmation of the existence in reality "of such a general law as would, if we suppose some conditions present, produce a certain result." Thus in the pure hypothetical form of Judgment the reference of our thought to an objective system is more explicit than in any Judgment which can properly be expressed in the categorical form.

The whole interest of the two writers has its centre in this reference to a general law, with its implication of an objective system, and in the further question as to how far the law or ground of the hypothesis is implicit, occult, or latent in the universal Judgment when expressed in its proper conditional form. But this reference is only one side of the truth of the universal Judgment; the latter requires also to be connected with experience; a universal that was not so connected would be barren and empty as knowledge. Now to

1 This affirmation Mr Bradley takes to be 'categorical.'

2 Any number of Universals cannot give us more than such a system of relations without terms as that which Green has in view.

ask, In what sense are Universals true of experience? is to ask, In what sense are Individual Judgments true? the former question involves the latter. The Universal (bearing no reference to time or place) cannot be true of experience (which consists of events in time and space) until it has been brought into relation with experience; and it cannot be brought into relation with experience at all unless an individual Judgment, referring to time and place, is true. This appears very clearly in the case of such an ultimate generalisation as the Law of Uniformity,—“the same system of causes will have the same effect." This I take to be categorically true, as a fundamental postulate of our intelligence: a system of causal conditions ABCD..., having occurred once with the effect E, will have the same effect wherever and whenever it occurs again. But what avails this for the growth and organisation of our knowledge, unless we can say truly-in some sense of the word, or significance of the idea-that 'here,' or there,' is a case of the conditions A B CD...? The same relation between the two kinds of knowledge appears when we consider the proof or discovery. of such Universals. When (as above) the Universal expresses, in the form of a Judgment, what is a constituent part of the organic structure of intelligence, then the notion of proof is inapplicable to it; but in most cases the Universal states a law formulated on grounds of experience. In such a case we may say that a single individual instance here and now may form the ground of a truly universal law, provided the investigation of it is sufficiently thorough; but whatever the process of the investigation, it can only consist of individual Judgments. Again, therefore, the truth of the latter is an important aspect of the case. We