the changing presentations and growing cognitions of the individual consciousness. The fact of this apparent reference, and the manner of its occurrence in Judgment, Psychology must accurately set forth; but Psychology rests in the appearance. Epistemology does not rest in the appearance: its business is continually to emphasise this fundamental constituent of knowledge, and to show that it cannot be doubted, perverted, or denied, as is done by the various forms of Scepticism, Relativism, Subjective Idealism, and the like. In the course of this inquiry it would be shown that the fact in question is no mere Intuitionthat it is not merely a clear and distinct belief arising inevitably in consciousness: this much Hume and every Sceptic would willingly allow. It would be shown to be a belief which is rationally inevitable, by exposition of the consequences to which doubt or denial. of it must inevitably lead.1

Intuitionism makes the certainty of all the fundamental principles of knowledge consist in their isolation-i.e., each is known to be certain, in and for itself, on simple presentation of it to the rational faculty. The best modern expositions of this point of view will be found in the writings of Dr James Martineau and of Hermann Lotze.2 The Theory of Knowledge must, I think, regard the matter from another point of view. Its aim should be to exhibit knowledge as an organic unity of such a kind that no one constitutive principle of it can be denied without denying all the rest—that

1 For an indication of the lines on which such an Inquiry would proceed, I may refer to Professor A. Seth's Scottish Philosophy, ed. 2.

2 See especially Lotze's Logic, bk. iii. Historically we should also refer to Hamilton, and then back to Jacobi, by whose influence Hamilton was largely dominated.

is, without giving up every kind of knowledge. We wish to discover the vital functions of knowledge, or the principles whose organic co-operation is essential for its existence; and the importance of such functions lies not in their isolation but in their union. On this view the basal principles of knowledge will be of such a character that they prove one another when put together, though no one of them can authenticate itself in isolation. But it must not for a moment be supposed that we are within sight of the possibility of forming such a system of first principles: this must remain an ideal merely, though it is an ideal which must be steadily kept in view if any progress is to be made in the Theory of Knowledge. Hence we have provisionally to accept the doctrine that all mediate certainty must in the end rest on immediate knowledge, and that the ultimate premisses of proof cannot be proved. At the same time we have to recognise that this point of view-which is essentially that of Intuitionism-is not final, but only a temporary stage: though we may have long to remain in it.

1

§4. We have now to raise the following questions: In what sense does the psychologist deal with Reality? In what sense does the epistemologist start from Reality? In what sense does he endeavour to pass to Reality? The answers that will be suggested may be thus summed up. (a) Epistemology begins by assuming Reality in the psychological sense: that is, it starts with a conception of Reality which, though sufficient for its purpose, is very partial and incomplete. (b) It does not endeavour to pass to Reality: it endeavours

1 Mainly suggested by Professor Jones's attack upon Epistemology, Mind, N.S., Nos. 7, 8.

to vindicate a function of knowledge which is a psychological fact. (c) This function of knowledge refers to Reality-which for the pure Theory of Knowledge can be defined only in a negative and relative way. From the very nature of the case, we cannot attempt to make this conception of Reality positive, or to complete the (psychological) conception with which we started, until a clear view has been obtained of the significance of the epistemological problem. (d) The attempts just made constitute Metaphysics, or (a much more appropriate term) Ontology-the science of Reality as a whole.

In the first place, then, what is Reality for the psychologist? In other words, what is the nature of the fundamental function or union of functionswhich we concluded it was necessary to take as the principle of scientific explanation in Psychology? This question has already been answered by implication. We have seen (in § 1) that the psychological subject—that is, the Reality with which Psychology deals-must at least signify a unity of the many distinguishable states; and (in § 2) that this reality has a double aspect, -i.e., the Presentation in its various grades of ideality, from Perception through Imagination to Conception and Judgment, and the states of Activity and Feeling that cannot enter into any Presentation as constituent elements of it. I return to the question in order to bring out more clearly what was implied. We found that the reference to self, though always occurring within the field of presentation in the wide sense of the term 'presentation' which has just been indicated-appears as a reference beyond the factual sphere of presentations as such: which is an indication that the Subject is not simply

a name for their unity and continuity, but, while meaning this, means also more. Accordingly, as I have already implied, the natural view, which we spontaneously tend to take, is that the function of consciousness is not exhausted in the unification of its contents. Consciousness is more than knowledge,it is not all merely cognitive. There is a great tendency to treat it as if it were this-especially since all its constituents are more or less known about whenever in self-consciousness we reflect upon our mental functions. This tendency-which shows itself in Metaphysics as Intellectualism, in Psychology as what has been called Presentationism-seems to me to be profoundly and fatally wrong. It is because consciousness is more than knowledge that we are able to be self-conscious at all. The factors of consciousness which are more than knowledge constitute what Hamilton would have called the 'subjectively subjective' side of our mental life; in this we can distinguish (a) an intensive state which is in general conditioned by the presentations; and (b) an intensive state which in general conditions the presentations. These are respectively Feeling (pleasure or pain) and Activity, which is essentially selective or feeling-directed in relation to the presentations. Neither of these notions can be further analysed or defined. The facts they stand for are matters of an experience closer than knowledge. The psychologist must decline to give any account of the reality of the presentations except by his impartial analysis of them and of their relations

1 Self-consciousness has a real content which is more than the content of the objective knowledge realised by that self. When I am reflectively selfconscious, I am not merely conscious of having attained to certain knowledges about Reality beyond me.

to these subjective facts; and this analysis at the same time constitutes all the account he can give of the reality of the Subject of these presentations. But his account must be partially true; if it is true in the psychological reference it cannot be false in any other reference. A completely true account of the reality of the Subject would be a final ontological account. Thus Psychology depends on an ontological hypothesis, but on one which is limited; it is this limitation which specialises Psychology—in other words, distinguishes it from Ontology. Our conclusion, then, in brief is, that Psychology compromises with Ontology by declining to transcend this fact of presentation to a Subject, as we have analysed it: declining to transcend it in either direction, subjective or objective.

In truth it is impossible to ignore the metaphysical and ethical aspects of psychological inquiry. I venture directly to reverse the ordinary view and say that the more truly scientific the inquiry becomes, the less possible is it to ignore them. It is only by a compromise, merely for practical convenience, that the separation is made. We cannot entirely separate the science from metaphysics, and at the same time leave metaphysical questions open and unprejudiced; certain fundamental questions are implicitly settled by such a separation, since the implication will be that there is nothing in mind beyond the elements which the 'scientific' 'nonmetaphysical' treatment makes use of in its so-called explanation. When we have made the practical compromise referred to, there is always an extensive region of psychological work wherein such compromise produces little difficulty. For the rest, it is in the interest of clear thinking not to stretch the separation of Psychology and Metaphysics, since then we can make our