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of intellectualism.' But we do not correct 'intellectualism' by opposing Emotion and Will to Thoughtassuming that Reality is found in them more than in Thought and that we are before all things active and feeling beings; nor by regarding our nature as a mere combination of the three, as a rope may be of three strands; but by regarding even our deepest knowledge of these three (in their distinction and relation) as itself only symbolic and partially true; so that the three functions become three inseparable and equally complete symbols of what man verily is. Our most perfect knowledge is only the most perfect symbol of what we are—the most perfect yet attained. It does not yet appear whether it will be always thus with our knowledge, or whether an absolute knowledge will still be symbolic or not.

By consistently carrying out these principles, it becomes possible to conceive the reality of God, of Man, and of Nature or the world, without merging two of them in the third, as Pantheism, Sceptical Idealism, and Naturalism do; and to conceive this without denying the absolute validity of the real laws of Thought.

I gladly take the opportunity which these words of preface afford, of acknowledging a twofold obligation to the Hibbert Trust: first, for the many advantages I have enjoyed as a Hibbert Scholar; and again, for generous and timely assistance in the publication of this book.


November 1897.




Philosophy as the synthesis of Science and Religion ; past and

present aspects of the relation between these two great
movements of human thought, pp. 1-32.



This subject may be conveniently considered under the heads of
Psychology, Epistemology, Ontology.

§ 1. The subject of Psychology is the description and explanation

of conscious states as such. The implications of this mode
of statement : ‘as such, 34; "explanation,' 35-38 ; 'descrip-
tion, 39, 40. No clear separation can be made between
Psychology and Logic: to pass from one to the other is to

shift the centre of gravity of a continuous inquiry, 41-45.
§ 2. The subject of Epistemology is the structure of knowledge.

Two main branches of that structure : limitation of the meta-
phor of 'branches,' 45. The validity of the reference to Self

must be explicitly recognised by Psychology, 46-50.
§ 3. The reference to an Objective World from which the self is

distinguished : meaning of objective' and of ‘reference,' 51-54.

§ 2. The law of Identity as applied to the meaning of words, 132 ;

illustration from Mathematics suggested, 133.

§ 3. The law of Identity as applied to the meaning of ideas (the

real principle here discussed): its formulation, 134. How it

explains and justifies predication as referring to real individuals,


Differentia of the individual and universal forms of

Judgment, 136.

§ 4. The connection between the two forms of Judgment. Sense

in which the universal is `hypothetical,' 136-138 ; how it implies

the reality of a general law and the reality of an individual, of

which the law is to hold, 138-140. The same connection is

still more evident in disjunction ; how this implies the reality

of a system of orderly relations, as Bosanquet shows, and the

reality of an individual placed in the system, as Sigwart and

Lotze show, 140-143.

§ 5. Hence the question : In what sense is the individual Judg-

ment true? Bradley's view, 143, 144, leads us to distinguish

two senses in which all Thought may be 'abstract, 144, 145.

Significance of the second of these, for the two main forms of

Judgment, 145-147. Questions arising out of the first ineaning

of the 'abstract,'—in connection with the individual Judgment

and its dependence on 'Sense,' 147-149.

§ 6. Hence we are led to the question of the relation between

Sense and Thought. Two views, 149-152. The individual

Judgment may be true, because the objective reality is re-

vealed in Sense only when Thought has emerged from Sense

and begun to work upon it, 152, 153.

Part iv. Fuller definition of Individuality.

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