principles, and a new and ample field is opened to his astonished view. He then not merely looks upon a Washington, a Lafayette, a Schuyler or a Greene, as a brave man fighting with enthusiasm and skill in the cause of the people, with a plan confined to the narrow limits of the battle-field; but he sees operations developed by the minds of great men, so vast, so extensive, for hundreds of miles around, that he reads accounts of their achievements as mental, as well as moral and physical, victories over the invading foe. It is this great plan that constitutes the interest of the science of war; it is this that exhibits the majesty of mind; it is this that, even now, may elevate our veneration for the living, and reverence for the dead, heroes of our army and navy-that may exalt their merits still higher in the estimation of the American people; it is this that gives defensive war, in the hands of men engaged in a just cause, a dignity that God himself, in his providence, has smiled upon it, when our fathers struggled for the rights of man.

In laying down the fundamental principles of war in this chapter, we shall avail ourselves of the information of the very best authorities now extant, to draw rich stores of knowledge from the latest English, French and German works, which it was heretofore impossible to obtain without much labour or expense.

If it should be asked why we obtain much of our information from European works, let it be remembered that we owe our tactics to Europe, and that it was against European tactics that our heroes had to exercise their powers. It was not so much the possession of superior tactics on the part of the Americans that crowned their efforts with victory, as the superior application of them to practice. Many of our illustrations of principles are taken from foreign wars, but they are merely to develope principles, as carried out by various distinguished chief commanders of ancient and modern times, under different circumstances, to make the subject more clear and comprehensible to those who have not made war a particular study, or who have not had the good fortune of seeing those few rare works on this subject in the different languages.

Independent of the numerous other advantages resulting from such an arrangement, which are too obvious to need any further comment, by rendering these maxims clear, (which are applicable to wars in all countries), by foreign examples chiefly, we shall avoid repetition in describing the American campaigns, which will, incidentally, develope their own governing principles with clearness and perspicuity to those acquainted with military movements; or who first carefully peruse this key to the wonderful projects of the great general, and the thrilling and startling secrets of his success.

I.

To throw, by a combined operation, the greatest mass of forces upon the decisive or primitive objective point, in which resides the principle of strength in the enemy, so as to destroy this point in the shortest, most decided and effectual manner, constitutes the one great governing principle-the maxim of maxims in war; in other words, to attack the most vulnerable point of the enemy, which conquered, would be most decisive in terminating the war. All other maxims or precepts are intended to instruct us in the mode of accomplishing this great object.

II.

The application of the first maxim to a great and perfect operation ought to include these three primitive combinations:-First, forming the plan of a campaign, offensive or defensive, embracing the lines of operation in the best manThe second is the art of moving the mass of forces with the greatest rapidity upon the objective point of the line of operations. This is the mode of execution or strategy. The third is the art of combining the mass of forces to act simultaneously on the most important point on the battle

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field.

1. In laying a plan of campaign, six essential points present themselves to our consideration: a, the political situation of both parties; b, the situation at the particular time; c, the relative force and means of carrying on the war; d, the location and distribution of the armies of both parties; e, the natural lines of operations; ƒ, the most advantageous line of

operations. The relative means of war between the parties are only to be viewed as they are of importance. Territorial or manœuvring lines of operation, says a late writer, are the principal object; and though they are subject to many accessory considerations, the rules of the art must nevertheless form their basis. Originality and great boldness are not incompatible with their application.

But, before we proceed, it will be proper to give a definition of several military terms.

A base or basis of operations is the frontier, a large river, a coast, chains of mountains, fortresses, deserts or any topographical or political extent of country, upon the imaginary line of which the corps of an army assemble, offensively, to take their departure from thence into the country of the enemy, and to which, if they fail, they intend to retreat; defensively, to counteract all the measures of an invading foe.

Lines of operations are territorial and manoeuvring lines. The territorial lines are those traced by art or nature for the defence or invasion of states. Frontiers covered with fortresses, or having a natural defence, as mountains, rivers, &c., form their constituents. Manœuvring lines are the dispositions of the general to traverse them offensively, or cover them defensively. Both these lines of operations are intimately connected. In offensive war, the line is an imaginary perpendicular upon the base, along which an army operates against the enemy; in defensive war it is often the same, but still oftener parallel to the territorial line. A line of communication is either the same as that of operations, or any other by which the army receives its supplies and communicates with the base.

Some examples will render the definition more intelligible. France and Austria have three great lines of operations against each other; by Italy on one side, Switzerland and Tyrol on the centre, and by Germany on the other. In these the Po, the Maine, the Danube, or a principal road, constitutes the matériel of lines, which are amenable to only a few rules presented by their nature. Between Prussia and Austria are again three lines-through Moravia, Lusatia, and

Saxony. Lines of operations are divisible into collateral or separate points. Frederick entered Bohemia by his central line upon four points. The French invaded Germany, in 1796 and 1799, upon two subdivided lines. Napoleon always operated upon one principal line, as did the Duke of Wellington in Spain.

2. Rapidity of movement increases the force of an army by enabling the mass to be carried alternately on every point of the line. "The whole mystery of warlike operations is centred in the legs!" says Marshal Saxe. Napoleon holds nearly the same language: "The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army, and increases all the chances of victory." WASHINGTON said so, if you please, when he took possession of Dorchester Heights, and compelled the British army to leave Boston without firing a gun; thus winning the game by the very first move. He again acted in accordance with the same principle, when he rushed like a meteor from the north to the south, to besiege Yorktown and strike the decisive blow before John Bull got his spectacles fairly adjusted to see where he was. Rapidity, says Montecuculli, is of importance in concealing the movements of an army, because it leaves no time to divulge the intention of the commander. It is, therefore, an advantage to attack the enemy unexpectedly-to take him off his guard-to surprise him, and let him feel the thunder before he sees the flash. But if too great celerity exhausts your troops, while on the other hand delay deprives you of the favourable moment, you must weigh the advantage against the disadvantage, and choose between. Marshal Villars observes, that in war everything depends upon being able to deceive the enemy; and, having once gained this point, in never allowing him time to recover himself. Villars has united practice to precept. His bold and rapid marches were almost always crowned with success. It was the opinion of Frederick the Great, that all wars should be short and rapid; because a long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates the state, and exhausts its resources. The principle of rapid

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ity, carried to the extent of Villars and Frederick, however, must be received with some caution: in the case of the latter, in adopting it as a maxim; in that of the former, in the manner of carrying it into execution. In the one we must be governed by circumstances; in the other by prudence. If the movements of an army are too slow, their antagonists will not only guard against surprise, but be prepared for their reception. General Schuyler retreated before Burgoyne, but he threw so many obstacles in his way, that by the time he arrived at Saratoga the Americans were prepared to meet him.

3. Among the first principles in battle is that of operating with a superior force upon a decisive point, because the physical force of organic numbers in arms furnishes the unerring means of victory when the moral qualities in both armies are equal. The means of bringing this force to bear in the most advantageous manner is the art of fighting; consequently, courage and fortune being nearly balanced, that general who can operate with the largest mass upon the most decisive point must be successful: but, to effect this purpose, the combinations must be such as to produce a unity of movements, conducing simultaneously to the same object.

It is necessary to avoid dispositions which have generally proved fatal; such as, 1st, forming isolated divisions; 2d, ordering extended movements, which deprive the army of a part of its strength, and enable the enemy to ruin either the main body or the detachment; 3d, positions with too great an extent of front; 4th, allowing obstacles to separate the wings, or obstacles which prevent the connexion of columns, and expose them to separate defeats.

The first combinations are those which produce an oblique order of battle-those with a wing reinforced, those which outflank the enemy, and those which form a perpendicular upon a hostile extremity, or upon a scattered centre. These are almost always successful, because they present a whole line to an extremity, and therefore a greater mass than the enemy. Thus the fundamental principle of all military combinations, namely, to effect with the greatest mass of forces