VIII.

In the formation of large armies, the great variety of stores and ammunition which are required, makes it necessary to establish positions, forming depôts or magazines, and keep the communication with them always open and yet protected. These positions are the base—the foundation of all offensive war, from which the line of operations is directed forward into the enemy's country.

IX.

There are a great variety of manœuvring lines. Simple lines of operations, where an army operates in only a single direction from a frontier, without forming detached corps. Double and multiplied lines, when it acts upon the same frontier with two or three isolated corps, towards one or several objects. Interior lines of operations are formed to oppose several hostile lines, and are so directed as to possess internal connexion, and enabled to move and approach each other, without allowing the enemy to oppose a superior mass to them. Exterior lines, on the contrary, possess the opposite qualities: they are such as an army may form at the same time, upon the two extremities of one or several hostile lines. Lines upon an extended front are those which are arranged upon a great contiguous development by isolated divisions, but still belonging to the same mass of forces, and operating upon the same object. Under this head are comprehended, likewise, lines formed by two separate corps upon one given extent they are then double lines upon a great front. Deep or lengthened lines are those which, commencing at their base, pass over a great extent of country before they can attain their object; as Napoleon's campaign into Russia. Concentric lines of operation are either several or a single line subdivided, moving from distant points in order to arrive at the same object, in front or in rear of their base. Eccentric lines designate a single mass starting from one point, and dividing itself in order to form several diverging lines upon isolated objects. Secondary lines are those in the great combinations of two armies, which designate their relative connexion while operating upon the development of the same

frontier. Accidental lines are produced in the original plan of campaign, when unexpected events necessitate a new direction for the operations. They are of the highest importance, and rarely adopted but by generals of the first abilities. Among all these lines, the simple and interior are the best, particularly when combined, as being most congenial to the great principle of carrying a mass of troops upon the decisive point. A few remarks will make the truth of this apparent. If an army advances from its base of operations upon one line, it is clear that the general commanding will have but two important dangers to provide against; first, that of his troops being attacked unawares; and, secondly, that of being turned and cut off from his communications with his base. An army, on the other hand, which moves upon double, exterior or multiplied lines, must be weakened in proportion to the number of its divisions. The general has many combinations to attend, and many dangers to guard against; his columns being on many roads, and unconnected, must also be dependent upon many persons and many orders. Obstacles will be multiplied at every step; and errors cannot be known or corrected without much loss of time.

X.

Fig. 1.

North Sea

The configuration of the theatre of war may possess the same importance as that of a frontier; for, in fact, every theatre of war may be considered as a quadrilateral figure. To elucidate this idea, the scene of operations of the French army from 1757 to 1769, and the operations of Napoleon in 1806, A may be cited. In Fig. 1, the side A B being enclosed by the North Sea, the side BD by the river Weser, base of the army of Prince Ferdinand; CD representing the river Maine, base of the French, and A C the Rhine, likewise in possession of

the French; their armies operating

Rhine

Maine

Weser

offensively on the sides A C and C D, had the third, A B,

or North Sea, in their favour, and therefore B D was the only side which they were to gain by their manœuvres, to have possession of the four sides, and consequently of the base of all the communications of their adversary.

This is more clearly exemplified in Fig. 2. The French

M

Fig. 2.

army, E, proceeding from the base, BC D, to gain the position F G H, cuts off the allied army, J, from the side B D, its only communication and base. It would thus be driven into the angle LA M, which is formed near Embden by the line of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea; while the army, E, could always communicate with CD, or the Maine.

E

H

D

The manœuvre of Napoleon on the Saale, in 1806, was combined on the same principle. He moved upon Jena and Naumburg in the position F G H; and then advancing by Helle and Dessau, he threw the Prussian army, J, upon the side, A B, formed by the sea. The fate which attended that army at Erfurth, Magdeburg, Lübeck, and Prentzlow, is well known. The great art, therefore, consists in combining the marches so as to arrive upon the communications of the enemy without sacrificing one's own. Now the lines F G H, by means of the prolonged position and the angle formed towards the extremity of the enemy, always preserves the communication with the base, C D. This constitutes the application of the manœuvres of Marengo and Jena.

When the theatre of hostilities is not near the sea, it will be still circumscribed by some great neutral power, which guards the frontier, and encloses one side of the quadrangle. No doubt this barrier is inferior to the sea, but, in a general view, it must nevertheless be considered as an obstacle, upon which it is dangerous to be driven after a defeat, and advantageous to push an enemy. A state with 200,000 men will not suffer its neutrality to be violated with impunity; and if a beaten army ventured so to do, still it would be cut off from its base. But if an inferior power forms the limit of

the theatre of war, the square of operations may then be considered as extending over it to the next great neutral power, or the sea.

To give a still more convincing proof of the justness of the preceding ideas, let us examine the scene of the campaign of 1806-7, in Poland. The Baltic and the frontier of Austrian Gallicia formed the two sides A B and CD of the above square. It was of great consequence to both parties to avoid being driven upon either of these obstacles. The configuration of the frontiers may modify the sides of the square, and convert them into a parallelogram, or a trapezius, as in Fig. 3. In this case, the army G H, being in possession of the sides A C and CD, would be still more favourably situated, because the base of the opponent, being contracted at B D, would be more difficult to keep open. The front of the base B D having less extent, offers fewer resources for manoeuvring, and affords to the army, G H, the

A

G

K

Fig. 3.

H

B

means of operating with more success, because the direction of the line CD naturally leads upon the communications of the enemy, and because the space to be occupied in order to cut him off is shorter, and therefore more easily held with concentrated forces.

Thus it will be seen that the manner of embracing a theatre of war is amenable to these two principles:

1. To direct the masses upon the decisive points of the line of operations; that is, upon the centre, if the enemy has imprudently scattered his forces, or upon an extremity, if he is in a contiguous line.

2. To make the great effort, in the latter case, upon that extremity which has its back against an insurmountable obstacle, or which leads upon the communications of the enemy without sacrificing our own.

XI.

Passive defence should never be depended upon, nor mere

fortresses without an army, as it would be like a shield without a sword. It is very obvious that the defensive system which has the greatest number of offensive faculties is always to be preferred. In passive defence the enemy can choose their own time and place to strike, and prepare accordingly; but in offensive operations, besides increasing the morale of the army, as already observed, the enemy has not time or does not know where to concentrate their forces. Independent of this, you keep the horrors of war out of your own country by successful invasions of the enemy's country.

XII.

As armies defend a country, so fortresses defend armies. These likewise secure the magazines, stores, and hospitals of an army, and save the matériel and broken troops after a defeat.

XIII.

At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance is a matter of grave consideration; but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skilful the manœuvres, a retreat always weakens the morale of an army, because losing the chances of success; these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and matériel than the most bloody battles; with this difference, that in battle the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own, whereas in a retreat the loss is on your side only.

Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats are so favourable as those which are made before a languid and unenterprising enemy; for when he pursues with vigour, the retreat soon degenerates into a rout. Upon this principle it is a great error, says the Marshal, to adhere to the proverb which recommends us to build a large bridge of gold for a retreating enemy. No.-Follow him up with spirit, and he is destroyed.

XIV.

Although it has been already stated that it is better to attack the extremity of a line, yet it must appear evident that both the extremities should not be attacked at the same time,