Charleroy; and, next, facilitated the junction of the Prussians; and, besides, the corps on the other side of the Hain flanked the advance, and could, in a short time, be sustained by the two divisions in its rear, and which he knew to be at hand. He would, therefore, have been placed between two fires, and have lost his point of retreat upon Charleroy; and the road by Nivelles might, meantime, be cut off by the troops left behind at Mons. Again, if he threw his masses towards the left, he only went to meet the Prussians, and left the British masters of the road of Nivelles, and possibly, if he advanced far, of that of Charleroy. He entangled himself in woods and defiles, where his superior cavalry could not act. The character of his opponent bespoke immediate offensive movements from the moment his right would be at liberty; therefore the chances were again in favour of the enemy; yet this was the only advantageous side, because it brought him nearer Grouchy, and, in case of defeat, he could take a new line of retreat by Namur. He, however, preferred the experiment which the enthusiastic valour of his troops might enable him to make; and this committed him so deeply, that, when at length the Prussians appeared, a retreat was no longer possible.

These observations disprove the ignorant assertion, that little skill was displayed on either side. The generals and the soldiers equally did their duty: the veteran Blucher behaved with just prudence in keeping so long back from the dangerous manœuvre which was assigned him; and when he saw the hostile cavalry destroyed, he acted with vigour and skill. As for Grouchy, who wasted his time in forcing the position of Wavre across the Dyle, everywhere fordable, his manœuvres show that he felt the danger of his movement, and he wisely remained on the banks. Much might be added upon the judgment which posted the corps at Wavre, and another at Hal, on the several lines of retreat which the allies could take in case of defeat, on the dispositions of the artillery, the squares and lines formed and reduced repeatedly, the dispositions and effect of the charges of cavalry, the counter-offensive of the Prussians, the general charge to the

front, and fate of the enemy's squares; but enough has been stated to recommend the study of a battle where the greatest commanders and the best manœuvring armies in Europe struggled for victory, and decided whether the divine right of kings should or should not prevail.

Having thus given a compilation of the warlike operations by land, we shall now proceed to the warlike operations at sea, commencing with some general observations upon naval actions, from the "French Naval Tactics," as given in the Military and Naval Magazine of 1835.

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CHAPTER II.

WARLIKE OPERATIONS AT SEA.

It is necessary, in fleets as well as in single vessels, to consider the absolute force, or material strength, resulting from the number of men and guns; and the relative force, which comprises all that superiority of talents, experience, boldness, activity, perseverance, discipline, in short, all that moral causes can add to the chances for success.

A commander cannot double the number of his men or his ships; but he may cause them to acquire a degree of relative force, which will be limited only by the extent of his ability, and the confidence which it inspires. The application of this principle must not, however, be pushed too far; for at sea, where there is no permanent position to be occupied or maintained, it is not always easy to preserve for a long time an equality between unequal material forces, when in presence of each other. But, if the commander cannot perform impossibilities, it is certain that he may supply, to a certain extent, the want of numbers, by his talents for command or

by the excellence of his preparatory arrangements he may also supply the want of numbers, by calling to his aid, when opportunities may offer, that principle which is the proper basis of every military system, and which demands a vigorous and powerful attack upon a weak point of your enemy.

Thus, in consequence of an acquired superiority, or of the effects of a favourable position, or, what is still better, by a combination of both, a vessel of inferior force may resist another which is superior. The same may be said of a fleet of inferior numbers, even when possessed of no other means of balancing that inferiority than the power of throwing his whole, or a superior, force, on a part of the opposing fleet. In this sense, skill consists in obtaining over an opponent the advantage of absolute force, by neutralizing a part of his, instead of attacking the whole, and engaging with equal chances or upon equal terms.

This being granted, it is apparent that as the power of a vessel is in her broadside, whilst her bow and stern are comparatively unarmed, the object to be desired in actions between single vessels is to obtain a position, either permanent or temporary, which will place the broadside on the bow or stern of the enemy.

By analogy, the same remark will apply to a line of vessels, of which the extremities are more vulnerable than the other parts. An attack upon one of these extremities should, therefore, be attempted, since the object of the assailant ought generally to be to compel a part of the fleet of the enemy to bear the fire of the whole of his own, and thus to destroy it in detail.

These observations lead to some remarks upon the Line of Battle, and upon the present system of fleet actions.

A very close line of ships, which move like one body, certainly presents a formidable front. Each ship, besides her own force, is supported by her connexion with others, which increases the strength of all; a combination which constitutes the advantages and the strength of the line of battle. But this combination, excellent in itself, and the best for a regular battle, may be destroyed by a change of wind, by a loss of

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spars, by a fault, or even by the nature of the attack of an enemy, as events have shown.

The art of war is necessarily modified by time, by the opinions of men, and by the progress of the arts and sciences, which lead to new discoveries. Thus, steam-vessels have actually changed many parts of the maritime system of Europe. Half a century since, and numerous fleets were arranged in line; they manœuvred long and ably to obtain, by a good position, a partial advantage. A cannonade was kept up at a distance, from time to time, and generally the two fleets were able to renew the contest after a few days, scarcely weakened by the injuries which a small number of their ships had sustained. Since about the close of the war of the independence of the United States, the line of battle has been broken, and pell-mell actions fought, not accidentally, but in pursuance of previous plans. Less art, and more impetuosity, has been employed, as though actuated by a mutual desire to produce entire destruction, or at least great results.

In the present situation of things, belligerents will probably, in accordance with public opinion, strive to obtain prompt and decisive effects. Besides, the expense of large fleets begins to excite alarm; steam navigation has also begun to furnish its aid, if not for distant expeditions, at least for those operations which are to be performed upon neighbouring coasts, or in narrow seas, without speaking of the effects which certain improvements in artillery, and particularly the use of shells, may produce.

From these changes, which have occurred within the last fifty years, it may be concluded that there will be a tendency to diminish the numbers of ships in fleets, and that, hereafter, less attention will be given to the mere arrangements or display of force, and that greater exertions will be made to come to close quarters, and to pell-mell actions, or, at least, to produce decisive effects, at the expense of any regular order in which an enemy may appear to place too much confidence.

Thus the theory of battle in squadrons is so far definitively modified, that the line of battle is no longer to be considered

the whole of the system, although now rendered shorter and more manageable; but rather as a powerful means for advantageously sustaining, or for making an attack which will be powerful, and often followed by an intermixture of the contending ships. Consequently, if battles at sea become more rare, they will also be more decisive: success will always depend, when numbers are equal, upon the superiority of relative force, and upon the ability with which the attack. may be conducted, and, still more than ever, upon the determination of brave commanders, attentive to sustain each other, in defence as well as in attack, and to group themselves together against opposing groups of less strength. In fact, it would be vain for an admiral to expect the successful execution of measures which he might direct, if he should not be seconded by admirals and captains, whose bravery and intelligence could supply the want of signals, and provide at the moment for everything which the position of the admiral and the rapidity of events might prevent him from seeing or directing. Without such complete and well-founded confidence, a chief cannot act with decision; or, in other words, he cannot succeed.

If it is only by profiting with vigour and promptitude of a first advantage, however small it may be, that others more important can be secured; in the same manner, it is only by the most energetic measures, that the first successes of an enemy can be checked, and victory wrested from him. In such circumstances, less regard should be had to our own injuries than to those of the enemy, in determining to continue or to renew the contest.

It is not to be inferred from the preceding remarks, that the science of combined movements has lost its utility; on the contrary, since battles have become more decisive, it is important to conduct them with all possible ability, or to avoid them when circumstances are unfavourable. Besides, now, as formerly, it depends at least as much on skill as devotedness, to supply upon occasions the want of numbers or strength.

If the system of fleet actions has been modified by the