ON THE LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES (SYSTEM OF LOGIC, BOOK VI.) CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY REMARKS § 1. Theories of Scientific Method can only be developed by studying the way in which investigations have actually been conducted; and this truth, which is exemplified by the history of other sciences, awaits confirmation in the case of those which relate to man himself; for, while a considerable body of truths is already established concerning man's physical constitution, the laws of Mind, and especially of society, are so little known that it is even questioned whether they are capable of becoming subjects of science; and, if agreement as to these subjects is to be obtained, this can only be done by deliberately applying the methods which have been successfully employed in investigating simpler phenomena. To facilitate this is the object of the present discussion. § 2. Abstract logical discussion can only make a slight and vague contribution to this task, the completion of which requires the actual construction of the sciences of Ethics and Politics. All that can be done here is to examine the relation of logical methods to various branches of moral inquiry, and to consider whether moral sciences exist, or can exist, and how far and how they can be developed. At the threshold of this inquiry we are met by an objection, which, if not removed, would be fatal to the attempt to treat human conduct as a subject of science. It is often denied that human actions are subject to invariable laws, or that constancy of causation obtains among them; and this subject must be deliberately considered. CHAPTER II OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY § 1. The question whether the law of causality applies as strictly to human actions as to other phenomena is the controverted question of the Freedom of the Will. The affirmative opinion is called the doctrine of Necessity as asserting human volitions and actions to be necessary and inevitable. The negative maintains that the will is determined, not, like other phenomena, by antecedents, but by itself—that volitions have no causes which they uniformly obey. The metaphysical theory of free will was invented because the alternative of admitting actions to be necessary was thought inconsistent with instinctive consciousness as well as humiliating and degrading; and the doctrine of necessity, as sometimes misconceived by its supporters, is open to these imputations. §2. Correctly conceived, the doctrine of necessity means that from the motives present to an individual's mind and his character and disposition, his action might be unerringly inferred; and this simply states a universal conviction based on experience; for hesitation in predicting conduct arises merely from uncertainty as to the circumstances or character of the agent. Nor does this doctrine conflict with our feeling of freedom; for freedom is not felt to be inconsistent with the possibility of predicting actions; and it is not the doctrine that actions are consequents of antecedent states which is contradicted by consciousness, or felt to be degrading. But the doctrine is always conceived to involve more than this; for causation is not generally believed or felt to be merely certain and unconditional sequence; and even if the reason repudiates, the imagination retains the feeling of some more intimate connection, of some peculiar tie or mysterious constraint exercised by the antecedent over the consequent. Now this it is which, considered as applying to the human will, conflicts with our consciousness and revolts our feelings. But such mysterious compulsion forms no element in the |