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| Undertake, in the following discourse, 1 to consider two Questions, in which the credit of almost all great writers, since the time of Homer, is vitally concerned.
First, “Whether that conformity in Phrase 56.0r Sentiment between two writers of dif« ferent times, which we call IMITATION, “ may not with probability enough, for the
* most part, be accounted for from general .." caufes, arising from our common nature;
so that is, from the exercise of our natural “ faculties on such obječts as lie in common s to all observers.”
Secondly, “Whether; in the case of con. a feled Imitations, any certain and neceflary - conclusion bolds to the disadvantage of the * natural GENIUS of the imitator ?" Questions, which there seems no fit meVOL: III.
thod of resolving, but by taking the matter pretty deep, and deducing it from its first principles.
SECTION 1. ALL Poetry, to speak with Aristotle d and the Greek critics (if for fo plain a point authorities be thought wanting) is, properly, imitation. It is, indeed, the nobleft and most extensive of the mimetic arts ; having all creation for its object, and ranging the entire circuit of universal being. In this view every wondrous original, which ages have gazed at, as the offspring of creative fancy; and of which poets themselves, to do honour to their inventions, have feigned, as of the immortal panoply of their heroes, that it came down from heaven, is itself but a copy, a transcript from some brighter page of this vast volume of the universe. Thus all is derived; all is unoriginal. And the office of genius is but to select the fairest forms of things, and to present them in due place and circumstance, and in the richest colouring of expreffon, to the imagination. This primary or original copying, which in the ideas of Philosophy is Imitation, is, in the language of Criticism, called INVENTION.'
Again; of the endless variety of these original forms, which the poet's eye is inceffantly traversing, those, which take his attention' molt; his active mimetic faculty prompts him to convert into fair and living resemblances. This magical operation the divine philosopher (whose fervid fancy, though it fometimes obscures [a] his reasoning, yet never fails to clear and brighten his imagery) excellently illuftrates by the fimilitude of a mirror; “ which, says “ he, as you turn about and oppose to the für“ rounding world, presents you instantly with " a sun, STARS, aud SKJES, with your “ own, and every other living form; with “ the EARTH, and its several appendages “ of TREES, Plants, and FLOWER'S ." Just so, on whatever side the poet turns his imagination, the shapes of things immedi- ately imprint themselves upon it, and a new corresponding creation reflects the old one.
[a] Menairei te; says Dionysius of Halicarnassus, speaking of his figurative manner, sò sapès ses 3dow tu oleī aapamañowo. [T. ii. p. 204. Ed. Hudson.]  Plato De REPUB. lib. x: B2
This shadowy ideal world, though unsubftantial as the American vision of souls [c], yet glows with such apparent life, that it becomes, thenceforth, the object of other mirrors, and is itself original to future reflexions. This secondary or derivative image, is that alone which Criticism confiders under the idea of IMITATION.
And here the difficulty, we are about to examine, commences. For the poet, in his quick researches through all his stores and materials of beauty, meeting every where, in his progress, these reflected forms ; and deriving from them his stock of imagery, as well as from the real subsisting objects of nature, the reader is often at a loss (for the poet himself is not always aware of it) to discern the original from the copy; to know, with certainty, if the sentiment or image, presented to him, be directly taken from the life, or be itself a lively transcript, only, of some former copy. And this difficulty is the greater, because the original, as well as the copy, is always at hand for the poet to turn to, and we can rarely be certain, since both were equally in his [c] Spectator, No 56.,