too curiously into the myfteries of it, the fame conclufion meets us as before. The expreffion of two writers may be fimilar, and sometimes even identical, and yet be original in both. Which fhews the neceffity there was to lead the reader through this long investigation of the general fources. of fimilitude in works of INVENTION, in order to put him into a condition of judging truly and equitably of thofe of IMITATION. For if fimilarity, even in this province of words, which the reafon of the thing fhews to be most free from the conftraint of general rules, be no argument of theft in all cafes; much less can it be pretended of the other fubjects of this inquiry, which from the neceffary uniformity of Nature in all her appearances, and of common fenfe in its operations upon them, muft give frequent and unavoidable occafion to fuch fimilarity. But then this is all I would infinuate.

For, after the proper allowances which candid criticism requires to be made on this head, it will ftill be true (and nothing in this Effay attempts to contradict it), "that "coincidencies of a certain kind, and in a ❝ certain

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"certain degree, cannot fail to convict a "writer of imitation." What these are, the impatient reader, I fuppofe, is ready to enquire. And, not entirely to disappoint him, I have thrown together, at the close of this volume, fome remarks which, perhaps, will be of use in folving that difficult quef tion []. In the mean time, it seemed of importance to free the mind from the perverfion of that early prejudice, which is fo prompt to mistake refemblance uni verfally for imitation. And what other method of effecting this, than by taking a view of the extent and influence of the genuine powers of nature, which, when rightly apprehended, make it an easier task to detect, in particular inftances, the intervention of defign?

Allowing then (what this previous inquiry not only no way contradicts, but even affifts us in perceiving more clearly) that certain refemblances may be urged as undoubted proofs of imitation; it remains only to the integrity of this difcourfe, to fatisfy that other question, "how far the credit of

[] Letter to Mr, MASON.

" the

"the imitator is concerned in the discovery ?" or, in other words (fince the praise of invention is of the highest value to the poet), "how far the conceffion of his having bor"rowed from others may be justly thought "to detract from him in that refpect?" An inquiry which, though, for its confequences to the fame of all great writers fince the time of Homer, of much importance, may yet be dispatched in few words.

SECTION II.

IN entering on this apology for professed imitators, I fhall not be fufpected of undervaluing the proper merits of invention, which unquestionably holds the first place in the virtues of a poet, and is that power, which, of all others, enables him to give the highest entertainment to the reader. Much less will it be thought, that I am here pleading the cause of those base and abject fpirits, who have not the courage or ability to attempt any thing of themselves, and can barely make a fhift, as a great poet of our own expreffes it, to creep fervilely after the fenfe of fome other. Thefe

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I readily

I readily refign to the fhame and cenfure which have so justly followed them in all ages; as fubfcribing to the truth of that remark, "Imitatio per fe ipfa non fufficit, "vel quia pigri eft ingenii, contentum effe " iis quae funt ab aliis inventa." My concern is only with those whofe talent of ori ginal genius is not difputed, but the degree of ftrength and vigour, with which it prevails in them, somewhat lowered in the general estimation, from this imputed crime of PLAGIARISM. And, with refpect to fuch as these, something, I conceive, may be faid not undeferving the notice of the candid reader.

1. The most univerfal caufe, inducing imitation in great writers, is, the force of early difcipline and education. Were it true, that poets took their defcriptions and images immediately from common nature, one might expect, indeed, a general fimilitude in their works, but fuch as could feldom or never, in all its circumstances, amount to a strict and rigorous correfpondency. The properties of things are fo numerous, and the lights in which they fhew themselves to a mind uninfluenced by former

former prejudices fo different, that some grace of novelty, fome tincture of original beauty, would conftantly infufe itself into all their delineations. But the cafe is far otherwife. Strong as the bent of the imagination may be to contemplate living forms, and to gaze with delight on this grand theatre of nature; its attention is foon taken off, and arrested, on all fides, by thofe infinite mirrors, and reflexions of things, which it every where meets with in the world of imitation. We are habituated to a furvey of this fecondary and derivative nature, as prefented in the admired works of art, through the entire courfe of our education. The writings of the beft, poets are put into our hands, to inftruct us in the knowledge of men and things, as foon as we are capable of apprehending them. Nay, we are taught to lifp their very words in our tendereft infancy. Some quick and tranfient glances we cannot chuse but caft, at times, on the phænomena of living beauty; but its forms are rarely contemplated by us with diligence but in these mirrors, which are the conftant furniture of our schools and closets. And no wonder,