power, which of the two he chofe to make the object of his own imitation. For it is not enough to fay here, as in the cafe of reflections, that the latter is always the weaker, and of course betrays itself by the degree of faintnefs, which, of neceffity, attends a copy. This, indeed, hath been faid by one, to whofe judgment a peculiar deference is owing. QUICQUID ALTERI SIMILE EST, NECESSE EST MINUS SIT EO, QUOD IMI

TATUR [d]. But it holds only of strict and fcrupulous imitations. And of fuch alone, I think, it was intended; for the explanation follows, ut umbra corpore, & imago facie, & actus hiftrionum veris affectibus; that is, where the artist confines himself to the fingle view of taking a faithful and exact tranfcript. And even this can be allowed only, when the copyift is of inferior, or at moft but of equal, talents. Nay, it is not certainly to be relied upon even then; as may appear from what we are told of an inferior painter's [Andrea del Sarto's] copying a portrait of the divine Raphael. The story is well known. But, as an aphorifm, brought to determine the merits of [] QUINCTIL. lib. x. c. 11.

imitation, in general, nothing can be falfer or more delufive. For, 1. Befides the fuppofed original, the object itself, as was obferved, is before the poet, and he may catch from thence, and infuse into his piece, the fame glow of real life, which animated the first copy. 2. He may also take in circumstances, omitted or overlooked before in the common object, and fo give new and additional vigour to his imitation. Or, 3. He may poffefs a ftronger and more plaftic genius, and therefore be enabled to touch, with more force of expreffion, even those particulars, which he profeffedly imitates.

On all these accounts, the difficulty of diftinguishing betwixt original, and secondary, imitations is apparent. And it is of im portance, that this difficulty be seen in its full light. Becaufe, if the fimilarity, observed in two or more writers, may, for the most part, and with the highest probability, be accounted for from general principles, it is fuperfluous at least, if not unfair, to have recourfe to the particular charge of imitation.

Now

Now to fee how far the fame common principles of nature will go towards effecting the fimilarity, here fpoken of, it is neceffary to confider very diftinctly,

1

I. THE MATTER ; and

II. THE MANNER, of all poetical imitation.

I. In all that range of natural objects, over which the restless imagination of the poet expatiates, there is no fubject of picture or imitation, that is not reducible to one or other of the three following claffes. 1. The material world, or that vaft compages of corporeal forms, of which this univerfe is compounded. 2. The internal workings and movements of his own mind, under which I comprehend the manners, fentiments, and paffions. 3. Thofe internal operations, that are made objective to fenfe by the outward figns of gefture, attitude, or action. Befides these I know of no fource, whence the artist can derive a single sentiment or image. There needs no new diftinction in favour of Homer's gods, Milton's angels, or Shakespear's witches it being clear, that these are only B 4 buman

human characters, diverfified by such attributes and manners, as fuperftition, religion, or even wayward fancy, had affigned to each.

་;་

1. The material univerfe, or what the painters call ftill life, is the object of that fpecies of poetical imitation, we call defcriptive. This beauteous arrangement of natural objects, which arrefts the attention on all fides, makes a neceffary and forceable impreffion on the human mind. We are fo constituted, as to have a quick perception of beauty in the forms, combinations, and afpects of things about us; which the philofopher may amuse himself in explaining from remote and infufficient confiderations; but consciousness and common feeling will never fuffer us to doubt of its being entirely natural. Accordingly we may obferve, that it operates univerfally on all men; more efpecially the young and unexperienced; who are not lefs tranfported by the novelty, than beauty of material objects. But its impreffions are strongest on those, whom nature hath touched with a ray of that celeftial fire, which we call true genius. Here the workings of this inftinctive fenfe are fo powerful,

powerful, that, to judge from its effects, one fhould conclude, it perfectly intranced and bore away the mind, as in a fit of rapture. Whenever the form of natural beauty prefents itself, though but cafually, to the mind of the poet; bufied, it may be, and intent on the investigation of quite other objects; his imagination takes fire, and it is with difficulty that he restrains himself from quitting his proper pursuit, and stopping a while to furvey and delineate the enchanting image. This is the character of what we call a luxuriant fancy, which all the rigour of art can hardly keep down and we give the highest praise of judgment to those few, who have been able to difcipline and confine it within due limits.

I infift the more on this ftrong influence of external beauty, because it leads, I think, to a clear view of the fubject before us, fo far as it refpects defcriptive poetry. These living forms are, without any change, pre-fented to obfervation in every age and country. There needs but opening the eyes, and thefe forms neceffarily imprint themfelves on the fancy; and the love of imitation, which naturally accompanies and keeps

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