ance Co. of N. A., 69 Tex. 353; Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Faires, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 111, 35 S. W. Rep. 55; Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co., 4 Wyo. 419; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Public Parks' Amusement Co., 63 Ark. 187; Highlands v. Lurgan Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Pa. St. 566, 35 Atl. Rep. 728; St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 47 Minn. 352; Burnham v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 63 Mo. App. 85.

3. Equitable Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 60 Ill. 509; Anthony v. German-American Ins. Co., 48 Mo. App. 65; Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co., 4 Wyo. 419; Moffitt v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 11 Ind. App. 233, 38 N. E. Rep. 835. As to distinction between waiver and estoppel, see Rules 6, 11. And see Construction."

66

4. Burlington Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 42 Nebr. 208, 60 N. W. Rep. 599.

RULE 29.

Test of Authority of Agent as Bearing on a Question of Waiver. If knowledge of an agent or an oral waiver by him is to be imputed to the company, it should be that of an agent authorized to bind the company in the transaction concerning which the knowledge or declaration is to operate as a waiver.

Martin v. Jersey City Ins. Co., 44 N. J. L. 273. And see West v. Norwich Union Ins. Co., 10 Utah, 442, 37 Pac. Rep. 685; Continental Fire Assoc. v. Morris, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 299, 70 S. W. Rep. 769. And see vol. 2, "Agents."

RULE 30.

Effect of Failure to Cancel and Return Unearned Premium.

If the company or an authorized agent has or acquires knowledge of facts making policy void, after its issue, failure to cancel and return the unearned premium may, in connection with other facts, afford evidence of a waiver or an estoppel;1 but not when the policy remains valid under operation of a mortgagee clause.2

74 N. E. Rep. 141: Ark. 86 S. W.

1. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Grove, Ill. German-American Ins. Co. v. Harper, Rep. 817; Turner v. Providence-Washington Ins. Co., 86 Mo. App. 387; Millis v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 95 Mo. App. 211, 68 S. W. Rep. 1066; Thompson v. Traders' Ins. Co., 169 Mo. 12, 68 S. W. Rep. 889; Pollock v. German Ins. Co., 127 Mich. 460,

86 N. W. Rep. 1017; Rauch v. Michigan Millers' Ins. Co., 131 Mich. 281,91 N. W. Rep. 160; Home Ins. Co. v. Marple, 1 Ind. App. 411, 27 N. E. Rep. 633; Hanover Ins. Co. v. Dole, 20 Ind. App. 333, 50 N. E. Rep. 772; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Congregation Sholom, 80 Ill. 558; Williamsburg City Ins. Co. v. Cary, 83 Ill. 453; Illinois Ins. Co. v. Stanton, 57 Ill. 354; North British & M. Ins. Co. v. Steiger, 26 Ill. App. 228, affd., 124 Ill. 81, 16 N. E. Rep. 95; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 1 Ind. App. 329, 27 N. E. Rep. 628; Anthony v. German-American Ins. Co., 48 Mo. App. 65. And see New Jersey Rubber Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 64 N. J. L. 580, 46 Atl. Rep. 777; Commercial Assur. Co. v. New Jersey Rubber Co., 61 N. J. Eq. 446, 49 Atl. Rep. 155; Moffitt v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 11 Ind. App. 233, 38 N. E. Rep. 835; Kalmitz v. Northern Ins. Co., 186 Pa. St. 571, 40 Atl. Rep. 816; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Corey, 41 Nebr. 724, 60 N. W. Rep. 12; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Coffman, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 631, 32 S. W. Rep. 810; Kahler v. Insurance Co., 106 Iowa, 380.

2. Ordway v. Chace, 57 N. J. Eq. 478, 42 Atl. Rep. 149. And that company is not estopped by mere failure to cancel, see also Norris v. Hartford Ins. Co., 55 S. C. 450, 33 S. E. Rep. 566, 28 Ins. L. J. 747; Taylor v. State Ins. Co., 98 Iowa, 521, 67 N. W. Rep. 547; Keith v. Royal Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 531, 94 N. W. Rep. 295.

RULE 31.

Effect of Payment of Premium and Receipt Therefor After Issue of Policy.

Where assured, upon delivery of the policy, pays a part only of the premium, and afterward pays the balance to an authorized agent of the company who has knowledge of facts constituting a forfeiture, and who gives a receipt therefor, with verbal assurance that it is all right, and that policy would continue, it operates as an equitable estoppel, specially when it might be found as a fact that the receipt was given to be added or attached to the policy.

Northam v. International Ins. Co., 45 App. Div. 177, 61 N. Y. Supp. 45, affd. on opinion below, 165 N. Y. 666. And see Northam v. Dutchess Ins. Co., 166 N. Y. 319, 324.

RULE 32.

Effect of Written Consent Held for Insured by Agent-Effect of His Statement.

A written consent by the company or its agent, agreed upon and actually made out and held for the insured, who is to call for it, is valid though not actually attached to the policy until after the fire occurring a few days later;1 and so a statement by the agent that a necessary permit had been attached to the policy may operate as an estoppel.2

1. Bennett v. Western Underwriters' Assoc., 130 Mich. 216, 89 N. W. Rep. 702.

2. Morgan v. Illinois Ins. Co., 130 Mich. 427, 90 N. W. Rep. 40.

RULE 33.

Effect of Written Indorsement for Another Purpose.

A written indorsement by an authorized agent of the company for a specific or another distinct purpose, recognizing and continuing the policy as in force with knowledge of facts constituting a forfeiture, operates as a waiver or an estoppel.

Stuart v. Reliance Ins. Co., 179 Mass. 434, 60 N. E. Rep. 929; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Public Parks' Amusement Co., 63 Ark. 187; Nebraska Ins. Co. v. Sasek, 64 Nebr. 17, 89 N. W. Rep. 428; Hunt v. State Ins. Co., 66 Nebr. 121, 92 N. W. Rep. 921; Walker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 156 N. Y. 628, 51 N. E. Rep. 392; Ladd v. Etna Ins. Co., 70 Hun, 490, affd., 147 N. Y. 478; Shearman v. Niagara Ins. Co., 46 N. Y. 526; Solmes v. Rutgers Ins. Co., 3 Keyes (N. Y.), 416; Lewis v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 63 Lowa, 193; Gould v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 134 Pa. St. 570; Oakes v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 135 Mass. 248; Bonenfant v. American Ins. Co., 76 Mich. 653, 43 N. W. Rep. 682; Batchelor v. People's Ins. Co., 40 Conn. 56; New Orleans Ins. Assoc. v. Holberg, 64 Miss. 51; Keeler v. Niagara Ins. Co., 16 Wis. 523.

RULE 34.

Waiver by Treating Policy as in Force After a Fire. Where there has been a breach of condition, company may or may not take advantage of such breach and claim a forfeiture. It may, consulting its own interests, choose to waive the forfeiture, and this it may do by express language to that effect, or by acts from which an intention to waive may be inferred, or from which a waiver follows as a legal result. A waiver cannot be inferred from its mere silence. It is not obliged to do or say anything to make the forfeiture effectual. It may wait until claim is made under the policy, and then in denial thereof, or in defense of a suit commenced therefor, allege the forfeiture. But it may be asserted broadly that if in any negotiations or transactions with the assured, after knowledge of the forfeiture, it recognizes the continued validity of the policy, or does acts based thereon, or requires the assured, by virtue thereof, to do some act or incur some trouble or expense, the forfeiture is as matter of law waived; and it is now settled that such a waiver need not be based upon any new agreement or an estoppel.

Titus v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 410; Benninghoff v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. 495; McNally v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 137 N. Y. 389, 33 N. E. Rep. 475; Walker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 156 N. Y. 628, 51 N. E. Rep. 392, revg. 89 Hun, 33, 35 N. Y. Supp. 374; Roby v. American Central Ins. Co., 120 N. Y. 510, 24 N. E. Rep. 808; Hanover Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 48 Nebr. 743, 67 N. W. Rep. 774, 25 Ins. L. J. 681; Home Ins. Co. v. Kuhlman, 58 Nebr. 488, 78 N. W. Rep. 936; Montgomery v. Delaware Ins. Co., 55 S. C. 1, 32 S. E. Rep. 723; Graham v. American Ins. Co., 48 S. C. 195, 26 S. E. Rep. 323; Dick v. Equitable Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 46, 65 N. W. Rep. 742; Replogle v. American Ins. Co., 132 Ind. 360, 31 N. E. Rep. 947; Manu

facturers & Mer. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 145 Ill. 469, 34 N. E. Rep. 553; Granger v. Manchester Assur. Co., 119 Mich. 177; Carpenter v. Continental Ins. Co., 61 Mich. 635; Cobbs v. Fire Assoc., 68 Mich. 463; Hollis v. State Ins. Co., 65 Iowa, 454; Grubbs v. North Carolina Ins. Co., 108 N. C. 472, 13 S. E. Rep. 236; Haas v. Montauk Ins. Co., 49 Hun, 272; German Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 53 Ark. 494, 14 S. W. Rep. 672; Insurance Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Landfare, 63 Nebr. 559, 88 N. W. Rep. 779; Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Allen, 128 Ala. 451, 30 So. Rep. 537; Dolan v. Missouri Ins. Co., 88 Mo. App. 666; Jerdee v. Cottage Grove Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 345; Renier v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 74 Wis. 89, 42 N. W. Rep. 208; Germania Ins. Co. v. Pitcher, 160 Ind. 392, 64 N. E. Rep. 921; Planters' Ins. Co. v. Lloyd, 67 Ark. 584, 56 S. W. Rep. 44; Westchester Ins. Co. v. McAdoo, 57 S. W. Rep. 409, affd. orally by Supreme Court (Tenn.), 412; Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Goode, 95 Va. 751, 30 S. E. Rep. 366; Stauffer v. Manheim Ins. Co., 150 Pa. St. 531, 24 Atl. Rep. 754, 21 Ins. L. J. 1051; Lutz v. Anchor Ins. Co., 120 Iowa, 136, 94 N. W. Rep. 274; Couch v. Home Protection Ins. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.). 73 S. W. Rep. 1077; Brown v. Commercial Ins. Co., 21 App. D. C. 325; Nugent v. Rensselaer Ins. Co., App. Div. 94 N. Y. Supp. 605.

The insurance company may point out to the insured those conditions precedent to loss becoming due and payable, which he has contracted to perform, or object to statement furnished as not being in compliance therewith without making any demand in recognition of the validity of the policy. There is a distinction between those conditions which become operative only on request of the company and those which the assured has contracted to perform. A company can require performance by the insured after a fire of those conditions which he has contracted to perform and which are essential to his cause of action and preliminary to the assertion of any claim, without a waiver of its right under the contract, provided the insured