is not misled or required to do something that he did not agree to do.

Armstrong v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 560, distinguishing Titus v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 410; Betcher v. Capital Ins. Co., 78 Minn. 340, 80 N. W. Rep. 971; Freedman v. Providence-Washington Ins. Co., 175 Pa. St. 355, 34 Atl. Rep. 730; Wheaton v. Insurance Co., 76 Cal. 415; McCormick v. Orient Ins. Co., 86 Cal. 260; Boyd v. Insurance Co., 90 Tenn. 212, 16 S. W. Rep. 470; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Flemming, 65 Ark. 54; Niagara Ins. Co. v. Miller, 120 Pa. St. 504, 516, 14 Atl. Rep. 385; Fitchpatrick v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 53 Iowa, 335; Rundell & Hough v. Anchor Ins. Co., 101 N. W. Rep. 517. See Rule 57.

Iowa,

Forfeitures are not favored in the law, and the courts are always prompt to seize hold of any circumstances that indicate an election to waive a forfeiture or any agreement to do so upon which the party has relied and acted. Any agreement, declaration, or course of action on the part of an insurance company, which leads a party insured honestly to believe that by conforming thereto a forfeiture of his policy will not be incurred, followed by due conformity on his part, estops the company from insisting upon the forfeiture.

Hartford Ins. Co. v. Unsall, 144 U. S. 439, 21 Ins. L. J. 439, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 671; Spoeri v. Massachusetts Ins. Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 752. And see Home Ins. Co. v. Feyerabend, 7 Kans. App. 231, 52 Pac. Rep. 899.

RULE 37.

Effect of Officer or Agent Acting in Ignorance of What Others Know or Have Done or Said.

While an officer or agent may act in ignorance of what other agents know, or have done or said, that does not necessarily prevent the question of a waiver

becoming one of fact;1 knowledge of a local agent who issued the policy is imputed to the company as knowledge of the same fact;2 but ordinarily to establish a waiver of a forfeiture there should be knowledge by the person or party by whom it is claimed the forfeiture was waived.3

1. Walker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 156 N. Y. 628, 51 N. E. Rep. 392; Lewis v. Guardian Assur. Co., 181 N. Y. 392, 74 N. E. Rep. 224.

2. Dick v. Equitable Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 46, 65 N. W. Rep. 742, 25 Ins. L. J. 449. And see Horton v. Home Ins. Co., 122 N. C. 498, 29 S. E. Rep. 944.

3. Weed v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 116 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. Rep. 229; Gray v. Guardian Assur. Co., 82 Hun, 380. See and compare Rules 40 and 41.

RULE 38.

In Absence of Express Waiver there Must be Some Elements of Estoppel-Silence.

In the absence of an express waiver at least some of the elements of an estoppel must exist. The insured must have been misled by some act of the insurer, or it must, after knowledge of the breach, have done something which could only be done by virtue of the policy or have required something of the assured, which he was bound to do only under a valid policy, or have exercised a right which it had only by virtue of such policy. Such an estoppel or waiver must be established by the person claiming it by a preponderance of evidence, and neither an estoppel nor waiver of the breach of a condition after forfeiture, by reason thereof, can be inferred from mere silence or inaction.

Gibson Electric Co. v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 159 N. Y. 418, 54 N. E. Rep. 23, affg. 10 App. Div. 225; Armstrong v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 560; Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v.

Dudley, 65 Ark. 240, 28 Ins. L. J. 44; Fournier v. GermanAmerican Ins. Co., 23 R. I. 36, 49 Atl. Rep. 98; Weidert v. State Ins. Co., 19 Oreg. 261, 24 Pac. Rep. 242; Keith v. Royal Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 531, 94 N. W. Rep. 295. And see Mueller v. Southside Ins. Co., 87 Pa. St. 399; How v. Union Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 32; Ervay v. Fire Assoc., 119 Iowa, 304, 93 N. W. Rep. 290; Sun Ins. Co. v. Dudley, 65 Ark. 240. And see Young v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 68 S. C. 387, 47 S. E. Rep. 681; Perry v. Caledonian Ins. Co., App. Div., 93 N. Y. Supp. 50.

RULE 39.

When Silence May be an Element of Estoppel.

Silence operates as an assent and creates an estoppel only when it has the effect to mislead. There must be such conduct on the part of the insurer as would, if it were not estopped, operate as a fraud on the party who has taken or neglected to take some action to his own prejudice in reliance upon it. When under duty to speak, or when failure to speak is inconsistent with honest dealing and misleads another, then silence may be deemed to be acquiescence.

More v. New York Bowery Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 537; Rauch v. Michigan Millers' Ins. Co., 131 Mich. 281, 91 N. W. Rep. 160.

RULE 40.

Waiver Dependent on Intention - May be Inferred. While waiver may be inferred from acts and declarations of the insurance company1 it is essentially a matter of intention, and to establish it there must be some declaration or act from which the insured may reasonably infer that the company does not mean to insist upon a right which, because of a change of position induced thereby, it would be inequitable to enforce;2 waiver involves the idea of assent, and assent is primarily an act of the understanding. It is the inten

tional relinquishment of a known right; such intention may be inferred from company's acts and declarations, although waiver is not actually intended where the assured acts on such belief and is justified in so believing.3

1. Westchester Ins. Co. v. McAdoo, 57 S. W. Rep. 409, affd. orally by Supreme Court (Tenn.), 412.

2. Freedman v. Providence-Washington Ins. Co., 175 Pa. St. 350, 34 Atl. Rep. 730; Freedman v. Fire Assoc., 168 Pa. St. 249, 32 Atl. Rep. 39, 25 Ins. L. J. 74; Devens v. Mechanics & Traders' Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 168; Donahue v. Windsor Ins. Co., 56 Vt. 374; St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 47 Minn. 352, 50 N. W. Rep. 240.

3. Hanscom v. Home Ins. Co., 90 Me. 333, 38 Atl. Rep. 324, 27 Ins. L. J. 19; United Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 82 Fed. Rep. 406, 27 C. C. A. 42, 53 U. S. App. 517; Findeisen v. Metropole Ins. Co., 57 Vt. 520; Astrich v. German-American Ins. Co., 131 Fed. Rep. 13, C. C. A. affg. 128 Fed. Rep. 477.

RULE 41.

,

Knowledge Essential Element of Waiver.

The insurance company cannot waive that which it does not know; knowledge of the facts or of the right is an essential element of waiver.

Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Rosenfield, 95 Fed. Rep. 358, 37 C. C. A. 96; Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. McGreevy, 118 Fed. Rep. 415; Etna Ins. Co. v. Holcomb, 89 Tex. 404, 34 S. W. Rep. 915, 25 Ins. L. J. 833; Freedman v. Fire Assoc., 168 Pa. St. 249, 32 Atl. Rep. 39, 25 Ins. L. J. 74; Robinson v. Ætna Ins. Co. (Ala.), 34 So. Rep. 18; United States Ins. Co. v. Moriarty (Tex.). 36 S. W. Rep. 943; Cottome v. National Ins. Co., 65 Kans. 511, 70 Pac. Rep. 357; Manufacturers & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 145 Ill. 469, 34 N. E. Rep. 553; Replogle v. American Ins. Co., 132 Ind. 360, 31 N. E. Rep. 947; German-American Ins. Co. v. Waters, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 30 S. W. Rep. 576; Planters' Ins. Co. v. Lloyd, 67 Ark. 584, 56 S. W. Rep. 44; Dick v. Equitable Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 46, 65 N. W. Rep. 742, 25 Ins. L. J. 449; Ryan v. Springfield Ins. Co., 46 Wis. 671; Devens v. Mechanics & Traders' Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 168;

Gray v. Guardian Assur. Co., 82 Hun, 380, 31 N. Y. Supp. 237; Fitchpatrick v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 53 Iowa, 335; Donahue v. Windsor Ins. Co., 56 Vt. 374; St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 47 Minn. 352, 50 N. W. Rep. 240. And see Ellis v. State Ins. Co., 68 Iowa, 578, 27 N. W. Rep. 762; Kahler v. Insurance Co., 106 Iowa, 380; Merrill v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 48 Me. 285; Wheaton v. North B. & M. Ins. Co., 76 Cal. 415, 18 Pac. Rep. 758; Weed v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 116 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. Rep. 229; Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Barker, 6 Colo. App. 535, 41 Pac. Rep. 513; American Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 73 Mo. 364; Traders' Ins. Co. v. Cassell, 24 Ind. App. 238, 56 N. E. Rep. 259; German Ins. Co. v. Stiner, 96 N. W. Rep. 122; Continental Ins. Co. v. Cummings,

Neb.

Tex.

,

81 S. W. Rep. 705; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Enoch, Ark. 77 S. W. Rep. 899; Philadelphia Underwriters' Ins. Co. v. Fla. 37 So. Rep. 210.

Bigelow,

RULE 42.

Refusal to Pay on Specified Ground as Estoppel. Refusal of the insurance company to pay loss on a specified ground may estop it from asserting any other ground of defense of which it had full knowledge;1 but there must be in connection elements of estoppel;2 nor is there a waiver where the refusal is on a specified ground among others."

1. McCormick v. Royal Ins. Co., 163 Pa. St. 184, 29 Atl. Rep. 747, 23 Ins. L. J. 778; Douville v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 113 Mich. 158, 71 N. W. Rep. 517; Smith v. German Ins. Co., 107 Mich. 270, 65 N. W. Rep. 236, 25 Ins. L. J. 192.

2. Welsh v. London Assur. Co., 151 Pa. St. 607, 25 Atl. Rep. 142, 22 Ins. L. J. 94; Cassimus v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 135 Ala. 256, 33 So. Rep. 163. And see Findlay v. Union Ins. Co., 74 Vt. 211, 52 Atl. Rep. 429; Brink v. Hanover Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 108.

3. Cronin v. Fire Assoc., 119 Mich. 74, 77 N. W. Rep. 643.

RULE 43.

Omission to Disclose Ground of Defense when Claim Made.

Omission to disclose ground of defense when claim is made does not operate as a waiver of it, unless as