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be confined to one building, but may extend to all used in connection for the same purpose.
Lieberstein v. Baltic Ins. Co., 45 Ill. 301; Blake v. Exchange Ins. Co., 12 Gray (Mass.), 265. And see Texas Banking Co. v. Hutchins, 53 Tex. 61.
Admission of Parol Evidence.
If a building is accurately described and there is no ambiguity, parol evidence is not admissible in action upon the policy to show that another building was intended.
Sanders v. Cooper, 115 N. Y. 279; Boak Fish Co. v. Manchester Fire Ins. Co., 84 Minn. 419, 87 N. W. Rep. 932.
Part of Description False.
If there is enough of the description true to identify the location and the property in accordance with the intention, the fact that part of the description is a mistake or is false, does not prevent recovery upon the policy; it is not necessary to reform it.
1. Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 48 Tex. 622; Texas Ins. Co. v. Stone, 49 Tex. 4; Hatch v. New Zealand Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 122 ; Bryce v. Lorillard Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 240; Heath v. Franklin Ins. Co., 1 Cush. (Mass.) 257; Meadowcraft v. Standard Ins. Co., 61 Pa. St. 91; American Central Ins. Co. v. McLanathan, 11 Kans. 533; Baker v. State Ins. Co., 31 Oreg. 41, 48 Pac. Rep. 699; Connelly v. Guardian Ins. Co., 30 N. B. 316, affd., 20 Can. Sup. 208; Edwards v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 43 Misc. 354, 87 N. Y. Supp. 507.
2. Phænix Ins. Co. v. Gebhard, 32 Nebr. 144, 49 N. W. Rep. 333; Omaha Ins. Co. v. Dufek, 44 Nebr. 241, 62 N. W. Rep. 465; Burr v. Broadway Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. 267.
Usage and Custom.
Usage and custom may lengthen or extend the precise boundary of location described as a yard" "ship yard;” 1 but description of lumber as yard” cannot be construed as a clearing in a forest; a local usage giving such meaning to the word“ yard is not binding, unless both parties had knowledge of it and contracted with reference to it.?
1. Webb v. National Fire Ins. Co., 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 497. 2. Cook v. Loew, 34 Misc. 276. And see Construction.”
Ambiguity in Description of Location.
An ambiguity in description of location is removable by parol testimony as to intention and surrounding circumstances,' reformation is not necessary; but reformation is necessary when building is wrongly described as located on a certain section.3
1. Eggleston v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 65 Iowa, 308; Burr v. Broadway Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. 267; Yonkers Ins. Co. v. Hoffman Ins. Co., 6 Robt. (N. Y.) 316; Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Sailer, 67 Pa. St. 108; Bryce v. Lorillard Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 240; Bowman v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 59 N. Y. 521; Fair v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 112 Mass. 320; Massell v. Protective Ins. Co., 19 R. I. 565, 35 Atl. Rep. 209; Holter Lumber Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 18 Mont. 282, 45 Pac. Rep. 207.
2. Burr v. Broadway Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. 267; Eggleston v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 65 Iowa, 308.
3. Collins v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 44 Minn. 440, 46 N. W. Rep. 906. See Rule 8,
Knowledge or Verbal Permission of Agent.
The application of Rule 1 is not affected by knowledge or verbal permission of the agent who issues the policy;' or by written indorsement of the agent after the fire.
1. Farmers' Ins. Assoc. v. Kryder, 5 Ind. App. 430.
2. St. Onge v. Westchester Ins. Co., 80 Fed. Rep. 703, 26 Ins. L. J. 1017. But see and compare Pollock v. German Ins. Co.,
Mich. 86 N. W. Rep. 1017, and volume 2, title Agents."
Written Application - Estoppel — Renewal. Where written application, made part of the policy, wrongly describes the subject or location of the insured property, and such application and policy were made by the company's agent having knowledge of the facts, it may operate as an estoppel preventing the company from setting up such misdescription as a defense;' and so when the policy is renewed with knowledge of a change in location, but in same building described.?
1. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 109 Ind. 273, 10 N. E. Rep. 85.
See 2. Ludwig v. Jersey City Ins. Co., 48 N. Y. 379. “ Waiver.”
Consent of Removed Agents.
Where no notice is given to the company, or its authorized agent, of the removal of property insured to a new location, and no consent to such removal is indorsed upon the policy, an oral consent of agents who have been removed as such is a nullity.
Burlington Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 42 Nebr. 208, 24 Ins. L. J. 379, 60 N. W. Rep. 599.
RULE 15. Loss After consent to Removal to New Location. A consent indorsed on the policy to cover same property in new location does not prevent valid claim for a loss happening in old location before removal;' and when part of property is removed to new location, and there destroyed, insured is entitled to recover his whole loss, and cannot be required to prorate with what was left in old location.2 Consent to removal does not cover property while in transit. When consent is given it is operative, notwithstanding a prior removal to another location, without consent.
1. Kunzze v. American Exchange Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. 412.
2. Westchester Ins. Co. v. McAdoo, 57 S. W. Rep. (Tenn.) 409, affd. orally by Supreme Court, 412.
3. Goodhue v. Hartford Ins. Co., 184 Mass. 41, 67 N. E. Rep. 645.
4. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Burget, 65 Ohio St. 119, 61 N. E. Rep. 712.
Hay in Stack.
Where policy covers a barn or stable and a specified amount“ on hay therein or in stack, it may cover hay in stack some distance from the barn.
Soli v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 51 Minn. 24, 52 N. W. Rep. 979, 21 Ins. L. J. 908; Sawyer v. Dodge County Ins. Co., 37 Wis. 503.
Rule 1 May be Changed or Modified by Written Description.
The written description in the policy may modify or waive the limitation as to place or location imposed by Rule 1; for instance, where it covers a threshing machine or combined harvester and described as in use or not in use, or while operating and in transit, etc. ;1
and so in case of a vessel or boat, unless limited by express terms or warranty ;' and so in case of a horse insured against lightning while in use, etc., 4 or oil “while contained in a tank;'5 or property “in transit.” 6
1. Slinkard v. Manchester Assur. Co., 122 Cal. 595, 55 Pac. Rep. 417; Bernicia Agricultural Works v. Germania Ins. Co.. 97 Cal. 468, 32 Pac. Rep. 512; Mawhinney v. Southern Ins. Co., 98 Cal. 184, 32 Pac. Rep. 945; Minneapolis Threshing Co. r. Firemen's Ins. Co., 57 Minn. 35, 58 N. W. Rep. 819, 23 Ins. L. J. 734. And see Boyd v. Mississippi Home Ins. Co., 75 Miss. 47, 21 So. Rep. 708.
2. St. Nicholas Ins. Co. v. Merchants’ Ins. Co., 11 Hun, 108; Mark v. National Ins. Co., 24 Hun, 565, affd., 91 N. Y. 663, on opinion below; Hennesey v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 28 Hun, 98; Teutonia Ins. Co. v. Boylston Ins. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 148.
3. Devens v. Mechanics & Traders’ Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 168. 4. Boright v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 34 Minn. 352.
5. Western Pipe Lines v. Home Ins. Co., 145 Pa. St. 346, 22 Atl. Rep. 665.
6. Northern Pacific Express Co. v. Traders’ Ins. Co., 183 Ill. 356, 55 N. E. Rep. 702; Phænix Ins. Co. v. Belt R. Co., 82 ni. App. 265, affd., 182 Ill. 33.
Removal of Property Endangered by Fire as Governed by
If property covered by the policy is so endangered by fire as to require removal to a place of safety, and is so removed, that part of the policy in excess of its proportion of any loss and of the value of property remaining in the original location, shall for the ensuing five days only cover the property so removed in the new location; if removed to more than one location, such excess of the policy shall cover therein for such five days in the proportion that the value in any one such new location bears to the value in all such