CHAPTER I.

OF WAR.

SECTION I. PEOPLE OF GREECE IN ALL TIMES VERY WARLIKE.

No people of antiquity, except the Romans, could dispute the glory of arms and military virtue with the Greeks. During the Trojan war, Greece signalized her valour in battle, and acquired immortal fame by the bravery of her captains sent thither. This expedition was however, properly speaking, c more than the cradle of her infant glory; and the great exploits, by which she distinguished herself there, were only her first essays, and apprenticeship in the art of war.

There were in Greece at that time several small republics, neighbours to one another by their situation, but extremely remote in their customs, laws, characters, and particularly in their interests. This difference of manners and interests was a continual source and occasion of divisions among them. Every city dissatisfied with its own dominion, was studious to aggrandize itself at the expense of its next neighbours, according as they lay most commodious for it. Hence all these little states, either out of ambition, and to extend their con quests, or the necessity of a just defence, were always under arms, and by that continual exercise of war, formed a the people a martial spirit, and an intrepidity which made them invincible in the field, as appeared when the united forces of the east came to invade Greece, and made her sensible of what she was, and of what she was capable.

Two cities distinguished themselves above the rest, and held indisputably the first rank; these were Sparta and Athens: In consequence of which, those cities, either successively or together, had the empire of Greece, and maintained themselves through a long series of ages in power, which their superiority of merit, universally acknowledged by all the other states, had acquired them. This merit consisted principally in their military knowledge and martial virtue; the most glorious proofs of which they had given in the war against the Persians. Thebes disputed this honour with them for some years, by surprising actions of valour, which had something of prodigy in them; this however, was but a momentary blaze, which after having shone out with exceeding splendour, soon disappeared, and left that city in its original obscurity. Sparta and Athens will therefore be the only objects of our reflections as to what relates to war; and we shall join them together in order to be the better able to distinguish their characters, as well in what they resemble, as in what they differ from each other.

SECTION II.-ORIGIN AND CAUSE OF THE VALOUR AND MILITARY VIRTUE OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS.

ALL the laws of Sparta and institutions of Lycurgus seem to have had no other object than war, and tended solely to the making the subjects of that republic a body of soldiers. All other employments, all other exercises, were prohibited among them. Arts, polite learning, sciences, trades, even husbandry itself, had no share in their application, and seemned in their eyes unworthy of them. From their earliest infancy, no other taste was instilled into them but for arms; and indeed the Spartan education was wonderfully adapted to that end. To go barefoot, to lie hard, to be satisfied with little meat and drink, to suffer heat and cold, to exercise continually in hunting, wrestling, running on foot and horseback, to be inured to blows and wounds without vent ing either complaint or groan; these were the rudiments of the Spartan youth with regard to war, and enabled them to support all its fatigues, and to confront all its dangers.

The habit of obeying, contracted from their infancy, respect for the magis trates and elders, a perfect submission to the laws, from which no age nor con

dition was exempted, prepared them amazingly for military discipline, which in a manner the soul of war, and the principle of success in all great enterprises. One of these laws was, to conquer or die, and never to surrender to the enemy. Leonidas, with his three hundred Spartans, was an illustrious example of this; and his intrepid valour, extolled in all ages with the highest applauses, and proposed as a model to all posterity, had given the same spirit to the nation, and traced out for them the plan they were to follow. The disgrace and infamy annexed to the violation of this law, and to such as quitted their arms in battle, confirmed the observance of it, and rendered it in a manner inviolable. The mothers recommended to their sons, when they set out for the field, to return either with or upon their bucklers. They did not weep for those who died with their arms in their hands, but for those who preserved themselves by flight. Can we be surprised after this, that a small body of such soldiers, with such principles, should put an innumerable army of barbarians to a stand?

The Athenians were not bred up so roughly as the people of Sparta, but possessed equal valour. The taste of the two people was quite different in regard to education and employment; but they attained the same end, though by different means. The Spartans knew only how to use their arms, and were no more than soldiers: but among the Athenians, and we must say as much of the other people of Greece, arts, trades, husbandry, commerce, and navigation, were held in honour, and thought no disgrace to any one. These occupations were no obstacles to the valour and knowledge necessary in war; they disqualified none for rising to the greatest commands and first dignities of the republic. Plutarch observes, that Solon, seeing that the territory of Attica was barren, applied himself to turning the industry of his citizens, upon arts, trades, and commerce, in order to supply his country thereby with what it wanted in fertility. This taste became one of the maxims of the government and fundamental laws of the state, and perpetuated itself among the people, but without diminishing in the least their ardour for war.

The ancient glory of the nation, which had always distinguished itself by military bravery, was a powerful motive for not degenerating from the reputation of their ancestors. The famous battle of Marathon, wherein they had sustained alone the shock of the barbarians, and gained a signal victory over them, infinitely heightened their courage; and the battle of Salamin, in the success of which they had the greatest share, raised them to the highest pitch of glory, and rendered them capable of the greatest enterprises.

A noble emulation not to give place in point of merit to Sparta, the rival of Athens, and a lively jealousy of their glory, which during the war with the Persians contained itself within due bounds, were another strong incentive to the Athenians, who every day made new efforts to surpass themselves, and sustain their reputation.

The rewards and honours granted to those who had distinguished themselves in battle; the monuments erected in memory of the citizens who had died in defence of their country; the funeral orations publicly pronounced in the midst of the most august religious ceremonies, to render their names im mortal; all conspired infinitely to eternize the valour of both nations, and particularly of the Athenians, and to make fortitude a kind of law and indispen sible necessity with them.

There was a law at Athens, by which it was ordained that those who had heen maimed in war, should be maintained at the public expense. The same favour was granted to the fathers and mothers, as well as the children, of such as had fallen in battle, and left their families poor, and not in a condition to maintain themselves. The republic, like a good mother, generously tock them into her care, and, with great regard to them, supplied all the duties, and procured all the relief, they could have expected from those whose loss they deplored.*

* Flut, in Solan. p. §.—Idem, in Menex. p. 248 $49.—Diog. Laert, in Solon, p. 27

This exalted the courage of the Athenians, and rendered their troops invincible, though not very numerous. In the battle of Platææ, where the army of the barbarians, commanded by Mardonius, consisted of no less than three hundred thousand men, and the united forces of the Greeks, of only one hundred and eight thousand two hundred men; there were in the latter only ten thousand Lacedæmonians, one half of whom were Spartans, that is to say, inhabitants of Sparta, and eight thousand Athenians. It is true, each Spartan brought with him seven helots, amounting to thirty-five thousand men ; but they were scarcely ever reckoned as soldiers.

This great merit in point of martial valour, generally acknowledged by the other states and people, did not suppress in their minds all sentiments of envy and jealosy, as appeared once in relation to the Lacedæmonians. The allies, who were very far superior to them in number, were mortified to see themselves subjected to their orders, and murmured against it in secret. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, without seeming to have any knowledge of their disgust, assembled the whole army, and after having made all the allies sit down on one side, and the Lacedæmonians by themselves on the other, he caused proclamation to be made by a herald, that all smiths, masons, carpenters, and so on, through the other trades, should rise up. Almost all the allies did so, and not one of the Lacedæmonians, to whom all trades were prohibited. Agesilaus then smiling, " You see," said he, "how many more soldiers Sparta furnishes, than all the rest of the allies together;" thereby intimating, that to be a good soldier, it was necessary to be only a soldier; that trades diverted the artisan from applying himself wholly to the profession of arms and the science of war, and prevented his succeeding so well in it as those who made it their sole business and exercise. But Agesilaus spoke and acted in that manner from the prejudice of his opinion in favour of Lacedæmonian education; for indeed those whom he was for having considered only as simple artisans, had well demonstrated in the glorious victories they had gained over the Persians, and even Sparta itself, that they were by no means inferior to the Lacedæmonians, entirely soldiers as they were, either in valour or military knowledge.

SECTION III.-OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF TROOPS WHICH COMPOSED THE ARMIES OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS.

THE armies both of Sparta and Athens were composed of four sorts of troops; citizens, allies, mercenaries, and slaves. The soldiers were sometimes marked in the hand, to distinguish them from the slaves, who had that character impressed upon their forehead. Interpreters believe, that in allusion to this double manner of marking, it is said in the Revelation, that all were obliged "to receive the mark of the beast in their right hand, or in their foreheads;"* and that St. Paul says of himself, "I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus."†

The citizens of Lacedæmon were of two sorts, either those who inhabited Sparta itself, and who for that reason were called Spartans, or those who lived in the country. In the time of Lycurgus, the Spartans amounted to nine thousand, and the others to thirty thousand. This number seems to have been somewhat diminished in the time of Xerxes, as Demaratus, speaking to him of the Lacedæmonian troops, computes only eight thousand Spartans. The latter were the flower of the nation; and we may judge of the value they set upon them, by the anxiety the republic expressed for three or four hundred, besieged by the Athenians in the small island of Sphacteria, where they were taken prisoners. The Lacedæmonians generally spared the troops of their country very much, and sent only a few of them into the armies. When a Lacedæmonian general was asked, how many Spartans there were in the army? he answered, "As many as are necessary to repulse the enemy." They served the state at their own expense, and it was not till after a length of time that they received pay from the public.

Rev. xiii. 16.

Gal. vi 17.

The greatest number of the troops in the two republics were composed of the allies; who were paid by the cities which sent them.

The foreign troops in the pay of the republic, to the aid of which they were called in, were styled mercenaries.

The Spartans never marched without helots; and we have seen that in the battle of Platææ every citizen had seven. I do not believe this number was fixed; nor do I well comprehend for what service they were designed. It would have been very ill policy to have put arms into the hands of so great a number of slaves, generally much discontented with their master's harsh treatment of them, and who in consequence had every thing to fear from them in a battle. Herodotus, however, in the passage I have cited from him, represents them carrying arms in the field as light-armed soldiers.

The infantry consisted of two kinds of soldiers. The one were heavyarmed, and carried great bucklers, lances, half-pikes, and scimitars. The other were light-armed, that is to say, with bows and slings. They were commonly placed in the front of the battle, or upon the wings as a first line to shoot their arrows, and throw javelins and stones at the enemy; and when they had discharged, they retired through the intervals behind the battalions as a second line, and continued their vollies.

Thucydides, in describing the battle of Mantinæa, divides the Lacedæmonian troops in this manner. There were seven regiments of four companies each, without including the Squirites, to the number of six hundred; these were horsemen, of whom I shall soon speak farther. The company consisted, according to the Greek interpreter, of one hundred and twenty-eight men, and was subdivided into four platoons, each of thirty-two men. So that a regiment amounted to five hundred and twelve men, and the seven made together three thousand five hundred and eighty-four. Each platoon had four nen in frout and eight in depth, for that was the usual depth of the files, which the officers might change as occasion required.*

The Lacedæmonians did not actually begin to use cavalry, till after the war with Messene, where they perceived their want of it. They raised their horse principally in a small city not far from Lacedæmon, called Sciros, from whence these troops were denominated Scirites, or Squirites. They were always on the extremity of the left wing, which was their post by right.†

Cavalry was still more uncommon among the Athenians, on account of the situation of Attica, broken with numerous mountains. It did not amount, after the war with the Persians, which was the time when the prosperity of Greece was at the highest, to more than three hundred horse, but increased afterwards to twelve hundred; a smail body for so powerful a republic.

I have already observed, that among the ancients, as well Greeks as Romans, no mention is made of the stirrup, which is very surprising. They threw themselves nimbly on horseback.

Subjiciunt in equos

-Corpora saltu

"And with a leap sit steady on the horse"

En. 1. xi. ver. 287.

Sometimes the horse, broke early to that kind of manage, would stoop dowu before, to give his master the opportunity of mounting with more ease:

Inde inclinatus collum, submissus et armos

De more, inflexis præbebat scandere terga

Cruribus.

Sil. Ital. de Equo Coelii Equ. Rem.

Those whom age or weakness rendered heavy, made use of a servant in mounting on horseback, in which they imitated the Persians, with whom it was the common custom. Gracchus caused fine stones to be placed on each side of the great roads of Italy, at certain distances from one another, to help travellers to get on horseback without the assistance of any body.‡

Thucyd. 1. v. p. 390.

↑ Thucyd. I. v. p. 390.

• Αναβολεύς μη διομένος. This word αναβολεύς, signifes a servant who has helped his master to mount on horseback.

I am surprised that the Athenians, expert as they were in the art of war, did not distinguish that the cavalry was the most essential part of an army, especially in battles; and that some of their generals did not turn their attention that way, as Themistocles did in regard to maritime affairs. Xenophen was well capable of rendering them a like service in respect to the cavalry, of the importance of which he was perfectly apprised. He wrote two treatises upon this subject; one of which regards the care it is necessary to take of horses, and how to understand and break them; to which he adds the exerci. cf the squadron, both well worthy of being read by all who profess arms. In the latter he states the means of placing the cavalry in honour, and lays down rules upon the military art in general, which might be of very great use to all those who are designed for the employment of war.

I have wondered, in running over this second treatise, to see with what care Xenophon, a soldier and a pagan, recommends the practice of religion, a veneration for the gods, and the necessity of imploring their aid upon all occa sions. He repeats this maxim in thirteen different places of a tract in other respects brief enough; and rightly judging that these religious insinuations might give some people offence, he makes a kind of apology for them, and concludes the piece with a reflection, which I shall repeat entire in this place. "If any one," says he, "wonders that I insist so much here upon the necessity of not forming any enterprises without arst endeavouring to render the Divinity favourable and propitious, let him. reflect, that there are in war a thousand unforeseen and obscure conjunct.res, wherein the generals, vigilant to take advantages, and lay ambuscades for each other, from the uncertainty of an enemy's notions, can take no other counsel than that of the gods. Nothing is doubtful or obscure with them. They unfold the future to whom they please, on the inspection of the entrails of beasts, by the singing of birds, by visions, or in dreams. Now, we may presume that the gods are more inclined to enlighten the minds of such as consult them, not only in urgent necessities, but who at all times, and when no dangers threaten them, render them all the homage and adoration of which they are capable.'

It became this great man to give the most important instructions to his son Gryllus, to whom we addressed the treatise we mention; and who, according to the common opinion, was appointed to discipline the Athenian cavalry.

SECTION IV. OF MARITIME AFFAIRS, FLeets, and NAVAL FORCES.

If the Athenians were inferior to the Lacedæmonians in respect to cavalry, they surpassed them greatly in naval affairs, by which means they became masters at sea, and obtained a superiority over all the other states of Greece. As a knowledge of this subject is very necessary to rightly understand many passages in this history, I shall treat it more extensively than other matters, and shall make great use of what the learned father Don Bernard de Montfaucon has said of it in his books upon antiquity.

The principal parts of a ship were the prow or head, the poop or stern, and the middle, called in Latin carina, the hulk or waist.

The PROW was the forward extremity of the ship; it was generally adorned with paintings, and different sculptures of gods, men, or animals. The beak called rostrum, lay lower, and level with the water; it was a piece of timber which projected from the prow, covered at the point with brass, and sometimes with iron. The Greeks termed it μboxov

The other extremity of the ship, opposite to the prow, was called the POOP There the pilot sat and held the helm, which was a longer and larger oar than

the rest.

The WAIST was the hollow of the vessel, or the hold.

The ships were of two kinds, vessels of war and vessels of burden, intended for commerce or as transports. The former were generally propelled by oars the latter by sails. Both were sometimes, but rarely used together. The ships of war were also called Long Ships, and by that name distinguished from ves sels of burden.