eeming to reproach mankind for exposing whatever may be thought of the proper name heads so old and white to the pelting of the of this singular gratification, of a musical ear, pitiless storm. While such pictures suggest it seems to be quite certain, that all that rises images so pathetic, it looks almost like a wil- to the dignity of an emotion in the pleasure we ful perversity, to ascribe their beauty entirely receive from sounds, is as clearly the gift of o the mixture of colours which they display, association, as in the case of visible beauty, aud to the forgetfulness of these images. of association with the passionate tones and Even for the dunghill, we think it is possible modulations of the human voice, with the to say something,-though, we confess, we scenes to which the interesting sounds are have never happened to see any picture, of native,-with the poetry to which they have which that useful compound formed the pe- been married, or even with the skill and ✓ culiar subject. There is the display of the genius of the artist by whom they have been painter's art and power here also; and the arranged. dunghill is not only useful, but is associated Hitherto we have spoken of the beauty of with many pleasing images of rustic toil and external objects only. But the whole diffi occupation, and of the simplicity, and comfort, culty of the theory consists in its application and innocence of agricultural life. We do not to them. If that be once adjusted, the beauty know that a dunghill is at all a disagreeable of immaterial objects can occasion no perobject to look at, even in plain reality-pro- plexity. Poems and other compositions in vided it be so far off as not to annoy us with words, are beautiful in proportion as they are its odour, or to soil us with its effusions. In conversant with beautiful objects-or as they a picture, however, we are safe from any of suggest to us, in a more direct way, the moral these disasters; and, considering that it is and social emotions on which the beauty of usually combined, in such delineations, with all objects depends. Theorems and demonother more pleasing and touching remem- strations again are beautiful, according as they brancers of humble happiness and content-excite in us emotions of admiration for the ment, we really do not see that it was at all necessary to impute any mysterious or intrinsic beauty to its complexion, in order to account for the satisfaction with which we can then bear to behold it.

Having said so much with a view to reduce to its just value, as an ingredient of beauty, the mere organical delight which the eye is supposed to derive from colours, we really have not patience to apply the same considerations to the alleged beauty of Sounds that are supposed to be insignificant. Beautiful sounds, in general, we think, are beautiful from as sociation only, from their resembling the natural tones of various passions and affections,- --or from their being originally and most frequently presented to us in scenes or on occasions of natural interest or emotion. With regard, again, to successive or coexistent sounds, we do not, of course, mean to dispute, that there are such things as melody and harmony; and that most men are offended or gratified by the violation or observance of those laws upon which they depend. This, however, it should be observed, is a faculty quite unique, and unlike anything else in our constitution; by no means universal, as the sense of beauty is, even in cultivated societies; and apparently withheld from whole communities of quick-eared savages and barbarians. Whether the kind of gratification, which results from the mere musical arrangement of sounds, would be felt to be beautiful, or would pass under that name, if it could be presented entirely detached from any associated emotions, appears to us to be exceedingly doubtful. Even with the benefit of such combinations, we do not find, that every arrangement which merely preserves inviolate the rules of composition, is considered as beautiful; and we do not think that it would be consonant, either with the common feeling or common language of mankind, to bestow this epithet upon pieces that had no other merit. At all events, and

genius and intellectual power of their inventors, and images of the magnificent and beneficial ends to which such discoveries may be applied; and mechanical contrivances are beautiful when they remind us of similar talents and ingenuity, and at the same time impress us with a more direct sense of their vast utility to mankind, and of the great additional conveniences with which life is consequently adored. In all cases, therefore, there is the suggestion of some interesting conception or emotion associated with a present perception, in which it is apparently confounded and embodied-and this, according to the whole of the preceding deduction, is the distinguishing characteristic of beauty,

Having now explained, as fully as we think necessary, the grounds of that opinion as to the nature of beauty which appears to be most conformable to the truth-we have only to add a word or two as to the necessary conse quences of its adoption upon several other. controversies of a kindred description.

In the first place, then, we conceive that it establishes the substantial identity of the Sublime, the Beautiful, and the Picturesque; and, consequently, puts an end to all controversy that is not purely verbal, as to the dif. ference of those several qualities. Every material object that interests us, without ac-, tually hurting or gratifying our bodily feelings, must do so, according to this theory, in one and the same manner, that is, by suggesting or recalling some emotion or affection of ourselves, or some other sentient being, and presenting, to our imagination at least, some natural object of love, pity, admiration, or awe. The interest of material objects, therefore, is always the same; and arises, in every case, not from any physical qualities they may possess, but from their association with some idea of emotion. But, though material objects have but one means of exciting emotion, the emotions they do excite are infinite. They

D

are mirrors that may reflect all shades and all colours; and, in point of fact, do seldom reflect the same hues twice. No two interesting objects, perhaps, whether known by the name of Beautiful, Sublime, or Picturesque, ever produced exactly the same emotion in the beholder; and no one object, it is most probable, ever moved any two persons to the very same conceptions. As they may be associated with all the feelings and affections of which the human mind is susceptible, so they may suggest those feelings in all their variety, and, in fact, do daily excite all sorts of emotions-running through every gradation, from extreme gaiety and elevation, to the borders of horror and disgust.

Beautiful, already referred to, has observed not only that there appears to him to be no inconsistency or impropriety in such expressions as the sublime beauties of nature, or of the sacred Scriptures;-but has added, in express terms, that, "to oppose the beautiful to the sublime, or to the picturesque, strikes him as something analogous to a contrast between the beautiful and the comic-the beautiful and the tragic-the beautiful and the pathetic -or the beautiful and the romantic."

The only other advantage which we shall specify as likely to result from the general adoption of the theory we have been endeavouring to illustrate is, that it seems calculated to put an end to all these perplexing and vexatious questions about the standard of taste, which have given occasion to so much impertinent and so much elaborate discussion. If things are not beautiful in themselves, but only as they serve to suggest interesting conceptions to the mind, then every thing which does in point of fact suggest such a conception to any individual, is beautiful to that individual; and it is not only quite true that there is no room for disputing about tastes, but that all tastes are equally just and correct, in so far as each individual speaks only of his own emotions. When a man calls a thing beautiful, however, he may indeed mean to make two very different assertions;

suggesting to him some interesting emotion; and, in this sense, there can be no doubt that, if he merely speak truth, the thing is beautiful; and that it pleases him precisely in the same way that all other things please those to whom they appear beautiful. But if he mean farther to say that the thing possesses some quality which should make it appear beautiful to every other person, and that it is owing to some prejudice or defect in them if it appear otherwise, then he is as unreasonable and absurd as he would think those who should attempt to convince him that he felt no emotion of beauty.

Now, it is certainly true, that all the variety of emotions raised in this way, on the single basis of association, may be classed, in a rude way, under the denominations of sublime, beautiful, and picturesque, according as they partake of awe, tenderness, or admiration: and we have no other objection to this nomenclature, except its extreme imperfection, and the delusions to which we know that it has given occasion. If objects that interest by their association with ideas of power, and danger, and terror, are to be distinguished by the peculiar name of sublime, why should there not be a separate name also for objects that interest by associations of mirth and gaiety-another for those that please by sug--he may mean that it gives him pleasure by gestions of softness and melancholy-another for such as are connected with impressions of comfort and tranquillity-and another for those that are related to pity, and admiration, and love, and regret, and all the other distinct emotions and affections of our nature? These are not in reality less distinguishable from each other, than from the emotions of awe and veneration that confer the title of sublime on their representatives; and while all the former are confounded under the comprehensive appellation of beauty, this partial attempt at distinction is only apt to mislead us into an erroneous opinion of our accuracy, and to make us believe, both that there is a greater conformity among the things that pass under the same name, and a greater difference between those that pass under different names, than is really the case. We have seen already, that the radical error of almost all preceding inquirers, has lain in supposing that every hing that passed under the name of beautiful, must have some real and inherent quality in common with every thing else that obtained that name: And it is scarcely necessary for us to observe, that it has been almost as general an opinion, that sublimity was not only something radically different from beauty, but actually opposite to it; whereas the fact is, that it is far more nearly related to some sorts of beauty, than many sorts of beauty are to each other; and that both are founded exactly upon the same principle of suggesting some past or possible emotion of some sentient being.

Upon this important point, we are happy to find our opinions confirmed by the authority of Mr. Stewart, who, in his Essay on the

All tastes, then, are equally just and true, in so far as concerns the individual whose taste is in question; and what a man feels distinctly to be beautiful, is beautiful to him, whatever other people may think of it. All this follows clearly from the theory now in question: but it does not follow, from it, that all tastes are equally good or desirable, or that there is any difficulty in describing that which is really the best, and the most to be envied. The only use of the faculty of taste, is to afford an innocent delight, and to assist in the cultivation of a finer morality; and that / man certainly will have the most delight from this faculty, who has the most numerous and the most powerful perceptions of beauty. But, if beauty consist in the reflection of our affections and sympathies, it is plain that he will always see the most beauty whose affections are the warmest and most exercisedwhose imagination is the most powerful, and who has most accustomed himself to attend to the objects by which he is surrounded. In so far as mere feeling and enjoyment are con

cerned, therefore, it seems evident, that the best taste must be that which belongs to the best affections, the most active fancy, and the most attentive habits of observation. It will follow pretty exactly too, that all men's per-ing need give them no uneasiness; and the ceptions of beauty will be nearly in proportion to the degree of their sensibility and social sympathies; and that those who have no affections towards sentient beings, will be as certainly insensible to beauty in external objects, as he, who cannot hear the sound of his friend's voice, must be deaf to its echo.

per.

of theirs that the public would be astonished or offended, if they were called upon to join in that admiration. So long as no such call is made, this anticipated discrepancy of feelsuspicion of it should produce no contempt in any other persons. It is a strange aberration indeed of vanity that makes us despise persons for being happy-for having sources of enjoyment in which we cannot share:-and yet this is the true source of the ridicule, which is so generally poured upon individuals In so far as the sense of beauty is regarded who seek only to enjoy their peculiar tastes as a mere source of enjoyment, this seems to unmolested :-for, if there be any truth in the be the only distinction that deserves to be theory we have been expounding, no taste is attended to; and the only cultivation that bad for any other reason than because it is taste should ever receive, with a view to the peculiar as the objects in which it delights gratification of the individual, should be must actually serve to suggest to the indithrough the indirect channel of cultivating vidual those common emotions and universal the affections and powers of observation. If affections upon which the sense of beauty is we aspire, however, to be creators, as well as every where founded. The misfortune is, observers of beauty, and place any part of however, that we are apt to consider all our happiness in ministering to the gratifica-sons who make known their peculiar relishes, tion of others as artists, or poets, or authors and especially all who create any objects for of any sort then, indeed, a new distinction their gratification, as in some measure dicof tastes, and a far more laborious system of tating to the public, and setting up an idol for cultivation, will be necessary. A man who general adoration; and hence this intolerant pursues only his own delight, will be as much interference with almost all peculiar percep charmed with objects that suggest powerful tions of beauty, and the unsparing derision emotions in consequence of personal and ac- that pursues all deviations from acknowledged cidental associations, as with those that intro- standards. This intolerance, we admit, is often duce similar emotions by means of associa-provoked by something of a spirit of proselyttions that are universal and indestructible.ism and arrogance, in those who mistake their To him, all objects of the former class are own casual associations for natural or univerreally as beautiful as those of the latter-and for his own gratification, the creation of that sort of beauty is just as important an occupation: but if he conceive the ambition of creating beauties for the admiration of others, he must be cautious to employ only such objects as are the natural signs, or the inseparable concomitants of emotions, of which the greater As all men must have some peculiar asso part of mankind are susceptible; and his ciations, all men must have some peculiar faste will then deserve to be called bad and notions of beauty, and, of course, to a certain false, if he obtrude upon the public, as beau-extent, a taste that the public would be entiful, objects that are not likely to be associa-titled to consider as false or vitiated. For ted in common minds with any interesting those who make no demands on public admi impressions.

For a man himself, then, there is no taste that is either bad or false; and the only difference worthy of being attended to, is that between a great deal and a very little. Some who have cold affections, sluggish imaginations, and no habits of observation, can with difficulty discern beauty in any thing; while others, who are full of kindness and sensibility, and who have been accustomed to attend to all the objects around them, feel it almost in every thing. It is no matter what other people may think of the objects of their admiration; nor ought it to be any concern

sal relations; and the consequence is, that mortified vanity ultimately dries up, even for them, the fountain of their peculiar enjoyment; and disenchants, by a new association of general contempt or ridicule, the scenes that had been consecrated by some innocent but accidental emotion.

ration, however, it is hard to be obliged to sacrifice this source of enjoyment; and, even for those who labour for applause, the wisest course, perhaps, if it were only practicable, would be, to have two tastes-one to enjoy, and one to work by-one founded upon uni versal associations, according to which they finished those performances for which they challenged universal praise--and another guid ed by all casual and individual associations, through which they might still look fondly upon nature, and upon the objects of their secret admiration.

(November, 1812.)

De la Littérature considérée dans ses Rapports avec les Institutions Sociales. Par MAD. DE STAËL-HOLSTEIN. Avec un Précis de la Vie et les Ecrits de l'Auteur. 2 tomes. 12mo. pp. 600. London: 1812.*

WHEN we say that Madame de Staël is de- and manners; or who has thrown so strong a cidedly the most eminent literary female of light upon the capricious and apparently unher age, we do not mean to deny that there accountable diversities of national taste, gemay be others whose writings are of more di- nius, and morality-by connecting them with rect and indisputable utility-who are distin- the political structure of society, the accidents guished by greater justness and sobriety of of climate and external relation, and the vathinking, and may pretend to have conferred riety of creeds and superstitions. In her lighter more practical benefits on the existing genera- works, this spirit is indicated chiefly by the tion. But it is impossible, we think, to deny, force and comprehensiveness of those general that she has pursued a more lofty as well as observations with which they abound; and a more dangerous career;-that she has treat- which strike at once, by their justness and ed of subjects of far greater difficulty, and far novelty, and by the great extent of their ap more extensive interest; and, even in her plication. They prove also in how remarkfailures, has frequently given indication of able a degree she possesses the rare talent greater powers, than have sufficed for the of embodying in one luminous proposition success of her more prudent contemporaries. those sentiments and impressions which float While other female writers have contented unquestioned and undefined over many an themselves, for the most part, with embel- understanding, and give a colour to the chalishing or explaining the truths which the racter, and a bias to the conduct, of multitudes, more robust intellect of the other sex had who are not so much as aware of their existpreviously established-in making knowledge ence. Besides all this, her novels bear more familiar, or virtue more engaging-or, testimony to the extraordinary accuracy and at most, in multiplying the finer distinctions minuteness of her observation of human chawhich may be detected about the boundaries racter, and to her thorough knowledge of of taste or of morality-and in illustrating the those dark and secret workings of the heart, importance of the minor virtues to the general by which misery is so often elaborated from happiness of life-this distinguished person the pure element of the affections. Her has not only aimed at extending the bounda- knowledge, however, we must say, seems to ries of knowledge, and rectifying the errors of be more of evil than of good: For the prereceived opinions upon subjects of the greatest dominating sentiment in her fictions is, despair importance, but has vigorously applied her- of human happiness and human virtue; and self to trace out the operation of general their interest is founded almost entirely on causes, and, by combining the past with the the inherent and almost inevitable heartlesspresent, and pointing out the connection and ness of polished man. The impression which reciprocal action of all coexistent phenomena, they leave upon the mind, therefore, though to develope the harmonious system which ac-powerfully pathetic, is both painful and hutually prevails in the apparent chaos of human affairs; and to gain something like an assurance as to the complexion of that futurity towards which our thoughts are so anxiously driven, by the selfish as well as the generous principles of our nature.

We are not acquainted, indeed, with any writer who has made such bold and vigorous attempts to carry the generalizing spirit of true philosophy into the history of literature

miliating; at the same time that it proceeds, we are inclined to believe, upon the double error of supposing that the bulk of intelligent people are as selfish as those splendid victims of fashion and philosophy from whom her characters are selected; and that a sensibility to unkindness can long survive the extinction of all kindly emotions. The work before us, however, exhibits the fairest specimen which we have yet seen of the systematizing spirit of the author, as well as of the moral enthusiasm by which she seems to be possessed.

I reprint this paper as containing a more comprehensive view of the progress of Literature, especially in the ancient world, than any other from The professed object of this work is to show which I could make the selection; and also, in that all the peculiarities in the literature of some degree, for the sake of the general discussion different ages and countries, may be explained on Perfectibility, which I still think satisfactorily conducted. I regret that, in the body of the article, by a reference to the condition of society, and the portions that are taken from Madame de Staël the political and religious institutions of each; are not better discriminated from those for which I and at the same time, to point out in what only am responsible. The reader, however, will not go far wrong, if he attribute to that distinguished person the greater part of what may strike him as bold, imaginative, and original; and leave to me the humbler province of the sober, corrective, and

distrustful.

way the progress of letters has in its turn modified and affected the government and religion of those nations among whom they have flourished. All this, however, is bottomed upon the more fundamental and fa

of brilliant thoughts and profound observations; but we are most struck with those sentiments of mingled triumph and mortification by which she connects these magnificent speculations with the tumultuous aspect of the times in which they were nourished.

vourite proposition, that there is a progress, to There is a very eloquent and high-toned produce these effects that letters and intelli- Introduction, illustrating, in a general way, gence are in a state of constant, universal, and the influence of literature on the morals, the irresistible advancement-in other words, that glory, the freedom, and the enjoyments of the human nature is tending, by a slow and inter-people among whom it flourishes. It is full minable progression, to a state of perfection. This fascinating idea seems to have been kept constantly in view by Madame de Staël, from the beginning to the end of the work before us; and though we conceive it to have been pursued with far too sanguine and assured a spirit, and to have led in this way to most of what is rash and questionable in her conclusions, it is impossible to doubt that it has also helped her to many explanations that are equally solid and ingenious, and thrown a light upon many phenomena that would otherwise have appeared very dark and unac

countable.

révolution, contristent votre cœur, étouffent vos

mouvemens, en imposent à votre talent même, non par leur supériorité, mais par cette malveillance qui ne cause de la douleur qu'aux ames douces, et ne fait souffrir que ceux qui ne la méritent pas."-Tom. i. p. 27, 28.

"Que ne puis-je rappeler tous les esprits éclairés à la jouissance des méditations philosophiques! Les contemporains d'une Révolution perdent souvent tout intérêt à la recherche de la vérité. Tant d'évé nemens décidés par la force, tant de crimes absous par le succès, tant de vertus flétries par le blâme, tant d'infortunes insultées par le pouvoir, tant de sentimens généreux devenus l'objet de la moquerie, In the range which she here takes, indeed, tout lasse de l'espérance les hommes les plus fidèles tant de vils calculs philosophiquement commentés; she has need of all the lights and all the aids au culte de la raison. Néanmoins ils doivent se that can present themselves;-for her work ranimer en observant, dans l'histoire de l'esprit contains a critique and a theory of all the humain, qu'il n'a existé ni une pensée utile, ni une literature and philosophy in the world, from vérité profonde qui n'ait trouvé son siècle et ses the days of Homer to the tenth year of the admirateurs. C'est sans doute un triste effort que French revolution. She begins with the early travers l'avenir, sur nos successeurs, sur les étran de transporter son intérêt, de reposer son attente, à learning and philosophy of Greece; and after gers bien loin de nous, sur les inconnus, sur tous characterizing the national taste and genius les hommes enfin dont le souvenir et l'image ne of that illustrious people, in all its depart- peuvent se retracer à notre esprit. Mais, hélas! si ments, and in the different stages of their l'on en excepte quelques amis inaltérables, la pluprogress, she proceeds to a similar investi-part de ceux qu'on se rappelle après dix années de gation of the literature and science of the Romans; and then, after a hasty sketch of the decline of arts and letters in the later days of the empire, and of the actual progress of the human mind during the dark ages, when it is supposed to have slumbered in The connection between good morals and complete inactivity, she enters upon a more that improved state of intelligence which detailed examination of the peculiarities, and Madame de Staël considers as synonymous the causes of the peculiarities, of all the dif- with the cultivation of literature, is too obviferent aspects of national taste and genius that ous to require any great exertion of her talents characterize the literature of Italy, Spain, for its elucidation. She observes, with great England, Germany, and France-entering, as truth, that much of the guilt and the misery to each, into a pretty minute exposition of its which are vulgarly imputed to great talents, general merits and defects and not only of really arise from not having talent enoughthe circumstances in the situation of the coun- and that the only certain cure for the errors try that have produced those characteristics, which are produced by superficial thinking, but even of the authors and productions, in is to be found in thinking more deeply:-At which they are chiefly exemplified. To go the same time it ought not to be forgotten, through all this with tolerable success, and that all men have not the capacity of think without committing any very gross or ridicu- ing deeply-and that the most general cultilous blunders, evidently required, in the first vation of literature will not invest every one place, a greater allowance of learning than with talents of the first order. If there be a has often fallen to the lot of persons of the degree of intelligence, therefore, that is more learned gender, who lay a pretty bold claim unfavourable to the interests of morality and to distinction upon the ground of their learn- just opinion, than an utter want of intelliing alone; and, in the next place, an extent gence, it may be presumed, that, in very enof general knowledge, and a power and com-lightened times, this will be the portion of prehensiveness of thinking, that has still more the greater multitude-or at least that nations rarely been the ornament of great scholars. and individuals will have to pass through this Madame de Staël may be surpassed, perhaps, in scholarship (so far as relates to accuracy at least, if not extent,) by some-and in sound philosophy by others. But there are few indeed who can boast of having so much of both; and no one, so far as we know, who has applied the one to the elucidation of the other with so much boldness and success. But it is time to give a little more particular account of her lucubrations.

troubled and dangerous sphere, in their way to the loftier and purer regions of perfect understanding. The better answer therefore probably is, that it is not intelligence that does the mischief in any case whatsoever, but the presumption that sometimes accompanies the lower degrees of it; and which is best disjoined from them, by making the higher degrees n.ore attainable. It is quite true, as Madame de Staël observes, that the