and accounts for his forgetfulness, by acknow ledging that he had paid no attention. A groom, who never heard of the association of ideas, feeds the young war-horse to the sound of a drum; and the unphilosophical artists who tame elephants and train dancing dogs, proceed upon the same obvious and admitted principle. The truth is, that as we only know the existence of mind by the exercise of its functions according to certain laws, it is impossible that any one should ever discover or bring to light any functions or any laws of which men would admit the existence, unless they were previously convinced of their operation on themselves. A philosopher may be the first to state these laws, and to describe their operation distinctly in words; but men must be already familiarly acquainted with them in reality, before they can assent to the justice of his descriptions.

Now, it appears to us to be pretty evident that the phenomena of the Human Mind are almost all of the latter description. We feel, and perceive, and remember, without any purpose or contrivance of ours, and have evidently no power over the mechanism by which those functions are performed. We may observe and distinguish those operations of mind, indeed, with more or less attention or exactness; but we cannot subject them to experiment, or alter their nature by any process of investigation. We cannot decompose our perceptions in a crucible, nor divide our sensations with a prism; nor can we, by art and contrivance, produce any combination of thoughts or emotions, besides those with which all men have been provided by nature. No metaphysician expects by analysis to discover a new power, or to excite a new sensation in the mind, as a chemist discovers a new earth or a new metal; nor can he hope, by any For these reasons, we cannot help thinking process of synthesis, to exhibit a mental com- that the labours of the metaphysician, instead bination different from any that nature has of being assimilated to those of the chemist produced in the minds of other persons. The or experimental philosopher, might, with less science of metaphysics, therefore, depends impropriety, be compared to those of the gramupon observation, and not upon experiment: marian who arranges into technical order the And all reasonings upon mind proceed ac- words of a language which is spoken familcordingly upon a reference to that general iarly by all his readers; or of the artist who exobservation which all men are supposed to hibits to them a correct map of a district with have made, and not to any particular experi- every part of which they were previously ments, which are known only to the inventor. acquainted. We acquire a perfect knowledge -The province of philosophy in this depart- of our own minds without study or exertion, ment, therefore, is the province of observation just as we acquire a perfect knowledge of our only; and in this department the greater part native language or our native parish; yet we of that code of laws which Bacon has pro- cannot, without much study and reflection, vided for the regulation of experimental in- compose a grammar of the one, or a map of duction is plainly without authority. In meta- the other. To arrange in correct order all the physics, certainly, knowledge is not power; particulars of our practical knowledge, and to and instead of producing new phenomena to set down, without omission and without diselucidate the old, by well-contrived and well-tortion, every thing that we actually know conducted experiments, the most diligent inquirer can do no more than register and arrange the appearances, which he can neither account for nor control.

upon a subject, requires a power of abstrac tion, recollection, and disposition, that falls to the lot of but few. In the science of mind, perhaps, more of those qualities are required But though our power can in no case be than in any other; but it is not the less true directly increased by the most vigilant and of this, than of all the rest, that the materials correct observation alone, our knowledge may of the description must always be derived often be very greatly extended by it. In the from a previous acquaintance with the subscience of mind, however, we are inclined to ject-that nothing can be set down technically suspect that this is not the case. From the that was not practically known-and that no very nature of the subject, it seems necessa- substantial addition is made to our knowledge rily to follow, that all men must be practically by a scientific distribution of its particulars. familiar with all the functions and qualities After such a systematic arrangement has been of their minds; and with almost all the laws introduced, and a correct nomenclature apby which they appear to be governed. Everyplied, we may indeed conceive more clearly, one knows exactly what it is to perceive and to feel, to remember, imagine, and believe; and though he may not always apply the words that denote these operations with perfect propriety, it is not possible to suppose that any one is ignorant of the things. Even those laws of thought, or connections of mental operation, that are not so commonly stated in words, appear to be universally known; and are found to regulate the practice of those who never thought of enouncing them in precise or abstract propositions. A man who never heard it asserted that memory depends upon attention, yet attends with uncommon care to any thing that he wishes to remember;

and will certainly describe more justly, the nature and extent of our information; but our information itself is not really increased, and the consciousness by which we are supplied with all the materials of our reflections, does not become more productive, by this disposition of its contributions.

But though we have been induced in this way to express our scepticism, both as to the probable improvement and practical utility of metaphysical speculations, we would by no means be understood as having asserted that these studies are absolutely without interest or importance. With regard to Perception, indeed, and some of the other primary

functions of mind, it seems now to be admit- stated the perceptible improvement that has ted, that philosophy can be of no use to us, lately taken place in the method of considerand that the profoundest reasonings lead using those intellectual phenomena, he conback to the creed, and the ignorance, of the cludes with the following judicious and elovulgar. As to the laws of Association, how- quent observations:ever, the case is somewhat different. In"The authors who form the most conspicuous stances of the application of such laws are exceptions to this gradual progress, consist chiefly indeed familiar to every one, and there are of men, whose errors may be easily accounted for, few who do not of themselves arrive at some by the prejudices connected with their circumscribed imperfect conception of their general limits habits of observation and inquiry;-of Physiolo and application: But that they are sooner gists, accustomed to attend to that part alone of the human frame, which the knife of the Anatomist learned, and may be more steadily and excan lay open; or of Chemists, who enter on the tensively applied, when our observations are analysis of Thought, fresh from the decompositions assisted by the lessons of a judicious instruc- of the laboratory; carrying into the Theory of Mind tor, seems scarcely to admit of doubt; and itself (what Bacon expressly calls) the smoke and though there are no errors of opinion perhaps tarnish of the furnace. Of the value of such pur that may not be corrected without the help I must be allowed to observe, that the most dis suits, none can think more highly than myself; but of metaphysical principles, it cannot be distinguished pre-eminence in them does not necesputed, that an habitual acquaintance with those principles leads us more directly to the source of such errors, and enables us more readily to explain and correct some of the most formidable aberrations of the human understanding. After all, perhaps, the chief value of such speculations will be found to consist in the wholesome exercise which they afford to the faculties, and the delight which is produced by the consciousness of intellectual exertion. Upon this subject, we gladly borrow from Mr. Stewart the following admirable quotations :—

sarily imply a capacity of collected and abstracted reflection; or an understanding superior to the prejudices of early association, and the illusions of popular language. I will not go so far as Cicero, when he ascribes to those who possess these adMagni est ingenii revocare mentem a sensibus, et vantages, a more than ordinary vigour of intellect : cogitationem a consuetudine abducere.' I would only claim for them, the merit of patient and cautious research; and would exact from their an tagonists the same qualifications."-pp. 110, 111.

The second great objection that has been made to the doctrines of Dr. Reid, is, that they tend to damp the ardour of philosophical "An author well qualified to judge, from his curiosity, by stating as ultimate facts many own experience, of whatever conduces to invigo- phenomena which might be resolved into rate or to embellish the understanding, has beauti- simpler principles; and perplex the science fully remarked, that, by turning the soul inward of mind with an unnecessary multitude of on itself, its forces are concentrated, and are fitted internal and unaccountable properties. As for stronger and bolder flights of science; and that, in such pursuits, whether we take, or whether we to the first of these objections, we agree enlose the game, the Chase is certainly of service.' tirely with Mr. Stewart. It is certainly betIn this respect, the philosophy of the mind (abstract-ter to damp the ardour of philosophers, by ing entirely from that pre-eminence which belongs to it in consequence of its practical applications) may claim a distinguished rank among those preparatory disciplines, which another writer of equal talents has happily compared to the crops which are raised, not for the sake of the harvest, but to be ploughed in as a dressing to the land."""

pp. 166, 167.

exposing their errors and convincing them of their ignorance, than to gratify it by subscribing to their blunders. It is one step towards a true explanation of any phenomenon, to expose the fallacy of an erroneons one; and though the contemplation of such errors may render us more diffident of our own sucIn following out his observations on the cess, it will probably teach us some lessons scope and spirit of Dr. Reid's philosophy, Mr. that are far from diminishing our chance of Stewart does not present his readers with any obtaining it. But to the charge of multiplygeneral outline or summary of the peculiar ing unnecessarily the original and instinctive doctrines by which it is principally distin- principles of our nature, Mr. Stewart, we guished. This part of the book indeed ap- think, has not made by any means so satispears to be addressed almost exclusively to factory an answer. The greater part of what those who are in some degree initiated in the he says indeed upon this subject, is rather an studies of which it treats, and consists of a apology for Dr. Reid, than a complete justifivindication of Dr. Reid's philosophy from the cation of him. In his classification of the most important objections that had been made active powers, he admits that Dr. Reid has to it by his antagonists. The first is proposed multiplied, without necessity, the number of by the materialist, and is directed against the our original affections; and that, in the other gratuitous assumption of the existence of parts of his doctrine, he has manifested a mind. To this Mr. Stewart answers with leaning to the same extreme. It would have irresistible force, that the philosophy of Dr. been better if he had rested the defence of Reid has in reality no concern with the theo-his author upon those concessions; and upon ries that may be formed as to the causes of the general reasoning with which they are our mental operations, but is entirely confined very skilfully associated, to prove the supe to the investigation of those phenomena which rior safety and prudence of a tardiness to are known to us by internal consciousness, generalise and assimilate: For, with all our and not by external perception. On the deference for the talents of the author, we theory of Materialism itself, he makes some find it impossible to agree with him in those admirable observations: and, after having particular instances in which he has endeav

aid or intervention of any material existence at all. Those perceptions, too, might still have been accompanied with a belief that would not have been less universal or irresistible for being utterly without a foundation in reality. In short, our perceptions can never afford any complete or irrefragable proof of the real existence of external things; because it is easy to conceive that we might have such perceptions without them. We do not know, therefore, with certainty, that our perceptions are ever produced by external objects; and in the cases to which we have just alluded, we actually find perception and its concomitant belief, where we do know with certainty that it is not produced by any external existence.

irresistible belief of it that is implied in Per- | bodily organs at all." But it is surely altoception and Memory; a belief, the founda- gether as reasonable to say, that we might tions of which, he seems to think, it would have had all those perceptions, without the be something more than absurd to call in question. Now the reality of this general persuasion or belief, no one ever attempted to deny. The question is only about its justness or truth. It is conceivable, certainly, in every case, that our belief should be erroneous; and there can be nothing absurd in suggesting reasons for doubting of its conformity with truth. The obstinacy of our belief, in this instance, and its constant recurrence, even after all our endeavours to familiarise ourselves with the objections that have been made to it, are not absolutely without parallel in the history of the human faculties. All children believe that the earth is at rest; and that the sun and fixed stars perform a diurnal revolution round it. They also believe that the place which they occupy on the surface is absolutely the uppermost, and that the inhabitants of the opposite surface must be suspended in an inverted position. Now of this universal, practical, and irresistible belief, all persons of education are easily disabused in speculation, though it influences their ordinary language, and continues, in fact, to be the habitual impression of their minds. In the same way, a Berkleian might admit the constant recurrence of the illusions of sense, although his speculative reason were sufficiently convinced of their fallacy.

The phenomena of Dreaming and of Delirium, however, appear to afford a sort of experimentum crucis, to demonstrate that a real external existence is not necessary to produce sensation and perception in the human mind. Is it utterly absurd and ridiculous to maintain, that all the objects of our thoughts may be "such stuff as dreams are made of?" or that the uniformity of Nature gives us some reason to presume that the perceptions of maniacs and of rational men are manufactured, like their organs, out of the same materials? There is a species of insanity known among medical men by the epithet notional, in which, as well as in delirium tremens, there is frequently no general depravation of the reasoning and judging faculties, but where the disease consists entirely in the patient mistaking the objects of his thought or imagination for real and present existences. The error of his perceptions, in such cases, is only detected by comparing them with the perceptions of other people; and it is evident that he has just the same reason to impute error to them, as they can have individually for imputing it to him. The majority, indeed, necessarily carries the point, as to all practical consequences: But is there any absurdity in alleging that we can have no absolute or infallible assurance of that as to which the internal conviction of an individual must be supported, and may be overruled by the testimony of his fellow-creatures?

Dr. Reid has himself admitted that "we might probably have been so made, as to have all the perceptions and sensations which we now have, without any impression on our

It has been said, however, that we have the same evidence for the existence of the material world, as for that of our own thoughts or conceptions;-as we have no reason for be lieving in the latter, but that we cannot help it; which is equally true of the former. Now, this appears to us to be very inaccurately argued. Whatever we doubt, and whatever we prove, we must plainly begin with consciousness. That alone is certain-all the rest is inference. Does Dr. Reid mean to assert, that our perception of external objects is not a necessary preliminary to any proof of their reality, or that our belief in their reality is not founded upon our consciousness of perceiving them? It is only our perceptions, then, and not the existence of their objects, which we cannot help believing; and it would be nearly as reasonable to say that we must take all our dreams for realities, because we cannot doubt that we dream, as it is to assert that we have the same evidence for the existence of an external world, as for the existence of the sensations by which it is suggested to our minds.

We dare not now venture farther into this subject; yet we cannot abandon it without observing, that the question is entirely a matter of philosophical and abstract speculation, and that by far the most reprehensible passages in Dr. Reid's writings, are those in which he has represented it as otherwise. When we consider, indeed, the exemplary candour, and temper, and modesty, with which this excellent man has conducted the whole of his speculations, we cannot help wondering that he should ever have forgotten himself so far as to descend to the vulgar raillery which he has addressed, instead of argument, to the abettors of the Berkleian hypothesis. The old joke, of the sceptical philosophers running their noses against posts, tumbling into kennels, and being sent to madhouses, is repeated at least ten times in different parts of Dr. Reid's publications, and really seems to have been considered as an object on not less forci ble than facetious. Yet Dr. Reid surely could not be ignorant that those who have questioned the reality of a material universe, never af fected to have perceptions, ideas, and sensa tions, of a different nature from other people. The debate was merely about the origin of

these sensations; and could not possibly affect the conduct or feelings of the individual. The sceptic, therefore, who has been taught by experience that certain perceptions are connected with unpleasant sensations, will avoid the occasions of them as carefully as those who look upon the object of their perceptions as external realities. Notions and sensations he cannot deny to exist; and this limited faith will regulate his conduct exactly in the same manner as the more extensive creed of his antagonists. We are persuaded that Mr. | Stewart would reject the aid of such an argument for the existence of an external world. The length to which these observations have extended, deters us from prosecuting any farther our remarks on Dr. Reid's philosophy. The other points in which it appears to us that he has left his system vulnerable are, his explanation of our idea of cause and effect, and his speculations on the question of liberty

and necessity. In the former, we cannot help thinking that he has dogmatised, with a de gree of confidence which is scarcely justified by the cogency of his arguments; and has endeavoured to draw ridicule on the reasoning of his antagonists, by illustrations that are utterly inapplicable. In the latter, also, he has made something more than a just use of the prejudices of men and the ambiguity of language; and has more than once been guilty, if we be not mistaken, of what, in a less respectable author, we should not have scrupled to call the most palpable sophistry. We are glad that our duty does not require us to enter into the discussion of this very perplexing controversy; though we may be permitted to remark, that it is somewhat extraordinary to find the dependence of human actions on Motives so positively denied by those very philosophers with whom the doc trine of Causation is of such high authority.

(October, 1806.)

Memoirs of Dr. Joseph Priestley, to the year 1795, written by himself: With a Continuation to the time of his decease, by his Son Joseph Priestley; and Observations on his Writings. By THOMAS COOPER, President Judge of the Fourth District of Pennsylvania, and the Reverend WILLIAM CHRISTIE. 8vo. pp. 481. London: 1805.

In the Second part of his book, Mr. Cooper professes to estimate the Metaphysical writings of Dr. Priestley, and delivers a long and very zealous defence of the doctrines of Materialism, and of the Necessity of human actions. A good deal of learning and a good deal of talent are shown in this production: But we believe that most of our readers will be surprised to find that Mr. Cooper considers both these questions as having been finally set at rest by the disquisitions of his learned friend!

DR. PRIESTLEY has written more, we believe, and on a greater variety of subjects, than any other English author; and probably believed, as his friend Mr. Cooper appears to do at this moment, that his several publications were destined to make an era in the respective branches of speculation to which they bore reference. We are not exactly of that opinion: But we think Dr. Priestley a person of no common magnitude in the history of English literature; and have perused this miscellaneous volume with more interest than we have usually found in publications of the same description. The memoirs are now be considered as settled; for those who can "Indeed," he observes, "those questions must written with great conciseness and simplicity, resist Collins' philosophical inquiry, the section of and present a very singular picture of that in- Dr. Hartley on the mechanism of the mind, and defatigable activity, that bigotted vanity, that the review of the subject taken by Dr. Priestley precipitation, cheerfulness, and sincerity, and his opponents, are not to be reasoned with. which made the character of this restless maxim of technical law. It will apply equally to Interest reipublicæ ut denique sit finis litium, is a up philosopher. The observations annexed by the republic of letters; and the time seems to have Mr. Cooper are the work, we think, of a pow-arrived, when the separate existence of the human erful, presumptuous, and most untractable Soul, the freedom of the Will, and the eternal understanding. They are written in a defying, dogmatical, unaccommodating style: with much force of reasoning, in many places, but often with great rashness and arrogance; and occasionally with a cant of philosophism, and a tang of party politics, which communicate an air of vulgarity to the whole work, and irresistibly excite a smile at the expense of this magnanimous despiser of all sorts of prejudice and bigotry.*

* I omit now a very considerable portion of this review, containing a pretty full account of Dr. Priestley's life and conversation, and of his various publications on subjects of theology, natural philosophy, and chemistry; retaining only the following

axamination of his doctrine of Materialism.

duration of Future punishment, like the doctrines of the Trinity! and Transubstantiation, may be regarded as no longer entitled to public discussion."-p. 335.

The advocates of Necessity, we know, have long been pretty much of this opinion; and we have no inclination to disturb them at present with any renewal of the controversy: But we really did not know that the advo

cates of Materialism laid claim to the same triumph; and certainly find some difficulty in admitting that all who believe in the existence of mind are unfit to be reasoned with. To us, indeed, it has always appeared that it was much easier to prove the existence of mind, than the existence of matter; and with what