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or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being; for so Cicero saith very truly, " Usus uni rei deditus, et naturam et artem srepe vincit." And therefore if it be said of men,

"Labor omnia vincit Improbus, ct duris urgens in rebus egcstas;"

it is likewise said of beasts, " Quis psittaco docuit suum x°'P£;" W^10 taught the raven in a drought io throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where she espied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail ihrough such a vast sea of air, and to find the way from a field in flower a great way off, to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill lest it should take root and grow? Add then the word extundere, which importeth the extreme difficulty j and the word paulalim, which importeth the extreme slowness; and we are where we were, even amongst the ^Egyptian pjis; there being little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty of art, formatter of invention.

Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles of sciences may be pretended to be interned, and so the middle propositions by derivation from the principles; their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent; wherein iheir error is the fouler, because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced nature. For tie that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, " Aerei mellis coelestia dona," distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find, that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects, upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appear not. As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse, which were brought before him, and failed of David which was in the field. And this form, to ay truth, is so gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtile, as have managed these things, to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars, which their manner was to use but as lictores and viatores, for Serjeants and whifflers, ad summovendam turbam, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather 'ban in their true use and service: certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth; for as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child; so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions, whereof we speak, as if it were a second infancy or childhood.

Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism, that is, by touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like; yea, and divinity, because it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capacity of the simplest, that form may have use, and in natural philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, " Quie assensum parit, operis effceta est;" but the subtilty of nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds; for arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of words, and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things ; which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of consequences of arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can ever correct that error, being, as the physicians speak, in the first digestion; and therefore it was not without cause, that so many excellent philosophers became sceptics and academics, and denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension, and held opinion, that the knowledge of man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, " Seientiam dissimulando simulavit:" for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge, like the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but would not acknowledge so much; and in the later academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of acatalepsia, I doubt, was not held sincerely: for that all those which excelled in copy of speech, seem to have chosen that sect as that which was fittest to give glory to their eloquence, and variable discourses; being rather like progresses of pleasure, than journeys to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both academies did hold it in subtilty and integrity. But here was their chief error; they charged the deceit upon the senses, which in my judgment, notwithstanding all their cnvillations, are very sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too subtile for the sense, to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I speak not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek help: for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass.

This part of invention, concerning

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the invention of sciences, 1 purpose, if literatn. et inGod give me leave, hereafter to pro- {far^J^Rti0 pound, having digested it into two parts; whereof the one I term experientia literata, and the other interprctatio natiinc: the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise.

The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention; for to invent, is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know; and the use of this invention is no other, but out of the knowledge, whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So as, to speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which is the cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chace, as well of deer in an enclosed park, as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name; let it be called invention, so as it be perceived and discerned that the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.

To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, preparation and suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near his time, saying, "They did as if one that professed the art of shoemaking should not teach how to make a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes." But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, "that the kingdom of heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and old store:" and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept that pleaders should have the places whereof they have most continual use, ready handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of the law against equity, and contrary; and to speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth it plainly; that whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speak of, if he will take the pains, he may have it in effect premeditate, and handled in thesi: so that when he cometh to a particular, he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names, and times, and places, and such other circumstances of individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes, who in .regard of the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations and speeches. All which authorities and precedents may overweigh Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears.

But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the farther handling of it to rhetoric.

The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth assign and direct us to certain marks or places, which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge, as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use, truly taken, only to furnish argument to dispute probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may these places serve only to prompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, "Whosoever seeketh, knoweih that which he seeketh for in a general notion, else how shall he know it when he hath found it?" And therefore the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask: or, if we have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve: so as I cannot report, that this part of invention, which is that which the schools call topics, is deficient.

Nevertheless topics are of two sorts, general and special. The general we have spoken to, but the particular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the schools, which is, to be vainly subtile in a few things, which are within their command, and to reject the rest, I do receive particular topics, that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences: for in these it holdeth, "Ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis;" for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth; so every degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth, which light if we strengthen, by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit.

Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations, which as to induction hath a coincidence with invention: for in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all one as in the sense: but otherwise it is in proof by syllogism; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequences is another: the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of interpretation of nature.

For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently and excellently laboured; for the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed and unmovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished; so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within, to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of falling: therefore men did hasten to set down some principles about which the variety of their disputations might turn.

So then this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions to principles in a middle term. The principles to be agreed by all, and exempted from argument: the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man's invention: the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted; the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a probation ostensive; the other, when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, which is that which they call per incommodum, or pressing an absurdity; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle.

But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution; the former frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflections from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. Toward the composition and structure of which form it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple words; and this is that part of logic which is comprehended in the analytics.

The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and assurance' sake; discovering the more subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations, with their redargutions, which is that which is termed Elenches. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca maketh the comparison well, as in juggling feats, which though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be, yet the more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man besides his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.

This part concerning Elenches is excellently handled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example; not only in the persons "f the sophists, but even in Socrates himself, who professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallacy, and redargution. And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution; yet it is manifest, the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advantage, though the difference be good which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature.

Vol. j. B

But yet farther, this doctrine of Elenches hath a more ample latitude and extent, than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge; whereof some are laboured, and others omitted. For first, I conceive, though it may seem at first somewhat strange, that that part which is variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an elenche; for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase, especially of such words as are most general and intervene in every inquiry; it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful uses, leaving vain subtilties and speculations, of the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities of speech. So again, the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments, are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions.

Secondly, there is a seducement that w-orketh by the strength of the impression, and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation, not so much perplexing the reason, as over-ruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle, when I shall speak of rhetoric.

But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind, beholding them in an example or two; as first in that instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, that to the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or active to effect more than the negative or privative. So that a few times hitting, or presence, countervails ofttimes failing, or absence; as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him, in Neptune's temple, the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, " Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest." "Yea, but," saith Diagoras, " where are they painted that are drowned?" Let us behold it in another instance, namely, " That the spirit of man, being of an equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth." Hence it cometh, that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves, except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged of eccentries. Hence it cometh, that whereas there are many things in nature, as it were, monodica, sui juris; yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an element of fire to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like: nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies, the similitude of human actions and arts, together wilh the making of man communis mensura, have brought into natural philosophy, not much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the gods to be of human shape. And therefore Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked, why God should have adomed the heavens with stars, as if he had been an JEdilis; one that should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays. For if that great work-master had been of an human disposition, he would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders, like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number; so differing an harmony there is between the spirit of man, and the spirit of nature.

Let us consider, again, the false appearances imposed upon us, by every man's own individual nature and custom, in that feigned supposition that Plato maketh of the cave; for certainly, if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations. So in like manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many examples in one of the errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first book.

And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort; and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well, " Loqnendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes;" yet certain it is, that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment; so as it is almost necessary in all controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematics, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is in questions and

differences about words. To conclude Elenchi , . , - , ,

mas-ni.sivede therefore, it must be confessed that it

hun'anTnat'i- '8 not Poss>°le to divorce ourselves from

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nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless the caution of them, for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions, doth extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or cautions against these three false appearances, I find altogether deficient.

There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient; which is, the application of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of subjects; for there being but four kinds of demonstrations, rjeanalocia that is, by the immediate consent of demonstraiiothe mind or sense, by induction, by syl- num' logism, and by congruity; which is that which Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb, or circle, and not a notioribus; every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded, and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hinderance to knowledge, the distributions and assignations of demonstrations, according to the analogy of sciences, 1 note as deficient.

The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character, and the order of the entry: for the art of characters, or other visible notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar; and therefore I refer it to the due place: for the disposition and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good digest of common-places; wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as that which assureth copy of invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the methods of common-places that I have seen, there is none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying merely the face of a school, and not of a world, and referring to vulgar matters, and pedantical divisions, without all life, or respect to action.

For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which is memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of. An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there are better precepts than that art and better practices of that art than those received. It is certain the art as it is may be raised to points of ostentation prodigious: but in use, as it is now managed, it is barren, not burdensome nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren; that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and occasions. And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or rhimes ex tempore, or the making of a satirical simile of every thing, or the turning of every thing to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of every thing by cavil, or the like, whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great copia, and such as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder, than I do of the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, baladines; the one being the same in the mind, that the other is in the body; matters of strangeness without worthiness.

This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the one prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would remember, anddirecteth us to seek in a narrow compass; that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory. Emblem rednceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike the memory more; out of which axioms may be drawn much better practic than that in use: and besides which axioms, there are divers more touching help of memory, not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only ill managed.

There remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our knowledge to others, which I will term by the general name of tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three parts: the first concerning the organ of tradition j the second, concerning the method of tradition; and the third, concerning the illustration of tradition.

For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing: for Aristotle saith well, "Words are the images of cogitations, and letters are the images of words;" but yet it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by the medium of words. For whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to express cogitations. And therefore we see in the commerce of barbarous people, that understand not one another's language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men's minds we expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we understand farther, that it ii the use of China, and the kingdoms of the high Levant, to write in characters real, which express neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions; insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand not one another's language, can nevertheless read one another's writings, because the characters are accepted more generally than the languages do extend; and therefore they have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as radical words.

These notes of cogitations are of two sorts; the one when the note hath some similitude or confruity with the notion; the other ad placitum, having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, things of ancient use, and embraced chiefly by the ./Egyptians, one of the most ancient nations, they are but as continued impresses and emblems. And as for gestures, they are as transi

tory hieroglyphics, and are to hieroglyphics, as words spoken are to words written, in that they abide not: but they have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with the things signified; as Periander, being consulted with, how to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he saw him do, and went into his garden and topped all the highest flowers; signifying, that it consisted in the cutting ofT and keeping low of the nobility and grandees. Ad placitum are the characters real before mentioned, and words: although some have been willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to have derived imposition of names from reason and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent; but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This portion of knowledge, touch- feerTMm.is ing the notes of things, and cogitations in general, I find not inquired, but deficient. And although it may seem of no great use, considering that words and writings by letters do far excel all the other ways; yet because this part concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge, for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver, I thought to propound it to better inquiry.

Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them hath produced the science of Grammar; for man still striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived; and as he hath striven against the first general curse, by the invention of all other arts; so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse, which was the confusion of tongues, by the art of gTammar, whereof the use in a mother tongue is small; in a foreign tongue more; but most in such foreign tongues ns have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures; the one popular, which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well for intercourse of speech, as for understanding of authors; the other philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they are the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words and reason is handled sparsim, brokenly, though not entirely; and therefore I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself.

Unto Grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of the accidents of words, which are measure, sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and harshness of them: whence hath issued some curious observations in rhetori". but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the verse, and not of the argument; wherein though men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of dances; for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured Rpccch. In these things the sense is better judge than the art;

"Ccenae fercula nostrce
Mallem convivis, quam placuiue cocis."

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