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tries. Hence it cometh, that whereas there are many things in nature, as it were, monodica, sui juris; yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an element of fire to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like: nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies, the similitude of human actions and arts, together wilh the making of man communis mensura, have brought into natural philosophy, not much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the gods to be of human shape. And therefore Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked, why God should have adomed the heavens with stars, as if he had been an JEdilis; one that should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays. For if that great work-master had been of an human disposition, he would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders, like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number; so differing an harmony there is between the spirit of man, and the spirit of nature.
Let us consider, again, the false appearances imposed upon us, by every man's own individual nature and custom, in that feigned supposition that Plato maketh of the cave; for certainly, if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations. So in like manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many examples in one of the errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first book.
And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort; and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well, " Loqnendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes;" yet certain it is, that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment; so as it is almost necessary in all controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematics, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is in questions and
differences about words. To conclude Elenchi , . , - , ,
mas-ni.sivede therefore, it must be confessed that it
hun'anTnat'i- '8 not Poss>°le to divorce ourselves from
vis et adventi- these fallacies and false appearances,
because they are inseparable from our
nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless the caution of them, for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions, doth extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or cautions against these three false appearances, I find altogether deficient.
There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient; which is, the application of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of subjects; for there being but four kinds of demonstrations, rjeanalocia that is, by the immediate consent of demonstraiiothe mind or sense, by induction, by syl- num' logism, and by congruity; which is that which Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb, or circle, and not a notioribus; every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded, and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hinderance to knowledge, the distributions and assignations of demonstrations, according to the analogy of sciences, 1 note as deficient.
The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character, and the order of the entry: for the art of characters, or other visible notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar; and therefore I refer it to the due place: for the disposition and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good digest of common-places; wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as that which assureth copy of invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the methods of common-places that I have seen, there is none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying merely the face of a school, and not of a world, and referring to vulgar matters, and pedantical divisions, without all life, or respect to action.
For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which is memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of. An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there are better precepts than that art and better practices of that art than those received. It is certain the art as it is may be raised to points of ostentation prodigious: but in use, as it is now managed, it is barren, not burdensome nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren; that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and occasions. And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or rhimes ex tempore, or the making of a satirical simile of every thing, or the turning of every thing to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of every thing by cavil, or the like, whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great copia, and such as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder, than I do of the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, baladines; the one being the same in the mind, that the other is in the body; matters of strangeness without worthiness.
This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the one prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would remember, anddirecteth us to seek in a narrow compass; that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory. Emblem rednceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike the memory more; out of which axioms may be drawn much better practic than that in use: and besides which axioms, there are divers more touching help of memory, not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only ill managed.
There remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our knowledge to others, which I will term by the general name of tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three parts: the first concerning the organ of tradition j the second, concerning the method of tradition; and the third, concerning the illustration of tradition.
For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing: for Aristotle saith well, "Words are the images of cogitations, and letters are the images of words;" but yet it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by the medium of words. For whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to express cogitations. And therefore we see in the commerce of barbarous people, that understand not one another's language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men's minds we expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we understand farther, that it ii the use of China, and the kingdoms of the high Levant, to write in characters real, which express neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions; insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand not one another's language, can nevertheless read one another's writings, because the characters are accepted more generally than the languages do extend; and therefore they have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as radical words.
These notes of cogitations are of two sorts; the one when the note hath some similitude or confruity with the notion; the other ad placitum, having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, things of ancient use, and embraced chiefly by the ./Egyptians, one of the most ancient nations, they are but as continued impresses and emblems. And as for gestures, they are as transi
tory hieroglyphics, and are to hieroglyphics, as words spoken are to words written, in that they abide not: but they have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with the things signified; as Periander, being consulted with, how to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he saw him do, and went into his garden and topped all the highest flowers; signifying, that it consisted in the cutting ofT and keeping low of the nobility and grandees. Ad placitum are the characters real before mentioned, and words: although some have been willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to have derived imposition of names from reason and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent; but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This portion of knowledge, touch- feerTMm.is ing the notes of things, and cogitations in general, I find not inquired, but deficient. And although it may seem of no great use, considering that words and writings by letters do far excel all the other ways; yet because this part concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge, for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver, I thought to propound it to better inquiry.
Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them hath produced the science of Grammar; for man still striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived; and as he hath striven against the first general curse, by the invention of all other arts; so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse, which was the confusion of tongues, by the art of gTammar, whereof the use in a mother tongue is small; in a foreign tongue more; but most in such foreign tongues ns have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures; the one popular, which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well for intercourse of speech, as for understanding of authors; the other philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they are the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words and reason is handled sparsim, brokenly, though not entirely; and therefore I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself.
Unto Grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of the accidents of words, which are measure, sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and harshness of them: whence hath issued some curious observations in rhetori". but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the verse, and not of the argument; wherein though men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of dances; for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured Rpccch. In these things the sense is better judge than the art;
"Ccenae fercula nostrce
And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and unfit subject, it is well said, "Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate est maxime novum."
For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets, but may be in words. The kinds of ciphers, besides the simple ciphers, with changes, and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants, are many, according to the nature or rule of the infolding: wheelciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, &c. But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be impossible to decipher; and in some cases, that they be without suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write omnia per omnia; which is undoubtedly possible with a proportion quincvple at most, of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of ciphering hath for relative an art of deciphering, by supposition unprofitable, but, as things are, of great use. For suppose that ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them which exclude the decipherer. But in regard of the rawness and unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass, the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers.
In the enumeration of these private and retired arts, it may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them for show and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those which are skilful in them judge, whether I bring them in only for appearance, or whether in that which I speak of them, though in few words, there be not some seed of proficience. And this must be remembered, that as there be many of great account in their countries and provinces, which when they come up to the seat of the estate, are but of mean rank, and scarcely regarded; so these arts being here placed with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things; yet to such as have chosen them to spend their labours and studies in them, they seem great matters.
For the method of tradition, 1 see it hath moved a controversy in our time. But as in civil business, if there be a meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and no proceeding at all; so in learning, where there is much controversy, there is many times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly inquired, as I shall report it deficient.
Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in logic, as a part of judgment: for as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgment upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of method containeth the rules of judgment upon that which is to be delivered; for judgment precedeth delivery, as it followeth invention. Neither is the method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity of method, is
of method referred to use, and method referred to progression, whereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other of probation.
The latter whereof seemeth to be via deserta et interclusa. For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of error, between the deliverer and the receiver; for he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as may be best examined: and he that receiveth knowledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant inquiry: and so rather not to doubt, than not to err; glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength. ,
But knowledge, that is delivered as a thread to be spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method wherein it vraa invented, and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet nevertheless, secundum majus et minus, a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges, as it is in plants, if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots; but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of knowledges, as it is now used, is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter.
But if vou will have sciences grow, it _ _ ,. .
is less matter for the shaft or body of sincere, sire the tree, so you look well to the taking fu"'^ sciel" up of the roots: of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath some shadow; but generally I see it neither put in ure nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.
Another diversity of method there is, which hath some affinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain persons, who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit merchandises; and that is, enigmatical and disclosed. The pretence whereof is to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil.
Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods; wherein we may observe, that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few axioms or observations upon any subject to make a solemn and formal art, filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a sensible method; but the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not approach.
For first it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; discourse of connexion and order is cutoff; descriptions of practice are cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms, but some good quantity of observation: and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in methods,
"Tantum series juncturaque pollet, Tantumde medio sumptis accedit honoris;"
as a man shall make a great show of an art, which if it were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or belief, but tss fit to point to action; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy. But particulars being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire farther; whereas methods carrying the show of a total, do secure men as if they were at farthest.
Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight, is, the handling of knowledge by assertions, and their proofs; or by questions, and their determinations; the latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning, as it is to the proceeding of an army io go about to besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of themselves; indeed a man would not leave some important piece with an enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not to minister and excite disputations and doubts.
Another diversity of methods is according to the subject or matter which is handled; for there is a great difference in delivery of the mathematics, which »re the most abstracted of knowledges, and policy, frhich is the most immersed; and howsoever contention hath been removed, touching the uniformity of method in multiformity of matter; yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain empty and barren generalities; being but the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out aid expulsed with the torture and press of the method: and therefore as I did allow well of particular topics for invention, so do I allow likewise of particular methods of tradition.
Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and tearhing of knowledge, is according unto the light and presuppositions of that which is delivered; for that knowledge which is new and foreign from opinions received, is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith, "If »e shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes," &c. For those, whose conceits are seated ln popular opinions, need only but to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular
opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate: so that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for paradoxes, that which was offered, before they had understood or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are: for it is a rule, "That whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in aid of similitudes."
There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and received: as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of concealment or cryptic, &c. which I do allow well of, though I have stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I have remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and DterJdTMf0enni"a constitute one general inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touching the wisdom of tradition.
But unto this part of knowledge concerning method, doth farther belong, not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns thereof, not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure: and therefore method considereth not only the disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the propositions; not as to their truth or matter, but as to their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules of proposition, KafM\n rrpwrov Kara 7ra>roc, &c. than he did in introducing the canker of epitomes; and yet, as it is the condition of human things, that, according to the ancient fables, " The most precious things have the most pernicious keepers;" it was so, that the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted, that should design to make axioms convertible; if he make them not withal circular, and non promovent, or incurring into themselves: but yet the intention was excellent.
The other considerations of method concerning propositions, are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the dimensions of sciences; for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity, which is the truth and substance of it that makes it solid, to have a longitude and a latitude, accounting the latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude towards action ; that is, from the greatest generality, to the most particular precept: the one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of another, which is the rule they call icnOavro: the other giveth rule, unto what degree of particularity a knowledge should descend: which latter I find passed over in silence, being in my judgment the more material: for certainly there must be somewhat left to practice; but how much is worthy the inquiry. We see remote and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men, and are no more aiding lo practice, than an Ortelins's universal map is to direct the way between London and York. The better
sort of rules have been not unfitly comD|P^^i°nepared to glasses of steel unpolished;
where you may see the images of things, but first they must be filed : so the rules will help, if they be laboured and polished by practice. But how crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far forth they may be polished aforehand, is the question ; the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient.
There hath been also laboured, and put in practice, a method, which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture, which is, to deliver knowledges in such manner as men may speedily come to make a show of learning, who have it not; such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius in making that art, which bears his name, not unlike to some books of typocosmy, which have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words of all arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the art; which collections are much like a fripper's or broker's shop, that hath ends of every thing, but nothing of worth.
Now we descend to that part which concerneth the illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science which we call Rhetoric, or art of eloquence; a science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For although in true value it is inferior to wisdom, as it is said by God to Moses, when he disabled himself for want of this faculty, " Aaron shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God:" yet with people it is the more mighty: for so Solomon saith, " Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet;" signifying, that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life; and as to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of rhetorics exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art: and therefore the deficiencies which I shall note, will rather be in some collections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.
Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest; the duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will: for we see reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means; by illaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or affection, which pertains to morality. And as in negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves men are undermined by inconsequences, solicited and importuned by impressions or observations, and transported
by passions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason and not to establish and advance it; for the end of logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it. The end of morality, is to procure the affections to obey reason, and not to invade it. The end of rhetoric, is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it: for these abuses of arts come in but ex obliquo for caution.
And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing out of a just hatred of the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces, to the pleasure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think; and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech, knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And therefore as Plato said elegantly, " That Virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection ;" so seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is, to show her to the imagination in lively representation; for to show her to reason only in subtilty of argument, was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus, and many of the Stoics, who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man.
Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true, there should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs: but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections,
"Video meliora, proboque; Dcteriora sequor;"
Reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affections part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the affections; for the actions themselves carry ever an appetite to good as reason doth. The difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the present, reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.
We conclude therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with vice. For we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also, that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as the