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fist from the palm, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact, and in truth; and rhetoric handleth it 8,8 it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both: for the proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men indifferent and the same: but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors:
"Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion."
Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to them all respectively, and several ways; though this politic part of eloquence in private speech, it is easy for the greatest orators to want; whilst by the r* pmden- observing their well graced forms of u»«nnonis speech, they lose the volubility of ap
plication: and thereof it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry, not being curious, whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth policy. Coloresboni Now therefore will I descend to the « nali, sim- deficiencies, which, as I said, are but pjirattcom- attendances: and first, I do not find
the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric, as I touched before. For example;
"Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum."
"Laudit venales qui vult cxtrudere merces. Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor; sed cum recesserit, turn gloriabitur."
The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three; one, that there be but a few of many; another, that their elenchus's are not annexed; and the third, that be conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in impression. For many forms are equal in signification, which are differing in impression; as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp, and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same: for there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said; "Your enemies will be glad of this;"
"Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno inercentur Atrida?;"
than by hearing it said only; "This is evil for you."
Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching provision or preparatory store, for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts; the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made up, ooth to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request: the former of these I will call antitheta, and the latter formulas.
Antitheta are theses argned pro et contra, wherein men may be more large AyJ,r„mta and laborious; but in such as are able to do it, to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; sup-plying authorities and examples by reference.
PRO VERBIS LEOIS.
"Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, qua? recedit a litem. Cum receditur a litera judex transit in legislatorein."
PRO SENTENT1A LEOIS.
"Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus, qui interpretatur singula."
Formulie are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well-casting of the stair-cases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect.
A CONCLUSION IN A DELIBERATIVE.
"So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences future."
There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical; for all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books; so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books; whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors, wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often presumed that that which they understand not, is false set down. As the priest, that where he found it written of St. Paul, "Demissus est per sportam," mended his book, and made it "Demissus est per portam," because sporta was a hard word, and out of his reading; and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of the same kind. And therefore as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.
The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries, wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain.
The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light to true interpretations.
The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors, that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to read.
And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies, that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.
For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of tradition which is proper for youth, whereunto appertain divers considerations of'great fruit.
As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what to initiate them, and from what, for a time, to refrain them.
Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so proceed to the more difficult, and in what courses to press the more difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy j for it is one method . to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heavy shoes.
A third is the application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto, for in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin: and as sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting; and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom what kinds of wits and natures are most proper for what sciences.
Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults, and get ill habits as well as good; so there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance and intermission of exercises. It were too long to particularize a number of other considerations of this nature ; things but of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy: for as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants, is that that is most important to their thriving; and as it was noted, that the first six kings, being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the infancy thereof, was the principal cause of the immense greatness of that state which followed; so the culture and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible, though unseen, operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also, how small and mean faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall into great men or great matters, do work great and important effects; whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus, of two stage players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing, put the Pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and combustion; for there arising a mutiny amongst them, upon the death of Augustus Ceesar, Bleesus the lieutenant had committed some of the mutineers, which were suddenly rescued; whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did in this manner: "These poor innocent wretches appointed to cruel death, you have restored to behold the light: but who shall restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, that was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of the common cause? And he hath murdered him this last night by some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Bleesus, what is done with his body? The mortalest enemies do not deny burial. When I have performed my last duties to the corpse with kisses, with tears, com
mand me to be slain beside him, so that these my fellows, for our good meaning, and our true hearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us." With which speech he put the army into an infinite fury and uproar; whereas truth was he had no brother, neither was there any such matter, but he played it merely as if he had been upon the stage.
But to return, we are now come to a period of rational knowledges, wherein if I have made the divisions other than those that are received, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those divisions which I do not use; for there is a double necessity imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The one, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort together those things which are next in nature, and those things which are next in use; for if a secretary of state should sort his papers, it is like, in his study, or general cabinet, he would sort together things of nature, as treatise, instructions, &c.; but in his boxes, or particular cabinet, he would sort together those that he were like to use together, though of several natures; so in this general cabinet of knowledge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of things; whereas if myself had been to handle any particular knowledge, I would have respected the divisions fittest for use. The other, because the bringing in of the deficiencies did by consequence alter the partitions of the rest: for let the knowledge extant, for demonstration sake, be fifteen, let the knowledge with the deficiencies be twenty, the parts of fifteen are not the parts of twenty, for the parts of fifteen are three and five, the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten; so as these things are without contradiction, and could not otherwise be.
We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the Appetite and Will of Man, whereof Solomon saith, "Ante omnia, fili, custodi cor tuum, nam inde procedunt actiones vita;." In the handling of this science, those which have written, seem to me to have done as if a man that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets, and letters joined, without giving any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters: so have they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well described as the true objects and scopes of man's will and desires; but how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and unprofitably; for it is not the disputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature, or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, and the like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of this part.
The reason of this omission I suppose it to be that hidden rock whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast away; which is, that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary and common matters, the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine; for life consisted not in novelties or subtilities: but contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen to give glory either to the subtilty of disputations, or to the eloquence of discourses. But Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence: "Nocet illis elcquentra, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit, sed sui." Doctrine should be such as should make men in love with the lesson, and not with the teacher, being directed to the auditor's benefit, and not to the author's commendation; and therefore those are of the right kind which may be concluded as Demosthenes concludes his counsel, " Qua; si feceritis, non oratorem duntaxat in preesentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam, non ita multo post statu rerum testrarum meliore." Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired of a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed obtained, who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of the heroical acts of iEneas:
"Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum
Geory. iii. 289.
And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to write at leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action and active life, these georgics of the mind concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty, and felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the Exemplar or Platform of Good, and the Regiment or Culture of the Mind; the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.
The doctrine touching the Platform or Nature of Good considereth it either simple or compared, either the kinds of good, or the degrees of good; in the latter whereof those infinite disputations which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, or the highest good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen divinity, are by the christian faith discharged. And, as Aristotle saith, "That young men may be happy, but not otherwise but by hope;" so we must all acknowledge our minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future world.
Freed therefore, and delivered from this doctrine of the philosopher's heaven, whereby they feigned an higher elevation of man's nature than was, for we see in what a height of style Seneca writeth, "Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis, secuntatem Dei," we may with more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and labours; 'herein for the nature of good, positive or simple, 'hey have set it down excellently, in describing the forms of virtue and duty with their situations and postures, in distributing them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like: nay farther, they have commended them to man's "stare and spirit, with great quickness of argument
and beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and intrenched them, as much as discourse can do, against corrupt and popular opinions. Again, for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have also excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the comparison between a contemplative and an active life, in the distinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, in their encounters between honesty and profit, in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like; so as this part deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured.
Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular and received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and evil, and the strings of those roots, they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that which followed; and especially if they had consulted with nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound: which being by them in part omitted and in part handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner.
There is formed in every thing a double nature of good, the one as every thing is a total or substantive in itself, the other as it is a part or member of a greater body; whereof the latter is in degree the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form: therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy moveth to the loadstone, but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies: so may we go forward, and see that water and massy bodies move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth in regard of their duty to the world. This double nature of good and the comparative thereof is much more engraven upon man, if he degenerate not, unto whom the conservation of duty to the public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and being; according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by his friends about him, that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only to them, " Necesse est ut earn, non ut vivam:" but it may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as the holy faith: well declaring, that it was the same God that gave the christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints of God have wished themselves anathematized and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity, and infinite feeling of communion.
This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is conversant. For first, it decideth the question touching the preferment of the contemplative or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle: for all the reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative, are private, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man's self, in which respects, no question, the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence; not much unlike to that comparison, which Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying of philosophy and contemplation; who being asked what he was, answered, " That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that some came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as merchants to utter their commodities, and some came to make good cheer and meet their friends, and some came to look on, and that he was one of them that came to look on." But men must know, that in this theatre of man's life, it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on: neither could the like question ever have been received in the church, notwithstanding their " Pretiosa in oculis Domini more sanctorum ejus j" by which place they would exalt their civil death and regular professions, but upon this defence, that the monastical life is not simply contemplative, but performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed as an office in the church, or else of writing or taking instructions for writing concerning the law of God; as Moses did when he abode so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch the seventh from Adam, who was the first contemplative, and walked with God; yet did also endow the church with prophecy, which St. Jude citeth. But for contemplation, which should be finished in itself, without casting beams upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not.
It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, and their schools and successions, on the one side, who placed felicity in virtue simply or attended; the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue, as it is used in some comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits, to be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and attended j and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation; as if they would have deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one air and season; and Herillus, who placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming things according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation; which opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or wavering of belief: all which are manifest to tend to private repose and contentment, and not to point of society.
It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which presupposeth that felicity must be placed in
those things which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance; as if it were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune: as Consalvo said to his soldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting, *' He had rather die one foot forwards, than to have his life secured for long, by one ■ foot of retreat." Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath signed, who hath affirmed "that a good conscience is a continual feast;" showing plainly, that the conscience of good intentions, howsoever succeeding, is a more continual joy to nature, than all the provision which can be made for security and repose.
It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy, which grew general about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an occupation or profession; as if the purpose had been not to resist and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a particular and kind course of life to that end, introducing such a health of mind, as was that health of body, of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did nothing all his life long but intend his health: whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as that health of body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities; so likewise that health of mind is most proper, which can go through the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes's opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which sustained, and could refrain their mind in precipitio, and could give unto the mind, as is used in horsemanship, the shortest stop or turn.
Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application in some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical men, that did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations; whereas the resolution of men truly moral, ought to be such as the same Consalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, e tela crassiore, and not so fine, as that every thing should catch in it and endanger it.
To resume private or particular good, it falleth into the division of good active and passive: for this difference of good, not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or household terms of Promus and Condus, is formed also in all things, and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in creatures; the one to preserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or multiply themselves; whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier; for in nature the heavens, which are the more worthy,are the agent; and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the patient; in the pleasures of living creatures, that of generation is greater than that of food: in divine doctrine, " Beatius est dare, quam accipere:" and in life there is no man's spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire, more than sensuality. Which priority of the active good is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed to fortune: for if we might have a perpetuityand certainty in our pleasures, the state of them would advance their price; but when we see it is liuf'Magni aestimamus mori tardius," and " Ne glorieris de crastino, nescis partum diei," it maketh us to desire to have somewhat secured and exempted from time, which are only our deeds and works; as it is said, "Opera eorum sequuntur eos." The preeminence likewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is natural in man towards variety and proceeding, which in the pleasures of the sense, which is the principal part of passive good, can have no great latitude. "Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris: cibus.somnus, ludus per hunccirculum curritur; mori veHe non tantum fortis, aut miser, aut prudens, sed etiam fastidiosus potest." But in enterprises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much variety, whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils, re-integrations, approaches and attainings to their ends. So as it was well said, " Vita sine proposito languida et raga est." Neither hath this active good any identity with the good of society, though in some case it hath an incidence into it: for although it do many times bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to a man's own power, glory, amplification, continuance; as appeareth plainly, when it findeth a contrary subject. For that gigantine state of mind which possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was Lucius Sylla, and infinite other in smaller model, who would have all men happy or unhappy as they were their friends or enemies, and would give form to the world according to their own humours, which is the true theomachy, pretendeth, and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth farthest from good of society, which we have determined to be the greater.
To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of conservative and perfective. For let us take a brief review of that which we have said; we have spoken first of the good of society, the intention •hereof embraceth the form of human nature, • hereof we are members and portions, and not our own proper and individual form; we have spoken of active good, and supposed it as a part of private and particular good. And rightly, for there is impressed upon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves; one of preserving and continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting their form; and a third of multiplying and extending their form upon other things; whereof the multiplying or signature of it upon other things, is that which we handled by the name of active good. So as there remaineth the conserving of it, and perfecting or raising of it; which latter is the highest degree of passive good. For to preserve in state is the less, to preserve with advancement is the greater. So in man,
"Igneus est ollis vigor, et coelestis origo."
His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which good, is that which is thetemP** of human life, while man, upon the instinct of an advancement formal and essential, is carried to
seek an advancement local. For as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove internal: so is it with men in ambition, when failing of the means to exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their place. So then passive good is, as was said, either conservative or perfective.
To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it seemeth to be the most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well judged of, nor well inquired. For the good of fruition or contentment, is placed either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour of it; the one superinduced by equality, the other by vicissitude; the one having less mixture of evil, the other more impression of good. Whether of these is the greater good, is a question controverted; hut whether man's nature may not be capable of both, is a question not inquired.
The former question being debated between Socrates and a sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill words: the sophist saying that Socrates's felicity was the felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist's felicity was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both these opinions do not want their supports: for the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general consent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue beareth a great part in felicity: and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations, than in compassing desires. The sophist's opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is greater than good of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a show of advancement, as motion, though in a circle, hath a show of progression.
But the second question decided the true way maketh the former superfluous: for can it he doubted but that there nre some who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures, than some other, and yet nevertheless are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them: so as this same, "Non uti, ut non appetas; non appetere, ut non metuas; sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis." And it seemeth to me that most of the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautionary than the nature of things requireth: so have they increased the fear of death in offering to cure it: for when they would have a man's whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs make men think that it is a terrible enemy against whom there is no end of preparing. Better saith the poet,
"Qui finem viUe extremum inter muncra ponat
So have they sought to make men's minds too uniform and harmonical, by not breaking them suffi