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ciently to contrary motions: the reason whereof I suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops and passages, as a set song or voluntary; much after the same manner was the diversity between a philosophical and a civil life. And therefore men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers, who if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone, they help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity, as they destroy not magnanimity.
Having therefore deduced the good of man, which is private and particular, as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that good of man which respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term duty; because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself; though neither can a man understand virtue without some relation to society, nor duty without an inward disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic, but not if it be well observed; for it concerneth the regiment and government of every man over himself, and not over others. And as in architecture the direction of the framing the posts, beams, and other parts of building, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an instrument or engine, is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and employing it; and yet nevertheless in expressing of the one you incidently express the aptness towards the other; so the doctrine of conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their conformity thereunto.
This part of duty is subdivided into two parts; the common duty of every man as a man or member of a state, the other the respective or special duty of every man in his profession, vocation, and place. The first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The second likewise I may report rather dispersed, than deficient; which manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be best: for who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every several vocation, profession, and place? For although sometimes a looker on may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, " That the vale best discovered the hills;" yet there is small doubt but that men can write best, and most really and materially, in their own professions; and that the writing of speculative men of active matter, for the most part, doth seem to men of experience, as Phormio's argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which accompanieth them that write in their own professions, that they magnify them in excess; but generally it were to be wished, as that which would
make learning indeed solid and fruitful, that active men would or could become writers.
In which I cannot but mention, honoris causa, your majesty's excellent book touching the duty of a king, a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other arts; and being in mine opinion one of the most sound and healthful writings that I have read, not distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the coldness of negligence; not sick of business, as those are who lose themselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do who seek to please the reader more than nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for action, and far removed from that natural infirmity whereunto I noted those that write in their own professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt it above measure: for your majesty hath truly described, not a king of Assyria, or Persia, in their extern glory, but a Moses, or a David, pastors of their people. Neither can I ever lose out of my remembrance, what I heard your majesty in the same sacred spirit of government, deliver in a gTeat cause of judicature, which was, " That kings ruled by their laws as God did by the laws of nature, and ought as rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative, as God doth his power of working miracles." And yet notwithstanding, in your book of a free monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a king, as well as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent writing of your majesty, as a prime or eminent example of Tractates concerning special and respective duties, wherein I should have said as much if it had been written a thousand years since: neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence; no, it is flattery to praise in absence, that is, when either' the virtue is absent, or the occasion is absent, and so the praise is not natural but forced, either in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration pro Marcello, which is nothing but an excellent table of Caesar's virtue, and made to his face; besides the example of many other excellent persons wiser a great deal than such observers; and we will never doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just praises to present or absent.
But to return, there belongeth farther to the handling of this part, touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession, which hath been likewise handled. But how? Rather in a satire and cynically* than seriously and wisely; for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than with judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt For, as Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: "Qua?renti derisori scientiam, ipsa se abscondit: sed studioso fit obviam." But the ranIXcautelis naS'nS °f ,n's argument with integrity et malis >rti- and truth, which I note as deficient, llui seemeth to me to be one of the best
fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he see you first, you die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth: so is it with deceits and evil arts, w hich if they be first espied, lose their life; but if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do: for it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest; that is, all forms and natures of evil: for without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of evil: for men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and men's exter or language. So as, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality; "Non recipit stultns verba prudentite, nisi ea dixeris, qute versantur in corde ejus."
Unto this part touching respective duty doth also appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant: so likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties; not as they are parts of government and society, but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons.
The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it also not simply alone, but comparatively, whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular and public: as we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so much extolled; yet what was said?
"Infclix, utcunque ferent ca fata minorea."
So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both woes. Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their as«ociates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being an usurper, they were diT'ded in opinion, some holding that servitude was •he extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was tetter than a civil war; and a number of the like ewes there are of comparative duty : amongst which •hat of all others is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice, which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: "Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, •I multa juste fieri possint." But the reply is good, "Auctorem preesentis justitice habes, sponsorem future non habes;" men must pursue things which are just in present, and leave the future to the Di
vine Providence. So then we pass on from this general part touching the exemplar and description of good.
Now therefore that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image, or statua, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion: whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words, " Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ^SjjjTM ex qnibus gignatur. Inutile enim fere fuerit, virtutem quidem nosse, acquirendre autem ejus modos et vias ignorare: non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, queerendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat; utmmque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse et ejus compotes fieri: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo." In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part: so saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied himself to philosophy, "non ita disputandi causd, sed ita vivendi." And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of their life, as Seneca excellently saith, "De partibus vitae quisque deliberat, de summA nemo," may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, " Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, iis mens a?grotatj" they need medicine not only to assuage the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said, that the cure of men's minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true: but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, that " the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress," and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid, to discern of the mistress's will; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself, within due limits, many sound and profitable directions.
This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry, the rather because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant, and such wherein the common talk of men, which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass, is wiser than their books. It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient, which S( emeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have written. We will therefore enumerate some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.
First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical, we ought to cast op our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application only. The husbandman cannot command, neither the nature of the earth, nor the seasons of the weather, no more can the physician the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command; points of nature, and points of fortune; for to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these things therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application;
"Vincenda est omnia furtuna ferendo:"
and so likewise,
"Vincenda est omnia nature ferendo."
But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary, which is that properly which we call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we do apply; for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take measure of the body.
So then the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound and true distributions, and descriptions of the several characters and tempers of men's natures and dispositions, especially having regard to those differences which are most radical, in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention: for if it deserve to be considered, "that there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others to small," which Aristotle handleth or ought to have handled by the name of magnanimity, doth it not deserve as well to be considered, "that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others to few?" So that some can divide themselves, others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few tilings at oncej and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And again, " that some mind* are proportioned to that which may be despatched at once, or within a short return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of pursuit,"
"Jam turn tenditque fovetque."
So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly ascribed to God, as a magnanimity. So farther deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, " that there is a disposition in conversation, supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man's self, to soothe and please; and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross:" and deserveth it not much better to be considered, "that there is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more serious nature, and supposing it still in things merely indifferent, to take pleasure in the good of another, and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another?" which is that properly which we call good-nature or
ill-nature, benignity or malignity. And therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel, that this part of knowledge, touching the several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry and suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men's natures, according to the predominances of the planets; lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort of these relations, which the Italians make touching conclaves, the natures of the several cardinals handsomely and livelily painted forth ; a man shall meet with, in every day's conference, the denominations of sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, "huomo di prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione," and the like: and yet nevertheless this kind of observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are found, many of them, but we conclude no precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater, because both history, poesy, and daily experience, are as goodly fields where these observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary, that receipts might be made of them for the use of life.
Of much like kind are those impressions of nature, which are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent, and not extern; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune; as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the like. And therefore we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, " benignitas huius ut adolescentuli est." St. Paul concludeth, that severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans. "Increpa eos dure," upon the disposition of their country, " Cretenses semper mendaces, make bestir, ventres pigri." Sallust noteth, that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories ; " Sed plerumque regia> voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, stepeque ipste sibi adverste." Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition, "Solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius." Pindanis maketh an observation, that great and sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men, " Qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt." So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune: "Divitiae si affluant, nolite cor apponere." These observations, and the like, I deny not hut are touched a little by Aristotle, as in passage in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered discourses; but they were never incorporate into moral philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the knowledge of the diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions doth to the physician; except we mean to follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to all patients.
Another article of this knowledge, is the inquiry touching the nffections; for as in medicining of the Iiody, it is in order first to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases; and lastly, the cures; so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men's natures, it followeth, in order, to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations and distempers of the affections. For as the ancient politicians in popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable, if the seditious orators did not set ihetn in working and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections, which is the principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are considered but collaterally, and in a second degree, as they may be moved by speech, he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the quantity: but where their true place is, he prctermitteth them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections, as light is to particular colours. Better travails, I suppose had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which I have at second hand. But yet, it is like, it was after their manner, rather in subtilty of definitions, which, in a subject of this nature, are but curiosities, than in active and ample descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular writings of an eloquent nature, touching some of the affections; as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness, of countenance, and other. But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge, where we may find painted forth with great life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act, and farther degree; how they disclose themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify; how they are inwrapped one within another j and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and other the like particularities. Amongst the which, this last is of special use in moral and civil matters: liow, I say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another, even as we used to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of premium and peena, whereby civil states consist, employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest.
For as in the government of states, it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within.
Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies : these as they have determinate use in moralities, for from these the mind suffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and described, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine ; of which number we will insist upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and habit to speak of.
The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of those things which consist by nature, nothing can be changed by custom ; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up, it will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing, we do not learn to hear or see the better. For though this principle be true in things wherein nature is peremptory, the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discuss, yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we speak louder- and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold, we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few.
The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either too high a strain, or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you discourage; in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a farther expectation than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak of the other side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task.
Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at two several times; the one when'the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst disposed; that by the one you may give a great step, by the other yon may work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant.
Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioncth by the way, which is, to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a wand straight, by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness.
Another precept is, that the mind is brought to any thing better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that wherenntoyou pretend be not first in the intention, but tanquam aliud agendo, because of the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint Many other axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom; which being so conducted, doth prove indeed another nature; but being governed by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of nature, and bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit.
So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining thereunto P Did not one of the fathers in great indignation call poesy vinum demonum, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, "That young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and experience?" And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers, whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty; and popular opinions against virtue in their parasites' coats, fit to be scorned and derided, are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read, and revolved by men in their mature and settled years^but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality, lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the verse describes it?
"Prosperum ct felix scelus virtus vocatur:"
"Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hie diadema:"
which the poets do speak satirically, and in indignation on virtue's behalf: but books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for it so pleaseth Machiavel to say, " that if Ceesar had been overthrown, he would have been more odious than ever was Cataline:" as if there had been no difference, but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most excellent spirit, his ambition reserved, of the world? Again, is there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities themselves, some kinds of them, lest they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible, as Cicero saith of Cato in Marco Catone: " Heec bona, quae videmus, divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria: quae nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a natur&, sed a magistro?" Many other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and effects, which studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so likewise is there touching the use of
all those other points, of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine of morality.
But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground: that the minds of all men are sometimes in a state more perfect, and at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose therefore of this practice is, to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and observances or exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an inception or account de novo, for the time to come: but this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all good moral philosophy, as was said, is but a handmaid to religion.
Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all other means the most compendious and summary; and, again, the most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them; it will follow, that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the works of nature, whereas the other course is like the work of the hand: for as when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh, as if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such time as he comes to it; but, contrariwise, when nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time: so in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like; but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous but divine: his words are these; "Immanitati autem consentaneum est, opponere earn, qua; supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem." And a little after, " Nam ut ferae neque vitium neque virtus est, sic neque Dei. Sed hie quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam a vitio." And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration; where he said, "that men needed make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as good lords to them as Trajan had been;" as if he had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be