MANOR.

1, If a lord of a manor convey a customary estate to the tenant, he cannot reserve to himself the ancient services; for the tenant by reason of the statute of quia emptores must then hold of the superior lord.

Bradshaw v. Lawson. 4 T. R. 443 2. The customary tenements in the north of England, which are parcels of the respective manors in which they are situate, and descendible from ancestor to heir by the hereditary right called tenant right, and held by the lord according to the custom, are not within the statute of partition.

Barrell v. Dodd. 3 B. & P. 378 3. Where the lord of a customary manor, by his deed, made since the statute of quia emptores, granted to his customary tenant, who then held by the payment of certain customary rents and other services, that in consideration of a 61 penny fine (or 61 years rent), he, the lord, ratified and confirmed to the tenant and his heirs all his customary and tenant right estates, with the appurten ances, &c. and granted that the tenant and his heirs should be thereof freed, acquitted, exempted, and dis charged from the payment of all rents, fines, heriots, &c. dues, customs, serrices, and demands, at any time thereafter happening to become due in respect of the tenancy; except one penny yearly rent, and also excepting and reserving suit of court, with the service! incident thereto; and saving and reserving all royalties, escheats, and for feitures, and all other advantages and emoluments belonging to the siguory, so as not to prejudice the immunities thereby granted to the tenant; and al30 granted liberty to cut timber, and to sell or lease, &c. without licence; held, that such confirmation to the tenant of his customary and tenant-right estate, freed, &c. from all rents and services, except,&c.was tantamount to a release of those rents and services not specifically excepted; and that by virtue thereof, the customary tenement became frank-fee, or held in free and common socage; and that the old customary estate, which before was not devisable, was extinguished, and became thereupon devisable by the statute of wills. Such customary estates, which are peculiar to the north of England, are not freehold, but seem to fall under the same general considera

4.

tion as copyholds; alienable by bargain and sale, and admittance thereon, and not holden at the will of the lord. Doé d. Reay v. Huntington. 4 E. R. 271 Where there is a grant of a particular thing once sufficiently ascertained by some circumstance belonging to it, the addition of an allegation, mistaken or falfe, respecting it, will not frustrate the grant but where a grant is in general terms, there the addition of a particular circumstance will operate by way of restriction and modification of such grant.

Roe d. Conolly y. Vernon. 5 E. R. 51 5. Therefore where one having customary tenements, compounded and ur compounded, surrendered to the use of his will all and singular the lands, tenements, &c. whatsoever, in the manor which he held of the lord by copy of court-roll, in whose tenure or occupation soever the same were, being of the yearly rent to the lord in the whole of 4. 10s. 8d., and compounded for?" held that the words " and compounded for," restrained the operation of the surrender to that description of copyholds then belonging to the surrenderor. And that the words "being of the yearly rent, &c. of 41. 10s. 8d.," which were not referable to any ac; tual amount of his rents, either compounded or uncompounded, though much nearer to the whole than to the compounded only, could not qualify or ib. impugn that restriction. (And see DEVISE II. 11.) In a quo warranto information the defendant relied on an election, to the office of Port Reeve, by a homage consisting of twenty-three free tenants; the jury found, on a special verdict, that twenty one of those persons were not free tenants; and this court held the election to be void.

6.

R. v. Mein. 4 T. R. 480 7. The lord of a manor, to whom the grant of a market is made infra villam de W. may hold it any where infra villam de W.: and whether villa extend to the town of W., or the township or parish of W., the lord has a right to remove the market-place from one situation to another within the precinct of his grant. And though he should have holden it for above 20 years within the township of IV, where the grant only gave it him with in the town properly so called at the time, yet if he afterwards give notice

of the removal to another place in the township, the public have no right to go upon his soil and freehold in the old market-place; and any person going there is liable to an action of trespass by the lord.

1.

Curwen v. Salkeld. 3 E. R. 538 8. The lord of a manor, as such, has no right, without a custom, to enter upon the copyholds within the manor, under which there are mines and veins of coal, in order to bore for and work the same and the copyholder may maintain trespass against him for so doing. Bourne v. Taylor. 10 E. R. 189 9. Bu, where the defendant justified under the lord, as being seised in fee of the veins of coal lying under the copyhold tenements, together with 2. the liberty of boring for and getting the coal, &c. it is not enough for the plaintiff to reply, that as well all the veins of coal under the said closes in which &c. as the rest of the soil within and under the same, had immemorially been parcel of the manor and demised and demiseable by copy, &c. without any exception or reservation of the coal. &c.; unless he also traverse the liberty of working the mines: because the plea claims such liberty not merely as annexed to the seisin in fee, to be exercised when in actual possession, 3. but as a present liberty, to be exercised during the continuance of the copyholder's estate: and therefore the replication is only an argumentative 4. denial of the liberty, and does not confess and avoid it. 10 E. R. 189 10. Though the lord of a manor in Cornwall may by conveyance and acts of ownership establish his right to all tin mines within the manor, as well under the freehold tenements as under customary tenements and the wastes; yet consistently therewith, the tenants of certain tenements in а vill within the manor, some of them freehold and some customary, may by acts of ownership for more than twen years past establish their right to copper mines, as well under the waste and customary lands, as under the freehold lands within the vill.

Curtis v. Daniel. 10 E. R. 273 11. To constitute a court baron, it must be held before two free suitors at least. ibid. Rumsey v. Walton, Hereford Summ. Ass. 1760, cor. Foster J, 4 T. K. 446) 12. An allegation in a declaration that one was scised of a manor of F., and

that he and all those whose estates he
has in the said manor have immemo
rially appointed a sexton of the pa
rish of F., is sustained by proof of his
seisin of a quondam manor, which had
ceased to be a legal manor for defect
of freehold tenants, and existed now
only by reputation.

Soane v. Ireland. 10 E. R. 259
MARRIAGE.

Bastards are within the meaning of the marriage act, stat. 26 G. 2. c. 33. which requires the consent of the father, guardian, or mother to the marriage of persous under age, who are not married by banns.

R. v. Hodnot. 1 T. R. 96 All marriages, whether of legitimate or illegitimate children, are within the general provisions of the marriage act 26 G. 2. c. 33. which requires all marriages to be by banns or licence: and, by three judges, a marriage of an illegitimate minor had by licence with the consent of her mother is void by the 11th section; the words father and mother in that section meaning legiti mate parents by one judge, it is casus omissus in the act, and the marriage good.

Priestley v. Hughes. 11 E. R. 1 A narriage, celebrated bona fide in Scotland, will undoubtedly entitle the woman to dower in England.

Ilderton v. Ilderton. 2 H. B. 145 And the lawfulness of such a marriage may be tried by a jury in England. 2 H. B. 145

5. Evidence that British subjects in a foreign country, being desirous of intermarrying, went to a chapel for that purpose where a service in the language of the country was read by a person habited like a priest, and interpreted into English by the officiating clerk; which service the parties understood to be the marriage service of the church of England; and they received a certificate of the marriage which was afterwards lost; is sufficient whereon to found a presumption (nothing appearing to the contrary) that the marriage was duly celebrated according to the law of that country, particularly after 11 years cohabitation as man and w fe till the period of the husband's death; and such British subjects being attached at the time to the British army on service in such foreign country and having military possession of the place, it seems that such marriage solemnised by a

N

policy, which was not illegal on the face of it; for he should have shewli it on the trial.

Gist v. Mason 1 T. R. 84 3. An objection to the competency of Witnesses, discovered after a trial, is not a sufficient ground of itself for granting a new trial: but it may have some weight with the court where the party applying appears to have merits. Turner v. Pearte. 1 T. R.717 6. Where a new trial was granted upon a new ground, not opened at the first trial, it was ordered to be upon payment ofcosts.

Sution v. Mitchell. 1 T. R. 20 . The court may in any case grant a new trial upou the ground of excessive damages. Ducker v. Wood. 1 T. R.277 3. In an action on the case for diverting the plaintiff's watercourse, where the jury under circumstances of aggravation, gave 30007. damages; the court granted a new trial on the ground that the damages given greatly exteeded the amount of the injury prov ed: but they directed that the former verdict should stand as a security in the meantime for the damages which might be given on the second trial. Pleydell.v. Ld. Dorchester.7 T.R.529| 9. The court will not grant a new trial in an action for criminal conversation inerely because the damages appear) to them to be excessive.

Duberley v. Gunning. 4'T. R. 651 10. But if, in such action, they are satisfied that the jury acted under the influence of undue motives, or of gross error or misconception, they will.Chambers v. Caulfield. 6 T. R. 244 11. A new trial will be granted on acCount of excessive damages in an action for an assault and battery,'

Jones v. Sparrow. 5 T. R. 257 1. The Court of K. B. said, that where the jury had found a verdict for the plaintiff upon a presumption contrary to evidence, the court will pot grant a new trial, if the plaintif be en itled to recover in conscience and equity, Wilkinson v. Payne. 4T. R. 468 13. So in the Court of C. P. where no point had been saved at the trial, a new trial was refused to be granted on a question of law, the justice and conscience of the case being with the verdict. Coz v. Kitchin. 1 B. & P. 338 14: Where a new trial is moved for ou the ground of a misdirection in point of law, if the court see that justice has been done between the parties,

they will not set aside the verdict, nor enter into a discussion of the question of law. Edmonson v. Machell.2 T. R. 4 15. Oh a motion for a new trial by a defendant, in an action against him for goods delivered to the use of a third person, on his undertaking to see the plaintiff paid, the court will take into consideration, not only the expressions used, but the particular situation of the defendant at the time of his undertaking, and the amount for which he will thereby be made liable.

Keate v. Temple. 1 B. & P. 158 16. If the testimony of witnesses ou which a verdict has proceeded, be founded on, and derive its credit from; particular circumstances, and those circumstance be afterwards clearly falsified by affidavit, the court will grant a new trial.

Lister one, &c. v. Mundell. 1B & P.427 17. It is no ground for the court to grant a new trial that a witness called to prove a certain fact was rejected on a supposed ground of incompetency, where another witness who was called established the same fact, which was not disputed by the other side; and the defence proceeded upon a collateral point, upon which the verdict turned. Edwards v. Evans. 3E. R. 451 18. Defendant brought a writ of error on the first day of term; obtained á rule nisi for a new trial on the second; and justified bail in error before causé shewn; this was held to be no objection to his supporting the rule for a new trial, as a point of importance was depending, which would have been shut out in the court of error

Hemmett & al. v. Yea( Bart.) M.38G.3. 1 B. & P. 140, n 19. The court will grant a new trial in a penal action after verdict for defendaut on account of a mistake or misdirection of the judge. Wilson v. Rastall. 4 T. R. 753: & Calcraft v. Gibbs. 5 T. R. 19 20. The court will not grant a new trial in a penal action, where a verdict has passed for the defendant on the ground of its being against the evidence. Brook q.t. v. Middleton. 10 E. R. 268 21. In case of felony, no new trial can be granted. 6 T. R. 638

22. But in the case of a misdemeanor the court are not fettered with any rules in granting a new trial, but will either grant or refuse a new trial as it will tend to the advancement of justice.

6 T. R. 638

23. Where several defendants are tried | 29. The Court of C. P. will not grant a

at the same time for a misdemeanor, some of whom are acquitted and some convicted, the court may grant a new trial as to those convicted, if they think the conviction improper R. v.

ranto.

new trial on a count of a verdict being against evidence where the damage to be recovered, would not exceed 51. Roberts v. Carr. 1 W. P. T. 495

NOTICE.

1. Generally speaking, where it is re-
quired by law that notice shall be given
to a party before he shall be affected
by any act, leaving it at his dwelling-
house is sufficient.
4 T. R. 465

Mawbey (Bart.) & al. 5 T. R. 619 24. All the defendants convicted upon an indictment for a conspiracy must be present in court when a motion for a new trial is made on behalf of any of them. R. v. Teal & al. 11 E. R. 307 25. A new trial may be granted in an information in nature of a quo war-2. R. v. Francis. 2 T. R. 484 26. A defendant, convicted on a criminal prosecution, cannot move for a new trial after the first four days of the next term: though if it appear to the court at any time before judg ment that injustice has been done by the verdict, they will interpose and grant a new trial.

R. v. Holt. 5T. R. 436. 27. The court refused to grant a rule nisi for a new trial after a verdict for the defendant upon an indictment for nonrepair of a church-yard fence, which was moved on the ground of the verdict being against evidence.

But it is otherwise in the case of process to bring a party into contempt; there personal notice is necessary.

4 T. R. 466 3. In some instances however of process, leaving it at the house is suffi cient; as a subpœna out of Chancery, or a quo minus out of the Exchequer. 4 T. R. 465

4. Where the tenant of an estate holden by the year has a dwelling-house at another place, the delivery of a notice to quit, to his servant at the dwelling-house, is strong presumptive evidence that the master received the notice and ought to be left to the jury. Jones d. Griffith v. Marsh. 4T. R. 464

NUISANCE.

1. A parol licence to put a sky-light over the defendant's area (which impeded the light and air from coming to the plaintiff's dwelling-house through a window) cannot be recalled at pleasure after it has been executed at the defendant's expense; at least not without tendering the expenses he had been put to and therefore no action lies for a private nuisance, in stopping the light and air, &c. and communicating a stench from the defendant's premises to the plaintiff's house by means of such sky-light.

R. v. Reynell, Clerk. 6 E. R. 315 28. A verdict having passed for the de.. fendants in an action to recover the amount of the re-exchange upon the dishonour of a bill drawn from Lon don on Lisbon, upon evidence that the enemy were in possession of Portugal when the bill became due, and Lisbon was then blockaded by a British squadron, and there was in fact no direct exchange between Lisbon and London, though bills had in some few instances been negociated between them through Hamburgh and America about that period; the Court refused to grant a new trial, on the presumption that the jury bad found their verdict upon the fact, that no re-exchange was proved to their satisfaction to have ex-2. isted between Lisbon and London at the time; the question having been) properly left to them to allow damages in the name of re-exchange, if the plaintiff, who had indorsed the dishonoured | bill to the holder, had either paid or were liable to pay re-exchange; and saving the question of law, whether any exchange or re-exchange could be allowed between this and an enemy's country.

De Tastet v, Baring. 11 E. R. 265

Winter v. Brockwell. 8 E. R. 308 Where lights had been put out and enjoyed without interruption for above 20 years, during the occupation of the opposite premises by a tenant; that will not conclude the landlord of such opposite premises without evidence of his knowledge of the fact: which is the foundation of presuming a grant against him, and consequently will not conclude a succeeding tenant, who was in possession under such landlord, from building up against such encroaching lights. Daniel v. North. 11 E. R. 372