science to be done; nay, it may oblige him to suffer and undergo punishment, rather than to do that which might be lawful for him. It is not necessary, though it were to be wished, that every man's conscience should be so sharp-sighted, as to discern the inside of every doubt that shall arise; it may be too hard for me, when another man may be as much too hard for it, and then I ought not to do what he lawfully and justly may do; but this is only the restrictive negative power of conscience, the affirmative power hath not that force. Conscience can never oblige a man to do, or excuse him for doing, what is evil in itself, as treason, murder, or rebellion, under what specious pretences soever, which want of understanding and want of honesty suggest where there is want of conscience; and it is a very hard thing to assert, that any thing can proceed from the conscience of that man who is void of knowledge, since there is some science necessary to be supposed, where there is a pretence to conscience.

He who obstinately refuses, upon the obligation of conscience, to do what the law under which he lives, and to which he owes subjection and obedience, requires him positively to do, had need to be sure that his 32

VOL. V.

doing of that which he is enjoined, and denies to do, is in itself sinful, and expressly forbid by the word of God. Doubting in this point is not excuse or warrant enough; the reverence he ought to have to the government and governors of his country, that the modest believing that a Christian kingdom or commonwealth cannot combine together to damn themselves, and all who live under them, should have power and authority enough to suppress and over-rule all doubts to the contrary. But if in truth the matter be so clear to him, that by obeying this law he becomes a rebel to God, I know not how his conscience can excuse him for staying and living under that government, and from making haste away to be under the protection of another government, where no such sinful action is required or enjoined; for no man can satisfy his own conscience, that though his courage, for the present, will support him to undergo the judgment and penalty that his disobedience is liable to, he may not in the end be weary of that submission; and since the duty is still incumbent upon him, and may still be required of him, he may not at last purchase his peace and quiet with complying in doing that which he knows is sinful and must offend God

Almighty; and therefore methinks he should, at the same time he resolves to disobey a law that is fixed, and not very probable to be altered, quit the country where so much tyranny is exercised, and repair to another climate, where it is lawful to give unto Cæsar what belongs unto Cæsar, and to give unto God what belongs unto God. And if his affection to his country will not suffer him to take that resolution, it is probable that his conscience is not so fully convinced of the impiety of the laws thereof; and the same affection should labour to receive that satisfaction, that he may be reconciled to give the obedience the laws require. The submitting to any present inconvenience or loss or damage, rather than do somewhat that is enjoined by public authority to be done; the preferring reproach and disgrace, before honour that must be attended with compliance and submission to what is required of us, is no argument that such refusal is an effect of conscience; pride, ambition, or revenge, will do the same, to raise a party that will enable him to compass and bring that to pass which he most desires. We see nothing more common, than for men of much wit and no conscience, to impose upon those who have no wit and pretend to much con

science, and lead them into ways which are too rough for their consciences to tread in, and to ends that they do not desire; and yet every step they make is an impulsion of their conscience: their conscience will not suffer them to take an oath, by which the wrong they have done may be discovered and repaired, yet that conscience will not compel them to do justice, nor restrain them from doing injury to their neighbours; it will neither oblige them to speak truth, that may prejudice a man they favour, nor to discover a fraud, by which they may be bound to reparation. Conscience is made the refuge of all perverse and refractory men, when they will not observe the law, and the warrant and incitement to any wickedness when they are inclined to break it: whereas conscience is a natural restraint within us, to keep us from doing what our foul affections and passions may tempt us to; it may be too scrupulous, but it can never be presumptuous; it may hinder us from using the liberty we have, but it is too modest to lead us into any excess; it is liable to fear, but never to rashness and impudent undertakings: "For this is thank-worthy, if a man for conscience towards God, endure grief, suffering wrongfulły," says St. Peter, (1 Peter ii. 19.) But con

science never carried a man into actions for which he is justly to suffer: that is true tenderness of conscience, which is tender of other men's reputation, shy and wary what they think of others, and not that which, out of tenderness to itself, cares not how it wrongs and violates its neighbours. Conscience is the meekest, humblest thing that can be conceived of; and when we find any proud thoughts to arise within us, such as exalt and magnify ourselves, and depress the reputation of our neighbour; when we have any unpeaceable inclination to disturb the quiet of the state, or the repose of those who live about us; we may be as sure that those suggestions do not proceed from conscience, as that the lusts of the flesh do not proceed from the warmth of the spirit.

"The tree is known by the fruit, a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit;" and conscience is best known by the effects; if the product be wrath, malice, pride, and contention, we may swear that conscience is not the mother of those children, which can produce nothing but love, humility, and peace; and men have taken too much pains to entitle her to the other unnatural issue. I know not how it comes to pass, except it be from a wanton affectation of the impropriety of