In Curry v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. (Mass.), 10 Pick. 535, the policy was for $1,000. The insured suffered a loss, which was adjusted at $142. Thereafter the property was damaged by a second fire. The court held that the amount paid on the first loss should be deducted from the face of the policy, leaving the balance ($858) applicable to the payment of the second loss. To the same effect is Lattomus v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Houston (Del.) 404. While located and contained as described herein, and not elsewhere. Before the adoption of the standard form of policy this clause usually read "contained in.” The courts, in construing this term, held that the words "contained in," where the property insured was necessarily in use outside of the described location, were words of description and not of limitation. That is, that the risk was not confined to the described location, but covered the goods wherever they might be. Mills v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 37 Ia. 400. In this case a horse which was insured under the policy was killed six miles away from the place specified in the policy. McCluer v. Girard Insurance Company, 43 Ia. 349, where the property insured was a phaeton, and was destroyed while in the shop, where it had been left for repairs. Lonquerville v. Western Assur. Co., 51 Ia. 553, where the property insured was wearing apparel. Noyes v. Northwestern National Bank Ins. Co., 64 Wis. 415, 15 Ins. L. J. 57, where the property insured was a sealskin dolman, and was destroyed in a fur store, where it had been sent for repair. To avoid this construction and to confine the risk to the described location, the clause in the standard form was adopted, and it is now generally held that the risk does not follow the goods to any other location than that described in the policy. Maryland Fire Ins. Co. v. Gusdorf, 43 Md. 506. London and Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co., 13 Ins. L. J. 845, 105 Pa. 424. First National Bank v. Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 62 Tex. 461, 14 Ins. L. J. 278. A. & E. R. R. Co. v. Baltimore Fire Ins. Co., 32 Md. 37. Where merchandise is situated in a building containing several storerooms and the policy does not confine the risk to any particular one of the storerooms, the company will be liable for a loss occurring in any one of them. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 43 Pa. 350. And so, if the description of the location is so general as to bear the construction that the entire building was intended to be embraced, the policy will be held to cover the goods in any part of the building. Clark v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 18 La. 431. Blake v. Exchange Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Mass.), 12 Gray 265. Fair v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 112 Mass. 320. In this last case the property was described as "contained in the frame building known as the Hunt building, situate in North Hampton, as per plan." At the time the policy issued the main floor was divided into three stores, as shown on the plan, the insured occupying the west store and the other rooms being occupied by other persons. At the time of the fire the insured occupied the whole floor, having removed the partitions. The company contended that the policy covered the goods in the west store only. The court held that the language of the policy included all three of the store rooms; that the reference to the plan was for the purpose of showing the situation of the building with reference to other buildings, and that the insured was. entitled to recover for all loss of, or injury to, his goods, in any part of the building. If it is intended to limit the risk to any particular part of the described building, language should be used so plain that no room is left for construction. Unless the intention clearly and plainly appears from the language used in describing the location that the risk is confined to a particular part of the building, the courts will hold that the goods are covered in any part of the building where they may be at the time of the loss. In a former talk to your club I considered the written or printed form, and I will therefore not speak of it again. Those of you who were not present at that lecture will find it in full in "Rough Notes" for February 4, 1905. Entirety of Contract. The question often arises under a form, whether the contract is an entire and indivisible one or whether it is subject to division. There is perhaps no question in insurance law about which there is greater conflict of authority. It is usual to include several subjects of insurance in one policy. Thus, one policy may cover a house, barn, household goods, farming implements, hay, carriages, wagons, etc., or a manufactory building and machinery. The policy in such case is issued for a sum in gross, with an apportionment in the written form to the several items insured. For example: A applies for a policy in the sum of $2,000 on his house, household goods, barn and contents therein, with request that the insurance be apportioned to the separate items. The written form would read: $1,000 on a two-story, frame, shingle-roof house. 300 on household goods contained therein. 300 on a frame barn. 400 on wagons, farming implements, etc., therein. It often becomes a question in such case, under the forfeiture clause in the policy, to determine whether such a policy evidences one entire, indivisible contract, or whether it is a separate and divisible contract as to each class of property insured. For example: A, after the issuance of the policy, mortgages the land on which the property is situated, or obtains other insurance thereon, and thereafter a fire occurs. The question then arises: Does this mortgage or other insurance render the policy void as to the personal property insured? For full information on this subject see Wright v. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 12 Mont. 474; 19 L. R. A. 211, with annotation. In McQueeney v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 52 Ark. 257; 5 L. R. A. 744, the court considers all the cases and concludes that the contract is indivisible. Also see: Havens v. Home Ins. Co., 111 Ind. 90. Napanee Furniture Co. v. Vernon Ins. Co., 10 Ind. App. 319. Bills v Hibernia Ins. Co., 87 Tex. 547. Taylor v. Anchor Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 57 L. R. A. 328. In this last case the court, after considering the authorities, says: "We therefore hold on this question, as involved in the case before us, that entirety of premium does not necessarily prove that the contract is indivisible, and that where it appears from the terms of the policy that distinct items or classes of property were separately insured the policy may be valid as to one item or class, although it is invalid as to another item or class by reason of breach of conditions of the policy with reference thereto, provided it appears also, that the risk which it was intended to exclude by the condition which is broken does not apply to the other items or classes of property. In this case a chattel mortgage on the cows and horses could not in any way affect the nature of the risk as to the dwelling house and contents, and therefore we find that a breach of condition in the policy as to the one class of property did not invalidate the insurance as to the other." This company shall not be liable beyond the actual cash value of the property at the time any loss or damage occurs, and the loss or damage shall be ascertained or estimated according to such actual cash value, with proper deductions for depreciation, however caused, and shall in no event exceed what it would then cost the insured to repair or replace the same with material of like kind and quality. The contract of fire insurance is essentially one of indemnity, and this indemnity must be adjusted on the principle of restoring the insured as nearly as he may be to the situation in which he was at the commencement of the risk. The amount of the insurable interest is the market value of the articles at the time and place of the commencement of the risk, and when they have been purchased near that time and place, the cost to the assured is the most satisfactory, though not the only, criterion of their value. Marchesseau v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 1 Rob. (La.) 438. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in passing on the question of measure of damages in case of loss of a reaping machine, says: "The measure of damage was that agreed upon in the policy, to-wit: "The actual cash value at the time of the loss and damage'; also that the option to replace the machinery, if destroyed, was a reservation for the benefit of the company. They were not bound to adopt it. What it would cost, therefore, to replace the reaping machine did not furnish the room for damages which the company must pay to make good the loss. Nor was the fact that the machines insured were constructed under a patent of any importance. Patented or unpatented, what they were worth at the time of the fire was by agreement of the parties to be the measure of their value, and this must be ascertained by testimony as is done in every other case where this value is not fixed." (Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Sennett, 37 Pa., 205). In Burgess v. Alliance Ins. Co., 10 Allen 221; 5 Bennett 46, which was an action for loss of property situated in Cuba, the court says: "The principal question is this: whether, in case of a partial loss of property situated in another country, and insured here, in computing the sum to be recovered, anything is to be allowed for the expense of transmitting to that country the sum of money, which, paid there, would furnish an equivalent for the value of the property destroyed by fire, and we are of opinion that no such allowance can legally be made. In other words, nothing can be added for the cost of exchange in transmitting the funds which are of intrinsically equal value in this country with those which represent the pecuniary measure of the loss in the country where it occurred. * * ** It is true that the object of a policy of insurance is indemnity to the insured; but the standard of value used in estimating the value of the loss may not, under all circumstances, produce the result of giving an exact indemnity at the place where a judgment is recovered upon the policy. The best practical rule for indemnity seems to us to be to estimate the loss at the place where it occurred in the currency of that country, and then find the equivalent in the country where suit is brought by determining the actual intrinsic value of the currency of that country as compared with that of the other, thus computing the value according to the real power of exchange." Insurance is but a contract of indemnity; the indemnity can go no further than the interest of the party who is indemnified, and, if that interest is partial, and not entire, the indemnity does not cover a value incident to ownership. Porter v. Etna Ins. Co., 2 Flipp. 100; 6 Ins. Law Journal 928. In Mack v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 2 McCrary 211, "actual cash value" was defined to mean the sum of money the insured goods would have brought for cash at the market price at the time when and place where they were destroyed. Estimated profits can not be added to increase the value. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Heflin, 60 S. W. 393. The question is not what it would cost to rebuild, but what is shown to be its money value under all the circumstances of its situation and surrounding at the time of the fire. Waynesboro Mut. Ins. Co. v. Creaton, 98 Pa. 451; Hilton v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 42 Atl. 412. When the policy provides that the cash value of the property destroyed or damaged shall not exceed what would be the cost to the assured of replacing it, and, in case of depreciation from use or otherwise, a suitable deduction shall be made from the cost of repairing, the measure of damages would be the cost of repairs, if thereby the property is rendered as valuable as it was before; if less valuable than before, then the difference must be added to the cost; and if more valuable, it must be deducted. Commercial Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 80 Ala. 571; 16 Ins. L. J. 741; Etna Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 11 Bush 587. The same rule has been applied to personal property (mill machinery), Vance v. Foster, 2 Crawford Dix Rep., 118 (Irish). A company insuring goods is liable for their actual market value at the time of loss, not for the cost price, although profits had not been insured. Equitable Fire Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 11 Low. Can. 170; Hoffman v. Ætna Ins. Co., 19 Abb. Pr. 325; Aff'd 32 N. Y. 405. If the insured is liable for the government tax on whisky insured, the amount of such tax may be included in the estimate of value. Hedger v. Union Ins. Co., 17 Fed 498, 12 Ins. L. J. 926, disapproving of decision in Security Ins. Co. v. Farrell, 2 Ins. L. J. 302 (Ill.), to contrary. Also see Queen Ins. Co. v. McCoin, 49 S. W. 800. Evidence of what injured goods brought at auction is evidence of their value after the fire. Clemnet v. British-American Assur. Co., 141 Mass. 298. The amount of recovery on a fire policy insuring stock of material in the hands of a manufacturer is the fair market value at the time and place of destruction. This, notwithstanding it appears that the actual cost of replacing or reproducing would be much less. Mitchell v. St. Paul German Fire Ins. Co., 92 Mich. 594; Parrish v. Virginia F. and M. Ins. Co., 20 Ins. L. J. 95. As to measure of recovery on building standing on leased ground, see Laurent v. Chatham Fire Ins. Co. in (N. Y.) 1 Hall 41. As to measure of recovery where insurance is by lessee on building, see Niblo v. North American Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 1 Sandf. 551. Upon issue as to value of house, it is proper to show what the land sold for after the buildings were destroyed, as affording evidence of the value of the buildings, when connected with proof of what both together had before been offered for at sale. Bardwell v. Conway Ins. Co., 122 Mass. 90; contra, Etna Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 11 Bush (Ky.) 587. Cost to rebuild is not the proper measure of damages. It is the actual value, or money value under all the circumstances of its situation and surroundings at the time of the fire. Waynesboro Ins. Co. v. Creaton, 98 Pa. 451. The true measure of damages is the real value of the property, and not its relative value to the assured; and, consequently, where assured had agreed to move the buildings, the amount recoverable is their real value, and not their relative value to the assured for purpose of removal. Washington Mills v. Commercial Fire Ins. Co., 13 Fed. 646, 12 Ins. L. J. 181; Grant v. Elliott Fire Ins. Co., 76 Me. 514; Adill v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 13 Can. L. T. 398. As to recovery where repairs or rebuilding must conform to certain laws or ordinances of city or State, see Grady v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 11 Mich. 425; Hamburg-Bremen Ins. Co. v. Garl |