the evidence-the arrangement would seem to indicate that the company was content to accept the responsibility of their own agent for such sums as he might receive or otherwise provide for on delivery of the policies, and to substitute the personal liability of the agent in the place of the security which the suspension clause in their contract afforded. This implication is greatly strengthened by the course of business which the agent pursued in the conduct of the company's business. He delivered such policies as he chose and charged the premiums in an account which he kept. He had a running account with Lancaster, and the premiums for this insurance were charged up to Lancaster when the policy in suit was delivered to him. The effect of such a course of business as respects Crane certainly was to substitute the liability of Lancaster for that of the assured. And Lancaster says he usually rendered bills to Mr. Elkins once in three months.

"In view of the course of business pursued by this company with Crane, and by this agent in consummation of their contracts, we think the implication might fairly arise that any absolute requirement of the policy, as to the actual prepayment of the premiums, had been dispensed with, and that the obligation of the agent to pay the premium was, in effect, the payment of it by the insured. If Crane had advanced the money to the company and delivered the policy, no one can doubt that it would have taken immediate effect, and in what respect can there be any difference, in principle, if Crane, with the company's consent, assumed the payment, thus substituting his personal liability in the place of the money? Lancaster became a debtor to Crane and Crane to the company, and this, in view of the course of business pursued, would, as between the insurer and the insured, we think, be equivalent to actual payment."

Other cases to the same effect are:

Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Carter, 11 Atl. 102.

Huggins Cracker Co. v. People's Ins. Co., 41 Mo. App. 530.
Bouton v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 542.
Sheldon v. Connecticut Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 207.

Dayton Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 24 Ohio 345.

Where a broker procures the insurance, and the policy is delivered to the broker to be delivered to the insured, with authority to the broker to collect the premiums, and the broker is charged with the premium by the agent in his account kept with him, this constitutes a payment of the premium.

Bang v. Farmville Ins. Co., 1 Hughes 290.

White v. Conn. Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 330.

Elkins v. Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Pa. 386.

Where the broker is not intrusted by the company with the delivery of the policy and the collection of the premium, and no account exists between the broker and the company, the payment of the premium to the broker in such case is not binding upon the company.

Pottsville Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Minnequa Springs Improvement Co., 100 Pa. 137, 11 Ins. L. J. 892.

Peoria Sugar Refinery v. Susquehanna Ins. Co., 20 Fed. 480, 14 Ins. L. J. 333.

It appears from the foregoing cases that the premium may be paid in either of the following ways: (1) By cash or note; (2) by the agent extending credit to the insured and charging himself with the amount of the premium in his account with the company; (3) by the agent charging the broker with the amount

of the premium and charging himself with the premium in his account with the company.

Does Insure...

Insurance is a contract of indemnity, and it appertains to the person or party to the contract, and not to the property which is subjected to the risk against which its owner is protected. Cummings v. Cheshire County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 55 N. H. 457, 4 Ins. L. J. 932. It is not a contract running with the land, as in the case of real estate, nor running with the personalty, so to speak, as in the case of a chattel interest of the insured.

Any person who would be subjected to a pecuniary loss in case of the destruction of real or personal property by fire, or other casualty, has an interest in such property which is subject to be insured for his benefit. Care should be taken in the preparation of the policy to name the insured correctly. Initials should be in all cases avoided in writing the name of the insured. The exact interest of the insured in the property should be ascertained, and if such interest be less than the fee simple title, it should be so expressed in the policy. Warehousemen, factors and brokers may insure property in their custody and care in their own name as such. Where two or more persons have a joint interest in property, the name of each and every person interested should be written in the policy, and so if individuals transact business by trade name, the names of the individuals should be written in the policy as well as their trade name.

For the term of ........ from the ... day of 19...., at noon, to the

......

day of

....

.at noon.

The question as to the proper construction to be given to the word "noon" has not been often before the courts. The leading case on the subject is Jones v. German Ins. Co. (Ia.), 29 Ins. L. J. 60, where it is said:

"How shall the exact time of 'noon' be determined by 'common' or 'standard' time? At Creston, Iowa, the latter is seventeen and a half minutes faster than the former, and, as the policy sued on covered the property destroyed 'for one year from the 18th day of September, 1896, at 12 o'clock at noon, to the 18th day of September, 1897, at 12 o'clock at noon,' and the fire broke out on the last day at about 11:45 o'clock a. m., common time, or at two and a half minutes after 12 o'clock, standard time, the rights of the parties depend on the correct solution of this question. The trial court instructed the jury that 'the usual means of determining time of day, when such time is referred to in ordinary contracts, is by the standard of the meridian of the sun, or sun time." The presumption is that common, or solar, time is the time intended by the parties when reference to the time of day is made in contracts, unless a different standard is shown to have been intended. It may be taken as a presumption from the use of the language, '12 o'clock at noon,' that the parties intended to mean 12 o'clock, sun time, as that phrase is commonly understood. The exigencies of some lines of business may require the adoption of a system which shall definitely fix the same hour and minute at a particular instant at localities widely separated in longitude, so that the delay of, and occasional mistake in, computation may be avoided. Indeed experience had demonstrated the inestimable importance to railroad companies of giving direction to employes everywhere on their lines of road with absolute certainty as to time. Without such certainty, safety would be imperiled. And it may be that, because of

the relation of transportation companies to the business interests of the community, and the inconvenience of two systems of computing time, it would be wise to use the 'central standard time' throughout the State. But, in the absence of a statutory enactment, we are not quite ready to concede that, for the mere convenience of these companies, nature's timepiece may be arbitrarily superseded. The apparent daily revolution of the celestial body, caused by the rotation of the earth, has, from the remotest antiquity, been employed as a measure of time. The successive returns of the sun do not, it is true, furnish a uniform measure of time, owing to the silghtly variable velocity of the sun's motion and inclination of its orbit to the equator. Certain corrections are necessary, and therefore the imaginary mean sun has been introduced with a uniform velocity. The difference between the apparent or true solar time and the mean solar time, as shown by clocks and watches in ordinary use, is slight. These indicate the time at 12 o'clock when the sun is at meridian at any locality. The law and usage of the country have recognized this method of fixing the time for generations, and it can not be lightly set aside on the mere pretext that certain lines of business so demand. If this were not so, a purely artificial standard of time, reckoned from the ninetieth meridian of longitude, might as well have been adopted, establishing 'central time' for the whole country, instead of dividing the map into four sections, with Eastern, Central,, Mountain and Pacific Standard time. Thus, Saturday might in part be turned into Sunday, and Sunday into Monday, and the period of night when the civil day beginsmidnight-made to depend on locality alone. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in deciding that a verdict was returned on Sunday, when standard time was somewhat slower than common time, said: seems idle to waste words in saying that the standard of time fixed by persons in a certain line of business can not be substituted, at will, by persons in a certain locality for the standard recognized by the statutes of the State, as well as the general law and usage of the country, especially when it is considered that such an arbitrary and artificial standard could as easily fix 5 o'clock for midnight as it could twenty minutes past twelve, as was done in this case. Local custom can not in this way change Sunday into Saturday. To expect courts of justice, officers of the law and the public generally (especially that large class of the population who do not live in cities or at railroad stations) to go to the railroads for the time which is to guide them in the performance of their duties under the law, when they have in the heavens above them a certain standard by which to ascertain or regulate the time, or permit them, at will, to follow two standards of time, would be highly impracticable and would be productive of great uncertainty and confusion in the administration of the law. Thus the legality of elections might be made to depend upon conflicting proof of local custom, for what might be considered a legal election in one precinct might be regarded as illegal in the next precinct, because of the time of opening or closing the polls; or the people of a precinct might differ among themselves as to this.' Henderson v. Reynolds (Ga.), 7 L. R. A. 327.

'It

"In Searles v. Averhoff, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in holding that a defendant who appeared in Justice Court before 11 o'clock, common time, was not in default, though after 11 o'clock, standard time, where, by the summons served, he was required to appear within one hour after '10 o'clock a. m.,' held that: "The presumption is that common time is that relied upon where there is nothing to show that a different mode of measuring time has been in general use. Where, therefore, the return of a summons is to be made at an hour named, standard time, the summons should so state; otherwise it will be presumed that common time was intended.' There is an additional reason why the time here mentioned should be construed to mean sun time. "Twelve o'clock' seems to be definitely fixed by the words, 'at noon.' Webster defines 'noon' as 'the middle of the day; midday; the time when the sun is in the meridian; twelve o'clock in the daytime.' Similar definitions are given by the other lexicographers. 'Noon' has, in common parlance, a similar meaning, and refers to the middle of the day; not to a period after or before that. It is the beginning of the sidereal day used by the astronomers, as midnight marks the opening of the civil day. Time, when it concerns a legal duty, should be fixed with reference to a certain, unvarying,

uniform standard and that standard in this State is the meridian of the sun. This appears from the different sections of our code uniformly fixing time by affixing ‘a. m.' or 'p. m.' to the hours named, or mentioning 'forenoon' or 'afternoon' of the day. (See Code, Sec. 2448, Subd. 9; id. Secs. 2751, 2754, 3514 and others.) The introduction in evidence of scientific treatises and dictionaries was entirely without prejudice, as the courts, in the instruction quoted, correctly defined what was meant by '12 o'clock at noon.'

"The court submitted to the jury whether, because of a known and established custom obtaining at Creston, the expression, 'at 12 o'clock at noon,' was intended by the parties to the contract to mean 12 o'clock standard time. While it was admitted that central-standard time was in general use there by the railroad company, the schools and business men generally, it does not appear but that the sun time was also used by other people of the city. As common or sun time was presumed to have been intended, the burden was upon the defendant to show to the contrary, and that issue was rightly left for the determination of the jury. But, is it noon at 12 o'clock standard time? If so, just before the change from central to mountain time, at McCook, Neb., and other places on the same degree longitude, the sun reaches the meridian at about half-past 12 o'clock. We are of opinion that it was not only necessary to show the customary use of standard time, but that, by custom of the place, ‘at 12 o'clock at noon' meant at 12 o'clock standard time.'"

I have quoted fully from the above case, for the reason that it is the only case in a court of last resort construing this clause in the policy. There was a suit recently in Louisville, Ky., involving this question. Several years ago there was a suit in Ohio in which this question was also involved, and the court rendered an opinion in accordance with the language of the Iowa court. This opinion, however, has not been reported in any of the regular court reporters.

Against all direct loss or damage by fire.

It would seem that there was no room for controversy as to what was intended by this language of the policy. Numerous cases have arisen, however, involving its construction. It is not necessary that the fire should have acted directly upon the property, but if the cause can be traced back to a fire, then the fire is held to be the proximate cause of the loss. The courts hold that this clause of the policy covers all loss or damage which may be directly traced to a fire unintentionally started.

The best illustrative case on this subject is Lynn Gas and Electric Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 178 Mass. 570, 22 Ins. L. J. 823, Ins. Dig. (1893) 64.

In this case a fire occurred in the wire tower through which the wires for electric lights were carried from the building. This fire caused a short circuit, and the short circuit resulted in keeping back or bringing into the dynamo below an increase of electric current, that made it more difficult for the armature to revolve than before, and caused a higher power to be exerted upon it; that this was transmitted to the pulley by which this armature was run through a belt. The shock destroyed that pulley, and by the destruction of that pulley the main shaft was disturbed, and the succeeding pulleys, up to the jack pulley, were ruptured. By reason of pieces flying from the jack pulley, or from some other cause, the flywheel of the engine was destroyed,

the governor broken and everything crushed. The court held that the fire was the direct and proximate cause of the loss.

In Renshaw v. Missouri State, etc., Co. (Mo.), 20 Ins. L. J. 385, Ins. Dig. (1891), p. 61, the court held that the company was liable for damage occasioned by an explosion caused by inflammable gas generated from escaping oil coming in contact with a gas jet which had been left burning in the building.

Loss or damage occasioned by the fall of an adjoining building on fire, or a partition wall by reason of fire in an adjoining building, is covered by the policy. Ermantrout et al. v. Girard F. and M. Ins. Co. (Pa.), 25 Ins. L. J. 87, 9 Ins. Dig. 58.

Where goods have been left in a building which has been damaged by fire, and repairs have been made to the building, and the wall of the building falls twenty-five days after the fire, damaging the goods, the loss is not covered by the policy. Cuesta v. Royal Ins. Co. (Ga.), 27 S. E. 172, 10 Ins. Dig. 93.

If a fire starts in a room in which there is an oil stove, or other stove, and ignites the burner of the stove, the company is liable for the loss or damage resulting from soot from the burning stove. Collins v. Delaware Ins. Co., 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 576, 12 Ins. Dig. 142. But if the damage is caused by soot from a lamp or stove which has been purposely lighted by the insured, then the company is not liable for the resulting damage.

Samuels v. Continental Ins. Co., 2 Pa. Dist. R. 397.

Fitzgerald v. German-Am. Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. Supp. 824, 13
Ins. Dig. 47.

Cannon v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (Ga.), 35 S. E. 775, 13 Ins.
Dig. 68.

Damage to boilers by fires in the furnace under them is not covered by the policy. American Towing Co. v. German Fire Ins. Co. (Md.), 20 Ins. L. J. 402, Ins. Dig. (1891), p. 66.

Where a building is torn down or blown up by an order of the civil authorities, to prevent the spread of a conflagration, the courts hold that the loss or damage is the direct result of fire, ⚫and is covered by the policy. City Fire Ins. Co. v. Corlies, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 367; Pentz v. Etna Ins. Co., 9 Paige (N. Y.) 568. Direct loss by fire covers loss by moisture directly traceable to water used in extinguishing a fire in an adjacent building. Boak Fish Co. v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co., 84 Minn. 419, 31 Ins. L. J. 253.

An explosion caused by the lighting of a match is not damage by fire within the meaning of the policy. Mitchell v. Potomac Fire Ins. Co., 183 U. S. 42.

For further cases on this subject see briefs of counsel in the case of Lynn Gas and Electric Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co. et al., 20 L. R. A. 297.

To an amount not exceeding $.......

The effect of this clause is to limit recovery under the policy to the amount written in the policy, whether the damage results from one or more fires.