defence of Fort Brown on the Rio Grande. Here was a little body of seven hundred men, doing battle with an enemy of six thousand around and about them. Time, until the main body of the army should return, was all-important; and this little field-work, thrown up for the emergency, with the scanty materials and defective implements at hand, stood a bombardment of seven successive days, against such fearful odds; and with a very trifling loss, held its position, until the enemy was put to flight by the advance of a strong reinforcement. It was the triumph of science over mere brute force; of the educated few, over the ignorant mass; and has reflected more credit on our arms, more glory on our national escutcheon, than the slaughter of thousands of our enemies in the open field! As incidental to this subject of fortifications, the special application of these principles to the particular detences required in our country, is dwelt upon at some length by the author. But we will detain our readers on but one subject more-the contests between ships and forts and as this is a subject now much agitated, and may soon become one of great practical importance to our country, we will let the author speak for himself. "Let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. The fort is to be properly constructed and in good repair; its guns in a position to be used with effect; its garrison skilful and efficient; its commander capable and brave. The ship is of the very best character, and in perfect order; the crew disciplined and courageous; its commander skilful and adroit; the wind, and tide, and sea-all as could be desired.* The numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more than requisite, with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the lists of the slain. The issue of this contest, unless attended with extraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances, would be a fair test of their relative strength. "What result should we anticipate from the nature of the contending forces? The ship, under the circumstances we have supposed, can choose her point of attack, selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable; but she herself is every where vulnerable; her men and guns are much concentrated, and consequently much exposed. But in the fort the guns and men are more distributed, a fort with an interior area of several acres not having a garrison as large as the crew of a seventy-four gun ship. All parts of the vessel are liable to injury; while the fort offers but a small mark,-the opening of the embrasures, a small part of the carriage, and now * These conditions for a battery are easily satisfied, but for the ship, are partly dependent on the elements, and seldom to be wholly attained. and then a head or arm raised above the parapet,-the ratio of exposed surfaces being not less than twenty to one. In the vessel, the guns are fired from an oscillating deck, and the balls go at random; in the fort, the guns are fired from an immovable platform, and the balls reach their object with unerring aim. There is always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship's guns, though accurately pointed at one moment, at the next, will be thrown entirely away from the object, even when the motion is too slight to be otherwise noticed; whereas, in the battery, the guns will be fired just as they are pointed; and the motion of the vessel will merely vary to the extent of a few inches the spot in which the shot is received. In the fort, the men and guns are behind impenetrable walls of stone and earth; in the vessel they are behind frail bulwarks, whose splinters are equally destructive with the shot. The fort is incombustible; while the ship may readily be set on fire by incendiary projectiles. The ship has many points exposed that may be called vital points. By losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her spars, she may become unmanagable, and unable to use her strength; she may receive shots under water, and be liable to sink; she may receive hot shot, and be set on fire; these damages are in addition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed by shots that pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers; while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned above-namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be struck." pp. 162-3-4. These deductions are abundantly fortified by the opinions. of military writers, and the facts of history; and we commend to the attention of the reader, the admirable summary of them given by the author, together with an examination in detail of the few instances of any note, in which it has been pretended that ships have gained the advantage over forts, viz. the attack on Copenhagen in 1801; the passage of the Dardanelles in 1807; the attack on Algiers in 1806; the attack on San Juan D'Ulloa in 1838; and the attack on St. Jean d'Acre in 1840; showing conclusively, that from the peculiar circumstances attending these, they cannot be relied upon as precedents for the future. Our chief object has been to attract attention to the little volume we have been noticing; and incidentally, we have discussed some subjects not embraced by the author. As we are particularly desirous of impressing upon our readers the duty of a State to preserve the art of war in its highest perfection; and to convince them that this art is "both comprehensive and complicated, requiring much previous study," and connected with so many other sciences, as to require the maintenance of a separate profession for that purpose, we have left untouched several instructing and important topics in the work before us. The subjects of army organization-the different orders of battle-the peculiar duties of the staff and the line-of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, all receive their share of attention from the author; but we have passed them over, both because they are topics more exclusively for the profession, and because, they are not so liable to be affected by the erroneous views of the community at large. It is time for our remarks on these subjects to be brought to a close. The period when this knowledge will be called into requisition must arrive, has already arrived. Our people must mourn over the losses which might be prevented by a proper attention to the defences of our country; and our aspirants after military glory, will be satisfied that plumes and epaulettes, and even a knowledge of the words of command necessary for facing, wheeling, and firing, do not make the general. Our distance from the old world, and the peculiar circumstances of our position, may have enabled us to adhere, with few interruptions, to our pacific policy. But neither the lessons of experience, the dictates of reason, nor the more sure word of prophecy, justify us in supposing that those principles of justice and benevolence, which are to secure the reign of universal peace, have yet been widely enough diffused. The earth must yet be shaken by bloody and desolating wars. The thunders and tornadoes of the moral world must first purify the noxious elements, before we can expect the clear and auspicious heavens to be ushered in, and if this "scourge of nations" must visit us in its turn, it becomes not only a wise precaution, but a high moral duty, to make due preparation for it. And by availing ourselves of the humanizing and pacific influences of learning, as applied to the military art, we are contributing not a little to the "restoration of the empire of mind, over mere brute force." Every great discovery has a life-saving and peace-promoting influence, and by perfecting ourselves in its use and applications, we are taking another step towards the "true grandeur of nations." ART. VIII.-MR. CALHOUN AND THE MISSISSIPPI. 1. Mr. Calhoun's Report on the Memphis Memorial. 1846. 2. Mr. Polk's Veto of the River and Harbor Bill 1846. 3. Mr. Rhett's Speech on the River & Harbor Bill. 1846. 4. Mr. Woodward's Speech on the River and Harbor Bill. 1846. VERY great interest was excited in South-Carolina, immediately after the adjournment of the Memphis Convention, concerning the part taken by her distinguished senator, Mr. Calhoun, in the extraordinary measures proposed by that convention for the consideration of Congress. Upon the publication of the proceedings of the convention and the speech of the President, it is difficult to say, whether South-Carolina received it, with more surprise or sorrow. Proud of their distinguished fellow-citizen and of their own long tried adherence to principle, many of her best citizens received the accounts, with the deepest mortification; many with incredulity. Some were struck dumb; while the great majority were desirous to delay any conclusion, until some more full report could be obtained. As in all cases, where the course of an eminent man is involved, not a few, blindfolded, were willing to venture in the dark, in pursuit of the leader, so indispensable to their movements. It appeared as though, by some great revolution of politics,-some convulsion of nature, or discovery of art, the noble river of the West, proud of her thousand steamers laden with the products of the finest valley of the world, was scorning longer to rank with the common streams, or creeks, or fluvial currents of vulgar earth, resolved to burst her banks and spreading herself over her luxurious shores, to be proclaimed by hocus or by pocus, a great, newfound, "inland sea." "The troubled surface, by the motion stirred, Wide and more wide, the floating rings advance, Fill all the watery plain, and to the margin dance." Some more faithful than discreet, "formed like wax, and moulded as you please," ventured to declare, that if not, already "An inland sea, The bolder and more resolute, fearing very properly, that the nation would be led, from the course of so influential a citizen, to suppose, that Carolina had abandoned her long cherished opinions, and desired, by assuming those which were more fashionable in the great world, to be introduced into better company than she had kept for some years past, thought it prudent and timely, that the State should again declare her determination, to remain in the republican family, that good old State rights, strict construing generation. There were others, and the majority, who thought it better, to lay upon the table for a time, the reputation of the State, rather than that of her great Senator. In this dilemma, of all the newspapers of the State, the "Charleston Mercury" alone, we believe, came to the rescue of her reputation, and boldly opposed the wishes and declarations of Mr. Calhoun at the Memphis Convention. The spirited communications in that paper, which were much commended by the editor, will not soon be forgotten. Speaking of these proposed vast improvements in the Mississippi, the writer says: "But the 3d resolution affords us an extremely awkward inducement to the conclusion which the resolution propounds. Such improvements are deemed by this convention impracticable by the States or individual enterprise, and call for the appropriation of money for the same, by the General Government.' Is it because these measures are impracticable by the States or individual enterprise, that this call is made on the Government? If the improvements fall within the duties belonging to the government, nothing is easier than to ascertain it. If they do not come within the powers of the government, will the impracticability of State or individual enterprise carry them there? Why not put the matter into plain English, and say the State cannot do it, ergo the government must. The proposition in its unvarnished condition, would not be a whit more abhorrent to the principles of States rights, and would be far more intelligible. Let any considerate man pause and ask himself this question. If the principles of the 2d and 3d resolutions are true, how many other abjects will claim the attention of the government, identical in principle, and varying only in degree? If these are objects of a national character, how many others that are now pressing into public notice, will not present claims equally strong? It is not long since we projected a gigantic scheme of communicating directly with Cincinnati. The minds and pockets of our own people and of our neighbors were taxed to accomplish the purpose. Its advantages in war, would have been great-its aid to our commerce immense-it was impracticable either by the State or by individuals; it failed, and its failure induced great loss. Did not this road come within the principle of these resolutions? But did it ever enter our heads to petition Congress to construct this for us, as a national road! |