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there may be a complete change of tenden- things the others, in consequence of mere cies or physical character, without any eg. previous feelings of the mind itself. sential change ; and that absolute identity, “ In this difference, then, of their antea in the strictest sense of that term, is con cedents, we have a ground of primary divisistent with infinite diversities.

sion. The phenomena may be arranged as It is easy to perceive that this new of two classes--the EXTERNAL AFFECmode of viewing the subject must re- TIONS OF THE MIND-the INTERNAL quire a new classification of pheno- AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND. mena, unlike those of former meta.

“III. The former of these classes adphysicians; and Dr Brown according

mits of very easy subdivision, according to ly treats the question of arrangement the bodilo

the bodily organs affected. as follows:

“ The latter may be divided into two * L. The very old classification of the Orders-INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE mental phenomena, as belonging to the

MIND, and EMOTIONS. These Orders, Understanding and to the Will, has little

which are sufficiently distinct in themselves, claim to be adopted on the ground of pre exhaust, as it appears to me, the whole cision, even with respect to the phenomena phenomena of the class. shich it comprehends; and there are innu. “ When I say, however, that they are merable phenomena, which belong neither sufficiently distinct in their own nature to the one nor to the other.

do not mean to say, that they are not often • The arrangement of them under the mingled in one complex state of mind; in Intellectual Powers of the Mind, and the the same way as when I class separately and Active Powers of the Mind, is as little wore distinctly sights and sounds, I do not mean thy of adoption. It is indeed almost the that we are incapable of perceiving visually same as the other, under a mere change of the instrument of music, and the musician, name. It does not comprehend all the phe- to whom we may be at the same moment nomena ; for, how is it possible to class such listening. Sight is still one state of mind, feelings as Grief, or the Emotion of Beau. hearing another state of mind ; though there ty, 33 in any peculiar sense, Intellectual or may be a complex state of mind that is vir. Active, any more than we could class them tually inclusive of both ; and when an inunder the Understanding or the Will? And tellectual state of mind is accompanied with it confounds even the phenomena which it an emotion, there is as little difficulty in does include ; for, if the word active have distinguishing these elementary feelings by any meaning at all, we are surely as active reflective analysis, as in distinguishing, by when we prosecute trains of reasoning or of a similar analysis, the elements of the comfancy, as when we simply love or esteem, plex sensation of sight and hearing. despise or hate.

“ There is one Emotion particularly, the

Emotion of Desire, which, in this metaphy. “ II. Let us consider the phenomena, sical sense of composition. m

sical sense of composition, mingles very then, without regard to any former arrange- largely with our other feelings, both of the ment.

External and Internal Class, and diversifies * The various feelings of the mind are them so much, in many cases, as to have Dothing more than the mind itself, existing led to the supposition of many distinct in a certain state. They may all, then, be Powers of the mind, from which the pecudesignated states of the mind, if we consider liar mixed results are supposed to flow. the feelings simply as feelings : or affections The nature of this illusive belief, however, of mind, if we consider the feelings in rela- will be best seen, when we analyze the comtion to the prior circumstances that have in plex results themselves.” duced them, and wish to express by a par. In treating of the External Percepticular word, not the momentary state of tions, Dr Brown begins with examinfeeling merely, but the reference also to some

ing into the nature of those numerous antecedent on which we suppose the change

8 of state to have been consequent.

bodily sensations which are not refer“ With this distinction of an implied re. able to the more important organs of ference in the one case and not in the other, perception, but diffused over the whole the phrases state of mind and affection of frame, and which had therefore, he mind, are completely synonimous They thinks, been too little noticed and may be used to comprehend all our feelings commented upon by former philosoof every order, that are nothing more than

phers. He says, states of the mind, the changes of which are co-extensive with the changeful circum " Our muscular frame would not be rightstances, material or mental, that may have ly estimated, if considered merely as that by induced them.

which motion is performed. It is also truly “Of these states or affections of mind, an organ of sense. when we consider them in all their variety, “ That it is capable, in certain states, of there is one physical distinction which can affording strong sensations, is shown by some not fail to strike us. Some of them arise in of our most painful diseases, and by that consequence of the operation of external oppressive uneasiness of fatigue which arises

when any part has been over-exerted. But ries, whether merely remembered as past, there are feelings of a fainter kind, increase or anticipated as future, is felt as of a cer ing in intensity with the exertion employed, tain length. The notion of a certain reguwhich accompany the simpler contractions, lar and limited length is thus acquired, and and enable us in some measure to distin. very soon becomes habitual to the mind of guish, independently of the aid of our other the infant; so habitual to it, that the first senses, our general position or attitude. feeling which attends the beginning conThese muscular feelings I conceive to form traction of the fingers, suggests, of itself, a a very important element of many of our length that may be expected to follow. complex sensations, in which their influence « It must be remembered, that it is the has been little suspected.

mere length of a sequence of feelings, at“ It is not to be supposed, however, that tendant on muscular contraction, of which I we are able, by a sort of instinctive ana. speak, and not of any knowledge of muscutomy, to distinguish the separate muscles of lar parts contracted. The infant does not our frame, which may have been brought know that he has fingers which move, even together into play. Our muscular move. when, from an instinctive tendency, or other ments themselves are almost always come primary cause to which we are ignorant how plicated; and our accompanying sensation, to give a name, he sets them in motion ; therefore, in such cases, is equally complex. but when they are thus in motion, and a But whether the number of muscles em consequent series of feelings already familiar ployed be more or less extensive, and the to him has commenced, he knows the regu. degree of their contraction be greater or less, lar series of feelings that are instantly to there is one result of sensation which forms follow. in every case one state of the mind; and it « In these circumstances, let us imagine is this joint result alone, which we distin- some hard body to be placed on his little guish from other muscular sensations, that palm. The muscular contraction takes place, may have resulted, in like manner, from as before, to a certain extent, and with it a various degrees of contraction of the same part of the accustomed series; but, from the or different muscles.”

resistance to the usual full contraction, there It is upon the nature of these muse is a break in the anticipated series of feelcular feelings that Dr Brown founds a ings, the place of the remaining portion of most original and remarkable specula

which is supplied by a tactual feeling comtion, with regard to our mode of per

bined with a muscular feeling of another ceiving space, extension, and the resiste

kind-that feeling of resistance which has ance and dimensions of solid bodies.

been already considered by us. As often as

the same body is placed again in the hand, Our first notions of these, he thinks,

the same portion of the series of feelings is are neither referable to sight nor to interrupted by the same new complex feeltouch, but to the series of sensations ing. It is as little wonderful, therefore, experienced in bending the muscles, that this new feeling should suggest or beand the occasional interruptions of that come representative of the particular length series in grasping solid bodies.

of which it supplies the place, as that the « 3. Let us once more consider the cir. reciprocal suggestion of one object by an. cumstances in which the infant first exists,

other should be the result of any other assowhen he is the subject indeed of various

ciation as uniform. A smaller body interfeelings, but is ignorant of the existence of

rupts proportionally a smaller part of the his own organic frame, and of every thing

accustomed series a larger body a larger external. If we observe him as he lies on

portion : and, while the notion of a certain his little couch, there is nothing which

length of sequence interrupted, varies thus strikes us more than his tendency to con

exactly with the dimensions of the external tinual muscular motion, particularly of the

object felt, it is not very wonderful that the parts which are afterwards his great organs

one should become representative of the of touch. There is scarcely a moment while

other; and that the particular muscular he is awake, at which he is not opening or

feeling of resistance, in combination with closing his little fingers, or moving his little

the tactual feeling, should be attended with arms in some direction. Now, though he notions of different lengths, exactly accorddoes not know that he has a muscular frame. ing to the difference of the length of which he is yet susceptible of all the feelings that it uniformly supplies the place. attend muscular contraction in all its stages. “ The only objection which I can conFrom the moment at which his fingers begin ceive to be made to this theory-if the cirto move towards the palm, to the moment stances be accurately stated, and if the inat which they close on it, there is a regular adequacy of touch as itself the direct sense series of feelings, which is renewed as un

of figure, have been sufficiently shown is, ceasingly as the motion itself is renewed. that the length of a sequence of feelings is The beginning of this series, as in every

so completely distinct in character, as to be other regular sequence of events in after

incapable of being blended with tactual nolife, leads to the expectation of the parts

tions of space. But this objection, as I flatwhich are to follow: and, like any other ter myself I have proved, arises from inat. qumber of continuous parts, the whole se tention, not to a few only of the phenomena

af tactual measurement, but to all the phe- this hypothesis there is far more oripomena ; for in the measurement even of ginality and invention shewn than in the most familiar object, as we have seen, & any former theory concerning the same difference of the mere rapidity or slowness subject. In so far as regards the perwith which we pass our hand along its sur. face, and therefore of the mere length or

ception of figure by sight, it is, howshortness of the accompanying series of feel ever, so revolting to our natural feelings, is sufficient to give in our estimate a ings or original impressions, as almost corresponding difference of length or shorts to preclude serious belief. We are irness to the surface which we touch. Length, resistibly led to attribute to colour the indeed, considered abstractly, whether it be same connexion with the perception of af time or of space, is nothing more in our space, as its cause really has with space conception than a number of continuous in the external world. The muscular parts; and this definition is equally appli- sensations experienced in moving the cable to it, in the one case as in the other.

In whatever manner the first mo. eye may remind us of succession and tions of the fingers may be produced, the change in altering the sphere of vision : infant will soon discover that they are re but the relations of parts in a simple krable by his will; and he will often figure appear to be perceived instanexercise this power. From the accustomed taneously; nor perhaps, if the figure antecedents he will expect the accustomed occupies but a small space in the sphere consequents, exactly as in after life ; since of vision, does the perception of the this anticipation, which is independent of relations of its parts employ any moveall reasoning, seems to flow from a law of me our physical being. Certain series of feel

ment of the eye. A series of muscular ings, then, begin and end in uniform order ;

changes of sensation may be conceived the anticipation of which is fulfilled as often to produce something like the feeling as he does not will to suspend them. At of linear progression ; but the proporlast, bowever, they are suspended, without tions of a figure lengthways and any will on his part, when some external breadthways (which, even when irresubstance has been placed in his hand. He gular, are often perceived instantaneexpected the whole of the accustomed se- ously with the utmost distinctness) ries: but the place of a portion of it is now supplied by another feeling ; and since all

would require to be represented by a of which he was conscious in himself at the

very great number of different trains moment preceding the interruption, was ex.

of muscular sensations, corresponding actly the same as in the many former in

to the different positions of the points stances when the regular sequence took that were compared in the figure-a place, be ascribes the feeling of resistance to number indeed far greater than the something that is foreign to him. There is mind seems capable of recollecting or something, then, which is not himself arranging into one conception. Whatsomething that represents a number of con- ever degree of probability may be ascurring lengths something that gives rise cribed to Dr Brown's notions concernto the feeling of resistance ; and we have tbus, however obscure they may be as first

ist ing perception, they are, beyond dis-, conceived by him, the rude elements, which pute, an important addition to what afterwards become more distinct in his non had previously been thought upon the tion of a system of external things. Matter subject. The qualities of space have is that which is without us - which has always proved the most fertile source parts which resists our effort to compress of difficulties to those who have specu

lated upon perception. Former med Thus he thinks that our notion of taphysicians saw that the perception of space is entirely founded upon a series them accompanied some sensations, of successive feelings experienced in but that the qualities of space were bending the muscles, and that the no- not themselves the causes of sensation; tion so formed is afterwards transferred while all other objects of perception to sensations received through the me-' were causes of sensation. Dr Brown dium of other organs, and accompanies has endeavoured to shew that nothing them only as an acquired perception. is made known to us by the senses but He conceives that the optic nerve reobjects that are causes of sensation ; cives only the sensation of colour and that space is not an object of prethat we do not originally perceive co- sent perception, but of memory, our lour spread out in particular figures, notions of it being founded entirely but that we ascribe extension to colour upon the succession of particulars in rein consequence of the series of muscu- membered trains of sensations. lar sérisations experienced in moving Having, in the first part of the vothe eye along the parts of a figure. In lume, discussed the external affections VOL. VII.

of the mind, he next proceeds to con- jectural, the name of Simple Suggestion ; sider the internal affections, which he meaning by that phrase to express nothing subdivides into intellectual 'states and more than is actually observed by us, in emotions. The part which relates to in

the readiness of certain feelings to arise aftellect is all that is found in the pre

ter certain other feelings, as resemblances sent volume, which was published in

of former perceptions or conceptions or other

preceding states of the mind; and restrictan unfinished state, before the inter- ing the phrase uniformly to such simple seesting branch relative to the emotions, quences of the similar feelings, exclusively had been got ready for the press. of all notions of relation of object to object,

In examining the intellectual states that may occasionally arise from them, and of the mind, the author shows admi be intermingled with them. rable powers of analysis. His obser

" Our trains of thought are not composvations are clear, comprehensive, and

ed, then, merely of such conceptions, or

other resemblances of former feelings, that satisfactory; and the following quota

wing quotd begin, and continue, and pass away, as it tion will enable the reader to perceive were separately, without impressing us DVIEWg QI Nis mode or thinking with any common relation which they bear.

“ Our Intellectual States of Mind, how. In the same manner as one conception sugever much they may specifically differ, will gests another conception, the perception or be found, even in their minutest variations conception of two or more objects suggests to exhibit only two generic diversities,—di. or gives rise to certain feelings of relation, versities which, in the ordinary metaphysical which, as states of the mind, differ from the sense of those terms, may be expressed very mere perceptions or conceptions themselves.. nearly by the phrases, Conceptions, and that have given rise to them, not merely as Feclings of Relation. Our whole trains of these perceptions or conceptions appear to thought, if we abstract from them the Sen. differ from each other, but generically as a sations which external objects may occasion distinct order of feelings. ally induce, and the emotions that may fre “ There is an original tendency of the quently mingle with them, will be found to mind to the one species of suggestion, in be composed of these, and of these alone. certain circumstances, as much as to the It is the very nature of the mind to be sus., other; and as to the one of these, which çeptible of these in certain trains; one per. affords us mere copies of former feelings, I. ception or conception suggesting, or, in other have given the name of Simple Suggestion ; words, having for its immediate consequent, to the other, which developes a new order of some other conception : as when the sight states of mind, in our feelings of relation, I. of a picture suggests the Artist who painted give the name of Relative Suggestion ; it, and the conception of the painter suggests, using the term Suggestion in both cases, as in like manner, the name of some other ar that which expresses most simply the mere tist of the same School, and this afterwards general fact of the rise of the feelings in the City in which that School of painting succession, without involving any hypo-, chiefly flourished. The successive concep thesis as to processes of former association, tions, in such cases, arise in the mind, in or any other circumstances, that may be the absence of the external objects that pro- justly or erroneously supposed to connect duced originally the corresponding perceptions; and, though capable of being modi. He afterwards enters into an inqui. fied to a certain extent by states of the bodily frame, are, as far as any discoveries of

ry concerning the principles, accordthe physiologist have yet been able to throw

ing to which simple suggestion takes light on their origin, Internal Affections of

place. After taking a survey of the Mind,-results of a tendency of the Mr Hume's opinions concerning the mind itself, in certain circumstances, to ex. laws of association, Dr Brown conist in one state after existing in some other cludes, that all the relations by which state. The tendency to this renovation of conceptions suggest each other, may former feelings has commonly received the be traced into Resemblance, Contrast, name of Association of Ideas ;-a name that and former Proximity. He even inis faulty in various respects, as limiting to clines to think, that suggestions, both our mere Ideas an influence which is not confined to them, and as seeming to imply

of Resemblance and Contrast, may, by some mysterious process of union as neces

farther analysis, be resolved into the sary before the suggestion itself; which, single principle of proximity. whether it be found to be true or not, on a “ The general fact of the rise of one con. more subtile analysis of the phenomena, is ception, in immediate suggestion by some at least not very easy to be reconciled with other conception or perception, is shewn, as the opinions of those who invented, or have I have said, by all the phenomena of our continued to employ the phrase. I have trains of thought; and it could scarcely fail preferred, therefore, for the sake of greater to be soon remarked, that the suggestion is precision, and for avoiding the intermixture not wholly vague and indiscriminate, but of any thing that can be considered as con that certain conceptions are, according to

the

1 or con

circumstances, more readily suggested than object resemble another, it must resemble it others. Of the knowledge of this readier in some particular circumstance or number snezestion, the use of verbal language, even of circumstances. There must be some part. in the rudest state of barbarous life, is a therefore, greater or less, of the complex sufficient proof; as are all the rude symbols perception or conception of each, that is the of every sort, that are einployed by the most same, or nearly the same, as some part of ignorant tribes in the first dawnings of ci.

of the vilization, for recording events in which other; and as, in both alike, this common they have nationally or individually taken element has co-existed with the other eleinterest

ments of the complex whole, it may, in ei“What even savages could not fail to dis. ther case, when only one of the objects is core, must have been remarked by philoso present to our perception or our thought, be pbers ef every Age. Yet, though the ten- sufficient for the reciprocal suggestion of dency to particular suggestions must have the similar object, and may produce this been the basis of all practical education, so effect without any other influence than that little attention had been speculatively paid of the mere proximity of one part to the to the laws which regulate them, that Mr other parts that have before co-existed with Hume, in reducing under a few general it. In like manner, when two objects are beads the phenomena of the association of strongly contrasted in any quality, they ideas,” in his Essay on that subject, con- must agree at least in this one respect, that ceived himself to be the first who had at they are both extraordinary in relation to tempted any such arrangement.

that quality; they are extremes of it, though « The opinion of the originality of the different extremes. Each, therefore, singattempt was indeed an erroneous one; since ly, may have excited this common sentiment a brief enumeration of the kinds of reminis- of extraordinariness with respect to the same cences, very similar to his own division of particular quality, and the feeling of exthem, is to be found in one of the Workstraordinariness with respect to the same of the great Founder of the Peripatetic quality, that has attended the perception of Philosophy, and in other works of interven- both objects, may, like any other part of a ing authors, both of the time of the school. complex whole in which two objects agree, ma and of more recent date. But the high be sufficient to produce a reciprocal sug. authority of Mr Hune's name has given to gestion, by the influence of mere co-exist. his classification an importance and a conse ence. quent claim to our consideration, greater,

In treating of simple suggestion, Dr perbaps, than in other respects it might justit be considered as deserving.

Brown remarks, that he considers a * Resemblance, Contiguity in place or tendency towards suggestions by anaa time, and Causation, are, according to him, logy as the principle cause of what is the principles of association of our ideas. called genius in individuals, as it serves Causation, it is evident, on his own princi- greatly to diversify the order of our ples, may be reduced to the head of Conti- conceptions, and so to lead to invenguity, of which it is in truth the most ex- tion : for. he observes, it is evident quisite exarnple; and Contrast, which he

there could be nothing new in the endeavours in vain, by a sort of obscure and almost contradictory analysis, very unwor.

products of suggestion, if objects, acthy of his general acuteness, to reduce un.

cording to their mere proximity on der the mixed influence of Resemblance and former occasions, were to suggest only Causation, is at least as well entitled to the very objects that had before co-exform a separate class, as either of the two to isted with thera : but there is a perwhich he would reduce it.

petual novelty of combination when * It is, perhaps, however, only in conse the images, that rise after each other quence of our imperfect analysis of the phe- by that shadowy species of resemblance nomena of Suggestion, that it has been

which constitutes analogy, are such as thought necessary to reduce them under distipa heads. It appears to me at least not

I never existed before together, or in improbable, that, on a mere minute exam- immediate succession. ination, they may all be found to admit of So much for the succession of mere being considered as examples of the single conceptions in the imagination, and the influence to which Mr Hume has given the laws that regulate their succession. name of Contiguity; and that every sug. He next proceeds to examine, under gestion, therefore, may be necessarily of the name of « Feelings of Relation," feelings that have previously co-existed, or those states of the mind which are been so immediately proximate in succession, that the rapid sequence, where one

commonly called Acts of the Underfeeling has scarcely ceased when the other standing. has begun, may be considered almost like We cannot long consider two or more ob-existence.

jects, without being impressed with some re"Resernblance, for example, is said to lation which they seem to bear to each other : be a principle of association. But, if one and this tendency to the suggestion of feel

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