there may be a complete change of tendencies or physical character, without any essential change; and that absolute identity, in the strictest sense of that term, is consistent with infinite diversities. It is easy to perceive that this new mode of viewing the subject must require a new classification of phenomena, unlike those of former meta physicians; and Dr Brown according ly treats the question of arrangement as follows: "L. The very old classification of the mental phenomena, as belonging to the Understanding and to the Will, has little claim to be adopted on the ground of precision, even with respect to the phenomena which it comprehends; and there are innumerable phenomena, which belong neither to the one nor to the other. "The arrangement of them under the Intellectual Powers of the Mind, and the Active Powers of the Mind, is as little worthy of adoption. It is indeed almost the same as the other, under a mere change of name. It does not comprehend all the phenomena; for, how is it possible to class such feelings as Grief, or the Emotion of Beauty, as in any peculiar sense, Intellectual or Active, any more than we could class them under the Understanding or the Will? And it confounds even the phenomena which it does include; for, if the word active have any meaning at all, we are surely as active when we prosecute trains of reasoning or of fancy, as when we simply love or esteem, despise or hate. "II. Let us consider the phenomena, then, without regard to any former arrange ment. "The various feelings of the mind are nothing more than the mind itself, existing in a certain state. They may all, then, be designated states of the mind, if we consider the feelings simply as feelings: or affections of mind, if we consider the feelings in relation to the prior circumstances that have induced them, and wish to express by a particular word, not the momentary state of feeling merely, but the reference also to some antecedent on which we suppose the change of state to have been consequent. "With this distinction of an implied reference in the one case and not in the other, the phrases state of mind and affection of mind, are completely synonimous. They may be used to comprehend all our feelings of every order, that are nothing more than states of the mind, the changes of which are co-extensive with the changeful circumstances, material or mental, that may have induced them. "Of these states or affections of mind, when we consider them in all their variety, there is one physical distinction which cannot fail to strike us. Some of them arise in consequence of the operation of external things the others, in consequence of mere previous feelings of the mind itself. "In this difference, then, of their antecedents, we have a ground of primary division. The phenomena may be arranged as of two classes-the EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND-the INTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND. mits of very easy subdivision, according to the bodily organs affected. "III. The former of these classes ad "The latter may be divided into two Orders INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MIND, and EMOTIONS. These Orders, which are sufficiently distinct in themselves, exhaust, as it appears to me, the whole phenomena of the class. "When I say, however, that they are sufficiently distinct in their own nature, I do not mean to say, that they are not often mingled in one complex state of mind; in the same way as when I class separately and distinctly sights and sounds, I do not mean that we are incapable of perceiving visually the instrument of music, and the musician, to whom we may be at the same moment listening. Sight is still one state of mind, hearing another state of mind; though there may be a complex state of mind that is virtually inclusive of both; and when an intellectual state of mind is accompanied with an emotion, there is as little difficulty in distinguishing these elementary feelings by reflective analysis, as in distinguishing, by a similar analysis, the elements of the complex sensation of sight and hearing. "There is one Emotion particularly, the Emotion of Desire, which, in this metaphysical sense of composition, mingles very largely with our other feelings, both of the External and Internal Class, and diversifies them so much, in many cases, as to have led to the supposition of many distinct Powers of the mind, from which the peculiar mixed results are supposed to flow. The nature of this illusive belief, however, will be best seen, when we analyze the complex results themselves." tions, Dr Brown begins with examinIn treating of the External Perceping into the nature of those numerous bodily sensations which are not referable to the more important organs of perception, but diffused over the whole frame, and which had therefore, he thinks, been too little noticed and commented upon by former philosophers. He says, "Our muscular frame would not be rightly estimated, if considered merely as that by which motion is performed. It is also truly an organ of sense. "That it is capable, in certain states, of affording strong sensations, is shown by some of our most painful diseases, and by that oppressive uneasiness of fatigue which arises when any part has been over-exerted. But there are feelings of a fainter kind, increasing in intensity with the exertion employed, which accompany the simpler contractions, and enable us in some measure to distinguish, independently of the aid of our other senses, our general position or attitude. These muscular feelings I conceive to form a very important element of many of our complex sensations, in which their influence has been little suspected. "It is not to be supposed, however, that we are able, by a sort of instinctive anatomy, to distinguish the separate muscles of our frame, which may have been brought together into play. Our muscular movements themselves are almost always complicated; and our accompanying sensation, therefore, in such cases, is equally complex. But whether the number of muscles employed be more or less extensive, and the degree of their contraction be greater or less, there is one result of sensation which forms in every case one state of the mind; and it is this joint result alone, which we distinguish from other muscular sensations, that may have resulted, in like manner, from various degrees of contraction of the same or different muscles." It is upon the nature of these mus cular feelings that Dr Brown founds a most original and remarkable speculation, with regard to our mode of perceiving space, extension, and the resist ance and dimensions of solid bodies. Our first notions of these, he thinks, are neither referable to sight nor to touch, but to the series of sensations experienced in bending the muscles, and the occasional interruptions of that series in grasping solid bodies. "3. Let us once more consider the circumstances in which the infant first exists, when he is the subject indeed of various feelings, but is ignorant of the existence of his own organic frame, and of every thing external. If we observe him as he lies on his little couch, there is nothing which strikes us more than his tendency to continual muscular motion, particularly of the parts which are afterwards his great organs of touch. There is scarcely a moment while he is awake, at which he is not opening or closing his little fingers, or moving his little arms in some direction. Now, though he does not know that he has a muscular frame, he is yet susceptible of all the feelings that attend muscular contraction in all its stages. From the moment at which his fingers begin to move towards the palm, to the moment at which they close on it, there is a regular series of feelings, which is renewed as unceasingly as the motion itself is renewed. The beginning of this series, as in every other regular sequence of events in after life, leads to the expectation of the parts which are to follow; and, like any other number of continuous parts, the whole se ries, whether merely remembered as past, or anticipated as future, is felt as of a certain length. The notion of a certain regular and limited length is thus acquired, and very soon becomes habitual to the mind of the infant; so habitual to it, that the first feeling which attends the beginning contraction of the fingers, suggests, of itself, a length that may be expected to follow. "It must be remembered, that it is the mere length of a sequence of feelings, attendant on muscular contraction, of which I speak, and not of any knowledge of muscu lar parts contracted. The infant does not know that he has fingers which move, even when, from an instinctive tendency, or other primary cause to which we are ignorant how to give a name, he sets them in motion; but when they are thus in motion, and a consequent series of feelings already familiar to him has commenced, he knows the regu lar series of feelings that are instantly to follow. "In these circumstances, let us imagine some hard body to be placed on his little palm. The muscular contraction takes place, as before, to a certain extent, and with it a part of the accustomed series; but, from the resistance to the usual full contraction, there is a break in the anticipated series of feelings, the place of the remaining portion of which is supplied by a tactual feeling combined with a muscular feeling of another kind-that feeling of resistance which has been already considered by us. As often as the same body is placed again in the hand, the same portion of the series of feelings is interrupted by the same new complex feeling. It is as little wonderful, therefore, that this new feeling should suggest or become representative of the particular length of which it supplies the place, as that the reciprocal suggestion of one object by another should be the result of any other association as uniform. A smaller body interrupts proportionally a smaller part of the accustomed series a larger body a larger portion: and, while the notion of a certain length of sequence interrupted, varies thus exactly with the dimensions of the external object felt, it is not very wonderful that the one should become representative of the other; and that the particular muscular feeling of resistance, in combination with the tactual feeling, should be attended with notions of different lengths, exactly according to the difference of the length of which it uniformly supplies the place. "The only objection which I can conceive to be made to this theory-if the cirstances be accurately stated, and if the inadequacy of touch as itself the direct sense of figure, have been sufficiently shown-is, that the length of a sequence of feelings is so completely distinct in character, as to be incapable of being blended with tactual notions of space. But this objection, as I flatter myself I have proved, arises from inattention, not to a few only of the phenomena of tactual measurement, but to all the phenomena; for in the measurement even of the most familiar object, as we have seen, a difference of the mere rapidity or slowness with which we pass our hand along its sur face, and therefore of the mere length or shortness of the accompanying series of feel ings, is sufficient to give in our estimate a corresponding difference of length or shortness to the surface which we touch. Length, indeed, considered abstractly, whether it be of time or of space, is nothing more in our conception than a number of continuous parts; and this definition is equally applicable to it, in the one case as in the other. 5. In whatever manner the first mo tions of the fingers may be produced, the infant will soon discover that they are renewable by his will; and he will often exercise this power. From the accustomed antecedents he will expect the accustomed consequents, exactly as in after life; since this anticipation, which is independent of all reasoning, seems to flow from a law of our physical being. Certain series of feelings, then, begin and end in uniform order; the anticipation of which is fulfilled as often as he does not will to suspend them. At list, however, they are suspended, without any will on his part, when some external substance has been placed in his hand. He expected the whole of the accustomed series: but the place of a portion of it is now supplied by another feeling; and since all of which he was conscious in himself at the moment preceding the interruption, was exactly the same as in the many former instances when the regular sequence took place, he ascribes the feeling of resistance to something that is foreign to him. There is something, then, which is not himself something that represents a number of concurring lengths something that gives rise to the feeling of resistance; and we have thus, however obscure they may be as first conceived by him, the rude elements, which afterwards become more distinct in his notion of a system of external things. Matter is that which is without us which has parts which resists our effort to compress it." Thus he thinks that our notion of space is entirely founded upon a series of successive feelings experienced in bending the muscles, and that the notion so formed is afterwards transferred to sensations received through the medium of other organs, and accompanies them only as an acquired perception. He conceives that the optic nerve receives only the sensation of colourthat we do not originally perceive colour spread out in particular figures, but that we ascribe extension to colour in consequence of the series of muscular sensations experienced in moving the eye along the parts of a figure. In VOL. VII. this hypothesis there is far more originality and invention shewn than in any former theory concerning the same subject. In so far as regards the perception of figure by sight, it is, howe ever, so revolting to our natural feelings or original impressions, as almost to preclude serious belief. We are irresistibly led to attribute to colour the same connexion with the perception of space, as its cause really has with space in the external world. The muscular sensations experienced in moving the eye may remind us of succession and change in altering the sphere of vision; but the relations of parts in a simple figure appear to be perceived instantaneously; nor perhaps, if the figure occupies but a small space in the sphere of vision, does the perception of the relations of its parts employ any movement of the eye. A series of muscular changes of sensation may be conceived to produce something like the feeling of linear progression; but the proportions of a figure lengthways and breadthways (which, even when irregular, are often perceived instantane ously with the utmost distinctness) would require to be represented by a very great number of different trains of muscular sensations, corresponding to the different positions of the points that were compared in the figure-a number indeed far greater than the mind seems capable of recollecting or arranging into one conception. Whatever degree of probability may be ascribed to Dr Brown's notions concerning perception, they are, beyond dispute, an important addition to what had previously been thought upon the subject. The qualities of space have always proved the most fertile source of difficulties to those who have speculated upon perception. Former me taphysicians saw that the perception of them accompanied some sensations, but that the qualities of space were not themselves the causes of sensation; while all other objects of perception were causes of sensation. Dr Brown has endeavoured to shew that nothing is made known to us by the senses but objects that are causes of sensation; and that space is not an object of present perception, but of memory, our notions of it being founded entirely upon the succession of particulars in remembered trains of sensations. Having, in the first part of the volume, discussed the external affection: I of the mind, he next proceeds to consider the internal affections, which he subdivides into intellectual states and emotions. The part which relates to intellect is all that is found in the present volume, which was published in an unfinished state, before the interesting branch relative to the emotions, had been got ready for the press. In examining the intellectual states of the mind, the author shows admirable powers of analysis. His observations are clear, comprehensive, and satisfactory; and the following quotation will enable the reader to perceive something of his mode of thinking. "Our Intellectual States of Mind, however much they may specifically differ, will be found, even in their minutest variations, to exhibit only two generic diversities,-diversities which, in the ordinary metaphysical sense of those terms, may be expressed very nearly by the phrases, Conceptions, and Feelings of Relation. Our whole trains of thought, if we abstract from them the Sensations which external objects may occasionally induce, and the emotions that may frequently mingle with them, will be found to be composed of these, and of these alone. It is the very nature of the mind to be susceptible of these in certain trains; one perception or conception suggesting, or, in other words, having for its immediate consequent, some other conception: as when the sight of a picture suggests the Artist who painted it, and the conception of the painter suggests, in like manner, the name of some other artist of the same School, and this afterwards the City in which that School of painting chiefly flourished. The successive conceptions, in such cases, arise in the mind, in the absence of the external objects that produced originally the corresponding perceptions; and, though capable of being modi. fied to a certain extent by states of the bodily frame, are, as far as any discoveries of the physiologist have yet been able to throw light on their origin, Internal Affections of the Mind,-results of a tendency of the mind itself, in certain circumstances, to exist in one state after existing in some other state. The tendency to this renovation of former feelings has commonly received the name of Association of Ideas ;-a name that is faulty in various respects, as limiting to our mere Ideas an influence which is not confined to them, and as seeming to imply some mysterious process of union as necessary before the suggestion itself; which, whether it be found to be true or not, on a more subtile analysis of the phenomena, is at least not very easy to be reconciled with the opinions of those who invented, or have continued to employ the phrase. I have preferred, therefore, for the sake of greater precision, and for avoiding the intermixture of any thing that can be considered as con jectural, the name of Simple Suggestion; meaning by that phrase to express nothing more than is actually observed by us, in the readiness of certain feelings to arise afof former perceptions or conceptions or other ter certain other feelings, as resemblances preceding states of the mind; and restricting the phrase uniformly to such simple sequences of the similar feelings, exclusively of all notions of relation of object to object, that may occasionally arise from them, and be intermingled with them. "Our trains of thought are not compos ed, then, merely of such conceptions, or begin, and continue, and pass away, as it were separately, without impressing us with any common relation which they bear. In the same manner as one conception suggests another conception, the perception or conception of two or more objects suggests or gives rise to certain feelings of relation, which, as states of the mind, differ from the mere perceptions or conceptions themselves, that have given rise to them, not merely as these perceptions or conceptions appear to differ from each other, but generically as a distinct order of feelings. other resemblances of former feelings, that "There is an original tendency of the mind to the one species of suggestion, in certain circumstances, as much as to the other; and as to the one of these, which affords us mere copies of former feelings, I have given the name of Simple Suggestion to the other, which developes a new order of states of mind, in our feelings of relation, I. give the name of Relative Suggestion ;using the term Suggestion in both cases, as that which expresses most simply the mere general fact of the rise of the feelings in succession, without involving any hypo-. thesis as to processes of former association, or any other circumstances, that may be justly or erroneously supposed to connect them." He afterwards enters into an inquiry concerning the principles, according to which simple suggestion takes place. After taking a survey of Mr Hume's opinions concerning the laws of association, Dr Brown concludes, that all the relations by which conceptions suggest each other, may be traced into Resemblance, Contrast, and former Proximity. He even inclines to think, that suggestions, both of Resemblance and Contrast, may, by farther analysis, be resolved into the single principle of proximity. "The general fact of the rise of one conception, in immediate suggestion by some other conception or perception, is shewn, as I have said, by all the phenomena of our trains of thought; and it could scarcely fail to be soon remarked, that the suggestion is not wholly vague and indiscriminate, but that certain conceptions are, according to circumstances, more readily suggested than others. Of the knowledge of this readier suggestion, the use of verbal language, even in the rudest state of barbarous life, is a sufficient proof; as are all the rude symbols of every sort, that are employed by the most ignorant tribes in the first dawnings of civilization, for recording events in which they have nationally or individually taken interest. "What even savages could not fail to discover, must have been remarked by philosophers of every Age. Yet, though the tendency to particular suggestions must have been the basis of all practical education, so little attention had been speculatively paid to the laws which regulate them, that Mr Hume, in reducing under a few general heads the phenomena of " the association of ideas," in his Essay on that subject, conceived himself to be the first who had attempted any such arrangement. "The opinion of the originality of the attempt was indeed an erroneous one; since a brief enumeration of the kinds of reminiscences, very similar to his own division of them, is to be found in one of the Works of the great Founder of the Peripatetic Philosophy, and in other works of intervening authors, both of the time of the schoolmen and of more recent date. But the high authority of Mr Hume's name has given to his classification an importance and a consequent claim to our consideration, greater, perhaps, than in other respects it might justbe considered as deserving. "Resemblance, Contiguity in place or time, and Causation, are, according to him, the principles of association of our ideas. Causation, it is evident, on his own principles, may be reduced to the head of Contiguity, of which it is in truth the most exquisite example; and Contrast, which he endeavours in vain, by a sort of obscure and almost contradictory analysis, very unworthy of his general acuteness, to reduce under the mixed influence of Resemblance and Causation, is at least as well entitled to form a separate class, as either of the two to which he would reduce it. "It is, perhaps, however, only in consequence of our imperfect analysis of the phenomena of Suggestion, that it has been thought necessary to reduce them under distinct heads. It appears to me at least not improbable, that, on a mere minute examination, they may all be found to admit of being considered as examples of the single influence to which Mr Hume has given the name of Contiguity; and that every suggestion, therefore, may be necessarily of feelings that have previously co-existed, or been so immediately proximate in succession, that the rapid sequence, where one feeling has scarcely ceased when the other has begun, may be considered almost like co-existence. "Resemblance, for example, is said to be a principle of association. But, if one object resemble another, it must resemble it in some particular circumstance or number of circumstances. There must be some part, therefore, greater or less, of the complex perception or conception of each, that is the same, or nearly the same, as some part of the complex perception or conception of the other; and as, in both alike, this common element has co-existed with the other elements of the complex whole, it may, in either case, when only one of the objects is present to our perception or our thought, be sufficient for the reciprocal suggestion of the similar object, and may produce this effect without any other influence than that of the mere proximity of one part to the other parts that have before co-existed with it. In like manner, when two objects are strongly contrasted in any quality, they must agree at least in this one respect, that they are both extraordinary in relation to that quality; they are extremes of it, though different extremes. Each, therefore, singly, may have excited this common sentiment of extraordinariness with respect to the same particular quality; and the feeling of extraordinariness with respect to the same quality, that has attended the perception of both objects, may, like any other part of a complex whole in which two objects agree, be sufficient to produce a reciprocal suggestion, by the influence of mere co-exist ence. Brown remarks, that he considers a In treating of simple suggestion, Dr tendency towards suggestions by analogy as the principle cause of what is called genius in individuals, as it serves greatly to diversify the order of our conceptions, and so to lead to invention; for, he observes, it is evident there could be nothing new in the products of suggestion, if objects, according to their mere proximity on former occasions, were to suggest only the very objects that had before co-existed with them: but there is a perpetual novelty of combination when by that shadowy species of resemblance the images, that rise after each other which constitutes analogy, are such as never existed before together, or in immediate succession. So much for the succession of mere conceptions in the imagination, and the laws that regulate their succession. He next proceeds to examine, under the name of "Feelings of Relation," those states of the mind which are commonly called Acts of the Understanding. We cannot long consider two or more objects, without being impressed with some relation which they seem to bear to each other: and this tendency to the suggestion of feel |