danger of an extreme abuse of it. To prove his conclusion as to the danger, he alleges that if they abuse their trust, they are subject either to be cut off by a rebellion of their people or to be strangled by their own janissaries. Thus, briefly stated, we have the following enthymeme: — Princes who abuse their power are liable to be cut off

by rebellion or assassination;

Therefore they are not safe in the abuse of it. Here nothing would be gained by thrusting in the general principle, "no person who is liable to be cut off by rebellion or assassination is safe." It is one of those enthymemes already described in the foregoing treatise, where the inference amounts to little more than a variety in the expression of the fact stated in the premise.

Our author, having thus shown that there are certain limitations to the power of princes, proceeds to intimate that absolute popular authority is exempt from such limitations, although his language is not altogether precise or direct to the point. Instead of having, like princes, to employ instruments, the people, he says, are in a great measure their own instruments, and they have an infinitely greater confidence in their own power than princes have, because they have a far better founded confidence.

This last clause, which in the extract is numbered 4, may be construed as a simple assertion that their greater confidence in their own power is caused by their confidence being better founded, the truth of which as a fact may be disputed. If it is regarded as an argument, we have the following enthymeme: -

Where popular authority is absolute and unrestrained,

the people have a far better founded confidence in their own power than princes have;

Therefore they have an infinitely greater confidence. This is a conclusion, however, not implied in the premise here stated. It may be naturally asked, is a better founded confidence entertained by mankind always a greater con

fidence? and this being a matter of experience, to be ascertained by examining a number of instances, the argument requires a major premise expressing or embodying that experience, as thus:

Whoever has a far better founded confidence in his

own power than another person possesses, has an infinitely greater confidence.

The argument is now completed: if you do not admit it, your objection would lie against the major premise as not true, and not against the reasoning as inconclusive. In point of fact, the major premise is not defensible; it is a false law deduced from a partial and imperfect induction of instances, the most undoubting confidence being frequently entertained where there is the smallest foundation for it. It is scarcely needful to add that the argument, with the major premise as above given, exemplifies the dictum de omni et nullo. At the same time, it must be observed that the whole is an instance of contingent under the form of demonstrative reasoning.

-

The next argument to be examined is numbered 5, in which the proposition maintained is that the people in a democracy are more exempt than princes are from another check "they are less under responsibility to one of the greatest controlling powers on earth, the sense of fame and estimation;" for which he assigns as a reason (although he does not indicate it by a causal conjunction) that "the share of infamy that is likely to fall to the lot of each individual in public acts is small indeed."

Here again the conclusion is implied in the premise, and if a major proposition were introduced, it would be merely a generalisation of the argument.

Argument No. 6. is to prove the proposition which forms the reason in the foregoing one:

The operation of opinion being in the inverse ratio to the number of those who abuse power,

The share of infamy likely to fall on each individual is small.

The reasoning here is elliptical but it is demonstrative. There is a change of terms also to be noted, which renders the whole less clear than it would be if a uniformity of language were observed, as in the following version of it:

The share of infamy falling on each individual is in the inverse ratio of the number of those who abuse. power;

Therefore the share of infamy falling on each indi

vidual in a democracy (which consists of a large number) is small.

The only premise in this argument is of the nature of a major premise, being a general proposition gathered from observation, and the conclusion is a particular instance coming under it. The principle exemplified is the dictum de omni et nullo. As the reasoning is a little complex, a minor premise might be introduced without puerility, and the logical dependence of the whole rendered clearer to common apprehension by a little amplification.

The share of infamy falling on each individual is in the inverse ratio of the number of those who abuse. power; i. e. if the number is large the share is small, if the number is small the share is large;

The number of persons in a democracy who abuse power is large;

Therefore the share of infamy falling on each individual is small.

The argument No. 7. is short: "A perfect democracy is the most shameless thing in the world, because their own approbation of their own acts has to them the appearance of a public judgment in their favour."

It is scarcely needful to point out that here again, although the reasoning is somewhat elliptical, there is no need of a major premise.

Argument No. 8. is of a precisely similar character: “A democracy is the most fearless thing in the world, because

no man apprehends in his person he can be made subject to punishment."

The next passage exhibits a complication of reasoning; it consists, in fact, of two arguments numbered 9 and 10, and denoted by the causal conjunctions "for" and "as." The conclusion maintained is, " the people at large never ought to become the subject of punishment," and the reason assigned is, "because the people at large can never become the subject of punishment by any human hand;" which last proposition is in its turn supported by the reason because "all punishments are for example towards the conservation of the people at large."

The first of these arguments, No. 9., is singular: "The people cannot be punished by any human hand; therefore they never ought." No one probably will contend that it will be mended by generalising it for the sake of obtaining a major premise, "Whoever cannot be punished by any human hand, never ought."

The second argument, No. 10., is, in brief, “ All punishments are for example to the people at large; therefore none can be inflicted on the people at large by any human hand.”

This is an instance of an enthymeme consisting of a major premise and conclusion. To bring it into regular form as a syllogism would require the language to be altered: All punishments which can be inflicted are for example to the people at large;

No punishment of the people at large can be for example to themselves;

Therefore no punishment of the people at large can be inflicted.

The passage No. 11. argues that as the people at large cannot be punished, it is of infinite importance that they should not imagine their will to be the standard of right and wrong.

Here again we have an enthymeme not to be strengthened in force by the introduction of a general proposition.

The next argument, No. 12., is somewhat longer and less plain. It may be summed up as follows:

The people are not more entitled, and are less qualified,

than kings to use any arbitrary power;

Therefore they are not tyrannically to exact from those who officiate in the state an abject submission to their will.

This concluding argument of the extract is manifestly of the same character as the last.

The examination of geometrical and moral reasoning, which we have now gone through, may appear tedious, but it will not be fruitless in confirming the principles of the present treatise. It shows that both mathematical demonstration and argumentative composition, such as mankind actually employ in appealing to the understandings of each other on moral and political subjects, abound with reasoning of a varied character, exemplifying divers general principles or maxims, and it especially proves that many of the arguments employed are at once non-syllogistic and demonstrative.

ARTICLE II.

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF ARGUMENTATIVE

COMPOSITION.

THE preceding examination of the nature of arguments may be useful to the student of Logic, by furnishing an example of the way in which such an analysis may be accomplished. It is confined, however, to exhibiting the species and varieties of reasoning, while the points of the greatest importance to him are the truth of the premises and the validity of the conclusion; and it has occurred to me that a few hints indicating the mode of proceeding to