Le Comte Capo d'Istria to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. MONSIEUR LE DUC, Londres, le 21me Septembre, 1827. C'est avec bien de la peine que je quitte l'Angleterre sans avoir pu me procurer l'honneur de revoir votre Excellence, et de lui exprimer encore une fois les espérances que les braves Hellènes placent dans la continuation de la bienveillance éclairée du négociateur qui a signé le Protocole du 7me Avril de l'année dernière. La grande pensée de cet acte a fait enfin entrevoir à la Grèce l'aurore de son salut, et désormais c'est de l'accomplissement du Traité de Londres, qui en est le développement, qu'elle attend sa restauration. En honorant de votre suffrage les observations que j'ai pris la liberté de vous faire à ce sujet, vous avez bien voulu, Monsieur le Duc, m'engager à vous en entretenir encore, lorsque je serai sur les lieux, et lorsque la marche des évènements aura placé dans tout leur jour les phases de cette immense question. J'augure si favorablement pour l'avenir de la Grèce de ce noble témoignage de votre intérêt, j'en suis si flatté moi-même, que je ne puis me dispenser, Monsieur le Duc, de vous rendre le dépositaire de ma profession de foi, tant sur l'état critique où la médiation trouvera ce brave et malheureux peuple, que sur les principes qui m'ont guidé et me guideront, si, à l'aide de Dieu, il me sera possible de justifier la confiance dont il m'honore. Je partage avec votre Excellence l'opinion que la Grèce pourrait encore opposer aux Turcs une longue résistance sur mer. Mais je doute qu'elle eût pu longtemps survivre à ses propres malheurs, à l'anarchie qui est le plus grand de tous, à l'isolement et à la misère qui en sont la cause. Sous ce point de vue, le Traité du 6me Juillet est un véritable bienfait pour la Grèce et pour l'Europe. Les calamités qui auraient fini par anéantir infailliblement les Hellènes, loin de préserver le monde des conséquences d'une guerre générale dans le Levant, n'auraient fait que les rendre plus imminentes et plus graves. Plus votre Excellence voudra considérer cette vérité sous tous ses rapports, et plus elle se persuadera que l'Acte du 7me Avril et le Traité de Londres offrent un gage de plus au maintien de la paix dont l'Europe jouit heureusement depuis 1815. Sans doute que l'exécution du Traité peut amener des chances périlleuses, mais elles ne me semblent nullement à redouter si les Cours intervenantes (dans le cas où la Porte rejette la médiation) préfèrent à toute autre mesure coërcitive celle d'exécuter complètement le traité en faveur des Grecs. En laissant aux Turcs le temps de se convaincre que les Puissances Européennes ont résolu unanimement et invariablement de conserver la paix par le salut de la Grèce, et en accordant à celle-ci les secours sans lesquels elle ne pourrait ni se défendre plus longtemps, ni même exister, les Cours intervenantes placeraient la Porte dans l'alternative ou de déclarer la guerre à la fois à l'Angleterre, à la France, et à la Russie, ou de subir lentement et graduellement les nécessités de sa situation, et d'accepter plus tard les conditions que son orgueil rejetterait aujourd'hui. C'est à St. Pétersbourg qu'en prenant connaissance pour la première fois de l'Acte du 7me Avril et du Traité de Londres, j'ai entrevu ce moyen de salut pour la Grèce. Les explications que sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas a daigné me donner sur la teneur de ces actes, et sur le but tout pacifique et tout européen de la médiation, m'ont engagé à vouer les peu de jours qui me restent à vivre, à la sainte cause d'une patrie à laquelle je n'ai jamais cessé d'appartenir. Fort du sentiment de mes devoirs et de la pureté des intentions dans lesquelles je m'efforcerai toujours de les remplir, je suis arrivé à Londres, et je vais me rendre à Paris, afin de connaître de près sous quels auspices il me sera possible de justifier la confiance que les Grècs m'accordent. J'emporte de Londres l'espoir de n'avoir pas tout-à-fait manqué mon but. Je croirai même l'avoir atteint, si votre Excellence, ainsi qu'elle a bien voulu m'en donner l'assurance, veut bien faire partager à ses amis la bonne opinion dont elle m'honore. Dites-leur, Monsieur le Duc, qu'à mon âge, et après avoir fourni avec loyauté et droiture une longue carrière publique, je n'en commencerai pas une nouvelle pour conduire les funérailles d'une nation qui a survécu miraculeusement à quatre siècles d'esclavage et à sept années de combats sanglants et destructeurs. Et ce serait l'enterrer pour tout jamais, que de vouloir la sauver par la protection exclusive de l'une ou de l'autre des Puissances intervenantes. Laissez-moi Je m'arrêterai ici pour ne pas vous fatiguer davantage. espérer, Monsieur le Duc, que vous me conserverez un souvenir d'amitié, et veuillez agréer l'assurance de mon respectueux dévouement. Monsieur le Duc, de votre Excellence le très-humble et très-dévoué serviteur, LE COMTE CAPO D'ISTRIA. [ 755. ] REMARKS ON THE INTERFERENCE OF OFFICERS, AND ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GENERAL OFFICERS FOR THE October, 1827. which This affair originated in a dispute between the respective officers of the Ordnance and the barrack-master at it fell to my lot to settle, when I was Master-General, by dismissing the barrack-master from the service. It now comes before me in another shape, that of the interference of MajorGeneral -, commanding at the station, in the original dispute; the mode of interference; and the letters written by the Major-General, and by Colonel, the senior officer of Ordnance, to the Commander of the Forces in the West Indies. I cannot but disapprove of the original interference of the Major-General. The question between the respective officers of Ordnance and the barrack-master was upon mere official details, as between the respective officers and the barrack-master, with which the Major-General had nothing to do. They were refer able to a distinct authority, responsible for the expenditure of money and stores, which authority settled the matter without reference to the Major-General's authority or opinion; and I must here add, that no other authority could have settled it. It is very desirable that General officers should consider these matters maturely before they interfere in them. They should study their instructions, and the rules and regulations of the service. They would therein find the limits of their authority; and, by acting accordingly, they would save themselves, and those placed over them, a great deal of useless trouble and correspondence. In respect to the mode of interference, I regret that the Major-General should have forgotten that the officers of the Ordnance, although not commissioned by his Majesty, are considered as officers; and that he ought not to have ordered a court of inquiry to investigate their conduct without previous report to, and sanction from, superior authority. In respect to the correspondence between the Major-General and the Colonel respectively, with the Commander of the Forces, I cannot but find fault with the whole of it. It contains the assertion, on both sides, of principles and pretensions, for which there is no authority, either in the regulations or practice of the service; and it is written in a tone quite unbecoming officers of rank corresponding with the commanding officer, on the conduct of others, vested with authority independent of the writer. The service cannot be benefited by such correspondence; and I would recommend to officers in authority not to allow themselves to be made the receivers and transmitters of such correspondence. I cannot, however, avoid observing upon one point, viz., the charge of Colonel against Lieutenant, the Staff officer of the Major-General. Every Staff officer must be considered as acting under the direct orders and superintendence of the superior officer, for whose assistance he is employed, and who must be considered responsible for his acts. To consider the relative situation of General officer and Staff in any other light would tend to alter the nature of the service; and, in fact, to give the command of the troops to the subaltern Staff officer instead of to the General officer. If Lieutenant has conducted himself improperly, Major-General is responsible; has no more right to notice the deficiencies and Colonel VOL. IV. K of Lieutenant Major-General -, than the Major-General had to interfere in a matter of detail between the respective officers and the barrack-master at I have only one more point to notice, and that is, the voluminous nature of this correspondence. If officers abroad will have no mercy upon each other in a correspondence of this nature, I entreat them to have some upon me; to confine themselves to the strict facts of the case, and to write no more than is necessary for the elucidation of their meaning and intentions. An attention to this request, and abstinence from interference, in which those who interfere have no authority, and in which they are not called upon to interfere by duty, will save the officers in command or authority abroad, and those placed over them at home, a great deal of unnecessary trouble; and leave much valuable time disposable for other purposes. WELLINGTON. MY DEAR DUKE, Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. New battle Abbey, October, 1827. Many thanks for your letter. The silence about your northern tour was a gracious rebuke for having undertaken it. I found Lord Grey decidedly adverse to the Treaty of July, though in general favourable to the Greeks. His comment on Capo d'Istria's letter was that it was an attempt to involve you in the business by representing it to have been a part of your Protocol. I probably shall hear from him when he forwards your reply. I heard him make the same observation to Lord Rosslyn, to whom he also showed the letter; whether he had any further conversation with Lord Rosslyn I do not know, but I found Lord Rosslyn afterwards very hostile to the Treaty. Lord Grey told me that the King, by way of inducing Lord Lansdowne not to resign, assigned as a reason that his resignation would have the bad effect of occasioning a change of Mr. Canning's system of foreign politics. My letter to Wilmot Horton, of which I apprised you, produced the enclosure of a correspondence, which I thought I could not in fairness return without explaining fully what I considered the system of communication between my late office and the Commander-in-Chief. I received for answer that my letter had unfortunately arrived a day too late, as Mr. Huskisson had written the day before, offering the command of the forces, as well as the government of Canada, to the Duke of Gordon. It is this which has occasioned Lord Goderich's letter to you. It was too early for him to have received the Duke's answer; but Lord Melville told me two days ago that he thought that the Duke would certainly not accept. The Duke denied to Lord Aberdeen his having had an offer of the Ordnance. It is I think clear that Sir G. Murray is to have the Ordnance; but I suspect he will have it without the Cabinet. The Marquess of Cleveland's coldness towards you was (according to Crevy's report to Lord Grey) occasioned more from a personal than a political feeling. He resents your having never taken any notice of him, after you had dined with him in St. James's Square. I have not yet seen Lord Lauderdale; but he writes me word that from what he is told by Sir G. Warrender, and from what he hears from Lord Holland, "the King's new friends" as he calls them, feel themselves under great difficulties. Lord Holland would not have written this if he had entertained any sanguine hopes of being included in the next move. The language at Raby Castle was that Brougham could not in consistency! accept office. The ladies beg to be most kindly remembered to you. Yours ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely, BATHURST. The victory of the Whigs in Lanark has offended the Buccleughs, who complain of the conduct of Lord Goderich, and the intended appointment of the Duke of Buccleugh to the Lord-Lieutenancy of Lothian will not pacify him. He seems a sharp lad. Viscount Goderich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Downing Street, 1st October, 1827. I am very much obliged to you for your letter, and for the very valuable suggestions which it contains, and which are deserving of every consideration. Upon the first point, viz., the supply of rations to the troops by the commissariat in certain of our colonies, I should conceive that in many of those (if not in all) which you have mentioned, it would be practicable for the troops to supply themselves with due facility and regularity; and if it be found practicable to make that change, it would certainly (I apprehend) be a saving of expense. There is another point, analogous to this, which appears to me worth considering. I mean the island allowances to the troops in the Mauritius and Ceylon. They amount to a considerable sum, and, being paid out of the island revenue, contribute to force the governments of those colonies to throw expense upon the mother country, which otherwise they could themselves defray. The Ionian government has always professed itself too poor to comply with the conditions of the treaty which binds it to pay for our troops in garrison there, and I believe that although their revenue is tolerably flourishing, they have large expenses for fortifications not yet completed; but they certainly have never thought of regulating their general expenditure with any reference to having the means of complying with the obligations of the treaty. I will have this matter looked into, as I am sure we are fully entitled to urge them upon the subject. I quite concur in the general view which you have taken as to the expense of the settlements on the coast of Africa. I believe that if every item of expense occasioned by the Slave Trade question were put together, they would not be less than 500,000l. per annum, I took this matter in hand when I was at the Colonial Department, where indeed some progress |