"Je vous demande, M. le Capitaine, votre opinion: regardez-vous comme une offense une pareille demande? N'est-il pas naturel de ne pas désirer l'entrée dans un port de forces deux à cinq fois supérieures, et qui inspirent de la défiance? "L'Amiral Anglais renvoya l'embarcation, en répondant qu'il ne venait pas pour recevoir des avis, mais pour donner des ordres ; et continua à gouverner avec son escadre en ligne sur Navarin, où il entra à 2 heures après midi, et de suite s'embossa à portée de pistolet devant l'armée turque. "Pendant ce temps une de ses frégates s'était détachée, et avait mouillé par travers de deux brûlots situés à l'entrée du port, et les Français et les Russes, suivant près l'Amiral Anglais, imitaient sa manœuvre. L'Amiral Turc, ayant envoyé une nouvelle embarcation à bord l'Amiral Anglais, pour demander des explications sur ces mesures hostiles, elle fut repoussée d'une manière outrageante; et dans le même moment la frégate embossée devant les brûlots a envoyé ses embarcations pour s'en emparer. Alors commença une fusillade qui fut comme le signal du combat, qui ne finit qu'à la nuit, et qui effectua l'entière destruction de notre escadre; laquelle, composée de trois vaisseaux de ligne, d'une quinzaine de frégates, et de quantité de petits bâtiments, et n'étant pas préparée au combat, avait affaire à dix vaisseaux de ligne, et nombre de frégates et corvettes. Les Amiraux pensent-ils avoir fait un ample moisson de gloire en égorgeant ainsi avec des forces aussi supérieures ceux qui ne pouvaient s'attendre à une pareille attaque, qui n'y avaient point donné lieu, et qui pour ainsi dire n'avaient fait encore aucun préparatif de défense? Maintenant dire qui a commencé l'attaque et tiré le premier coup de canon, c'est ce dont chacun se défend; ce qu'il y a de certain c'est que la frégate anglaise a, la première, et sans raison, voulu s'emparer des brûlots, et que c'est la juste résistance de ce côté qui a occasionné le premier feu. Enfin, Capitaine, ma conscience ne me reprochant rien, j'avoue que j'ignore encore le véritable motif d'un pareil attentat. Les puissances ont voulu, disent-elles, faire cesser l'effusion du sang dans le Levant, et voici que leurs Amiraux viennent d'en rougir la rade de Navarin, et de la couvrir de cadavres. On accuse, dit-on, Ibrahim d'avoir manqué à sa parole; mais j'irai à Paris et à Londres, s'il le faut, pour faire connaître la vérité; et ceux qui ont versé le sang innocent en porteront la honte et le blâme. Les bâtiments sont faits pour devenir la proie du feu et de la mer; ce n'est point eux que je regrette; mais m'accuser d'avoir rompu mes engagements, c'est une infame calomnie. "Je compte sur votre honneur, M. le Capitaine, pour répéter, mot par mot, à votre Amiral, ce que je viens de vous dire." [759.] MEMORANDUM UPON THE GREEK CASE. On the 2nd of August, 1826, Mr. Canning communicated to me certain queries put to him by Prince Lieven regarding the execution of the Protocol of the preceding April. Some of these queries applied to the execution of a plan which had been in contemplation, and respecting which in structions had been given to Mr. Stratford Canning and Sir Frederick Adam, and to the Admiral commanding his Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean. This plan had for its object to prevent the execution, by Ibrahim Pacha, of a project imputed to him by the Russians to remove the Greek inhabitants of the Morea into Africa and to colonise Greece by Egyptians. I had some discussion with Mr. Canning on that subject, the result of which was that Mr. Canning having informed Prince Lieven that upon inquiry having found that there was no ground whatever to impute either to the Porte or to Ibrahim Pacha a plan for the extermination of the Greek population, such as had been imputed to them, these queries were withdrawn; and, on the 7th August, it was agreed to communicate the Protocol to the other Allied Courts, according to what had been settled at St. Petersburg in April, which was accordingly done in the end of August. It appears that early in November, 1826, there was a renewal of the proposal from Russia, in a despatch or letter from Count Nesselrode, for the use of measures of force to obtain the consent of the Porte to the Protocol, to which Mr. Canning refused to listen. I had no farther communication with Mr. Canning on the subject of these arrangements till February, when he sent me the project of a Treaty including France, which had been drawn up at Paris, and was sent to England by Lord Granville, in his despatch No. 24, of the 29th January, 1827; the first mention of France becoming a party to the arrangement of St. Petersburg being on the 12th January, 1827, and of the intention of converting the Treaty into a Protocol. There was no mention of force in this project of a Treaty, but there was of commercial agents, which I urged Mr. Canning to strike out. I heard no more upon the subject of this Treaty till the 19th of March. But I see that in a despatch dated the 26th January, 1827, No. 64, Lord Granville mentions that the Russians were thinking of force. On the 19th of March, 1827, Mr. Canning sent me the French draft of the Treaty, its amendments, the draft suggested by Russia, including as separate articles part of what the Treaty of the 6th July contains. I stated to Mr. Canning my objections to the alterations in the Treaty from the Protocol in a letter which I wrote to him on the 20th March and a conversation I had subsequently with him in presence of Lord Granville; and I conceived he had given up the plan. In April I was out of office, and heard no more of it afterwards. WELLINGTON. Sir J. C. Smyth to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. MY LORD, Nutwood, Reigate, 30th October, 1827. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's letter of the 27th instant, together with that from Lord Anglesey of the 25th to your Grace. Your Grace had evidently not received the letter I took the liberty of addressing to your Grace, upon my return from Beau Desert. I was fully aware of Lord Anglesey's sentiments upon the subject. I believe, indeed, as far as his means will enable him, from what his Lordship said to me, it is decidedly his intention that your Grace's views, not only with respect to the Rideau Canal, but upon all the military points connected with his Majesty's North American Provinces, should be strictly followed. His Lordship told me that although the Ordnance estimates were to be very low, yet 10,000l. would be put in for Kingston, and the same for Halifax citadel. These sums are certainly very small, but still it is doing something, and will produce some effect upon the minds of the inhabitants of these provinces, as well as upon the Americans. No detailed plans, either for the Niagara or the Montreal fortress, have as yet been received. From the plans and reports I have seen I think your Grace would be much pleased with the progress made upon the Rideau. Whatever may have been Lieutenant-Colonel By's original errors, he certainly is now getting on with very great zeal and activity. He certainly at first wrote home a great deal of nonsense, and formed the most unmilitary notions as to the defence of Canada, proposing to remove the Richelieu Rapids, and other obstacles, on which the safety of the province in a great measure depends. His estimate for 1,200,000l. was also very ridiculous. He has also, perhaps, been unguarded in his conversation in allowing these notions of his to become public. With all this, he appears however to deserve the character they entertain of him at General Mann's office, of being a very active and capable officer, and well qualified to execute the details of this work. I should hope your Grace will have no further cause of uneasiness or of reference; and that in the year 1830 this most useful work, as connected with the permanent security of Canada, will be entirely completed. With respect to the impossibility of forming towing-paths, mentioned by Lieutenant-Colonel By in his report, and alluded to by your Grace in your letter of the 27th instant, I don't think it is of the least consequence, or need occasion the slightest regret to your Grace. In those parts of the water communication, which will be literally a canal, there will of course be a towing-path; where the water becomes broader there will be of course towing-steamers for hire. This is the case at present on all the lakes and broad parts of the St. Lawrence and at La Chine. Vessels either sail or are towed by steamers to that end of the La Chine nearest to Montreal. They are then towed by horses through the canal, at the end of which there is another steamer which, if the wind does not suit them, they may engage to tow them to any part of Lake St. Louis, to the foot of the Cascades Rapids, or up the Ottawa to the foot of the St. Anne's Rapids, according as they are bound. There is already a steamer on the Ottawa above the Grenville Canal, which will tow any vessel from the Grenville Canal to the mouth of the Rideau; and I respectfully submit to your Grace that as the communication is opened, and in proportion as the want of towing means are felt, steamers will be built and be navigated wherever they are required. I have reflected a good deal upon what your Grace said upon a former occasion with respect to the tolls and future management of the locks and canals. I have made some memoranda, but I have hardly as yet sufficient data to enable me to put anything satisfactory before your Grace. Two principles, however, I respectfully submit your Grace will probably think ought to be kept in view in the measures to be adopted. The first is to induce the Canadian boatmen to prefer and to make use of the Rideau communication in preference to the St. Lawrence, by making it a cheaper as well as a safer conveyance. The charge for pilotage through the St. Lawrence Rapids is very heavy: the expenses for going through the Rideau Canal ought consequently to be less. With a cheaper and safer mode of getting to Montreal, the St. Lawrence Rapids will be, of course, avoided, and they will remain a prominent military feature in the defence of the Canadas, and prevent a combined movement upon Montreal. The second point to which I think your Grace would probably wish to advert, will be to avoid an expensive establishment in taking charge of the locks and collecting the tolls. I should think that by letting them for a term of years, as turnpike-roads are in England, binding the lessee as to the tolls he is to collect, and to keep everything in order, under proper superintendence, would perhaps be the best plan. I will, however, ascertain how the Americans manage with their Western Canal, which is a very great source of revenue to the State of New York; as also how the La Chine Canal, which belongs to the Legislature of Lower Canada, is arranged. In a few years the amount of the tolls to be collected upon the Rideau will certainly be considerable, even keeping them at a very low rate. I have the honour to be, my Lord, with the sincerest respect, your Grace's most obliged and most obedient servant, J. CARMICHAEL SMYTH. The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. It is to be regretted that he did not finally make up his mind on the subject before he notified his desire to be relieved from his command in VOL. IV. L 1828, not only to the authorities in England, but to Lord Dalhousie, whom he knew to be a candidate to succeed him. Believe me, with the highest respect, my dear Duke, I send you the enclosed paper, as I see your name advertised as secretary, although it is just possible that there may be as little authority for the advertisement of your name as secretary as there is for that of mine as a president for the time being. I beg leave to protest against such use of my name, and against my being supposed in any manner connected with the transaction, viz. the Grand Imperial Canal from London to Portsmouth. If I should see my name in any other prospectus I shall think it necessary to publish this protest. [ 761.] I have, &c., To General Lord Hill. MY DEAR HILL, I beg to inform you that I never received any intimation whatever, whether by proof-sheet or otherwise, that it was |