intended to make use of my name as a member of the Grand Imperial Canal, till I received the paper which I returned to Mr. Wheeler some days ago. It now appears that that paper was not the proof-sheet, but is a publication, and that my name is to be withdrawn in future. I therefore think it proper to give you notice that if it is not notified by you to the public, between this and Sunday next, that the insertion of my name. was by mistake, a statement will appear in Monday's paper that the insertion was unauthorised by me, and that I have been obliged to make the statement myself, because those who, although unauthorised, inserted my name, have not made known to the public in a manner satisfactory to me that I did not belong to the Society.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Major-General Sir Jasper Nicolls to Sir Herbert Taylor.

MY DEAR SIR Herbert,

Calcutta, 10th November, 1827. However this may find you, as Colonel of the 85th, Deputy to the Secretary-at-War, or as Secretary to a Commander-in-Chief (which last I sincerely trust it may do), I feel that to you my opinions ought to be addressed, not only as my best surviving friend, but as the channel through which they may be made useful. This letter follows naturally that of the 29th April, in which I observe this comparison was promised. You have now four of my productions before you: 16th August, 1826; 29th November, 1826; 29th April, 1827; and 27th October.

I am sure you will acknowledge the propriety of my adressing this last to Lord Combermere. It is not the less interesting to you, and as his Lordship has just set off on an extensive tour, he may possibly direct his inquiries to some of the circumstances I have mentioned. I shall go on, with diligence, in making such further inquiries as my new command at Meerut may enable me to do, and in the end I may do some good.

One circumstance has struck me forcibly lately. Gradually, since the days of Lord Clive, the call here has been for more European officers, from a Captain-Commandant, with the aid of a few subalterns; this army has now 23 officers to each regiment, and I still say they require more, as long as there are so many absentees.

You will not fail to remember that Rogniat (in his treatise Sur la Guerre) condemns the excessive train of artillery which Napoleon brought into the field in 1813, although acknowledged by both to be meant to counterpoise the inefficiency of his infantry, both in number and discipline.

Are we in India come to the point when it is desirable to make up in officers what the Native infantry has lost in loyalty and morale? Few will

give this a willing affirmative; but I gather it from what we see done, and hear of very frequently.

Refer to Duff's History of the Mahrattas,' and see what he (a Bombay officer) writes of the sepoys of Hindostan ; you will find high tributes to their fidelity and valour in pages 207 and 256 of the 3rd volume.

Now, my dear Sir Herbert, if this army be still retrograding, officers alone will not counteract the depression. System alone can do it-well considered, liberally pursued, but enforced; and if the recruiting were altered, so as not to depend too much on a few districts and a few castes; if promotion for Europeans and Natives were more rapid, and encouragement more certain; and lastly, if discipline were better understood and attended to, the Bengal army ought to be the finest colonial army in the world.

A pursuit of these four would, no doubt, lead to the discovery of all other necessary amendments.

I shall endeavour to lay before you some opinions respecting the amalgamation of the Indian army with that of his Majesty's; but it really is a question which I approach with great hesitation and distrust of my own ability.

With warmest thanks for your kindness to me, and with every good wish,

[ENCLOSURE.]

I remain, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

Copy of a Letter to Viscount Combermere.

MY DEAR LORD, On board the Guide, 27th October, 1827. I have availed myself of the uninterrupted leisure of my voyage from Vizagapatam to prepare some remarks upon the military systems of India, which, according to a promise long since made, I now beg to offer to your perusal.

I am aware that it is neither an easy, agreeable, nor unobjectionable task to draw a comparison between the native armies of Bengal and Madras. Had I remained longer with the latter, I should have postponed the attempt for another year, and possibly have succeeded better than I can now hope to do.

Nothing but active and severe service, which shows the intelligence of man, his vigilance, patience, loyalty, and valour, can enable any one justly and fully to appreciate all that ornaments and gives value to the soldier. Not having had an opportunity, since 1803, of studying the Madras sepoy, I must not enter upon these parts of the finishel soldier, but confine myself to the composition, encouragement, and instruction of the two armies.

If I have not penetrated deeply, I have felt strongly. My desire is to avoid all prejudice or bias, and my humble hope is to do good.

The Madras sepoy is decidedly inferior in size to that of Bengal. He wants the strengthening food of the native of Hindostan; and, being born under a more even temperature, he is a stranger to the bracing effects of cold.

The standard is five feet five inches. It appears, however, that in seven native regiments in the Northern Division, there are no less than 1850 men below that height, occasioned by hasty recruiting during the Burmese war, by enlisting relatives, by taking sepoy boys into pay, and by disappointed expectations as to growth after enlistment. This is a decided evil, and it is corrected by discharging at every inspection; but it involves much expense, and labour

also, in teaching men who are unfit for the service. No man or boy should be entertained under 5 ft. 5 in.; indeed, while it was possible to get men of 5 ft. 6 in., even slowly, I should prefer it; 800 of that stature being, I think, equal to 900 of 5 ft. 5 in., who, if at all ill-made or badly formed, are unequal to bear the load of their arms, ammunition, and knapsack.

All this is, however, acknowledged by the attempts made to enlist the men of Hindostan for the Madras regiments.

The Bengal sepoys are more erect than those of the coast army. They have much finer chests, and originally a superior carriage. Their legs are not, probably, quite so good, owing to the common practice of squatting, by which the weight is thrown entirely on the calves of the legs.

When a slouching, awkward Bengal sepoy is seen, he exhibits merely a specimen of neglect, either in the recruiting officer or the adjutant of his corps; or perhaps he feels oppressed by some part of the system, and is not cheerful. A well set-up Madras sepoy shows that he has become so by pains and exertion, and continues so from pride, and the strong persuasion that he will be noticed and rewarded.

The personnel of the two services differs also exceedingly in caste. The Brahmins, who inundate the Bengal army, are not valued, and rarely admitted into the ranks of a Madras corps; whilst the Mussulmen are very numerous, and considered their best soldiers.

In these opinions, the last excepted, I think the Madras officers are right. The Brahmin wants many of the necessary qualities of a soldier, and very seldom, I think respects his officer, or the service, when compared with his caste, his idolatry, or his spiritual superior. I think too that Brahmins are not, in general, brave men.

From these two causes result their numerous and vile desertions when going upon service, and the odious, half-mutinous manner in which they demean themselves under difficulties. To cover their own shame they spread their disloyal whisperings, till the number of the discontented becomes too great for punishment. Their caste renders this easy. Adepts in persuasion, important from their numbers, seducing from their religious rank and supposed knowledge, they crown the evil by pernicious example.

The names of the mutineers of the 47th, who were tried, prove their high caste; and when the 15th misbehaved at Bhurtpore, though the disturbed feelings of the Mussulmen led to the disgraceful transaction, yet there was a Brahmin meddler implicated.

It always seemed to me that there was a feeling at that siege which was not drawn from a devoted allegiance to our government, but emanated from an impression that the place was beyond our power; and that if it fell, the last and chief hope and hold of the Hindoos was gone.

A deliberating soldier is a bad one. The essence of the profession is obedience. What can we think, then, of an army containing a third part of such deliberators? with influence over another equally large portion?

The truth or incorrectness of what I have stated might be ascertained by examining rolls of deserters, by perusing reports of disaffection amongst the Native army, and by soliciting the opinions of old and good officers.

It would be a wise measure, I think, to check their enlistment, at least as far as may, under my view of the case, appear to be safely practicable.

I do not value the Mussulman soldier as highly as he is esteemed in the Madras army, but I should be very glad to see the Brahmins in a great degree replaced by them in the ranks of Bengal. They are more profligate in some respects than the Hindoo, more careless, more impatient of discipline, but they are not so prone to combine under difficulty, unless their religion was assailed or openly slighted.

What the Rajpoot is in the Bengal service, its support and ornament, the Mussulman seems to be in the Madras army. This importance they derive partly from their numbers, and partly from the absence of the wily Brahmins. The partiality of the Madras officers to the Mussulmen had, at one time, raised so many of their sect to the rank of commissioned officers, that the government ordered promotion to be given equally, or nearly so. Even now, of 125 Native officers, in seven corps, at my inspection, 75 were Mussulmen and 50 Hindoos. There were 15 wanting or absent.

Even though the argument should weaken my own position, yet I must not pass over the Villore mutiny, where probably the Mahometan influence, acting on numbers, produced the same effects which I have ascribed to Brahmin craft.

Beyond doubt the Madras Mussulmen yield to discipline better than those of Bengal. The same remark may be made of the Rajpoots of Hindostan, thinly scattered over their ranks. They adopt cheerfully the habits of the Coast Army, except cooking with their clothes on, and either have not the wants of the Bengal troops, or suppress them.

The seven sepoy regiments before mentioned were thus composed in January last:

Here, to balance 37 Hindoos, there are nearly 26 of other castes, and of these 22 are Mussulmen.

Bearing in mind that Brahmins are not admitted, this seems to be a safe and good composition.

In the returns received, the Rajpoots were only distinctly specified by one corps, of 684 Hindoos, but 51 were Rajpoots, or 1 in 13.

The absence of the Brahmin, and the want of the Rajpoot, give that consequence to the Mussulman which I have already mentioned.

In a word, I think the Madras army as much inferior to that of Bengal in size and personal appearance, as it is superior to the latter in composition and dress.

We must next, in order, come to the means whereby these armies are instructed and animated for the performance of those duties for which they are retained, and in what degrees, respectively, they understand and fulfil them.

In each Madras regiment thirty recruit boys and forty pension boys are entertained; they receive 33 rupees per month. It is a most charitable institution, as it provides for the sons of old sepoys, and of those who fall in action, who are selected in preference to all others. When enrolled at four years old, and transported to the ranks at sixteen, they are very expensive recruits: 500 rupees has been the outlay. In return for this, the State at times obtains an excellent, smart sepoy-a soldier from the cradle-with very few prejudices; but if every corps should transfer six annually to the ranks (which is above the average) the charge of 3000 rupees has been incurred for it. Many do not attain the prescribed height, and are discharged. At my inspection I was compelled to select twenty-eight to be thus parted with.

Whether the satisfaction afforded to the men, and an occasional prize of a

* Old soldiers possibly; now not admitted.

† Of which 322 were Hindostanees.

thorough soldier, be worth the heavy expense, is a question which should not be hastily answered. The families of Bengal sepoys do not generally accompany them; hence such a charity is not so necessary, and if, when a sepoy was killed, a son was called for to be enrolled, some poor relative would frequently be substituted.

Promotion, the great encourager and agitator of the soldier, is very differently managed at the two Presidencies. In Bengal seniority is far too rigidly adhered to. Some instances of rewarding merit in war do there appear, but in the Coast Army the selection begins very early, as the following extract will show:

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'Adverting to the Standing Regulations, confidential men are in the first instance selected by officers commanding companies, with the sanction of the commanding officer, but as the respectability of the Native officers depends so essentially on a judicious selection of men, in the first instance, to form noncommissioned officers, you will be pleased to direct in future that officers commanding companies point out six of the smartest of these men, of good caste, and respectable characters; from these men you will select those you consider most likely ultimately to become good subadars and jemadars; and the Commander-in-Chief wishes particularly to impress upon your mind, not only the justice but policy of bringing forward for promotion the sons of old and respectable commissioned officers, provided they are duly qualified, and worthy of distinction; preserving at all times equal preferment to the Hindoos (Rajpoots in particular) as well as Mussulmen.

"If the confidential men and even the naigues, after selection, do not answer the expectation which has been entertained of their fitness for the duties required of them, they should be passed over in future promotion, or reduced to the ranks. In the latter case, when it is deemed expedient to resort to a measure of such severity, a special report of the circumstance is to be made at the foot of the monthly return, but it will be deemed sufficient cause, should they manifest either incapacity, idleness, or disinclination to perform their duties, without being guilty of any specific crime. Acts of insubordination, neglect, or irregularity, must in every practicable case be submitted previously to a court-martial. A naigue is not a non-commissioned officer, and does not fall under the same regulations." *

Four years is the general term of probation. After that, these confidential men (or lance-naigues) may be promoted according to their merits. I cannot positively quote an order establishing that period, but I called for a return of the havildars of a regiment, and found that three of them had only served five years each.

Here, then, is the mainspring of the Madras army, and it is founded on an accurate knowledge of man in all ages. From the moment he joins the ranks, a coast sepoy may, and a true soldier will, aspire to the consequence and hope for the pay of a Native officer.

The processes of selection, comparison, and of rejection have been already noticed. They may work their way to the grade of havildar, but the following rule bars them from further advancement:

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A man may make a good naigue, and a very tolerable non-commissioned officer, but at the same time fail in many of the qualifications requisite to form a respectable Native officer, who ought to be a man of high spirit, respectable family connexions, good caste, and sufficiently advanced in years to claim respect, without being too old to exert his zeal, and show a good example.

Circular Letter of Adjutant-General to Commanding Officers of regiments, 25th February, 1824.