his opponents' minor premiss, which he practically concedes. That is to say, the fact that dikala differ in different places (Kiveira), and are therefore capable of arbitrary variation (κƖŋτá), does not disprove the existence of an eternal, natural Síkalov to which the before-mentioned Síkala more or less conform. Hence Síkala may be divided into (1) púσe díkala, i. e. those which represent the eternal, natural δίκαιον, and (2) νόμῳ or συνθήκῃ δίκαια, which are wholly independent of it. "Ein unveränderliches Gerechte gibt es freilich unter Menschen nicht, wohl aber bei den Göttern. Dagegen ein Gerechtes, welches sich dem Menschen allenthalben durch eigene Kraft, wenn auch nicht mit unwiderstehlicher Nothwendigkeit aufdrängt, besteht allerdings." Hildenbrand's Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie p. 306. After the parenthesis the author resumes the main argument with a flat denial of their conclusion, leaving it to be understood that he demurs to their major—τὸ φύσει ἀκίνητον. If the sentence is not broken up in this way, the words aλλ' ouws seem strangely out of place. δοκεῖ δ ̓ ἐνιόις, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Plat. Laws x. 889 E καὶ δὴ καὶ [sc. φασίν] τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα· τὰ δὲ δίκαια οὐδ ̓ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ ̓ ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα· ἃ δ ̓ ἂν μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ ̓ οὐ δή τινι φύσει. See also [Plat.] Minos 315 A—316 B, quoted by Grant, and N. E. I. 3 § 2. § 4. þúσaɩ yáp, K.T.λ.] Nature intends the right hand to be stronger than the left, but all men may become ambidextrous. In place of πάντας Bekker without remark reads τινάς: but as πάντας is found so far as I know in all the MSS. and gives a good sense, I have, with Fritzsche (who compares M. M. 1. 34 § 21) and Zell, restored it to the text. § 5. ὠνοῦνται—πωλοῦσιν] sc. οἱ ἔμποροι. ὁμοίως δὲ καί, κ.τ.λ.] Human δίκαια [as opposed to the eternal, natural Síkalov] differ, inasmuch as the woλireîaɩ to which they belong are all deviations from the one perfect πολιτεία. § 6. Each law stands to the variety of action included under it in the relation of universal to particulars: cf. Polit. 11. 8. p. 44. 2. καθόλου γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον γραφῆναι, αἱ δὲ πράξεις περὶ τῶν καθ ̓ ἕκαστον eioív. This § and that which follows serve as a transition to another part of the inquiry-the justice and injustice of the individual. § 7. αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο] The editors write τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο in spite of the best MSS. Is the article necessary? This very thing when realized in fact is called an αδίκημα : until it is realized, it is only an ἄδικον.” This statement is qualified in 8 § 2, where we are told that every ἀδίκημα until it is committed is an ἄδικον: but not every ἄδικον when it is committed is an αδίκημα, because, to be an ἀδίκημα, an act must be ἑκούσιον. καλεῖται, κ.τ.λ.] “It is not improbable,” says Grant, “that Eudemus here is correcting the phraseology of Aristotle, who at all events in his Rhetoric, 1. 13 § 1, uses dikaiwμa as the opposite of ἀδίκημα, merely to denote a just action.” See Cope on Rhet. 1. 3 § 9. I have enclosed this sentence within marks of parenthesis to show that the original argument is continued in καθ ̓ ἕκαστον δέ, κ.τ.λ. ὕστερον] I. e. in the Politics, which treatise was evidently intended to include a book or books περὶ νόμων. 8 § 2.] See note on 7 § 7. § 3. πρότερον] The reference is to E. E. II. 9 § 3 ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐφ ̓ ἑαυτῷ ὂν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι ̓ αὑτόν, ἑκούσια ταῦτ ̓ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον τοῦτ ̓ ἐστίν· ὅσα δ ̓ ἀγνοῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀκών, rather than to N. E. III. 1 § 20 ὄντος δ ̓ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι ̓ ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ ̓ ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. Throughout this chapter we are reminded of the Eudemian, rather than of the Nicomachean, investigation of τὸ ἑκούσιον. μήτε δν] Before or after this phrase Bernays (Symb. Philol. Bonn. 1. 304) would add μήτε ὅ, comparing § 6. Would not this addition necessitate the further addition of ὅτι τύπτει καὶ before τίνα in the next clause? The list of particulars whereof ignorance is possible is not always given in full: even in E. E. 11. 9 §§ 1, 2, where we should have expected the lists to be complete, we have in one place εἰδότα ἢ ὂν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα, and in another ἀγνοοῦντι καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὅ. οὗ <ἕνεκα>] Bekker's addition of ἕνεκα appears to be necessary. ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβών, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Ε. Ε. 11. 8 § το ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα τύπτοι τινὰ ἀντιτείνοντος καὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν. On avrov vide supra 5 § 13. ὧν οὐθέν, κ.τ.λ.] So E. E. 11. 8 §§ 4, 5 καθόλου δὲ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν λίθον ἄνω καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενα φέρεσθαι φαμέν. ταῦτα δ ̓ ὅταν κατὰ τὴν φύσει καὶ καθ ̓ αὐτὰ ὁρμὴν φέρηται, οὐ βίᾳ, οὐ μὴν οὐδ ̓ ἑκούσια λέγεται, ἀλλ ̓ ἀνώνυμος ἡ ἀντίθεσις. ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βίᾳ φαμέν. Rassow however (Forschungen p. 95) corrects ὧν οὐθὲν οὔτ ̓ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔθ ̓ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, and Spengel (Aristot. Stud. I. 43) ὧν οὐθὲν ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν. ων § 4. διὰ φόβον] Cf. Ν. Ε. 111. 1 §§ 4-6, where the conclusion is the same, though somewhat differently expressed. § 5. τῶν δὲ ἑκουσίων, κ.τ.λ.] Here, as in E. E. II., actions are classified as Cf. E. E. II. το § 19 ἅμα δ ̓ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς διορίζονται οἳ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια τὰ δ ̓ ἀκούσια τὰ δ ̓ ἐκ προνοίας νομοθετοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ ̓ ἅπτονταί γέ πη τῆς ἀληθείας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει. In N. E. III. I § 13 οὐχ ἑκούσια are interpolated between ἀκούσια and ἑκούσια. § 6. τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν, κ.τ.λ.] The three sorts of βλάβη are ἀτύχημα, ἁμάρτημα, and ἀδίκημα; but ἀδίκημα is afterwards subdivided into simple ἀδίκημα, and ἀδίκημα which implies ἀδικία in the doer. If we further include ὅσα βίαια καὶ μὴ ἐφ ̓ αὑτῷ, we have the following classification: ἀκούσια (α) τὰ βίαια καὶ μὴ ἐφ ̓ αὐτῷ (β) τὰ μετ ̓ ἀγνοίας, ὅταν παραλόγως ἡ ἀτυχήματα ῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας) (γ) τὰ μετ ̓ ἀγνοίας, ὅταν μὴ παραλόγως ἁμαρτήματα The ayvola here mentioned is of course ignorance of the circumstances of the act (τὰ καθ ̓ ἕκαστα), not ignorance of rules (τὰ καθόλου): cf. Ε. Ε. II. 9 §§ 1, 2. Ν. Ε. III. 1 § 15. According to the above Eudemian list the act of the μelówv is ranked under (y), that of the θυμῷ ποιῶν under (δ), and that of the ἐπιβουλεύσας under (ε). In the Rhet. 1. 13. p. 47. 29 ἔστι δ' ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τ ̓ ἐστίν, (γ) and (δ) of the Eudemian list are classed together as ἁμαρτήματα: and in the same way in N. E. III. 1 § 14 the act of the μelúwv and the act of the ὀργιζόμενος are mentioned together as instances of ὅσα μὴ δι ̓ ἄγνοιαν ἀλλ ̓ ἀγνοῶν. Thus the θυμῷ ποιῶν according to Aristotle acts ἀγνοῶν ἀλλ ̓ οὐ δι ̓ ἄγνοιαν : according to Eudemus, εἰδὼς μὲν οὐ προβουλεύσας δέ. For this difference of statement Eudemus prepares us in II. 9 § 3 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἓν μὲν τὸ ἔχειν ἓν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δικαίως <ἂν> ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἔστι δ ̓ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἷον εἰ δι ̓ ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρῆτο. In the Rhet. ad Alexand. (c. 4. p. 24. 4. c. 36. p. 79. 27 Spengel) αδικία is said to be coextensive with τὰ ἐκ προνοίας, ἁμαρτία with τὰ δι ̓ ἄγνοιαν, and ἀτυχία with τὰ δι ̓ ἑτέρους τινὰς ἢ διὰ τύχην : but here τὰ δι ̓ ἄγνοιαν is equivalent to Aristotle's ὅσα ἀγνοῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ δι ̓ ἄγνοιαν. In M. Μ. I. 34 § 25, (γ), (δ), and (e) of Eudemus's list are roughly thrown together under the title of ἀδίκημα: see note on § 7. The Eudemian terminology seems to be based upon that of Attic law : see Antiphon, passim. ἁμαρτήματα] here includes ατυχήματα as well as ἁμαρτήματα in the narrower sense in which the word is used in § 7. ] So Rassow Forschungen p. 61, on the authority of Kb. Although the lists of particulars of which a man may be ignorant are not always the same, (see note on § 3,) it is reasonable to expect consistency in such a passage as the present, where the list occurs three times in the space of five lines. In E. Ε. 11. 9 §§ 1, 2 the particulars are as here, ov, &, o, and où eveka, os being suppressed and or doing duty for the περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι οἱ Ν. Ε. III. 1 § 16. § 7. ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] It is plain that this sentence ought to restate the distinction already drawn between ατύχημα and ἁμάρτημα : but it is difficult to see how ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας—so the MSS. except HaMb (which have κακίας), and all the editors-can be equivalent to μὴ παραλόγως, and ὅταν ἔξωθεν to παραλόγως. Μoreover, ý άpxy rŷs airías is a strange phrase. Hence I have supposed ΑΙΤΙΑΣ to be a corruption of ΑΓΝΟΙΑΣ, and I find the strongest possible confirmation of my conjecture both in the N. E. and in the Μ. Μ. Cf. Ν. Ε. III. 5 § 8 καὶ γὰρ ἐπ ̓ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας: also § 7: and M. Μ. 1. 34 S 27-28 ἔστω δὴ οὗτος ὁ διορισμός· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἄγνοια αἰτία ἢ τοῦ πρᾶξαί τι, οὐχ ἑκὼν τοῦτο πράττει, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖ· ὅταν δὲ τῆς ἀγνοίας αὐτὸς ᾖ αἴτιος, καὶ πράττῃ τι κατὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἧς αὐτὸς αἴτιός ἐστιν, οὗτος ἤδη ἀδικεῖ, καὶ δικαίως αἴτιος ὁ τοιοῦτος κληθήσεται. οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν μεθυόντων· οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες καὶ πράξαντές τι κακὸν ἀδικοῦσιν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγνοίας αὐτοί εἰσιν αἴτιοι· ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτοῖς μὴ πίνειν τοσοῦτον ὥστ ̓ ἀγνοήσαντας τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγνοιῶν ὅσαι μὲν γίνονται δι ̓ αὐτούς, οἱ κατὰ ταύτας ἀδικοῦντες ἄδικοι· ὧν δὲ μὴ αὐτοί εἰσιν αἴτιοι, ἀλλ ̓ ἡ ἄγνοια κἀκείνοις ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς πράξασι τοῦ πράξαι, οὐκ ἄδικοι : and again $ 29 ἡ γὰρ ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ πράττειν ταῦτα, τῆς δ ̓ ἀγνοίας οὐκ αὐτὰ αἴτια. (I have already remarked on § 6 that the ἁμαρτήματα of the present passage are called αδικήματα in the M. Μ.) See also E. E. II. 9 § 3. With this change the sentence becomes perfectly intelligible: it is an drúxnua when the doer does not know and could not have been expected to know, in other words when he is not answerable for his ignorance: but it is an ἁμάρτημα, when he might have been expected to know, in other words when he is answerable for his ignorance, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν μεθυόντων. See Antiphon Tetral. II., especially the defence, in which the father of the accused argues that the fatal accident was caused by the åμapría of the deceased, who ought not to have crossed the target. With the received text the best rendering which I can devise is— 'that is to say, a man åμapráve when the origin of (the ignorance which is) the cause of the wrong is in himself; he άruxeî when it is external to him.' § 8. εἰδώς] Thus ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν is accounted ειδώς. In the N. E. III. I § 14 he is classed with the μεθύων as an ἀγνοῶν: ἕτερον δ ̓ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι ̓ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι ̓ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δέ, ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. See note on § 6. οἷον ὅσα τε, κ.τ.λ.] Ι Thinking that the second ὅσα is the subject οι συμβαίνει, I expunge the commas which Bekker places after πάθη and φυσικά. If the first ὅσα were the subject of συμβαίνει, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις would be unmeaning and superfluous. On the other hand these words are positively necessary to complete the sense of oσa ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά. Cf. § 12 διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρω πικόν. See also Polit. III. Io. p. 75. 3 ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. v. (viii.) 7. p. 142. 32 ὃ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμ |