(4) no one can commit adultery with his own wife, burglary upon his own premises, or theft upon his own property, and without the Commission of some such αδίκημα no one can αδικείν.

Thus in general the dropia is resolved by a reference to the maxim oιθείς εκών αδικείται, established in 9 5, 6.

S 1. εκ των ειρημένων] Ι.e. from 9 8 1–13. τα μεν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. I $ 8. 2 S 6.

ου κελεύει “Does not allow, i.e. forbids. Cf. the well-known use of ουκ εάν as the correlative of κελεύειν. The words & δε μη κελεύει, απαγορεύει are explanatory of the phrase oυ κελεύει. So Victorius, quoted by Cardwell. Eudemus wishes to say— What the law bids is δίκαιον, what the law forbids is άδικον.' Cf. I $ 14 προστάττει δ' ο νόμος και τα του ανδρείου έργα ποιείν, οίον μη λείπειν την τάξιν... ομοίως δε και τα κατά τας άλλας αρετάς και μοχθηρίας, τα μεν κελεύων τα δ' απαγορεύων. Not appreciating this idiomatic use of oύ κελεύω, Grant remarks “The extraordinary assertion is made that “whatever the law does not command it forbids.' We might well ask, Did the Athenian law command its citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, &c.?” This criticism is endorsed by Rassow (Forschungen p. 42), who regards the last section of the book (with the exception of ch. 10) as a very unsatisfactory piece of patchwork.

S 2. όταν, κ.τ.λ.] The words μη αντιβλάπτων are parenthetical. Compare the parenthetical sentence ο γαρ διότι έπαθε και το αυτο αντιποιων ου δοκεί αδικείν in S 5. It is obvious that, in spite of the editors, who place a comma before έκών, εκών should be connected with βλάπτη. It is necessary to specify that ο βλάπτων is έκών, as otherwise he would be, not άδικών, but άδικα πράττων (cf. 983); whilst with αδικεί, εκών is superfluous.

εκων δε ο ειδως και δν και ω] A man is έκών when he does εκούσια, i.e. όσα εφ' εαυτώ ον μη πράττειν πράττει μη αγνοών και δι' αυτόν Ε. Ε. ΙΙ. 9 8 2. Here as elsewhere the definition is abbreviated, as is also the list of circumstances in regard to which ignorance is possible. Cf. 9 88 4, 5.

8 3. ατιμία] For the ατιμίαι of the suicide the commentators quote Aeschin. Ctesiph. $ 244 and Plat. Laws ix. 873 D.

8 4. όλως] Ι.e. κατα την όλην αδικίαν.

τούτο γαρ-άδικεί] These sentences are manifestly parenthetical. They explain the difference between universal and particular justice, and declare the necessity of investigating the atropía with regard to the latter as well as to the former.

8 5. έτι δε εκούσιον τε και εκ προαιρέσεως, και πρότερον] The words εκούσιον τε και εκ προαιρέσεως are not necessary to the argu

Indeed το αδικείν is not necessarily εκ προαιρέσεως : I have therefore translated the phrase 'voluntary or deliberate, and aggressive.'

ο γαρ διότι έπαθε, κ.τ.λ.] ου γαρ άρχει ο θυμό ποιών, αλλ' ο οργίσας.

8 6. προς δε τούτοις, κ.τ.λ.] “If, instead of arguing from our conception of adekia, we examine special cases of it, we come to the same conclusion.'

όλως, κ.τ.λ.] “The maxim oυθείς εκων αδικείται is decisive in both cases of the present απορία.'

S 7, 8. I have placed these SS after 5 $ 18. See Introduction, On dislocations in the text.

8 9. κατα μεταφοραν δε και ομοιότητα] There is a δίκαιον, ουκ αυτώ προς αυτόν, but between the parts of the individual's ψυχή. This dikalov resembles that which subsists between master and slave, or that which subsists between husband and wife. The parts in question are το λόγον έχον and το άλογον, which, as we have seen in 9 SS 5, 6, may be at variance.'

Fritzsche well compares the discussion in E. E. vii. 6 § 1 sqq. περί του αυτον αυτώ φίλον είναι η μή. See especially 88 2, 3 και όμοιον τα τοιαύτα πάντα, ει φίλος αυτός αυτό και εχθρός, και εί αδικεί τις αυτος αυτόν. πάντα γαρ εν δυσι ταύτα και διηρημένοις. ει δε δύο πως και η ψυχή, υπάρχει πως ταύτα: ει δ' ού διηρημένα, ουχ υπάρχει. In these discussions there is an allusion (as all the commentators from Mich. Ephes. downwards have seen) to Plato. See Rep. iv.

. . 443 D, &c. · In the same way in the Gorgias, 491 D, a man is said αυτος εαυτού άρχειν, when his reason controls his επιθυμίαι.

εν τούτοις γαρ τοις λόγοις, κ.τ.λ.] Mich. Ephes. δν λόγον έχει ο δούλος προς <τον> δεσπότην, τον αυτόν και το άλογον μέρος της ψυχής προς το λογιζόμενον. τοιαύτην γαρ διέστηκε ταύτα διάστασιν απ' αλλήλων ώσ<τε> είναι το μεν άρχον το δε αρχόμενον. Thus he makes εν τούτοις τους λόγους διέστηκε equivalent to κατά τούτους τους λόγους δ. Grant translates," for in the theories alluded to there is a separation made

, between the reasonable and the unreasonable part of man's nature :" and Paley understands the sentence in the same way. As here Eudemus compares the relation of λόγον έχον and άλογον to the relations of master and slave, husband and wife, so Aristotle in Polit. 1. 5. p. 7. 2 compares the relation of master and slave to the

relation of volls and õpetis; but whereas Eudemus is careful to say (6 $ 9) that the dikalov of the domestic relations is not identical with πολιτικόν δίκαιον, Aristotle, less precisely, attributes to νους an αρχη πολιτική και βασιλική.

και δοκεί] “People go on to assume.” Cf. Ε. Ε. ΙΙ. 8 38 12, 13 ώστε το μεν βία εκάτερον [sc. the εγκρατής and the άκρατής] φάναι ποιεϊν έχει λόγον, και δια την όρεξιν και δια τον λογισμόν εκάτερον άκοντα ποτέ πράττειν" κεχωρισμένα γαρ όντα εκάτερα εκκρούεται υπ' αλλήλων. όθεν και επί την όλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχήν, ότι των εν ψυχή τι τοιούτον ορώσιν. επί μεν ούν των μορίων ενδέχεται τούτο λέγειν' η δ' όλη εκούσα ψυχή και του άκρατούς και του εγκρατούς πράττει, βία δ' ουδέτερος, αλλά των εν εκείνοις τι, έπει και φύσει αμφότερα έχομεν.

ότι [έν] τούτοις] The preposition seems to me superfuous : : compare είναι προς άλληλα δίκαιόν τι και τούτοις in the next sentence. The sentence evidently means : 'because there may be a struggle between the λόγον έχον and the άλογον ́ (κεχωρισμένα γαρ όντα εκάτερα εκκρούεται υπ' αλλήλων. Ε. Ε. 11. 8 8 12). Thus an όρεξις is loosely and κατα μεταφοράν attributed to the λόγον έχον: strictly speaking, βούλησις, which is όρεξις αγαθού, though determined by the λόγον έχον, belongs to the άλογον, i.e. the φύσις άλογος μετέχουσα μέντοι πη λόγου of N. Ε. Ι. 13 8 15.

ώσπερ ούν άρχοντι και αρχομένω] Cf. Ρlat. Gorg. 491 D. Aristot. Polit. Ι. 13. pp. 20, 2Ι.

68 3. πως μέν ούν έχει, κ.τ.λ.] See Introduction, On dislocations in the text.

το 8 τ. ώστε και επί τα άλλα, κ.τ.λ.] For examples of this vague use of the word éLELKÝS see Berlin Index. Grant aptly quotes 4 $ 3.

το επιεικέστερον ότι βέλτιον δηλούντες] Does this mean (1) meaning by what is επιεικέστερον what is βέλτιον' Or (2) thus indicating that what is επιεικέστερον is βέλτιον? οτέ δε τω λόγω, κ.τ.λ.] There is an apparent inconsistency in

• the statement that το επιεικές παρα το δίκαιόν τι ον επαινετόν έστιν: for if επιεικές is distinct from δίκαιον, and at the same time so commendable a thing, do we not deny the excellence of δίκαιον ? If again we account both επιεικές and δίκαιον excellent, do we not deny that there is any difference between them ?' This must be the meaning of the sentence, but the ordinary text is perplexed by the words ου δίκαιον after ή το επιεικές. I think that Giphanius (on the authority of the V. A.) and Trendelenburg (on conjecture) are

6

с

right in omitting oύ δίκαιον. The words oύ δίκαιον ει are omitted

oủ dikalov. not only by the V. A., but also by Nb. Lambinus reads ñ tò επιεικές ουκ, εί δικαίου άλλο: Michelet and Fritzsche punctuate ή το επιεικές ού, δίκαιον ει άλλο: finally, Ntel suggests ή το επιεικές ου σπουδαίον.

SS 3, 4. Vide Polit, 11. 8. p. 44. 2. III. 10. p. 78. I. 15. p. 87. 6. 16. p. 90. 10 and p. 91. 8. Plat. Polit. 294 A sqq. Laws ix. 875 C sqq.

8 4. τοιαύτη] «Such that it is not possible ορθώς ειπείν καθόλου. § ]

s ' 8 5. δ κάν, κ.τ.λ.] I prefer είπεν το είπoι in this sentence, because it is distinctly assumed that the vouodérys is not present, and therefore does not pronounce.

The tenses are of course quite correct: the lawgiver would pronounce in this manner (a single act in present time) if he were with us (a state in present time), and would have legislated accordingly (a single act in past time) if he had known the circumstances (a state in past time).

8 6. ου του απλώς δε, κ.τ.λ.] του απλώς i. 4. του απλώς δικαίου, 'the just not limited in any particular way': dià tò amics i. 9.

δια το απλώς ειπείν, cf. απλώς ειπών 8 5 and δια το καθόλου infra, because the statement is not limited in any particular way.' I am surprised that the editors do not suspect αμαρτήματος. I should have expected αμαρτάνοντος. The Paraphrast writes δια τούτο η επιείκεια δίκαιον μέν έστι βέλτιον «δέ τινος δικαίου ού του καθόλου δικαίου, αλλά του νομικού του δια το καθόλου αμαρτάνοντος. $ 7. ó molibdivos kavár] “Quando murum construebant non

ο μολύβδινος κανών] ex quadratis et laeuibus, sed ex lapidibus polygoniis, in quibus alia eminerent alia essent concava, ut eiusmodi lapidi aspero et inaequali alium lapidem quam accuratissime (non interiectis lapidibus minoribus) coaptarent, norma utebantur plumbea, qua ad inaequalitatem saxi prioris inflexa, quod aliud saxum polygonium ad prius elegantissime accommodari posset, quaerebant. Eiusmodi accuratissima polygoniorum constructio lapidum est in muro quodam Cyclopio Mycenarum (Paus. II. 16). Cf. Forchhammer. in eph. Allgem. Bauzeitung von Förster, 9. Jahrg. 1844. p. 274. ibid. Förster p. 275: 'Noch jetzt baut man in Verona ähnliche Mauern aus polygonischen Steinen, und die Steinhauer bedienen sich gleichfalls einer beweglichen, aus mehreren Linealen zusammengesetzten Schmiege.'” Fritzsche.

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