(4) no one can commit adultery with his own wife, burglary upon his own premises, or theft upon his own property, and without the commission of some such αδίκημα no one can ἀδικεῖν. Thus in general the dropía is resolved by a reference to the maxim οὐθεὶς ἑκὼν ἀδικεῖται, established in 9 S 5, 6. § 1. Ek Tuν cipηuéror] I. e. from 91-13. τὰ μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] C£ 1 § 8. 2 § 6. ov keλevei] “Does not allow,' i. e. forbids. Cf. the well-known use of οὐκ ἐᾶν as the correlative of κελεύειν. The words ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, απαγορεύει are explanatory of the phrase οὐ κελεύει. So Victorius, quoted by Cardwell. Eudemus wishes to say-'What the law bids is δίκαιον, what the law forbids is ἄδικον. Cf. 1 § 14 προστάττει δ ̓ ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν... ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας, τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ ̓ ἀπαγορεύων. Not appreciating this idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύω, Grant remarks "The extraordinary assertion is made that 'whatever the law does not command it forbids.' We might well ask, Did the Athenian law command its citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, &c.?" This criticism is endorsed by Rassow (Forschungen p. 42), who regards the last section of the book (with the exception of ch. 10) as a very unsatisfactory piece of patchwork. § 2. ὅταν, κ.τ.λ.] The words μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων are parenthetical. Compare the parenthetical sentence ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ávtitolv ov dokeî adɩkeîv in § 5. It is obvious that, in spite of the editors, who place a comma before čκúv, čκúv should be connected with βλάπτῃ. It is necessary to specify that ὁ βλάπτων is ἑκών, as otherwise he would be, not adikŵv, but adiкa πрáttшv (cf. 9 § 3); whilst with ἀδικεῖ, ἑκών is superfluous. ékwv dè ó eidws kaì öv kaì è̟] A man is ékúv when he does ěkovσia, i.ε. ὅσα ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὂν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι' αὐτόν Ε. Ε. II. 9 § 2. Here as elsewhere the definition is abbreviated, as is also the list of circumstances in regard to which ignorance is possible. Cf. 9 $$ 4, 5. § 3. ἀτιμία] For the ἀτιμίαι of the suicide the commentators quote Aeschin. Ctesiph. § 244 and Plat. Laws Ix. 873 D. § 4. ὅλως] I. e. κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδικεῖ] These sentences are manifestly parenthetical. They explain the difference between universal and particular justice, and declare the necessity of investigating the dropía with regard to the latter as well as to the former. § 5. ἔτι δὲ ἑκούσιον τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, καὶ πρότερον] The words ἑκούσιον τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως are not necessary to the argument. Indeed τὸ ἀδικεῖν is not necessarily ἐκ προαιρέσεως : I have therefore translated the phrase 'voluntary or deliberate, and aggressive.' ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε, κ.τ.λ.] οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ ̓ ὁ ὀργίσας. 8 $9. § 6. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, κ.τ.λ.] ‘If, instead of arguing from our conception of ἀδικία, we examine special cases of it, we come to the same conclusion.' ὅλως, κ.τ.λ.] ‘The maxim οὐθεὶς ἑκὼν ἀδικεῖται is decisive in both cases of the present ἀπορία. § 7, 8. I have placed these S' after 5 § 18. See Introduction, On dislocations in the text. § 9. κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα] There is a δίκαιον, οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν, but between the parts of the individual's ψυχή. This Síkalov resembles that which subsists between master and slave, or that which subsists between husband and wife. The parts in question are τὸ λόγον ἔχον and τὸ ἄλογον, which, as we have seen in 9 S$ 5, 6, may be at variance.' Fritzsche well compares the discussion in E. E. vii. 6 § 1 sqq. περὶ τοῦ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μή. See especially §§ 2, 3 καὶ ὅμοιον τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ καὶ ἐχθρός, καὶ εἰ ἀδικεῖ τις αὐτὸς αὑτόν. πάντα γὰρ ἐν δυσὶ ταῦτα καὶ διῃρημένοις. εἰ δὲ δύο πως καὶ ἡ ψυχή, ὑπάρχει πως ταῦτα· εἰ δ ̓ οὐ διῃρημένα, οὐχ ὑπάρχει. In these discussions there is an allusion (as all the commentators from Mich. Ephes. downwards have seen) to Plato. See Rep. IV. 443 D, &c. In the same way in the Gorgias, 491 D, a man is said αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, when his reason controls his ἐπιθυμίαι. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις, κ.τ.λ.] Mich. Ephes. ὃν λόγον ἔχει ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς <τὸν> δεσπότην, τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ λογιζόμενον. τοιαύτην γὰρ διέστηκε ταῦτα διάστασιν ἀπ ̓ ἀλλήλων ὥσ<τε> εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον. Thus he makes ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε equivalent to κατὰ τούτους τοὺς λόγους δ. Grant translates, "for in the theories alluded to there is a separation made between the reasonable and the unreasonable part of man's nature :" and Paley understands the sentence in the same way. As here Eudemus compares the relation of λόγον ἔχον and ἄλογον to the relations of master and slave, husband and wife, so Aristotle in Polit. 1. 5. p. 7. 2 compares the relation of master and slave to the relation of νοῦς and ὄρεξις ; but whereas Eudemus is careful to say (6 § 9) that the δίκαιον of the domestic relations is not identical with πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, Aristotle, less precisely, attributes to νοῦς an ἀρχὴ πολιτικὴ καὶ βασιλική. καὶ δοκεῖ] People go on to assume. Cf. Ε. Ε. 11. 8 §§ 12, 13 ὥστε τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ἑκάτερον [sc. the ἐγκρατής and the ἀκρατής] φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἑκάτερον ἄκοντα ποτὲ πράττειν κεχωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἑκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ ̓ ἀλλήλων. ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχήν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὁρῶσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν· ἡ δ' ὅλη ἑκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατους πράττει, βίᾳ δ ̓ οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφότερα ἔχομεν. ὅτι [ἐν] τούτοις] The preposition seems to me superduous: compare είναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ τούτοις in the next sentence. The sentence evidently means: 'because there may be a struggle between the λόγον ἔχον and the ἄλογον (κεχωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἑκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ ̓ ἀλλήλων. Ε. Ε. 11. 8 § 12). Thus an ὄρεξις is loosely and κατὰ μεταφοράν attributed to the λόγον ἔχον: strictly speaking, βούλησις, which is ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ, though determined by the λόγον ἔχον, belongs to the ἄλογον, i.e. the φύσις ἄλογος μετέ χουσα μέντοι πη λόγου of Ν. Ε. 1. 13 8 15. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ] Cf. Plat. Gorg. 491 D. Aristot. Polit. 1. 13. pp. 20, 21. 6 § 3. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει, κ.τ.λ.] See Introduction, On disloca tions in the text. 10 § 1. ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.] For examples of this vague use of the word επιεικής see Berlin Index. Grant aptly quotes 4 $3. τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες] Does this mean (r) ‘meaning by what is ἐπιεικέστερον what is βέλτιον' or (2) thus indicating that what is ἐπιεικέστερον is βέλτιον ? ὁτὲ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ, κ.τ.λ.] • There is an apparent inconsistency in the statement that τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ἂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν: for if ἐπιεικές is distinct from δίκαιον, and at the same time so commendable a thing, do we not deny the excellence of δίκαιον ? If again we account both ἐπιεικές and δίκαιον excellent, do we not deny that there is any difference between them ?' This must be the meaning of the sentence, but the ordinary text is perplexed by the words οὐ δίκαιον after ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικές. I think that Giphanius (on the authority of the V. A.) and Trendelenburg (on conjecture) are right in omitting οὐ δίκαιον. The words οὐ δίκαιον εἰ are omitted not only by the V. A., but also by Nb. Lambinus reads To ἐπιεικὲς οὐκ, εἰ δικαίου ἄλλο: Michelet and Fritzsche punctuate ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὔ, δίκαιον εἰ ἄλλο: finally, Nötel suggests ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ σπουδαῖον. S$ 3, 4. Vide Polit. II. 8. p. 44. 2. III. 10. p. 78. 1. 15. p. 87. 6. 16. p. 90. 10 and p. 91. 8. Plat. Polit. 294 A sqq. 875 c sqq. Laws IX. § 4. τοιαύτη] ‘Such that it is not possible ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. § 5. δ καν, κ.τ.λ.] I prefer εἶπεν to εἴποι in this sentence, because it is distinctly assumed that the voμolérηs is not present, and therefore does not pronounce. The tenses are of course quite correct the lawgiver would pronounce in this manner (a single act in present time) if he were with us (a state in present time), and would have legislated accordingly (a single act in past time) if he had known the circumstances (a state in past time). § 6. οὐ τοῦ ἁπλῶς δέ, κ.τ.λ.] τοῦ ἁπλῶς i. q. τοῦ ἁπλῶς δικαίου, 'the just not limited in any particular way': dià tò áñλŵs i. q. dia δια τὸ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, cf. ἁπλῶς εἰπών § 5 and διὰ τὸ καθόλου infra, because the statement is not limited in any particular way.' I am surprised that the editors do not suspect ἁμαρτήματος. I should have expected ἁμαρτάνοντος. The Paraphrast writes διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἐπιείκεια δίκαιον μέν ἐστι βέλτιον <δέ> τινος δικαίου· οὐ τοῦ καθόλου δικαίου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ νομικοῦ τοῦ διὰ τὸ καθόλου ἁμαρτάνοντος. § 7. 8 políẞdivos Kaváv] "Quando murum construebant non ex quadratis et laeuibus, sed ex lapidibus polygoniis, in quibus alia eminerent alia essent concava, ut eiusmodi lapidi aspero et inaequali alium lapidem quam accuratissime (non interiectis lapidibus minoribus) coaptarent, norma utebantur plumbea, qua ad inaequalitatem saxi prioris inflexa, quod aliud saxum polygonium ad prius elegantissime accommodari posset, quaerebant. Eiusmodi accuratissima polygoniorum constructio lapidum est in muro quodam Cyclopio Mycenarum (Paus. II. 16). Cf. Forchhammer. in eph. Allgem. Bauzeitung von Förster, 9. Jahrg. 1844. p. 274. ibid. Förster p. 275: 'Noch jetzt baut man in Verona ähnliche Mauern aus polygonischen Steinen, und die Steinhauer bedienen sich gleichfalls einer beweglichen, aus mehreren Linealen zusammengesetzten Schmiege.'" 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