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NOTES.

[In quoting the N. E., the E. E., and the M. M. I have given the chapters and sections of Bekker's Oxford Edition (1837): in quoting the Politics and the Rhetoric I have given the chapter, the page, and the line of Bekker's small Berlin Editions (1855 and 1843 respectively): with these exceptions all references are to the large Berlin Edition.]

I § I. πepì dè Sikaloσúvys, K.T.λ.] In this sentence the questions to be considered in the first half of the book are concisely stated. Cf. 5 88 17-19, where the author recapitulates the results thus far attained, and declares that the questions proposed at the outset have been adequately answered.

§ 2. μélodov] The 'method' comprises the enumeration of the views entertained by the vulgar and by individuals in regard to the subject discussed, the criticism of those views, and the development of an original theory based upon the preliminary investigation. This process, "which, when performed between two disputants, Aristotle calls dialectic debate," is opposed to the strictly "didactic and demonstrative procedure: wherein the teacher lays down principles which he requires the learner to admit, and then deduces from them, by syllogisms constructed in regular form, consequences indisputably binding on all who have admitted the principles." Grote's Aristotle I. 67, 68: see also I. 300 sqq., 378 sqq. The method above described, for which we are prepared in N. E. 1. 4 § 4, 8 § 6, pervades both the Nicomachean and the Eudemian treatise, though it may be thought perhaps that its steps are more precisely discriminated in the latter. Cf. N. E. VII. = Ε. Ε. VI. 1 § 5 δεῖ δ ̓, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώ τατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγ μένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.

§ πρακτικοί] 3. TрактIко] "Muretus vertit propensi ad agendum, cum reliqui vertant apti vel idonei." Zell. From a comparison of E. E. II. I § 23 and II. 5 § I it would appear that these two possible meanings are here to be combined. Cf. Rhet. 1. 9. p. 30. 4. Hence the words καὶ ἀφ ̓ ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια are to be regarded as an explanation of ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσί. The definition of which these words form a part is only a rough, popular definition temporarily and provisionally accepted (διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα). us év TÚTO ÚTOKEίow Tavтa). Cf. 5 § 17, where in recapitulating his results the author is careful to introduce the phrase κатà πроaípeσw, by which his own definition is distinguished from the popular one of the present passage. Thus the use here of the word Bouλovrai ("cf. Plat. Gorg. 460 B, C," Fritzsche) instead of the Aristotelian πроаιроûvтaι is quite appropriate, not, as has been suggested, an Eudemian inaccuracy.

9 S$ 14-16.] On the position of these sections (and of 9 § 17 which I have introduced after § 9 of the present chapter) see Introduction, On dislocations in the text.

δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον] The remark in which these words occur applies to virtuous actions as well as to vicious ones. A virtuous action does not necessarily imply a virtuous eέis, any more than a vicious action a vicious eέis. The example alleged is a liberal action which does not necessarily proceed from λev@epía. Williams translates "to actually deliver a bribe," supposing that vicious actions only are exemplified.

wdi xovras] Cf. N. E. 11. 3 § 3. 'It is not easy, nor does it rest with ourselves at a given time to do a particular act in a given ģis, because time and practice are necessary to the attainment of the is in question, whether virtuous or vicious.' So Mich. Ephes. χρόνου γὰρ χρεία καὶ συνασκήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἕξεων κτήσιν.

9 § 15. ovdev olovraι σopòv elvai] For the phraseology cf. Met. 1. 2. p. 982. a. 10, a place which also resembles the present passage in being part of a collection of voλýves or popular notions.

ἀλλὰ πως πραττόμενα καὶ πως νεμόμενα] On the accentuation of the indefinite us when it is used emphatically see Schwegler on Met. III. 4 § 42.

τοῦτο δὲ πλέον ἔργον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι] I. e. the knowledge of Síkala is more difficult of attainment than that of vóμμa, just as the knowledge of rà laтpiká is more difficult of attainment than that of

(what Plato calls) τὰ πρὸ ἰατρικῆς. This is somewhat curtly expressed in the statement that 'to know Síkala is more difficult than to know τὰ ὑγιεινά. In other words, he who depends upon law for his conception of what is just, no more knows what is just than the apprentice knows surgery, if he understands the application of remedies, but does not know when they are to be applied. Zell appositely cites M. M. 11. 3 § 5 sqq., q. v. See also N. E. x. 9 § 21 and Plat. Phaedr. 268 B, C. 269 A.

πῶς δεῖ νείμαι] Dependent upon εἰδέναι repeated from the preceding clause.

9 § 16. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο] Sc. ὅτι ἐφ ̓ ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, the fundamental error which lies at the root of all the misconceptions discussed in 9 S$ 14-16.

τοῦ δικαίου] The δίκαιος here spoken of is the man of universal justice: hence the notion, that τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶν οὐθὲν ἧττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, is tested in the case of ὁ ἀνδρεῖος as well as in that of ὁ δίκαιος, the man of particular justice.

οὐθὲν ἧττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] Sc. ἢ τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν. Mich. Ephes. and the Paraphrast however supply τοῦ ἀδίκου.

ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν, κ.τ.λ.] For the form of the sentence cf. 9 § 15 supra, ἀλλ ̓ οὐ ταῦτ ̓ ἐστί, κ.τ.λ.

ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδί] ωδί= ἰατρικῶς, or as the Paraphrast puts it, ἕξιν ἰατρικὴν ἔχοντα: cf. N. E. 1. 4 §§ 1, 2 απορήσειε δ ̓ ἂν τις, πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώ φρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ ̓ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου υποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμ ματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ ̓ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικήν.

1 § 4. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτόν, κ.τ.λ.] A reference to this doctrine seems appropriate, if not necessary, after the last of the sections which I have interpolated from ch. 9. This was felt by Mich. Ephes., who says in his comment upon 9 § 16 εἰ δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ ἕξεως ἀδίκου τὰ ἄδικα ποιεῖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστίν, οὐ μόνον οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ δικαίῳ ἀδικεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατον. ὡς γὰρ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τοῦ βιβλίου, αἱ μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι τῶν ἐναντίων εἰσὶν οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ αἱ ἕξεις. The passage before us may be paraphrased as follows: ' the δίκαιος cannot ἀδικεῖν, because he has not got the appropriate ἕξις: for although an ἐπιστήμη or a δύναμις (i. e. the δύναμις μετὰ λόγου of Met. IX. 2. p. 1ο46. b. 2) includes τὰ ἐναντία (and therefore, as we shall see, ἐναντίαι ἕξεις), a

given is does not enable its possessor to conform to the contrary έis; for example, the healthy man cannot do what is characteristic of ill-health (ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μóvov).' That the knowledge of a thing includes the knowledge of its contrary is a Platonic maxim: cf. Plat. Phaed. 97 D ek dè Sn τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ ̓ ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγ καῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν, and Charm. 166 Ε. The doctrine is referred to by Aristotle, Anal. Pr. I. p. 48. b. 4. I. p. 50. a. 19. II. p. 69. b. 9. "The opinion that justice implies its contrary, as if it were an art," says Grant, "would be a consequence of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to and drew out the paradoxical conclusion, Repub. p. 334 A. Hipp. Min. pp. 375, 6. The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (eέis) sets the difficulty at rest.”

Suváμew] With the Aristotelian use of this word cf. Plato's transitional employment of it in Polit. 304 D sqq.

Eέis 8 ý évavтía Tŵv évaνtíwv ov] Rassow (Forschungen p. 95) after Muretus reads ἕξις δ ̓ ἡ αὐτή ; Spengel (on Rhet. II. 19) ἕξις δ' ᾗ ἐναντία. I cannot see that any alteration is necessary. See Translation.

§ 5. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘It follows from what has been said that, though one of two contrary us does not give the power of doing acts characteristic of the other, the knowledge of one is includes the knowledge of the other. Furthermore, έes may be known from their vπoкeíμeva.' These statements are introduced as corollaries of the doctrine of § 4, whilst they materially promote the argument by justifying the joint and simultaneous consideration of δικαιοσύνη, ἀδικία, δίκαιον, ἄδικον.

ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων]

άπо τŵν VπокEιμévwv] "As we might say 'from its facts,' the VTTоKEίμEVα being the singular instances in which a general notion is manifested. The meaning is, that τὰ δίκαια are to δικαιοσύνη as good symptoms are to good health." Grant. It would appear however from the statement subsequently made—that ‘Tò Evektɩkóv is Tò ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί’—that τὰ ὑποκείμενα include not merely manifestations and symptoms of the eέis in question, but also its causes and conditions. In fact the υποκείμενα of ύγίεια (to take a particular example) are và vyavá in the various kindred senses of φυλακτικά, ποιητικά, σημαντικά, and δεκτικὰ τῆς ὑγιείας. For these senses of viewvá cf. Met. III. 2. p. 1003. a. 34. X. 3. p.

1061. a. 5.

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Top. I. 15. p. 106. b. 35. The word voкeíμeva is similarly used to mean "res singulas notioni subjectas" (Bonitz) in Met. 1. 2. p. 982. a. 23. In order to avoid including 'things which produce good condition' amongst the vπokeiμeva of eveέía, Zell, after Muretus, takes εὐεκτικά to mean 66 corpora ipsa bene habita." See however the passage which Zell himself quotes for another purpose from Top. v. 7. p. 137. α. 3 οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἔχει ἰατρός τε πρὸς τὸ ποιητικὸς ὑγιείας εἶναι καὶ γυμναστής (not the athlete, but the trainer) πρὸς τὸ ποιητικὸς εὐεξίας, κ.τ.λ., whence it would appear that τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί (and therefore τὸ εὐεκτικόν) is that which produces eveέía, not that which exhibits it.

ἐάν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Polit. viii. (v.) 8. p. 210. 3 εἴπερ ἔχομεν δι' ὧν φθείρονται αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἔχομεν καὶ δι ̓ ὧν σώζονται· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τἀναντία ποιητικά, φθορὰ δὲ σωτηρίᾳ ἐναντίον. See also Polit. VIII. (v.) 11. p. 223. 17. Here as in other places rè yáp means no more than yáp or kai yáp: see Shilleto on Demosth. F. L. 391 (critical note), and Berlin Index s. v. Té. (Cf. x. 7 § 2, where the editors, not understanding this use of rè yáp, have placed a comma, instead of a full stop, after orɩoûv to the destruction of the argument. Rassow's Forschungen p. 134.) Of course eveέía must not be confounded with vieía: eveέía is “bona corporis habitudo," not "bona constitutio": see Zell.

§ 6. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] This qualifying phrase is introduced to meet such cases as that of φιλεῖν, which in the sense of τοῖς χείλεσιν ἀσπάLeola has no correlative: cf. Top. 1. 15. p. 106. b. 2, quoted by Mich. Ephes. on woλλáκis above.

εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία] τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία: Ha Mb Nb Ob εἰ τὸ

So Lb: Kb Pb read εἰ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.

This last reading is adopted by Bekker. But in § 5 it has been stated (1) that if we know one of two evavríai ëģes we can infer the other, and (2) that if we know тà væоkeiμeva we can infer the corresponding ἕξις, and the example derived from γυμναστική (cf. II § 7) is framed accordingly. It would seem then that the statement of § 6 has reference to both pairs of correlatives, and therefore that we should prefer the reading of Lb, which unites that of Kb Pb on the one hand and that of the remaining MSS. on the other. For an application of the principle here laid down cf. Polit. viii. (v.) 9. p. 214. 4 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτὸν τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι διαφοράς.

§ 7. λανθάνει] The subject to λανθάνει is ἡ ὁμωνυμία (' the equi

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