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'The statement

§ 9. ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνών] See note on 4 § 12. already made in regard to the arts of the builder and the shoemaker holds generally of all the arts.' (The remark is hardly necessary, but cf. Polit. 1. 9. p. 13. 22 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων. ΙΙΙ. 11. p. 76. 20 ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας Kaì Téxvas.) 'They would fall into disuse if there were no exchange, and in order that an exchange may take place, some method of equalizing unequal wares is required, exchange being between members of different trades or professions, whose wares are necessarily unlike.'

καὶ τέχνας.)

ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] This sentence is written and punctuated by the editors thus: ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον, and is understood to mean "for they would have been destroyed if there had not been the producer producing so much, and of a certain kind, and the consumer (τò πάσɣov) consuming just the same quantity and quality" (Grant). Accepting this interpretation I formerly suggested (Fournal of Philology 1872, IV. 318), the insertion of ô before èrroíel, a conjecture which Rassow had anticipated. But on further consideration I find myself wholly unable to harmonize the sentence, as it is ordinarily punctuated and interpreted, with the main argument. It is true that "the arts would perish if there were no demand for their products:" but how does this tend to prove the necessity and importance of the principle of proportionate exchange? Moreover the terms Tolov and wάoxov (which as Grant himself says "may probably have some reference to the avтITETоv@ós") imply that the 2/_reciprocity of the transaction is what we are here concerned with.

The sense required is then 'for the arts would fall into disuse if the article manufactured by A and received in exchange by B were not somehow equated with the article manufactured by B and received in exchange by A. Cf. § 1ο τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. This meaning I try to get by changing the punctuation, and making TOUTO the subject, instead of the object, of eñaσxe: ávypoûvto yàp av, ei μǹ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν, καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον καὶ τὸ πάσχον (subaud. πάσχει), ἔπασχε τοῦτο (i. e. τὸ ποιοῦν) καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον· οὐ γάρ, κ.τ.λ. ‘for the arts would perish, if the producer did not produce, and did not in return for his produce receive from the recipient of it an exact equivalent, quantity and quality being taken into account; [an equivalent, not an article precisely similar,] because two of a trade have no occasion to exchange their wares.'. Rassow, understanding the drift of the passage as I do, and admitting that it would be

clearer if for ἔπασχε we had ἀντεποίει οἱ ἀνταπεδίδου, nevertheless thinks the insertion of % the only change which is necessary: "Man muss nur bedenken, dass, wie es bei dem åντɩmeñovlós nöthig ist, beide Theile geben und empfangen, dass also das otov auch ein πάσχον und das πάσχον auch ein ποιοῦν ist.” Forschungen p. 18. I should have thought that he would have found further change necessary, either (with Trendelenburg) the omission of rò before πάσχον, or the omission of τὸ πάσχον, or the substitution of ἐποίει for maσxe. I do not of course pretend that the text naturally and properly bears the meaning which I have endeavoured to extract from it; but rather suspect that there is a lacuna after ¿oíeɩ, and that the sentence ought to run in some such way as this: ảvypoûvro yàp ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει <τὸ πάσχον ὅσον καὶ οἷον ποιεῖ> τὸ ποιοῦν, καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον καὶ τὸ πάσχον, ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.

§ 1ο. διὸ πάντα συμβλητά, κ.τ.λ.] From this point the chapter abounds in repetitions. Nötel (Quaest. Aristot. Spec. p. 28) would condemn §§ 11, 12. Rassow again finds in §§ 10-16 three distinct statements of the same matter; the first being contained in § 10 Siò πάντα συμβλητα—οὐκ ἔσται, the second in §§ 1-14 δεῖ ἄρα ἑνί τινι μένειν μᾶλλον, and the third in §§ 14-16 διὸ δεῖ πάντα-πέντε κλῖναι. The difficulty is also discussed by Imelmann, Observat. Crit. p. 35 sqq. Certainly the chapter would gain in perspicuity if § 1116 were rejected. The remarks upon currency, both as to thought and as to expression, recal Plat. Rep. II. 371 B. Laws XI. 918 B. Polit. 289 E.

§ II. OVK σTai allay] These words apply to the former of the two cases mentioned (εἰ μηθὲν δέοιντο); ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή to the latter (ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως).

OTI Où púσEL, K.T.λ.] Cf. Polit. 1. 9. p. 14. 28 sqq.

§ 12. εἰς σχῆμα δ ̓ ἀναλογίας, κ.τ.λ.] I have materially altered the punctuation of this sentence which is usually printed thus: eis σχῆμα δ ̓ ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας ἕξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον. ἀλλ ̓ ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ ̓ αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς A, K.T.λ. As I understand this difficult passage, it is a warning that the terms of the bargain must be determined by the ordinary process of higgling, before the exchange takes place, that is, during the continuance of the mutual demand, cf. § 11: e.g. A must arrange with B, before the transfer is effected, how many pairs of shoes the latter is to give him in return for a house. If A

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accepts one pair of shoes on account, trusting that B will subse quently make up to him the market value of the house, and B takes advantage of A's negligence, it is no longer an affair of commercial justice, but of corrective justice, which, as has been pointed out in 2 SS 12, 13 and in 4 § 1, plays a part in the rectification of voluntary transactions such as πρᾶσις, ὠνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρῆσις, παρακαταOnkη, μíolwois, as well as in the rectification of involuntary transactions such as κλοπή, μοιχεία, κ.τ.λ. In the case supposed A has now

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got one pair of shoes only, whilst B has got a house worth x pairs of shoes, and x- I pairs of shoes into the bargain. Hence A has x - I pairs of shoes less than his just right, B has x - 1 pairs of shoes more than his just right. Thus B has the advantage of A to the extent of 2 (x 1) pairs of shoes: in the language of our author 'B has both superiorities.' If then the time for arranging the terms of the bargain is allowed to pass by, the two parties to the transaction are to be regarded as two extremes, one of which exceeds the mean by as much as the mean exceeds the other: the reciprocal proportion of commercial justice must therefore be supplemented by the arithmetical propors tion of corrective justice. The words to etepov åкpov point unmistakeably to this interpretation, since A and B cannot possibly be regarded as extremes in the proportion A : B :: D: C. For orav xwoι rà avrov the commentators refer to 4 §§ 8, 14, forgetting that, whereas by corrective justice each recovers his own, commercial justice is attained when each surrenders his own (cf. § 8 deî..............aŮTÒV ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τοῦ αὐτοῦ). It seems to me clear that in the present passage these words are antithetical to orav åλλáğwvrai, and mean 'before they have delivered up their respective wares.' H. Richards anticipates me in referring to 4 SS 10-12 for the explanation of ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς and τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον (Fournal of Philology 1872, IV. 150), but interprets otherwise.

§ 13. οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ, κ.τ.λ.] Bekker reads ἐξαγωγῆς with Kb, and places a comma after olvov. We must then construe: 'whereas when B wants what A has, wine for example, they exchange; that is, A gives it to him in return for the privilege of exporting corn.' But (1) the separation of the words οἷον οἴνου from διδόντες, κ.τ.λ., which this reading involves, is surely an unnecessary complication of a sentence already harsh enough; and (2) I conceive that the weight, as well as the bulk, of the MS. authority is against έaywys. For ὥσπερ with ἀλλάττονται understood from οὐκ ἀλλάττονται in the main sentence, as they do when,' 'whereas they do exchange when,' see

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Berlin Index. In the present instance the construction is all the harsher because Sidóvres belongs grammatically to both the parties concerned, whereas in sense it refers only to one of them. For autós used to distinguish the person chiefly thought of from the other person concerned (τις), cf. 8 § 3 ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα AUTOû, K.T.λ. The same illustration of exchange occurs in Polit. 1. 9. p. 14. 3 οἷον οἶνον πρὸς σῖτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες. ἐξαγωγή is commonly translated here 'an export': but the passages referred to in the Berlin Index seem to show that it is 'the privilege of exporting.' Cf. Theophr. Tepì aλačoveías.

§ 14. μηδὲν δεῖται] plied from δέηταί τις.

Apparently the subject of δεῖται is τιs sup

δεῖ, κ.τ.λ.] Rassow's conjecture, ἀεὶ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι ἔσται Aaßeiv, is tempting.

§ 15. οἰκία, κ.τ.λ.] • The house A and the bed I are, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, incommensurable; but their values may be compared πpos Tv Xpeíav, and expressed in minas. Now if the house is worth 5 minas and the bed 1, 5 beds = 1 house: and in primitive times, before currency was invented, the terms of the contract were formulated in this way.'

§ 16. Kλîva] Rassow (Forschungen p. 94) conjectures kλívas: "denn das unpersönliche diapépei hat entweder einen indirecten Fragesatz oder Infinitive nach sich." I have allowed the text to stand, thinking that diapépe is used personally, its subject being the whole phrasekλîvaɩ, K.T.λ., and that in that phrase a participle, not an infinitive, is suppressed.

17-19. In these sections the investigation of the questions proposed in 1 § I is concluded, and its results are summarized. It remains in the second half of the book to distinguish particular kinds οἱ δίκαιον and ἄδικον, to investigate δίκαιον and ἄδικον as exhibited by individuals, to discuss certain supplementary dropía, and to determine the relations subsisting between justice and éπieίkela.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη, κ.τ.λ.] With Rassow I have inserted τις after μeσórηs (Kb Lb Pb), and dè after auróv (Kb Lb Ob Pb), and substituted Mais for πрóтeроv (Kb Lb Pb). For the form of the sen. tence cf. 10 §§ 3, 6.

ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν] The original theory of αρετή as a μεσότης is here virtually admitted to be a failure so far as justice is concerned. Nevertheless in the E. E. II. 3 § 4 κέρδος, ζημία, and δίκαιον stand side by side with ἀσωτία, ανελευθερία, ἐλευθεριότης.

text.

Kai wσTEр, K.T.A.] See Introduction, On dislocations in the

§ 18. τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ ̓ ἀναλογίαν] This genitive is not anacoluthic, as it belongs to the main sentence, and is regularly governed by διανεμητικός.

ἡ δ ̓ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον, κ.τ.λ.] I. e. ἡ δ ̓ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον [ἐστὶ καθ ̓ ἣν ὁ ἄδικος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν] τοῦ ἀδίκου.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, κ.τ.λ.] The statement made in the preceding sentence, that e avroû the unjust man assigns an unduly large share of what is advantageous and an unduly small share of what is harmful, from the nature of the case does not apply éπì tŵv äλλwv, i. e. when he does not himself take a share in the distribution.'

II §§ 7, 8. See Introduction, On dislocations in the text. In § 7 I have bracketed kaì wʊπep—yvμvaσtɩKŶ (vide supra, 5 § 17), and added ἐν οἷς δ ̓ ἀδικία—ἀδικία from 6 § 4. If I am right in making the second of these alterations, perhaps I ought to go a step further and write yap for d. The sense of the passage is as follows: 'adikeîobaɩ and al adɩkeîv are both bad, because, as has been shown, they are deviations from the mean; but adɩkeîv is the worse of the two, since it implies κακία, κακία which is either τελεία καὶ ἁπλῶς (if the act is ἐκ προαιρέσεως), or nearly so (if the act, though not ἐκ προαιρέσεως, is ἑκού σιον). Of course ἀδικεῖσθαι may be κατὰ συμβεβηκός the greater evil, because of its possible results.' Cf. E. E. 11. 10 SS 18, 19 for the distinction between προαιρετόν and ἑκούσιον, of which we shall hear more in the sequel. For the doctrine that it is worse adɩkeîv adikeîolai, see Plat. Gorg. 469 C, 508 B.

6 SS 1-3. See Introduction, On dislocations in the text.

6 § 4.] Hitherto we have been considering Tò árλŵs díkαιov, i. e. that which is characteristic of the virtue called dukatoσúvn, irrespective of the koivovía in which it is exhibited. Our statements are therefore true κałóλov,—of a trading company or a household as well as of a Tóλis-though our illustrations have been drawn for the most part from the political κοινωνία. We must now say something of δίκαιον as it presents itself in different kovovía: and of these species of δίκαιον, τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, i.e. the δίκαιον of a community of free and equal citizens, is the most perfect representation of тò dλŵs Síkalov [and moreover concerns us most nearly, as this treatise is preparatory to a treatise on politics]. Other species of díkalov are τὸ δεσποτικόν, το πατρικόν, and τὸ οἰκονομικόν, which differ from το

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