maxims of the government and fundamental laws of the state, and perpetuated itself amongst the people, but without les sening in the least their ardour for war.

The ancient glory of the nation, which had always distin guished itself by military bravery, was a powerful motive for not degenerating from the reputation of their ancestors. The famous battle of Marathon, wherein they had sustained alone the shock of the barbarians, and gained a signal victory over them, infinitely heightened their courage; and the battle of Salamin, in the success of which they had the greatest share, raised them to the highest pitch of glory, and rendered them capable of the greatest enterprises.

A noble emulation not to give place in point of merit to Sparta, the rival of Athens, and a lively jealousy of their glory, which during the war with the Persians contained itself within due bounds, were another strong incentive to the Athenians, who every day made new efforts to excel themselves, and sustain their reputation.

The rewards and honours granted to those who had distinguished themselves in battle; the monuments erected in me mory of the citizens who had died in the defence of their country; the funeral orations publicly pronounced in the midst of the most august religious ceremonies, to render their names immortal; all conspired infinitely to enternise the valour of both nations, and particularly of the Athenians, and to make fortitude a kind of law and indispensable necessity to them.

* Athens had a law, by which it was ordained, that those who had been maimed in the war, should be maintained at the expence of the public. The same grace was granted to the fathers and mothers, as well as the children of such as had fal len in battle, and left their families poor, and not in a condition to subsist themselves. The republic, like a good mother, ge nerously took them into her care, and, with great regard to them, supplied all the duties, and procured all the relief they could have expected from those whose loss they deplored.

This exalted the courage of the Athenians, and rendered their troops invincible, though not very numerous. In the battle of Platea, where the army of th. barbarians, command. ed by Mardonius, consisted of no less than 300,000 men, and the united forces of the Greeks of only 108,200 men, there were in the latter only 10,000 Lacedæmonians, of which one half were Spartans, that is to say, inhabitants of Sparta, and 8000 Athenians. It is true, each Spartan brought with him seven helots, which made in all 35,000 men; but they were scarce ever reckoned as soldiers.

* Plut. in Sol. p. 96. Ib. in Menex. p. 248, 249. Diog. Laert. in Sol. p. 37.

This shining merit in point of martial valour, generally ac knowledged by the other states and people, did not suppress in their minds all sentiments of envy and jealousy, as appeared once in relation to the Lacedæmonians. The allies, who were very much superior to them in number, were in pain to see themselves subjected to their order, and murmured against it in secret. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, without seeming to have any knowledge of their disgust, assembled the whole army; and after having made all the allies sit down on one side, and the Lacedæmonians by themselves on the other, he caused proclamation to be made by an herald, that all smiths, masons, carpenters, and so on through the other trades, should rise up. Almost all the allies did so, and not one of the Lacedæmonians, to whom all trades were prohibited. Agesilaus then smiling, "You see," said he, "how many more soldiers Sparta fur"nishes than all the rest of the allies together;" thereby intimating, that to be a good soldier it was necessary to be only a soldier; that trades diverted the artisan from applying himself wholly to the profession of arms and the science of war, and prevented his succeeding so well in it as those who made it their sole business and exercise. But Agesilaus spoke and acted in that manner from the prejudice of his opinion in favour of the Lacedæmonian education; for indeed those whom he was for having considered only as simple artisans, had well demonstrated in the glorious victories they had obtained over the Persians, and even Sparta itself, that they were by no means inferior to the Lacedæmonians, entirely soldiers as they were, either in valour or military knowledge.

SECTION III.

OF THE DIFFERENT KIND OF TROOPS WHICH COMPOSED THE ARMIES OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS

AND ATHENIANS.

THE armies both of Sparta and Athens were composed of four sorts of troops, citizens, allies, mercenaries, and slaves. The soldiers were sometimes marked in the hand, to distinguish them from the slaves, who had that character impressed upon their forehead. Interpreters believe, that in allusion to this double manner of marking, it is said in the Revelation, that an were obliged to receive the mark of the beast in their right "hand, or in their foreheads ;" and that St. Paul says of himself, "I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus." The citizens of Lacedæmonia were of two sorts, either those who inhabited Sparta itself, and who for that reason were called Spartans, or those who lived in the country. In Lycurgus's. time, the Spartans amounted to 9000, and the others to 30,000. * Rev, xiii, 16. + Gal. vi. 17.

This number seems to have been somewhat diminished in the time of Xerxes, as Demaratus, speaking to him of the Lacedæmonian troops, computes only 8000 Spartans. The latter were the flower of the nation; and we may judge of the value they set upon them, by the anxiety the republic expressed for 300 or 400, besieged by the Athenians in the small island of Sphacteria, where they were taken prisoners. The Lacedæmonians generally spared the troops of their country very much, and sent only a few of them into the armies. When a Lacedæmonian general was asked how many Spartans there were in the army, he answered, “As many as are necessary "to repulse the enemy." They served the state at their own expence, and it was not till after a length of time that they received pay from the public.

The greatest number of the troops in the two republics were composed of the allies, who were paid by the cities which sent them.

The foreign troops in the pay of the republic, to the aid of which they were called in, were styled mercenaries.

The Spartans never marched without helots, and we have seen that in the battle of Plataea every citizen had seven. I do not believe this number was fixed, nor do I well comprehend for what service they were designed. It would have been very ill policy to have put arms into the hands of so great a number of slaves, generally much discontented with their masters harsh treatment of them, and who in consequence had every thing to fear from them in a battle. Herodotus, however, in the passage I have cited from him, represents them carrying arms in the field, as light-armed soldiers.

The infantry consisted of two kinds of soldiers. The one were heavy armed, and carried great bucklers, lances, halfpikes, and scimitars. The other were light armed, that is to say, with bows and slings. They were commonly placed in the front of the battle, or upon the wings, as a first line, to shoot their arrows, and Ring their javelins and stones at the enemy; and when they had discharged, they retired through the intervals behind the battalions as a second line, and continued their volleys.

* Thucydides, in describing the battle of Mantinæa, divides the Lacedæmonian troops in this manner: There were seven regiments of four companies cach, without including the squirites, to the number of 600; these were horsemen, of whom I shall soon speak further. The company consisted, according to the Greek interpreter, of 128 men, and was subdivided into four platoons, each of 32 men; so that a regiment amounted to 512 men; and the seven made together 3584. Each platoon had four men in front, and eight in depth; • Lib. v. p. 390.

for that was the usual depth of the files, which the officers. might change according to occasion.

The Lacedæmonians did not actually begin to use cavalry till after the war with Messene, where they perceived their want of it. They raised their horse principally in a small city not far from Lacedæmon, called Sciros, from whence these troops were denominated scirites, or squirites. They were always on the extremity of the left wing, and this was their post by right.

Cavalry was still more rare amongst the Athenians: the situation of Attica, broken with abundance of mountains, was the cause of this. It did not amount, after the war with the Persians, which was the time when the prosperity of Greece was at the highest, to more than 300 horse; but increased afterwards to 1200: a small body for so powerful a republic. I have already observed, that amongst the ancients, as well Greeks as Romans, no mention is made of the stirrup, which is very surprising. They threw themselves nimbly on horseback,

-Corpora saltu

Subjiciunt in equos

Æn. 1. xi. ver. 287.

"And with a leap sit steady on the horse."

Sometimes the horse, broke early to that kind of manage, would stoop down before, to give his master the opportunity of mounting with more ease:

Inde inclinatus collum, submissus et armos De more, inflexis præbebat scandere terga Cruribus. Sil. Ital. de equo Cœlii. Equ. Rom. Those whom age or weakness rendered heavy, made use of a servant in mounting on horsekack in which they imitated the Persians, with whom it was the common custom. Gracchus caused fine stones to be placed on each side of the great roads of Italy, at certain distances from one another, to help travellers to get on horseback without the assistance of any body

*

I am surprised that the Athenians, expert as they were in the art of war, did not distinguish that the cavalry was the most essential part of an army, especially in battles; and that some of their generals did not turn their attention that way, as Themistocles did in regard to maritime affairs. Xenophon was well capable of rendering them a like service in respect to the cavalry, of the importance of which he was perfectly apprised. He wrote two treatises upon this subject, one of which regards the care it is necessary to take of horses, and how to understand and break them; to which he adds the

+ Lib. v. P.

390.

* "Αναβολές μὴ διομένος. This word αναβολέας, signifies a servant, who helped his master to mount on horseback.

exercise of the squadron; both well worth the reading of all who profess arms. In the latter he states the means of placing the cavalry in honour, and lays down rules upon the art military in general, which might be of very great use to all those who are designed for the trade of war.

I have wondered, in running over this second treatise, to see with what care Xenophon, a soldier and a pagan, recommends the practice of religion, a veneration for the gods, and the necessity of imploring their aid upon all occasions. He repeats this maxim in thirteen different places of a tract, in other respects brief enough; and rightly judging that these religious insinuations might give some people offence, he makes a kind of apology for them, and concludes the piece with a reflection, which I shall repeat entire in this place. "If any one," says he, "wonders that I insist so much here upon the necessity of "not forming any enterprise without first endeavoring to ren"der the Divinity favourable and propitious, let him reflect, “that there are in war a thousand unforeseen and obscure con"junctures, wherein the generals, vigilant to take advantages, "and lay ambuscades for each other, from the uncertainty of "an enemy's motions, can take no other council than that of "the gods. Nothing is doubtful or obscure with them. They "unfold the future to whomsoever they please, on the inspec❝tion of the entrails of beasts, by the singing of birds, by vis ❝ions, or in dreams. Now we may presume that the gods "are more inclined to illuminate the minds of such as consult "them not only in urgent necessities, but who at all times, "and when no dangers threaten them, render them all the "homage and adoration of which they are capable."

It became this great man to give the most important of instructions to his son Gryllus, to whom he addresses the treatise we mention, and who, according to the common opinion, was appointed to discipline the Athenian cavalry.

SECTION IV.

OF MARITIME AFFAIRS, FLEETS, AND NAVAL FORCES. If the Athenians were inferior to the Lacedæmonians in respect to cavalry, they carried it infinitely against them in naval affairs; and we have seen their abilities that way make them masters at sea, and give them a great superiority to all the other states of Greece. As this subject is very necessary to the understanding many passages in this history, I shall treat it more extensively than other matters, and shall make great use of what the learned father Don Bernard de Montfaucon has said of it in his books upon antiquity.

The principal parts of a ship, were the prow or head, the