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"one number is said to contain another; but it is virtually or "potentially that the more general idea contains the less general. "In this way the genus contains the species; for the genus 66 may be predicated of every species under it, whether existing or not existing; so that virtually it contains all the spe"cieses under it, which exist or may exist. And not only does "the more general contain the less general, but (what at first

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sight may appear surprising) the less general contains the "more general, not virtually or potentially, but actually. Thus, "the genus animal contains virtually man, and every other spe"cies of animal either existing, or that may exist: But the ge"nus animal is contained in man, and in other animals actually; for man cannot exist without being in actuality, and not potentially only, an animal*.”

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If we have recourse to Dr Gillies for a little more light upon this question, we shall meet with a similar disappointment. According to him, the meaning of the phrases in question is to be sought for in the following definition of Aristotle: "To say "that one thing is contained in another, is the same as saying,

* Ancient Metaphysics, Vol. IV. p. 73.

For the distinction betwixt containing potentially and actually, Lord Monboddo acknowledges himself indebted to a Greek author then living, Eugenius Diaconus. (Anc. Met. Vol. IV. p. 73.) Of this author we are elsewhere told, that he was a Professor in the Patriarch's University at Constantinople; and that he published, in pure Attic Greek, a system of logic, at Leipsic, in the year 1766. (Origin and Progress of Language, Vol. I. p. 45, 2d edit.) It is an extraordinary circumstance, that a discovery, on which, in Lord Monboddo's opinion, the whole truth of the syllogism depends, should have been of so very recent a date.

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"that the second can be predicated of the first in the full ex"tent of its signification; and one term is predicated of ano"ther in the full extent of its signification, when there is no particular denoted by the subject, to which the predicate "does not apply*.' In order, therefore, to make sure of Aristotle's idea, we must substitute the definition instead of the thing defined; that is, instead of saying that one thing is contained in another, we must say, that "the second can be predi"cated of the first in the full extent of its signification." In this last clause, I give Aristotle all the advantage of Dr Gillies's very paraphrastical version; and yet, such is the effect of the comment, that it at once converts our axiom into a riddle. I do not say that, when thus interpreted, it is altogether unintelligible; but only that it no longer possesses the same sort of evidence which we ascribed to it, while we supposed that one

Gillies's Aristotle, Vol. I. p. 73. "This remark (says Dr Gillies) which is the foun"dation of all Aristotle's logic, has been sadly mistaken by many. Among others, Dr "Reid accuses Aristotle of using as synonymous phrases, the being in a subject, and "the being truly predicated of a subject; whereas the truth is, that, according to Aris"totle, the meaning of the one phrase is directly the reverse of the meaning of the "other."

Ibid.

While I readily admit the justness of this criticism on Dr Reid, I must take the liberty of adding, that I consider Reid's error as a rere oversight, or slip of the pen. That he might have accused Aristotle of confounding two things which, although different in fact, had yet a certain degree of resemblance or affinity, is by no means impossible but it is scarcely conceivable, that he could be so careless as to accuse him of confounding two things which he invariably states in direct opposition to each other. I have not a doubt, therefore, that Reid's idea was, that Aristotle used, as synonymous phrases, the being in a thing, and the being a subject of which that thing can be truly predicated; more especially, as either statement would equally well have answered his purpose.

thing was said by the logician to be contained in another, in the same sense in which a smaller box is contained in a greater*.

To both comments the same observation may be applied; that, the moment a person reads them, he must feel himself disposed to retract his assent to the axiom which they are brought to elucidate; inasmuch as they must convince him, that what appeared to be, according to the common signification of words, little better than a truism, becomes, when translated into the jargon of the schools, an incomprehensible, if not, at bottom, an unmeaning ænigma.

I have been induced to enlarge, with more minuteness than I could have wished, on this fundamental article of logic, that I might not be accused of repeating those common-place generalities which have, of late, been so much complained of by Aristotle's champions. I must not, however, enter any farther into the details of the system; and shall therefore proceed, in the next section, to offer a few remarks of a more practical nature, on the object and on the value of the syllogistic art.

It is worthy of observation, that Condillac has availed himself of the same metaphorical and equivocal word which the foregoing comments profess to explain, in support of the theory which represents every process of sound reasoning as a series of identical propositions. "L'Analyse est la même dans toutes les sciences, parce que dans toutes elle "conduit du connu à l'inconnu par le raisonnement, c'est-à-dire, par une suite de juge"mens qui sont renfermés les uns dans les autres." La Logique.

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SECTION II.

General Reflections on the Aim of the Aristotelian Logic, and on the intellectual Habits which the study of it has a tendency to form. That the improvement of the power of reasoning ought to be regarded as only a secondary Object in the culture of the Understanding.

THE remarks which were long ago made by Lord Bacon on the inutility of the syllogism as an organ of scientific discovery, together with the acute strictures in Mr Locke's Essay on this form of reasoning, are so decisive in point of argument, and, at the same time, so familiarly known to all who turn their attention to philosophical inquiries, as to render it perfectly unnecessary for me, on the present occasion, to add any thing in support of them. I shall, therefore, in the sequel, confine myself to a few very general and miscellaneous reflections on one or two points overlooked by these eminent writers; but to which it is of essential importance to attend, in order to estimate justly the value of the Aristotelian logic, considered as a branch of education*.

* To some of my readers it may not be superfluous to recommend, as a valuable supplement to the discussions of Locke and Bacon concerning the syllogistic art, what has been since written on the same subject, in farther prosecution of their views, by Dr Reid in his Analysis of Aristotle's Logic, and by Dr Campbell in his Philosophy of Rhetoric.

It is an observation which has been often repeated since Bacon's time, and which, it is astonishing, was so long in forcing itself on the notice of philosophers, That, in all our reasonings about the established order of the universe, experience is our sole guide, and knowledge is to be acquired only by ascending from particulars to generals; whereas the syllogism leads us invariably from universals to particulars, the truth of which, instead of being a consequence of the universal proposition, is implied and presupposed in the very terms of its enunciation. The syllogistic art, therefore, it has been justly concluded, can be of no use in extending our knowledge of nature*.

On this point it would be a mere waste of time to enlarge, as it has been of late explicitly admitted by some of the ablest advocates for the Organon of Aristotle. "When "Mr Locke, (I quote the words of a very judicious and acute logician) when Mr "Locke says 'I am apt to think, that he who should employ all the force of his rea"son only in brandishing of syllogisms, will discover very little of that mass of know"ledge, which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses of nature;'-he expresses him"self with needless caution. Such a man will certainly not discover any of it. And if "any imagined, that the mere brandishing of syllogisms could increase their knowledge, "(as some of the schoolmen seemed to think) they were indeed very absurd." (Commentary on the Compendium of Logic used in the University of Dublin. By the Rev. John Walker. Dublin 1805.)

To the same effect, it is remarked, by a later writer, with respect to Lord Bacon's assertion," that discoveries in Natural Philosophy are not likely to be promoted by "the engine of syllogism;"-" that this is a proposition which no one of the present

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day disputes; and which, when alleged by our adversaries, as their chief objection to "the study of logic, only proves, that they are ignorant of the subject about which they are speaking, and of the manner in which it is now taught." (See an Anonymous Pamphlet printed at Oxford in 1810, p. 26.) Dr Gillies has expressed himself in terms extremely similar upon various occasions. (See, in particular, Vol. I. pp. 63, 64, 2d edit.)

This very important concession reduces the question about the utility of the Aristotelian logic within a very narrow compass.

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